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Abstract

SYSTEMATIZING GOD’S LAW: RABBANITE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
ISLAMIC WORLD FROM THE TENTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURIES
Marc Daniel Herman
Talya Fishman
This study examines the jurisprudential writings of medieval Rabbanites, Jews in
the Islamic world who saw themselves as heirs to the talmudic tradition. Rabbanite Jews
were the first to author systematic accounts of talmudic law, which they attempted to
transform from an amorphous, dialectical, and discursive corpus into a structured,
elegant, and logical system. In so doing, they sought to impose a coherent structure on
their legal traditions that would be compatible with larger theological, philosophical, and
epistemological ideas. By subjecting Rabbanite legal theory to diachronic and synchronic
analysis, this dissertation demonstrates that Rabbanites were involved in a multilayered
conversation that engaged their talmudic past, Rabbanite and non-Rabbanite
coreligionists, and elements of the Islamic intellectual tradition that were most helpful for
the explanation and reconsideration of their own tradition. While Rabbanite legal theory
drew heavily on talmudic ideas, it was, at its core, profoundly contemporary, spurred by
both Qaraite and Islamic legal theory, among many other factors. This study concentrates
on Rabbanite thinking about two, frequently intertwined, topics: the nature and scope of
extra-scriptural traditions, known as Oral Torah, and the methodology to be used in
enumerating the 613 commandments, which, talmudic legend claims, were given to
Moses at Sinai. Acknowledging earlier scholarship on these topics, this study presents a
ix

more holistic picture of Rabbanite legal theory. Particular attention is paid to the JudeoArabic writings of Moses Maimonides (1138-1204), the Rabbanite author who appears to
have been most explicitly concerned with problems of legal theory. Other central figures
include Saʿadya ben Joseph Gaon (882-942), Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli (fl. early
thirteenth c.), and Abraham ben Moses Maimonides (1186-1237).
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Note on Transliteration and Translation
Transliterations from Hebrew follow the “General” system of the second edition of the
Encyclopedia Judaica, with the exceptions of ʾ for א, which is only marked in intervocalic
position, ṭ for ט, ʿ for ע, ṣ for צ, and q for ק. Exceptions have been made for journal titles
such as Tarbiẓ and Ẓion, and similar transliterations that are adopted by the publishers
themselves, as well as for names such as Shmuel and words that are commonly left
untranslated in English, such as gaon or yisrael. Transliterations from Arabic follow the
transliteration chart of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Despite the
inconsistency, the tāʾ marbūṭa in Arabic transliterations is omitted, except in the
construct state, but the final heh in Hebrew transliterations is recorded.
I have only drawn attention to non-standard spellings that appear in Judeo-Arabic texts in
the body of this dissertation, but have not corrected them or otherwise noted them when
they appear in footnotes.
Translations of the Bible are based on the 1999 New Jewish Publication Society Tanakh,
but have been altered to accord with the understanding of the talmudic rabbis or medieval
Jews when necessary. Unless otherwise noted, all other translations are my own.
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Till objects are distinguished, they cannot be arranged. It is thus that truth and order go
on hand in hand. It is only in proportion as the former is discovered, that the latter can be
improved. Before a certain order is established, truth can be but imperfectly announced:
but until a certain proportion of truth has been developed and brought to light, that order
cannot be established. The discovery of truth leads to the establishment of order: and the
establishment of order fixes and propagates the discovery of truth.
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
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Introduction
Rabbanite Jews in the Islamic world were the first to author systematic accounts
of talmudic law. These heirs to talmudic tradition are labeled Rabbanites in order to
distinguish them from their late antique rabbinic predecessors and from their Qaraite
coreligionists, who denied the exclusive authority of the talmudic rabbis to determine
Jewish law. Rabbanites attempted to transform talmudic law from an amorphous,
dialectical, and discursive corpus into a structured, elegant, and logical system. While late
antique rabbis, particularly the Babylonian Amoraim, engaged in abstract legal thinking
and in the construction of legal categories,1 medieval Rabbanites proposed holistic and
methodological accounts of revelation and of rabbinic law; in so doing, they sought to
impose a coherent structure on their legal traditions that would be compatible with the
larger theological, philosophical, and epistemological ideas then in circulation. This
dissertation, which seeks to recover and analyze Rabbanite thinking, considers the
attempt of these scholars to provide rational explanations for the disparate and often
conflicting legal data found in earlier texts to have been a “legal theory” project.2 This
study concentrates on Rabbanite thinking about two, frequently intertwined, topics: the
nature and scope of extra-scriptural traditions, known as Oral Torah,3 and the

On talmudic-era “conceptualization,” see Benjamin de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit:
Peraqim Nivḥarim (Tel Aviv: A. Ṣiyoni, 1962), 142-56; Ephraim E. Urbach, Ha-Halakhah: Meqorotehah
ve-Hitpatḥutehah (Givatayim: Yad la-Talmud, 1984), 123-38; Jeffrey Rubenstein, “On Some Abstract
Concepts in Rabbinic Literature,” JSQ 4, no. 1 (1997): 33-73; and Leib Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning:
From Casuistics to Conceptualization (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002); for review of earlier scholarship,
see there, 11-15; for a definition of “conceptualization,” see there, 5-6; compare Rubenstein’s definition of
“abstraction” (33). For suggested continuities between later conceptualization and Tannaitic pedagogic
practices, see Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, Transmitting Mishnah: The Shaping Influence of Oral Tradition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 174-219.
2
I do not intend to preclude the possibility that legal theory shaped legal practice.
3
Of course, these writings debate the definition of “Oral Torah.”
1
1

methodology to be used in enumerating the 613 commandments, which, talmudic legend
claims, were given to Moses at Sinai. From the perspective of rabbinic and early posttalmudic literature, there was no reason to expect that the number 613 would become
central to the Jewish imagination, let alone to Rabbanite legal theory. Yet, Jewish jurists
in both Islamic and Christian lands made this idea the basis of liturgical, philosophical,
kabbalistic, and legal works. Acknowledging earlier scholarship on these theoretical
topics, this study presents a more holistic picture of Rabbanite legal theory and points to
some of the ways in which Rabbanite jurisprudence was in conversation with, and
borrowed from, contemporaneous Islamic legal theory.
Written primarily in Baghdad, the Maghreb, Andalusia, and Fusṭāṭ, Rabbanite
jurisprudential thought was facilitated by the rise of single-authored works in the
Islamicate cultural sphere4 and spurred, in both polemical and non-polemical respects, by
contemporaneous Islamic and Qaraite legal theory. 5
Rabbanites of the Islamic world appear to have been the first medieval talmudists
to engage these theoretical topics. As legal theory was held in high esteem in their
society, like contemporaneous Qaraites and Muslims, Rabbanites were inclined to reflect
on legal theory and to develop it through sustained discourse.6 One topic that was crucial

4

See below, n119.
On the development of Islamic legal theory, see Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal
Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 30-35;
and below, n173. For an overview Qaraite and Rabbanite legal theory in the tenth and eleventh centuries,
see Gregor Schwarb, “Uṣūl al-fiqh im jüdischen ‘Kalám’ des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts: Ein Überblick,” in
Orient als Grenzbereich? Rabbinisches und außerrabbinisches Judentum, eds. Annelies Kuyt and Gerold
Necker (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 2007), 77-104.
6
Qaraites appear to have been somewhat more engaged in legal theory than Rabbanites; see
Gregor Schwarb, “Capturing the Meaning of God’s Speech: The Relevance of uṣūl al-fiqh to an
Understanding of uṣūl al-tafsīr in Jewish and Muslim kalām,” in A Word Fitly Spoken: Studies in
5

2

to Rabbanite self-understanding, and of vital import in their debates with Qaraites and
Muslims, was the source of extra-scriptural traditions and the relationship of these
traditions to Scripture. Other themes developed in Rabbanite legal theory may not have
been triggered by polemical concerns; Moses Maimonides (Cordoba, Fusṭāṭ; 11381204),7 in particular, however, was concerned to depict Jewish law as a well-structured
legal system. His Sefer ha-Miṣvot (Book of the Commandments) constitutes the most
important and influential work on the enumeration of the commandments. In the Fourteen
Principles of that work’s Introduction, the author presented a systematic series of axioms
for determining the commandments to be included in the enumeration. It would not be a
stretch to suggest that Rabbanites were stimulated to systematize and rationalize their
own law because of the cultural currency of legal theory in their environment. Moreover,
contemporaneous legal theory offered Rabbanites linguistic and intellectual tools that
classical rabbinic literature did not provide.

Historiography
Study of medieval Jewish legal theory, both Rabbanite and Qaraite, remains in its
relative infancy,8 despite the fact that legal theory, as David Sklare argued, “is clearly

Mediaeval Exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and the Qur’ān Presented to Haggai Ben-Shammai, eds. Meir
Michael Bar-Asher et al. (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2007), 119*-21*.
7
On the year of Maimonides’ birth, see S.D. Goitein, “Moses Maimonides, Man of Action:
Revision of the Master’s Biography in Light of Geniza Documents,” Hommage à Georges Vajda: Études
d’histoire et de pensée juives, eds. Gérard Nahon and Charles Touati (Louvain: Peeters, 1980), 155; and
Herbert Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), 6-9.
8
One early study is Judith Romney Wegner, “Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence: The Four
Roots of Islamic Law and Their Talmudic Counterparts,” American Journal of Legal History 26 (1982):
25-71. To Wegner’s argument, compare Jany János, “The Four Sources of Law in Zoroastrian and Islamic
Jurisprudence,” Islamic Law and Society 12, no. 3 (2005): 291-332. For review of scholarship on
3

important to our understanding of how people of this period comprehended their religious
life.”9 Significant work in this field was pioneered by Moshe Zucker, who underscored
the need to situate Judeo-Arabic legal theory in its Islamic context.10 More recently,
Gideon Libson has turned attention to the role of custom (minhag) in geonic
jurisprudence and other theoretical matters,11 and Sklare himself has focused on the
jurisprudential thought of Samuel ben Ḥofni (d. 1013), his contemporaries, and other preMaimonidean jurists.12 Other scholars have begun to address this field,13 but most
treatments consider Rabbanite and Qaraite legal theory within the context of other

comparative Jewish and Islamic law, see Gideon Libson, “Mishpaṭ Mashveh Yehudi-Muslami – Toldot haMeḥqar u-Vaʿayotav,” Peʿamim 62 (1995): 43-81; idem, Jewish and Islamic Law: A Comparative Study of
Custom During the Geonic Period (Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School,
2003), 1-15, 183-207; and idem, “Jewish and Islamic Law, A Comparative Review,” Encyclopaedia
Judaica2, eds. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 11:26270.
9
David Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon and His Cultural World: Texts & Studies (Leiden: Brill,
1996), 158n62.
10
See Moshe Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ al-Samāʿīya,” Tarbiẓ 41, no. 4 (1973):
373-410; idem, “Ha-Maḥloqet bein ha-Qaraʾim veha-Rabbaniyim be-ʿInyan ʿAseh doḥeh lo Taʿaseh,” Dine
Israel 6 (1975): 181-94; and idem, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret (ha-Rambam neged R. Yaʿaqov
ben Ephraim me-Ereṣ Yisrael),” in Salo Wittmayer Baron Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of his Eightieth
Birthday, eds. Saul Lieberman and Arthur Hyman (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research,
1975), 2:319-25. For another important example of geonic and Qaraite engagement with Islamic thought
adduced by Zucker, see “Ha-Efshar she-Navi Yeḥaṭei? (ʿAl Baʿayat ‘ʿIṣma al-Anbiyāʾ’ bi-Islam uveYahadut),” Tarbiẓ 35, no. 2 (1966): 149-73; see also idem, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Feirush Rabbi Shmuel ben Ḥofni
le-Farashat va-Etḥanan,” ʿAlei Sefer 5 (1978): 5-24.
11
See Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law, 16-112; idem, “Halakhah and Reality in the Gaonic
Period: Taqqanah, Minhag, Tradition and Consensus – Some Observations,” in The Jews of Medieval
Islam: Community, Society, and Identity, ed. Daniel Frank (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 67-99; and idem, “Zikat
ha-Rambam la-Halakhah ha-Muslemit ʿal Reqaʿ Tequfato,” in Ha-Rambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut,
Mahapkhanut, ed. Aviezer Ravitsky (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2008), 1:272-85.
12
See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 56-57, 143-65; idem, “Yūsuf al-Baṣīr: Theological Aspects
of his Halakhic Works,” in The Jews of Medieval Islam, 249-70; idem, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger veḤiburo al-Ḥāwī,” Teʿudah 14 (1998): 103-123; and idem, “Are the Gentiles Obligated to Observe the
Torah? The Discussion Concerning the Universality of the Torah in the East in the Tenth and Eleventh
Centuries,” in Be’erot Yitzhak: Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. Jay M. Harris (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005), 311-46. On David ben Saʿadya, see also Y. Zvi Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ
ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad be-meiʾah ha-11: Bein Geonim le-Rishonim (ʿal pi Kitāb al-Ḥāwī le-R. David ben
Saʿadya),” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 25 (2008): 217-36.
13
See below, n141.
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disciplines, such as theology, philosophy, or scriptural exegesis. Mordecai Cohen’s
monograph on Maimonidean exegesis is one such example; while its focus is biblical
hermeneutics, it delves into Maimonides’ theories of law and discusses his views of the
relationship between written Scripture and oral tradition.14
The closest thematic and chronological parallel to Rabbanite jurisprudence is
Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh); its exponents developed a complex and rich library of
concepts and terms. Scholarly study of uṣūl al-fiqh has flourished in the past three
decades,15 but much work remains to be done, especially in the study of individual
jurists.16 This dissertation demonstrates that Rabbanite jurists frequently depicted their
own legal system against the backdrop of Islamic legal theory. They found both the terms
and concepts of uṣūl al-fiqh useful in presenting their ideas and, to a certain extent, in
reconsidering their own tradition. However, before attempting to discern the influence of
other legal cultures, Rabbanite ideas will be analyzed on their own terms and in relation

Mordecai Z. Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation: Maimonides’ Biblical Hermeneutics
in Light of his Geonic-Andalusian Heritage and Muslim Milieu (Leiden: Brill, 2011), esp. chaps. 2, 5, 6, 8;
see similarly, Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language and Religious Experience in
Judah ha-Levi’s Kuzari (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 56-68.
15
In 1974, W. Montgomery Watt called for scholars to turn their attention to Islamic legal theory;
“The Closing of the Gate of Iğtihād,” in Orientalia Hispanica sive Studia F.M. Pareja Octogenario Dicata,
eds. Felix Maria Pareja Casañas and J.M. Barral (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 678. Around a decade later, two
scholars independently noted the neglect of uṣūl al-fiqh; Nabil Shehaby, “ʿIlla and Qiyās in Early Islamic
Legal Theory,” JAOS 102, no. 1 (1982): 27; and Wael Hallaq, “Considerations on the Function and
Character of Sunnī Legal Theory,” JAOS 104, no. 4 (1984): 679-80. See similarly George Makdisi, The
Rise of Colleges: Institutions and Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1981), 340n145. Aron’s Zysow’s 1984 doctoral dissertation opened many issues in this field, now
published as The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta:
Lockwood Press, 2013); see the laudatory comments in Robert Gleave’s Forward to that volume.
16
The jurist subject to the most sustained analysis is Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī; see, e.g.,
George Makdisi, “The Juridical Theology of Shâfiʿî: Origins and Significance of Uṣûl al-Fiqh,” Studia
Islamica 59 (1984): 5-47; and Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Muḥammad ibn
Idrīs al-Shāfiʻī (Leiden: Brill, 2007). On other jurists, see Bernard Weiss, The Search for God’s Law:
Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press,
2010); and Oussama Arabi et al., eds., Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists (Leiden:
Brill, 2013).
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to their rabbinic precedents. Thus, for example, this dissertation’s analysis of the
assumptions that informed the Principles in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot will consider
each theme discussed in relation to its treatment in pre- and post-Maimonidean thought.
Many of the medieval texts treated here, particularly those (Maimonidean and
otherwise) that discuss the Oral Torah and the scope of Sinaitic revelation, have been
studied copiously by both traditional and academic scholars. Whenever possible, I have
made use of medieval and early modern interpreters of Maimonidean writings, though it
must be noted that exceedingly few of them read Maimonides’ Judeo-Arabic writings in
their original language. As will become clear, academic interpreters of Maimonides’
approach to the Oral Torah frequently took up issues raised by the earliest readers to have
scrutinized his writings.
The seminal work of Jacob Levinger deserves credit for having challenged
traditional assumptions about how Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah should be read, for
having proposed new explanations of his distinction between biblical and rabbinic law,
and for having worked through certain aspects of Maimonides’ approach to the
enumeration of the commandments.17 Gerald Blidstein and Moshe Halbertal are among
the more recent, influential, readers of Rabbanite approaches to the Oral Torah. The
impact of Blidstein’s writings – on geonic and Maimonidean approaches to the Oral
Torah and on medieval understandings of rabbinic authority – can be discerned
throughout this work. A book-length study by Blidstein treats what may be Maimonides’
richest presentation of the Oral Torah in the Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Mamrim, chaps. 1-

Jacob Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam: Meḥqar ʿal ha-Metodah
shel Mishneh Torah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1965), chaps. 1-3.
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4); some of his other publications have clarified “institutional” elements of Maimonides’
approach to the Oral Torah (e.g., the role of the elite in the promulgation and formulation
of the law), and the relationship of Maimonidean thought to its geonic antecedents.18
Though Blidstein has not focused explicitly on the Islamic context of Maimonidean
thought, he has been attentive to it.19 Moshe Halbertal has likewise illuminated many
relevant themes in Rabbanite jurisprudence, with particular focus on Maimonides; his
studies clarify important debates among medieval talmudists regarding the nature of
rabbinic authority and analyze Rabbanite depictions of their own sacred history.20
Though it focuses primarily on the modern period, Jay Harris’s study of Jewish
understandings of halakhic midrash lays important groundwork; his chapter on the

Important studies include Gerald Blidstien, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” Jewish Law Annual 1
(1978): 108-122; idem, “Oral Law as Institution in Maimonides,” in The Thought of Moses Maimonides,
eds. Ira Robinson et al. (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 1990), 167-82; repr. in The Legacy of Maimonides:
Religion, Reason and Community, eds. Yamin Levy and Shalom Carmy (Brooklyn: Yashar Books, 2006),
203-216 (references will be to the first version); idem, “Maimonidean Structures of Institutional Authority:
Sefer HaMizvot Aseh 172-177,” Dine Israel 17 (1993-1994): 103-126; idem, Samkhut u-Meri be-Hilkhat
ha-Rambam: Peirush Nirḥav le-Hilkhot Mamrim 1-4 (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 2002); and
“Halakhic Authority in Maimonides,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 31-55.
19
An example of Blidstein’s attention to this subject is his “Muhtasib and Shoter – The Shape of
Cultural Diffusion,” in Sobre la vida y obra de Maimonides: I congresso internacional, ed. Jesus Pelazez
del Rossa (Cordoba: Ediciones el Almendo, 1991), 37-43.
20
Among other studies, see Moshe Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam: ha-Arkiṭeqṭurah shel
ha-Halakhah veha-Ṭeʾoriyah ha-Parshanit Shelah,” Tarbiẓ 59, no. 3-4 (1990): 457-80; idem, People of the
Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 45-89; and idem,
Maimonides: Life and Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 92-133.
David Henshke has also extensively written on Maimonidean legal thought; see, e.g., his “LeYesodei Tefisat ha-Halakhah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 20 (1997): 103-149;
“Le-Ṭaʿamah shel Halakhah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Maimonidean Studies 4 (2000): 45-80; and “LeḤashivato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam – bein Dinamiyut Penimit le-Shamranut Memasdit: le-Ṭivah shel
Halakhah ha-Shaquʿa be-Sefer ha-Miṣvot,” in Ha-Rambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 1:11953.
18
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medieval period offers a broad historical perspective, and his brief treatment of the
thought of Judeo-Arabic authors identifies avenues for further research.21
On the whole, the studies mentioned above do not place Rabbanite legal thought
in its Islamic context; for the most part, researchers have accessed the Judeo-Arabic
writings of the jurists in question through Hebrew translations, medieval and modern.
The language barrier alone obscures the detection of both the themes and technical
terminology of Islamic law that Rabbanite writers employed.22
Furthermore, as Blidstein noted more than twenty-five years ago, interest in
Maimonides’ legal theory has focused on Principles One and Two in his Introduction to
Sefer ha-Miṣvot – those that address revelation and rabbinic authority.23 Scholars have
begun to address the other twelve Principles,24 but much work remains to be done,
particularly where the Judeo-Arabic original is concerned.

21
Jay Harris, How Do We Know This? Midrash and the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 73-89. Harris focused on Saʿadya Gaon, Abraham Ibn
Ezra, and Maimonides.
22
On Maimonides’ use of Islamic legal terminology, see Jon Irving Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal
Terms in Maimonides,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1980); and idem, “Munaḥim Mishpaṭiyim ʿAraviyim
mi-Dinei ha-Qinyan be-Geonim uve-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 14-15 (1989-1990): 61-87.
Of course, not every Judeo-Arabic usage of Islamic legal terminology adopts the meaning of a given term
in Islamic legal texts; see Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman, “Commercial Forms and Legal Norms in the
Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt,” Law and History Review 30, no. 4 (2012): 1020-1023; and idem,
“Arabic Legal Terminology in Judaeo-Arabic: Loanwords or Loan Shifts?” JSAI 43 (2016): 1-10.
23
Gerald Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand in the Study of Maimonidean Halakhah?” in Studies in
Maimonides, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for Jewish Studies, 1990), 18.
Blidstein noted that Ferdinand Rosenthal, “Die Kritik des maimonidischen „Buches der Gesetze“ durch
Nachmanides,” in Moses ben Maimon: Sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einfluss, eds. Wilhelm Bacher et
al. (Leipzig: Fock, 1908-1914), 1:475-95, only addressed Naḥmanides’ comments on the first two
Principles, despite the fact that Naḥmanides discussed several others.
24
Subsequent studies of other Principles include Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel
Ḥuqim ve-Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 15-16 (1998-1999): 95-106; idem,
“Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots: Logical Structure and Conceptual Analysis,” Jewish Law Annual 13 (2000):
3-30; Avraham Feintuch, Sefer Piqudei Yesharim: Beiʾurim ʿal Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rambam zal (Jerusalem:
Maʿaliyot, 1992), 46-58; Albert Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments: Maimonides on the
Enumeration, Classification and Formulation of the Scriptural Commandments (Boston: Academic Studies
Press, 2013), 52-60 and passim; Michael Abraham, “Miṣvot ve-Ḥelqei Miṣvot: ʿal Mahutam ha-Filosofiyit
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This dissertation also draws on the study of “meta-halakhah,” i.e., inquiry into
principles of halakhic jurisprudence that considers such matters as the nature and scope
of rabbinic authority, the methodology of halakhic decision making, and the role of nonor extra-halakhic factors in Jewish law.25 When studies of meta-halakhah examine legal
texts from jurisprudential, philosophical, or typological perspectives and ignore historical
context, they frequently fail to notice chronological and cross-cultural relationships. The
questions posed in these studies may also be examined from a historical perspective,
often quite fruitfully.26
Lastly, the present study is deeply informed by the historical study of the
development of halakhah. This field’s pioneer, Jacob Katz, argued that a researcher
interested in understanding halakhah’s historical development must first approach a
source with the attitudes and assumptions of a traditional halakhist, and only second,

shel Musagim be-Halakhah,” Aqdamot 21 (2008): 160-75; idem, “Kelalav shel ha-Rambam le-Minyan haMiṣvot,” and Shlomi Adler, “Miṣvat ha-Shevitah veha-Kelal ha-Shishi be-Sefer ha-Miṣvot,” in Mi-Birkat
Moshe: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim be-Mishnat ha-Rambam li-Khvodo shel ha-Rav Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch,
eds. Zvi Heber and Carmiel Cohen (Maʿaleh Adumim: Maʿaliyot, 2011), 1:121-72, 2:491-515. Recent,
broader studies of Sefer ha-Miṣvot include Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments; Feintuch, Sefer
Piqudei Yesharim; and idem, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei Yisharim (Jerusalem:
Maʿaliyot, 2010).
25
Eliezer Goldman was apparently the first to use the term “meta-halakhah”; Alexander Kaye,
“Eliezer Goldman and the Origins of Meta-Halacha,” Modern Judaism 34, no. 3 (2014): 324-28. For a
definition of this term, see Avinoam Rozenak, Halakhah ke-Meḥolelet Shinuy: ʿIyunim Biqortiyim beFilosofyahh shel ha-Halakhah (Jerusalem: Manges, 2007), 107-129. See also Isadore Twersky,
“Talmudists, Philosophers, Kabbalists: The Quest for Spirituality in the Sixteenth Century,” in Jewish
Thought in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Bernard Dov Cooperman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1983), 450n1.
26
Useful studies include Yoḥanan Silman, “Torah Elohit she-‘Lo ba-Shamayim Hi’: Beirur
Tipology,” Bar Ilan Annual 22-23 (1988): 261-86; idem, “Torat Yisrael le-Or Ḥidusheha – Beirur
Finomanologi,” PAAJR 57 (1990-1991): 49-67; idem, Qol Gadol ve-lo Yasaf: Torat Yisrael bein Shleimut
le-Hishtalmut (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1999); Avi Sagi, “Halakhic Praxis and the Word of God: A Study of
Two Models,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 1 (1992): 305-329; idem, “Models of Authority
and the Duty of Obedience in Halakhic Literature,” AJS Review 20, no. 1 (1995): 1-24; idem, Elu ve-Elu:
Mashmaʿuto shel ha-Siaḥ ha-Hilkhati (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 1996); and Shlomo Kassierer and
Shlomo Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit: Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Mishnatam shel ha-Rambam
veha-Ramban (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2007).
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from a historian’s perspective; this sequence, wrote Katz, would help to clarify the
impact of historical circumstances on a given halakhic ruling.27 Katz’s student Haym
Soloveitchik has written that if historians are to avoid “a simplistic sociology of law,”
their detection of “extraneous factors … impinging on the course of immanent
developments” must reflect, what he termed, an “angle of deflection,”28 such as
economic, sociological, or other factors. This dissertation seeks to apply the methodology
of this field to Rabbanite legal theory.

Central Themes
Rabbanites frequently disagreed about the interpretation of ambiguous concepts in
rabbinic literature. One ancient binary they discussed – of particular importance for this
dissertation – is the distinction between two types of laws: those of “biblical” (Hebrew:
divrei torah; Aramaic: de-orayta) status, and those of “rabbinic” (Hebrew: divrei sofrim;
Aramaic: de-rabbanan) status. This distinction is rooted in the Mishnah and was
developed more fully in the Amoraic period.29 While laws that are explicit in the

27
See Jacob Katz, “Maḥloqet ha-Smikhah bein Rabbi Yaʿaqov Berav veha-Ralbaḥ,” Ẓion 16
(1951): 41-44; and idem, Halakhah ve-Qabbalah: Meḥqarim be-Toldot Dat Yisrael ʿal Medorehah veZiqatah ha-Ḥevratit (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984), 1-6, 342-46. See also Bernard Cooperman, “Afterword:
Tradition and Crisis and the Study of Early Modern Jewish History,” in Jacob Katz, Tradition and Crisis:
Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages, trans. and ed. Bernard Cooperman (New York: NYU Press,
1993), 248-50. On earlier historical study of halakhah, see Marc Saperstein, “Abraham Geiger as Historian
of Medieval Judaism,” in Jüdische Existenz in der Moderne: Abraham Geiger und die Wissenschaft des
Judentums, eds. Christian Wiese et al. (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2013), 277-78.
28
Haym Soloveitchik, “Can Halakhic Texts Talk History?” AJS Review 3 (1978): 176; compare
idem, “Religious Law and Change,” AJS Review 12 (1987): 205-206. See also Jeffrey Woolf,
“Methodological Reflections in the Study of Halakhah,” European Journal of Jewish Studies Newsletter 11
(2001): 9-14.
29
On this distinction in rabbinic literature, see Ḥanokh Albeck, Mavo la-Mishnah (Jerusalem:
Bialik, 1959), 49-53; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 69-95; Martin S. Jaffee, “Halakhah as
Primordial Tradition: A Gadamerian Dialogue with Early Rabbinic Memory and Jurisprudence,” in
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Pentateuch are clearly of biblical status, and laws that are the result of rabbinic legislative
activity are clearly rabbinic, there are many sources of law whose classification is far
from obvious.30 These include laws found in the Prophets and Writings, laws termed
“halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai” (a law given to Moses at Sinai), laws “rooted in the Torah
(ʿiqaro mi-divrei torah) and explained by divrei sofrim” (see bSan 88b), and laws
“derived” through rabbinic interpretation of Scripture.31 Further complicating matters, the
Talmud claims that laws derived from “reasoning” (sevarah) are of biblical status, though
they are not found in Scripture.32 It is certainly not clear that the designations “biblical”
and “rabbinic” denote the source of the law (whether from God or from man) or its
relationship to Scripture.
A related question pertains to the enumeration of the 613 commandments: what
constitutes a distinct commandment? Though some seem to assume that the categories of
biblical law and enumerated commandment are equivalent,33 conflation of these
categories has led to much confusion (this will be discussed in Chapters Two and Four).
There is also no reason to assume that only laws that constitute distinct commandments
are biblical in status, or that failure to include a law in the enumeration establishes its
non-biblical status.

Interpreting Judaism in a Postmodern Age, ed. Steven Kepnes (New York: NYU Press, 1996), 99-107; and
idem, Torah in the Mouth: Writing and Oral Tradition in Palestinian Judaism, 200 BCE-400 C.E. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 92-99. See also Mayer I. Gruber, “The Meaning of  אורייתאin the
Babylonian Talmud,” Hebrew Studies 22 (1981): 25-33.
30
Menaḥem Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 3rd ed. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), 1:186.
31
Compare Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 34-36, 46. Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “LeHishtalshelutam shel Isurei Shevut be-Shabbat,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies, 10,
C, 1 (1989): 9-15, underscores the instability of the categories of “biblical” and “rabbinic” law.
32
See Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:807-808.
33
E.g., Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:186-87; and Harris, How Do We Know This, 88.
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The 613 Commandments
The notion that God gave Israel 613 commandments appears, first, in a non-legal
passage of the Babylonian Talmud (bMak 23b-24a):
Rabbi Simlai expounded (darash): “613 commandments were said to Moses (at
Sinai),34 365 negative commandments, like the days of the year, and 248 positive
commandments, corresponding to man’s limbs (eivarav).”35 Said Rav Hamnuna:
“What is the verse? ‘Moses commanded us a Torah’ (Deut. 33:4) – torah in
gemaṭria (numerical value of letters) is 611.36 ‘I am [the Lord your God who
brought you out of the Land of Egypt’ and ‘You shall have no other [gods before
me]’ (Ex. 20:2-3) we heard from the Almighty.” “David came and established
them (heʿemidan) as eleven, as it is written, ‘A psalm of David: Lord, who may
sojourn in Your tent, who may dwell in Your holy mountain? [1] He who lives
without blame, [2] who does what is right, [3] and in his heart acknowledges the
truth, [4] whose tongue is not given to evil, [5] who has never done harm to his
fellow, [6] or borne reproach for acts towards his neighbor, [7] for whom
contemptable man is abhorrent, [8] but who honors those who fear the Lord, [9]
who stands by his oath even to his hurt, [10] who has never lent money at interest,
[11] or accepted a bribe against the innocent. The man who acts thus shall never
be shaken’ (Ps. 15). … Isaiah came and established them as six, as it is written,
‘He who [1] walks in righteousness, [2] speaks uprightly, [3] spurns profit from
fraudulent dealings, [4] waves away a bribe instead of grasping it, [5] stops his
ears against listening to infamy, [6] and shuts his eyes against looking at evil’
(Isa. 33:16). … Micah came and established them as three, as it is written, ‘He
has told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requires of you: [1] Only to
do justice, [2] and to love goodness, [3] and to walk modestly with your God’
(Mic. 6:8). … Isaiah returned and established them as two, as it says, ‘Thus said
the Lord: [1] Observe what is right [2] and do what is just’ (Isa. 56:1). Amos
came and established them as one, as it says, ‘Thus said the Lord to the House of
Israel: Seek Me, and you will live’ (Am. 5:4).”37

On the words “at Sinai,” see below, n190.
This number is commonly accepted in rabbinic literature, e.g., mOhal 1:8; see Julius Preuss,
Biblical and Talmudic Medicine, ed. and trans. Fred Rosner (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 60-61.
36
Tav = 400, reish = 200, vav = 6, heh = 5.
37
This translation follows the printed text, as the precise wording of this passage is not at issue.
For treatment, see Wilhelm Bacher, Aggadat Amorei Ereṣ-Yisrael, trans. Alexander Siskind Rabinovitz
(Tel Aviv: Devir, 1924), 2:322-24 (on heʿemidan, see there, 323n1); Yaʿaqov Garṭner, “ʿIbud Bavli shel
Derashat Rabbi Simlai ʿal Taryag ha-Miṣvot,” Sinai 96 (1985): 236-49; and Naomi G. Cohen, “Taryag and
the Noahide Commandments,” JJS 43, no. 1 (1992): 46-57.
34
35
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This passing mention of the number 613 appears to indicate that it “is a symbolic rather
than mathematical number;”38 indeed, the narrative of the post-Sinaitic reductions of the
commandments to ever smaller numbers suggests that the purpose of this passage is to
assemble biblical verses that pithily catalogue man’s obligations. Furthermore, although
printed editions of the Talmud cite the number 613 in other contexts, Ephraim Urbach
showed that manuscripts of these passages almost invariably replace the phrase “613
commandments” with “all the commandments” or similar phrases.39 It appears highly
unlikely that Rabbi Simlai or anybody else in the rabbinic period counted the
commandments,40 especially because, as medieval jurists noted, the Talmud never treats
the enumeration of the commandments in any substantive way.41
Though some Rabbanites expressed skepticism about the significance of the
number 613, or its accuracy in reflecting the scope of Jewish law,42 this number became
the basis for countless liturgical, philosophical, kabbalistic, and legal works in the posttalmudic period. In 1878, Adolph Jellinek catalogued 144 works dedicated to this
number, and this list can be expanded in light of subsequent research.43 The earliest and

38
Cohen, “Taryag and the Noahide Commandments,” 47; see earlier Moïse Bloch, “Les 613
Lois,” REJ 1 (1880): 209-210.
39
Ephraim E. Urbach, Ḥazal: Pirqei Emunot ve-Deiʿot (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1969), 302. Note
Ḥananel Mack, “‘ʿIm Lavan Garti Taryag Miṣvot Shamarti’ – Darkhah shel ha-Derashah mi-Sifro shel R.
Moshe ha-Darshan el Peirush Rashi la-Torah,” Tarbiẓ 65 (1996): 251-62.
40
See Neil Danzig, “‘Shalosh Meʾot’ ve-Reishit Hitpatḥuto shel Minyan ha-Miṣvot,” Sinai 83
(1978): 153-58. For an alternative approach, see David Henshke, “Kelum Natnu ha-Tanaʾim Mispar laMiṣvot? (Mashehu le-ʿArikhato shel ha-Sifrei le-Devarim),” Sinai 116 (1995): 47-58.
41
See below, n829.
42
See below, n60, and nn831-834.
43
Adolph Jellinek, Qunṭres Taryag (Vienna, 1878), 1-23; see also Zalman Halberstam, Igeret
Biqoret, o Heʿarot ve-Hosafot le-S. Qunṭres Taryag (Lyck, 1878). To Jellinek’s list, add the works treated
in Adolf Neubauer, “Miscellanea Liturgica: Azharoth on the 613 Precepts,” JQR 6, no. 4 (o.s.) (1894): 709;
Menaḥem Zulai, “Azharot R. Yiṣḥaq Ibn Gikatilla,” Tarbiẓ 20, no.1 (1949): 161-76; Isaac Hahn, “Qeṭaʿ
min ha-Targum ha-ʿAravi shel Azharot ‘Atah Hinḥalta Torah le-ʿAmekha’,” in Ginzei Kaufmann, eds.

13

most widespread genre that employed the number 613 were liturgical poems (piyuṭim)
known as azharot (“warnings”); these were recited on Shavuʿot, which according to the
rabbis, celebrates the giving of the Torah.44 Israel Davidson’s 1933 Thesaurus of
medieval piyuṭ lists more than fifty such poems.45 What is probably the earliest surviving
azharah, Atah Hinḥalta, a poem apparently of Babylonian provenance (even ascribed in
one manuscript to a Babylonian yeshiva), contains fewer than 613 commandments.46 The
vast majority of azharot acknowledge various categories of commandments, adding
parshiyot and punishments to the talmudic division between positive and negative

David Shmuel Levinger and Alexander Scheiber (Budapest, 1949), 71-80; Avraham Y. Havaṣelet, “Sefer
Simanei Miṣvot le-Rabbeinu Avraham b.r. Ephrarim,” in Sefer ha-Zikaron li-Khvodo ule-Zikhro shel Rabbi
Yiṣḥaq Yedidya Frank, ed. David Lau (Jerusalem: Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1992), 281-304; Binyamin Bar
Tikvah, “Qavim le-Ṣivyonam shel Piyuṭei ha-Azharot ha-Qaṭaloniyim le-Ḥagim be-meiʾah ha-13,” in
Masoret ha-Piyuṭ, eds. Benjamin Bar Tikvah and Ephraim Ḥazan (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan Univeristy, 1996),
1:113-29; André Elbaz and Binyamin Bar-Tikva, “Tefillah le-David: Azharot Rabbi David ben Ḥasin,”
Revue Européenne des Études Hébraïques 3 (2000): 1-73 (Hebrew pagination); Sklare, Samuel Ben Ḥofni,
224; and Saverio Campanini, “Commentaries on the Azharot and Other Liturgical Poems Found in the
Biblioteca Civica of Alessandria,” in ‘Genizat Germania’ – Hebrew and Aramaic Binding Fragments from
Germany in Context, ed. Andreas Lehnardt (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 277-95. See also David Avraham,
“Hagahot R. Tam ʿal Azharot Rabbeinu Eliyahu ha-Zaqein,” Moriyah 34, no. 4-6 (2015): 38-42.
44
On this genre, see Jellinik, Qunṭres Taryag, 3-6; Halberstam, Igeret Biqoret, 2-6; Menaḥem
Kasher, Ḥumash Torah Shleimah (New York, 1947-1983), 16:205-211; Shem Tov Gaguin, “‘Azharot’,” in
Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J.H. Hertz, eds. Isidore Epstein et al. (London: Edward Goldston,
1942), 45-50; Meir Ḥavaṣelet, “Qeriʾat ‘Azharot’ be-Ḥag ha-Shavuʿot bi-Yemei ha-Geonim,” Ha-Doʾar 54
(1975): 409; Menaḥem Zulai, “Azharot,” in Encyclopedia ha-ʿIvrit (Jerusalem, 1983), 2:346-47; Ezra
Fleischer, “Yeṣirato shel Yosef ibn Avitur: Sugim ve-Tavniyot be-Piyuṭav,” (PhD diss., Hebrew
University, 1968), 304-309; idem, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin (ben Shmuel) Payṭan,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 11, no. 1
(21) (1985): 41-43; idem, Shirat ha-Qodesh ha-ʿIvrit bi-Yemei-ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2007),
73, 95; Yonah Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot: le-fi Minhagei Benei Ashkenaz le-khol ʿAnfeihem (Jerusalem:
Koren, 2000), 11-14; and Shulamit Eliṣur, “Le-Ofyav ule-Netivot Hashpaʿato shel ha-Merkaz ha-Payṭani
be-Bavel,” Tarbiẓ 79, no. 2 (2010-2011): 244-45. See also Neil Danzig, “Bein Ereṣ Yisrael le-Bavel:
Dapim Ḥadashim mi-Ḥibur ‘Pirqoy ben Bavoy’,” Shalem 8 (2009): 7 lines 20-21, 26-27.
45
Israel Davidson, Oṣar ha-Shirah veha-Piyuṭ: mi-Zeman Ḥatimat Kitvei ha-Qodesh ʿad Reishit
Tequfat ha-Haskalah (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1924-1933), 4:493.
46
Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 36-37; and below, n60.
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commandments (see Chapter Four).47 The number 613 even found its way into works of
Samaritan48 and Christian literature.49
Listings of the 613 commandments may be related to other enumerations of
(perhaps symbolic) numbers in Jewish texts,50 foremost among them, the Ten
Commandments. Although the Pentateuch refers to the “ten words” (ʿaseret ha-dibrot) in
three places (Ex. 34:28, Deut. 4:13, 10:4), neither scriptural presentation (Ex. 20:2-14;
Deut. 5:6-15) contains a numbering.51 Attempts to enumerate other numbers appear
throughout medieval Jewish literature.52

47

See below, nn864, 865.
See Moses Gaster, “Die 613 Gebote und Verbote der Samaritaner,” in Festschrift zum 75
jährigen Bestehen des Jüdisch-Theologischen Seminars (Breslau: M. & H. Marcus, 1929), 393-404
(German), 35-67 (Hebrew); Abraham S. Halkin, “Taryag Miṣvot eṣel ha-Shomronim,” in Ignace Goldziher
Memorial Volume, eds. Samuel Löwinger and Joseph Somogyi (Budapest: Globus 1948-1958), 2:86-100;
Menaḥem Haran, “Minyan ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam be-Piyuṭ Shomroni (Shirat ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Payṭan
Aharon ben Manir, Zemano u-Meqomo),” Ereṣ-Yisrael 4 (1956): 160-69; idem, “Shirat ha-Miṣvot leAharon ben Manir: Piyuṭ Shomroni le-Yom ha-Kippurim ʿal Taryag Miṣvot ʿal-pi ha-Rambam,” Divrei haAqademyah ha-Leʾumit ha-Yisraelit le-Madaʿim 4 (1971): 229-80; idem, “The Song of the Precepts of
Aaron Ben Manir: A Samaritan Hymn for the Day of Atonement on the 613 Precepts as listed by
Maimonides,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 5 (1976): 174-209; and
Ayala Lowenstamm, “Le-Sheʾelat Taryag eṣel ha-Shomronim,” Tarbiẓ 41, no. 3 (1983): 306-312.
49
See Luis Diez Merino, “Los 613 preceptos de la ley de Moises (manuscrito inédito de Alfonso
de Zamora, Ms. Bibl. Nac. Madrid, 4188),” El Olivo 18 (1983): 169-98; and Diana Di Segni, “La table des
préceptes dans le ‘Dux neutrorum’ de Moïse Maïmonide,” Das Gesetz – The Law – La loi, eds. Andreas
Speer and Guy Guldentops (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2014), 229-62.
50
I owe this suggestion to Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai.
51
See Moshe Greenberg, “The Decalogue Tradition Critically Examined,” and Mordechai Breuer,
“Dividing the Decalogue into Verses and Commandments,” in The Ten Commandments in History and
Tradition, eds. Ben-Zion Segal and Gershon Levi (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985), 96-109, 314-26; James
Kugel, Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the Bible as it Was at the Start of the Common Era (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998), 641-43; Aaron J. Kleist, “The Division of the Ten Commandments in
Anglo-Saxon England,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 103, no. 2 (2002): 227-40; Lesley Smith, The Ten
Commandments: Interpreting the Bible in the Medieval World (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 48-75; and Jason S.
DeRouchie, “Counting the Ten: An Investigation into the Numbering of the Decalogue,” in For Our God
Always: Studies on the Message and Influence of Deuteronomy in Honor of Daniel I. Block, eds. Jason S.
DeRouchie et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 93-125; further references appear there, 94n3.
52
Unsystematic study has turned up the following examples. (1) Identifying the thirteen middot of
R. Ishmael, as the list appears to include sixteen items; see Moshe Ostrovsky, Ha-Middot sheha-Torah
Nidreshet ba-hen (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1924), 26-28. (2) Saʿadya’s attempt to identify the “ten
biblical songs” mentioned in Saul Horovitz and Israel Abraham Rabin, eds., Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael
(Frankfurt, 1931), 116 (parashat ha-shirah, §1); and J.N. Epstein, ed., Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon ben
48
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The 613 Commandments as a Locus of Legal Reflection
Just as it was far from inevitable that the number 613 would gain a prominent
place in Jewish literature, there was no reason to expect that it would become a locus of
post-talmudic legal theory. The earliest compendia that went by the title “Book of the
Commandments” were authored by (proto-)Qaraites, including ʿAnan ben David
(Baghdad; late 8th c.) and Benjamin al-Nahāwandī (Iran[?]; mid. 9th c.); both authors were
mentioned, among others, by the Qaraite Yefet ben ʿEli (Jerusalem; fl. 960-1005) as
having written works with this title.53 It may well be that competition with Qaraites

Yoḥai (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1955), 71; see Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Meṣiʾah Aḥat she-Hi
Shetayim: Peirush Haʾazinu le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni u-Feirush va-Yoshaʿ le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon be-Khtav
Nishkaḥ,” Qiryat Sefer 61, no. 2 (1987): 320-27; idem, “ʿAseret ʿIqarei ha-Emunah shel Rav Saʿadya
Gaon,” Daʿat 37 (1996): 11-26; and idem, “Midrash Prognosṭi be-Khitvei Rasag: Petiḥat Peirusho le-Shirat
David (2 Sam. 22) ke-Dugmah Meyaṣeget,” in Meiʾah Sheʿarim: ʿIyunim be-ʿOlamam ha-Ruḥani shel
Yisrael bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim: le-Zekher Yiṣḥaq Twersky, eds. Ezra Fleischer et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes,
2001), 1-19. Many of Ben-Shammai’s studies of Saʿadya are now collected in his Mifʿalo shel Manhig:
ʿIyunim be-Mishnato ha-Hagutit veha-Parshanit shel Rasag (Jerusalem: Bialik, 2015); references will be to
earlier versions. (3) Isaac ben Judah Ibn Ghiyāth’s explication of Saʿadya’s statement that women are
exempt from thirty commandments; see B.M. Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Qidushin, Ḥeileq haTeshuvot (Haifa, 1928-1943), 9:79 (§177). (4) Attempts to figure out the “nine” prohibitions listed in
Maimonides’ Hilkhot Ishut, 1:7, which appears to list several more. (5) Attempts to list the one hundred
daily blessings; see below, n191. (6) Debate over the identification of the thirteen attributes of mercy in Ex.
34:6; see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 94-96. (7) Listing the thirty commandments accepted
by Noahides (see bḤul 92); see Aaron Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni Gaon
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1979), 66-74 (introductory pagination), 52-55 (Gen. 34:12; Hebrew
pagination); Aaron Lichtenstein, “Noahide Laws from the Genizah: The Thirty Laws of Samuel ben
Hophni Gaon,” Hebrew Studies 28 (1987): 113-16; and Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Some Genizah Fragments
on the Duty of the Nations to Keep the Mosaic Law,” in Genizah Research after Ninety Years, the Case of
Judaeo-Arabic: Papers Read at the Third Congress of the Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies, eds. Joshua
Blau and Stefan C. Reif (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24-25. (8) Saʿadya’s claim that
there are eighteen appearances of the word tefillah (prayer) in the Bible, corresponding to the Eighteen
Benedictions, and that other appearances of this word are “included under” the eighteen blessings; Saʿadya
ben Joseph, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt wal-Tasābīḥ, eds. Israel Davidson et al. (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei
Nirdamim, 1970), 6. Compare Muslim attempts to enumerate the “73 sects” into which Muḥammad’s
community would divide; see Ignaz Goldziher, “Le dénombrement des sects Mohamétanes,” Revue de
l’histoire des religions 26 (1892): 129-137.
53
See Samuel Poznański, “Anan et ses écrits,” REJ 45 (1902): 184. On these works, known by
various titles, see Zvi Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium: The Formative Years, 970-1100 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), 445n227; Bruno Chiesa, “A Note on Early Karaite Historiography,”
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encouraged Rabbanites to compile similarly titled works. Halakhot Gedolot, a legal
compendium of the geonic era ascribed to the ninth-century Simeon Qayyāra who may
have hailed from Basra, Iraq,54 may be the first Rabbanite legal work to engage the
enumeration, as it begins with a laconic list of the commandments. Apart from the
Introduction, however, this text makes little reference to the enumeration, leading some
to wonder if the enumeration was originally part of this work.55
Saʿadya ben Joseph al-Fayyūmī Gaon (882-942), who “pioneered the writing of
halakhic monographs and of systematic talmudic works,”56 appears to have been the first
to do more than merely list the commandments. Saʿadya was ambivalent about the
centrality of the 613 commandments in his prayer book, notwithstanding the reports of

History and Theory 27, no. 4 (1988): 59; and Fred Astren, Karaite Judaism and Historical
Understanding (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 100n138, 171, 180. See also Ḥaggai
Ben-Shammai, “Qeṭaʿ Ḥadash meha-Maqor ha-ʿAravi shel Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Levi ben Yefet ha-Qaraʾi,”
Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 99-133. I did not find similar titles from this period in
the indices in Abū al-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid
(London: al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2009); Fuat Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen
Schrifttums, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1967); and Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur
(Leiden: Brill, 1937-1942).
54
On this work, see Robert Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish
Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 223-30.
55
For this position, see Michael Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot le-fi Minyanan, Siduran, veHitḥalqutan (Berlin: M. und H. Marcus, 1928), 11-12; Moshe Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim mi-Sefer haMiṣvot le-R. Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliah,” PAAJR 29 (1960-1961): 9-10; Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 41;
and Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 12, 38. Zulai, “Azharot,” 346; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 284n4, incline towards this view; see also Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 183n41,
222n152. Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah) (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1980), 245n16, wrote that the date of this list “is not clear.” For the opposing view, see
Yosef Tobi, “Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon: Mahadurah Madaʿit (shel ha-Yoṣrot) u-Mavo Kelali le-Yeṣirato,”
(PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1982), 1:342n57a; and idem, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot le-Rav
Saʿadya Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 53, no. 2 (1984): 227n20. See also Ezriel Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot
Gedolot,” in Halakhot Gedolot (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1972), 3:9n1 (Hebrew pagination). This list
was probably the most influential on later enumerators, at least until Maimonides’ time; see there, 24-26
(Hebrew pagination).
56
Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia, 241.
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two later authors.57 Yet he did compose azharot, and explained, in Judeo-Arabic, his
motive for doing so:
We find that the people of our time are accustomed to having the category
headings (ʿuyūn)58 of the 613 commandments (sharīʿa) recited to them during the
musaf prayer [of Shavuʿot], which God commanded the Children of Israel,
according to the work which begins Atah Hinḥaltah. I examined it and found that
they (i.e., the commandments) fall short of 613. I saw in it repetitions and
superfluities59 unfit to mention in this book. I saw fit to replace it, not because it is
an indispensable principle (aṣl lā budd minhā), but because the hearts of men,
whom I have seen, are devoted to it.60
In the end, Saʿadya composed at least two azharot that list the commandments and a
reshut (introductory piyuṭ) that divides the commandments into more than twenty
classes.61

These ascribe to Saʿadya the assertion that, when Joshua “inscribed a copy of the teaching that
Moses had written” (Josh. 8:32) on stones, he “wrote on them the number of the commandments, as they
are written in the Halakhot Gedolot and azharot.” This statement appears in at least two medieval citations:
Abraham Ibn Ezra, Peirushei ha-Torah le-Rabbeinu Avraham Ibn Ezra, ed. Asher Weiser (Jerusalem:
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1977), 3:291 (Deut. 27:1): ויאמר הגאון ז"ל כי כתוב עליהם מספר המצות כמו הכתובות בהלכות
 ;גדולות בענין האזהרות ויפה אמרand David Qimḥi to Josh. 8:32 in Menaḥem Cohen, ed. Miqraʾot Gedolot haKeter (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1992-2012), 6:32: וכתב רבינו סעדיה ז"ל כי כתבו בהם מספר המצוות
כמו שהן כתובות בהלכות גדולות ובאזהרות ויפה אמר. I thank Gabi Weinberg for providing me with a copy of this
second text. See also Yosef Kafiḥ, Peirushei Rabbeinu Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Torah (Jerusalem: Mosad haRav Kook, 1963), 182.
58
See Joshua Blau, A Dictionary of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic Texts (Jerusalem: Academy of the
Hebrew Language, 2006), 472, s.v.  َعيْن.
59
This probably refers to commandments that, in Saʿadya’s view, are repeated in this list.
57

60
ווג'דנא אהל זמאננא הד'א קד עודו אן יקאל להם פי מוסף עיון ת'ר'י'ג' שריעה' אלתי שרעהא אללה תע' עלי בני
אסאראיל עלי אלתאליף אלד'י אולה אתה הנחלתה פאמתחנתהא פוג'דתהא לא תכמל ת'ר'י'ג' וראית פיהא אעאדאת וחשו לא תצלח אן
; אד'כרהא פי הד'א אלכתאב פראית אן אג'על עוצ'הא ליס לאנהא אצל לא בד מנהא לכן לתעלק קלוב אלנאס אלד'ין ראית פיהא

Saʿadya ben Joseph, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 156; see also below, n834. Note
Saʿadya’s comment that the Ten Commandments include the 613; Saʿadya ben Joseph, Peirushei Rav
Saʿadya Gaon le-Sefer Shemot, Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yehuda Raṣhabi (Jerusalem: Mosad haRav Kook, 1998), 317; see below, n65.
61
See Henry Malter, Saadia Gaon, his Life and Works (Philadelphia: JPS, 1921), 150, 330-31,
335-36; Robert Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, trans. Betsy Rosenberg (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish
Civilization, 2013), 108; and Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah,” 226-29. See also Joshua Blau, “A Poem on the
Decalogue Ascribed to Saadiah Gaon,” in Ten Commandments in History and Tradition, 355-62; and
Joseph Dana, “The Piyyuṭ on the Ten Commandments Ascribed to Saadiah Gaon,” JQR 86, no. 3-4 (1996):
323-75.
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While Saʿadya’s lists may have established a more careful enumeration of the 613
commandments (at least in his estimation), a greater literary innovation within the
Rabbanite community was his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the Commandments),62 which
appears to have inaugurated a series of Rabbanite works with similar titles. In the
Introduction to this work, Saʿadya identified three ways in which it would be superior to
liturgical enumerations of the commandments: Its composition in (Judeo-)Arabic would
make the text more broadly accessible; it would include not only the “category heading”
of each commandment, but basic information about it; and it was more organized than the
azharot, which mixed positive and negative commandments.63 In this work, Saʿadya
actually divided the commandments into 26 categories, among them, commandments that
pertain to worship, impurity, particular places, and particular people.64 (Elsewhere, he
offered different taxonomies, providing six classes of commandments in one of his
azharot and linking each commandment to one of the Ten Commandments in another.65)

This work remains largely unpublished; selections appear in D.Z. Baneth, “Hatḥalat Sefer haMiṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,” in Rav Saʿadya Gaon: Qoveṣ Torani-Madaʿi li-Melot Elef Shanah li-Feṭirato, ed.
Yehuda Leib Fishman (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1943), 365-81; Alexander Scheiber and Isaac
Hahn, “Leaves from Saadia’s Kitâb al-Šarâiʿ from the Kaufmann Geniza,” Acta Orientalia Hungarica 8
(1958): 99-109; repr. in Alexander Scheiber Genizah Studies (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1981), 12434; idem, “Dapim mi-Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 28, no. 1 (1959): 48-53; idem,
“Further Chapters from Saadia’s Kitâb al-Šarâiʿ from the Kaufmann Geniza,” Acta Orientalia 9 (1959):
97-107; repr. in Genizah Studies, 146-56; Alexander Scheiber, “Peraqim mi-Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav
Saʿadya Gaon,” in Sefer Yovel Mugash li-Khvod ha-Rav Dr. Shimon Federbush, ed. Judah Leib Maimon
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1960), 330-35; and David Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought of
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon: Texts and Studies in Cultural History,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1992),
2:189-202. I thank Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai for providing me with a draft of a translation of the Introduction
to this work.
63
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 184-85. On the disorganization of Atah Hinḥalta, see Frankel,
Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 36.
64
See the chapter headings cited in Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ in Sklare, Samuel ben
Ḥofni Gaon, 223-24.
65
For the former, see Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 156; and Sklare,
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 224; for the latter, see Dana, “Piyuṭ on the Ten Commandments,” 327; Saʿadya
ben Joseph, Sefer Yeṣirah (Kitāb al-Mabādiʾ): ʿim Peirush ha-Gaon Rabbeinu Saʿadya b.r. Yosef Fayyūmī,
62
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Dividing the law into 26 classes clearly required topical-conceptual
arrangement,66 yet the logic of this work is hardly self-evident. For example, the fourth
division of Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ, treating commandments that pertain to specific
places, includes two commandments that obligate individuals and three that obligate the
nation as a whole. Yet it is not clear what distinguishes this division from the fourteenth,
which includes twenty-five commandments that obligate the collective and not the
individual.67 It would appear that Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ was more a didactic
composition than a work of legal philosophy.68
The Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book on the Commandments) of Samuel ben Ḥofni,
which was extensively studied by Sklare, is markedly different from Saʿadya’s Kitāb alSharāʾiʿ.69 The first section of Samuel’s work discusses several standard issues of
contemporaneous Islamic legal theory, such as the imposition of obligation (taklīf), the
interpretation of revealed texts, the validity of extending revelation by means of analogy
(qiyās) for the determination of the law, and the importance of intention in the

Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1972), 47-48; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni
Gaon, 224. On other efforts to find the 613 commandments in the Ten Commandments, see Danzig,
“‘Shalosh Meʾot’,” 156-57n16; and Zvi A. Yehuda, “ʿAseret ha-Dibrot ve-Taryag Miṣvot,” in Sefer Aviʿad:
Qoveṣ Maʾamarim u-Meḥqarim le-Zekher Dr. Yeshayahu Wolfsberg-Aviʿad, eds. Oscar Wolfsberg and
Yiṣḥaq Raphael (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1986), 268-79. Qaraite legal works often structure the
law around the Ten Commandments; Astren, Karaite Judaism, 131.
66
Isadore Twersky used this phrase to describe the organization of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah;
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 254.
67
Similarly, Saʿadya had to determine the difference between laws that pertain to particular places
and laws that pertain to sowing, addressed in part five, many of which are only operative in the land of
Israel.
68
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 185.
69
On Samuel’s life and works, see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 1-36; Moshe Gil, Jews in
Islamic Countries in the Middle Ages, trans. David Strassler (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 359-72; and Gideon
Libson, “Terumat ha-Genizah le-Ḥeiqer ha-Monografiyot ha-Hilkhatiyot shel Rabbi Shmuel ben Ḥofni,”
Teʿudah 15 (1999): 189-239.
20

performance of the commandments. This section also addresses questions that are more
distinctly Jewish, such as the status of the Noahide commandments and of laws revealed
before Sinaitic revelation. Yet both these topics touched on the question of the
universality of the law, a matter of great controversy in the tenth and eleventh centuries.70
Following two chapters on the rational and revealed commandments, the second
part of Samuel ben Ḥofni’s work places the commandments into categories without much
comment.71 The author explained that he did not intend this treatise to set forth the law
(fiqh), but to address the “classification of the commandments” (qismat al-miṣvot) and to
refute those that he deemed heretics.72 Noting that Samuel did not categorize the
commandments into mutually exclusive groups and that Samuel does not appear to have
listed all of the 613 commandments, Sklare suggested that his classificatory undertaking
may reflect a perspective of the Basran Muʿtazilites. These theologians perceived
revealed law as a gift of grace (luṭf) given to man, and argued that the benefit (maṣlaḥa)
of the law must change as man’s condition changes throughout life. Sklare noted that, in
his ʿAshar Masāʾil (Ten Questions), Samuel argued that the commandments vary
according to one’s circumstances (by time, place, personal status, etc.).73 As Sklare

For an outline of this part, see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 172-75; on taklīf, see there, 14852; on the universality of the law, see there, 152-58; idem, “Are the Gentiles Obligated to Observe the
Torah,” and Yoram Erder, “Early Karaite Conceptions about Commandments Given before the Revelation
of the Torah,” PAAJR 60 (1994): 101-140.
71
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 175; the contents of the third part are unknown.
72
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 33 lines 1096-1097 (Hebrew pagination); translation there,
177-78.
73
Part two of the Kitāb fī al-Sharāʿiʾ classifies laws into overlapping categories and only treats the
revealed commandments (samʿīya), not rationally based commandments (ʿaqlīya), apparently because only
revealed laws can vary; Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 232. For discussion of luṭf and its relationship to
taklīf in the thought of ʿAbū al-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Samuel’s contemporary whose work Samuel may
have studied (Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 53), see J.R.T.M. Peters, God’s Created Speech: A Study in
the Speculative Theology of the Muʿtazilî Qâḍî l-Qudât Abû l-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbâr bn Aḥmad al70
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explained, the claim that the law’s benefits vary in accord with a person’s circumstance
enabled Samuel to affirm the Torah’s ability to accommodate every life condition. This
rebutted the Muslim charge that abrogation (naskh) of the Torah was necessary because
the earlier revelation was outdated.74 When seen from this perspective, Samuel’s partial
enumeration of the commandments may be understood to have served larger theological,
theoretical, and polemical purposes.75
The last significant Rabbanite Book of the Commandments composed before that
of Maimonides is the Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the Commandments) by Ḥefeṣ ben
Yaṣliaḥ (late tenth century?), of which only fragments remain.76 Unlike earlier Rabbanite
works of similar titles, the legal compendium compiled by Ḥefeṣ was all-encompassing,
structured around the 613 commandments. Benzion Halper, who first published sections
of this work, estimated its length at 800 pages.77 The Introduction to this work contains a

Hamadânî (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 32-33; Margaretha T. Heemskerk, Suffering in the Muʿtazilite Theology:
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 142-51; and Aron Zysow,
“Two Theories of the Obligation to Obey God’s Commands,” in The Law Applied: Contextualizing Islamic
Sharīʿa, Essays in Honor of Frank E. Vogel, eds. Peri Bearman et al. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 397-421.
See also Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 381.
74
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 186-88; see also there, 260-68. On the Kitāb fī al-Sharāʿiʾ, see
also Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 295-96.
75
Compare Boaz Cohen, “The Classification of the Law in the Mishneh Torah,” JQR 25, no. 4
(1935): 526-27. Samuel offered a different, three-fold division of the law in his commentary to Deut. 11:32;
unfortunately, this text is not preserved in full; see Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben
Ḥofni, 515.
76
For the identification of this author and his work, see Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 1-9; and
Neil Danzig, “The First Discovered Leaves of Sefer Ḥefeṣ,” JQR 82, no. 1-2 (1991): 54-60. Most of the
medieval references to Ḥefeṣ are collected in Benzion Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts by Hefes
ben Yasliah (Philadelphia: The Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, 1915), 9-49. For
published texts, see Halper’s work; Simḥa Assaf, “Mi-Shiyarei Sifrutam shel ha-Geonim,” Tarbiẓ 15, no. 1
(1944): 31-33; Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 13-68; idem, “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” PAAJR 49 (1982): 99100; and idem, “Miluʾim le-Sefer ha-Miṣvot shel Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ,” Ha-Doʾar 42, no. 23 (Nisan, 1963):
385-88.
77
Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 50.
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theoretical reflection on methodology and legal principles,78 and the remainder divides
Jewish law into at least 36 classes, such as laws that pertain to animal blemishes, human
blemishes, or ritual defilement.79 As in the cases of Saʿadya and Samuel ben Ḥofni, this
work forced the author to grapple with questions of taxonomy.80 The fragmentary state of
the evidence unfortunately precludes significant analysis of Ḥefeṣ’ theoretical reflections
on the enumeration.
Moses Maimonides’ engagement with the enumeration of the commandments
both drew on and departed from these earlier models. In his Introduction to the
Commentary on the Mishnah, a work completed by 1168,81 Maimonides’ asserted that
Sinaitic revelation centered on the 613 commandments (sharīʿa) and on their
“explanation.”82 This claim suggests that already at this early stage, Maimonides
somehow understood that Sinaitic revelation was structured on the 613 commandments.83
The idea that God revealed precisely 613 commandments also appears elsewhere in this
work,84 in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed,85 and in one of his letters to Joseph ibn

See Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 51; and Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 13-17.
Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 52-57.
80
See, e.g., the text treated below, n901.
81
See Davidson, Maimonides, 147-48.
82
Note the following: [אעלם אן] כל שריעה אנזל אללה עלי משה רבינו אנמא אנזלת עליה מע [תפסירהא פ]יקול
 ;אללה לה אלנץ ת'ם יקול לה תפסירה ותאוילהand  ;הכד'א אלסת מאיה ואלת'לאת' עשרה שריעה הי ותפסירהאMaimonides,
Mishnah ʿim Peirush Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon: Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1963), 1:1-2, 3; idem, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. Isaac Shailat
(Jerusalem: Maʻaliyot, 1992), 327, 328. Texts from the Introduction to the Commentary follow Shailat’s
edition; references will be given to both editions.
83
See also below, n527.
84
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:247 (mMak 3:17); 5:212 (mḤul 7:6). Note two
references to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, apparently added after the completion of the Commentary; there, 5:121,
(mMen 4:1:  ;כתאבנא פי עדד אלמצותsee there, n6); 5:178 (mHul 1:5: )כמא יבין לך מן כתאבי פי עדד אלמצות.
85
Guide, III:27, 31; Maimonides, Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Salamon Munk and Issachar Joel
(Jerusalem: Yunovits, 1930), 371, 383.
78
79
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Jābir of Baghdad.86 The Mishneh Torah, of course, is structured around the 613
commandments; as Halbertal put it, the commandments constitute the “architecture” of
this work.87 It has recently been suggested that when Maimonides first envisioned the
Mishneh Torah, he divided it into sections that address one or more related
commandments and only later imposed on it the fourteen-book structure that (later)
earned this work the title Yad (=14) ha-Ḥazaqah, i.e., “The Strong Hand.”88
Maimonides appears to have composed his Judeo-Arabic Sefer ha-Miṣvot89 during
the period that he was working on his Hebrew Mishneh Torah, which was completed in
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Maimonides, Igrot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. Isaac Shailat (Jerusalem: Maʿaliyot, 1987-1988),

1:405.
See Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 458-59, 465-66, 476.
Davidson, Maimonides, 213; and Lawrence Kaplan, “Further Reflections on Classification of
Mishneh Torah: Real Answers to Real Problems,” Ḥakirah 19 (2015): 41-44. Twersky, Introduction to the
Code of Maimonides, 260, made this suggestion more tentatively. On the title Yad ha-Ḥazaqah, see Cohen,
“The Classification of the Law,” 529n41; Isadore Twersky, “The Beginnings of Mishneh Torah Criticism,”
in Biblical and Other Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963),
173n55; idem, “R. Yosef Ashkenazi ve-Sefer Mishneh Torah le-Rambam,” in Salo Wittmayer Baron
Jubilee Volume, 3:185-92; and idem, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 105, 527.
89
This work does not seem to have had a stable Judeo-Arabic title; on the title Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
see Jacob Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1956), 91-100. For
bibliographies, see Jacob I. Dienstag, “ʿEin ha-Miṣvot (Leksiqon Bio-Bibliografi le-Ḥoqrei Sefer ha-Miṣvot
leha-Rambam ule-Mefarshav),” Talpiot 9 (1970): 663-759; and idem, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam:
Bibliografiya shel Hoṣaʾot, Targumim, Beiʾurim,” Areshet 5 (1972): 34-80.
Sefer ha-Miṣvot was translated three times in the medieval period; see Maimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot le-Rabbeinu Moshe be-Rabbi Maimon be-Tirgumo shel R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ʿal pi ketav yad
Minkhen u-khtav yad London, ed. Ḥayim Heller (Jerusalem, Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1946), 2, 8 (introductory
pagination). The standard translation is that of Moses Ibn Tibbon, the translation of Solomon ibn Ayyub is
preserved mainly in manuscripts, and the translation of Abraham ben Ḥisdai ha-Levi is largely lost, though
may be partially preserved in the editio princeps (Constantinople, 1510). On the question of which
translation Naḥmanides possessed, see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 7-9 (introductory pagination); and
Ḥayim Heller, “Peliʾah ʿal ha-Ramban,” Ha-Pardes 12, no. 1 (1938): 11-16. This dissertation primarily
utilizes the following editions: Maimonides, Le Livre des Précepts par Moïse ben Maimon dit Maïmonide,
ed. Moïse Bloch (Paris, 1888; hereinafter Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch); Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Heller; and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot: Maqor ve-Targum, trans. and ed. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem:
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1971). On Kafiḥ’s edition, see Joshua Blau, “Mahadurah Ḥadashah shel Sefer haMiṣvot,” Lĕšonénu 37 (1973): 291-302. I also occasionally use the translation found in David ben Samuel
Kokhavi, Sefer ha-Batim, ed. Moshe Hershler (Jerusalem: Beit Midrash la-Torah, 1982), vol. 2, which
generally includes the translation of Solomon ibn Ayyub. Unless otherwise noted, texts follow Kafiḥ’s
edition of Sefer ha-Misvot.
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88
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1178.90 The Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot depicts this work, in the words of Isadore
Twersky, “as a Talmudic enchiridion, a manual preparatory and auxiliary to the Mishneh
Torah.”91 According to one of Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s medieval Hebrew translators, Moses Ibn
Tibbon (fl. Montpellier; 1244-83), Maimonides “wrote [Sefer ha-Miṣvot] in Arabic in
order that it not be attached to his great compendium, even though [Sefer ha-Miṣvot] is
like an opening to [the Mishneh Torah].”92 Later in life, Maimonides addressed his
linguistic choice for Sefer ha-Miṣvot, stating “I greatly regret composing it in Arabic
because all ought to read it, and I now await [a time] that I will translate it into the holy
tongue.”93 However, as Abraham Halkin noted, it is unclear whether the phrase “because
all ought to read it” explains Maimonides’ original decision to write this work in JudeoArabic or explains why it should be translated into Hebrew.94
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See Davidson, Maimonides, 174; on the date for the Mishneh Torah, see below, n387.
Background on Sefer ha-Miṣvot appears in Davidson, Maimonides, 168-88. As Blidstein noted, however,
“we possess a work produced in near chronological proximity with Mishneh Torah and yet … studded with
disagreements with the Code”; “Where Do We Stand,” 20.
91
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 335; he also described this work as
“propaedeutic” (24). Twersky deduced that Maimonides’ attitude towards Sefer ha-Miṣvot eventually grew
more positive (336).
92
 ;וחבר זה בלשון הגרי למען לא יחובר עם חבורו הגדול ואע"פ שהוא כפתחיה אליוMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Heller, 27 (introductory pagination).
93
; וניחמתי הרבה על שחברתיו בלשון ערבי מפני שהכל צריכין לקרותו ואני מחכה עתה שאעתיק אותו ללשון הקודש
Maimonides, Teshuvot ha-Rambam: Yoṣaʾot le-Or be-Paʿam ha-Rishonah be-Meqoran ha-ʿAravi, trans.
and ed. Joshua Blau (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1957-1961), 2:725 (§447); idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat,
1:223.
94
Abraham S. Halkin, “The Medieval Jewish Attitude Toward Hebrew,” in Biblical and Other
Studies, 238n27: “this passage … is somewhat ambiguous but probably the explanation offers the reason
why it is in Arabic.” Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 334, wrote: “this comment is
ambiguous, for it is not clear whether the explanatory clause (‘because all people ought to read it’) refers to
his original motivation for writing it in Arabic or to the reason for his retrospective regret.” Recent scholars
have accepted the latter explanation; Sarah Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World: Portrait of a
Mediterranean Thinker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 21: “on another occasion
Maimonides expresses his regret at having written the Book of Commandments in Arabic, ‘since this is a
book that everyone needs’”; and Simon Hopkins, “The Languages of Maimonides,” in Trias of
Maimonides, Jewish, Arabic, and Ancient Culture of Knowledge, ed. Georges Tamer Berlin (New York: W.
de Gruyter, 2005), 97: “when later he expressed regret for [writing Sefer ha-Miṣvot in Arabic], it was not
because matter and medium were inherently unsuited, but because of the mundane practical consideration
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The stated purpose of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is to provide the necessary evidence and
background for the enumeration of the commandments; this would serve as the structure
upon which the Mishneh Torah would be built. Maimonides asserted that he had long
recognized the woeful inadequacy of earlier enumerations, writing that the azharot that
he heard in his Andalusian youth caused him “pains” (ālām).95 After the opening, which
also outlines the plans for the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides offered fourteen principles
(uṣūl; sing., aṣl),96 claiming that these would rectify the errors of earlier enumerators of
the commandments. In the body of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he followed the talmudic distinction
between positive and negative commandments. As he later put it, in this section, “I
explained the enumeration of each and every commandment, and I brought proofs from
the Sifra or Sifrei and from the Tosefta and from all places in the gemara for any
commandment regarding which there is doubt.”97
Gerald Blidstein noted that Sefer ha-Miṣvot “may well be the most pioneering of
Maimonides’ works, at least in its undergirding concepts,” and yet, “as the most original

that the use of Arabic automatically restricted his readership to the Arabic-speaking world alone: … ‘and I
much regret having composed it in the Arabic language, because everybody ought to read it.’” Mordechai
Cohen, “Hirhurim ʿal Ḥeiqer ha-Munaḥ ‘Peshuṭo shel Miqra’ be-Teḥilat ha-meiʾah ha-ʿEsrim ve-Ahat,” in
Le-Yashev Peshuṭo shel Miqra: Asupat Meḥqarim be-Farshanut ha-Miqra, eds. Sarah Japhet and Eran
Viezel (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2011), 41n160, also took this position.
95
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 4, 5 (introduction). On ālām, see Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 4n2. On this passage, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 250-52.
See also below, n856.
96
In at least two places, Maimonides translated uṣūl in this context as “peraqim” (chapters); see
Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:632 (§365), 2:725 (§447); and Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:232, 2:451. For aṣl, Solomon ibn
Ayyub used the word ʿiqar, and Moses Ibn Tibbon, shoresh; see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 7
(introductory pagination). See also idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8n55; and idem, Maimonides,
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, 1:78 and n5 (mBer 7:6, translating ʿiqar as aṣl), 4:7 (mBQ 1:1, translating avot as
uṣūl).
97

בארתי בו מנין כל המצוות מצוה מצוה והבאתי ראיות על כל מצוה שיש בה ספק מן ספרא או ספרי ומן התוספתות ומן
 ;כל מקום בגמראMaimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:725 (§447); idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:232.

26

and daring … [, it] would of necessity be the most flawed. For the basic question is
whether the Talmud lends itself to the kind of systematization undertaken in this work,
whether the Maimonidean categories and problems – Talmudic, of course – can be
imposed consistently on the protean Talmud. The task was Herculean.”98 Nowhere is this
“Herculean” task more evident than in the Fourteen Principles of this work’s
Introduction, which Twersky called Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s “real novum.”99 Maimonides
himself described the Fourteen Principles as ones which contain “great rules and many
principles (ʿiqarim), which are like mountains, on which all the matters depend. I placed
them in the preface,” he wrote, “in order to understand the ways that man can
comprehend the enumeration of the commandments.”100
The final Judeo-Arabic text addressed in this study is a debate concerning
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah and Sefer ha-Miṣvot that involved Daniel ben Saʿadya haBavli (Baghdad and Damascus; fl. early 13th c.) and Abraham ben Moses Maimonides
(Fusṭāṭ; 1186-1237).101 In early 1213, Daniel sent Abraham forty-seven questions about
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Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 26, 27.
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 3n3.
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שיש בהם כללים גדולים ועקרים רבים שהן כהררים שכל הדברים תלויין בהן וכולם הקדמתי אותם להבין הדרכים
 ;שיתפוס אדם במניין המצוותMaimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:725 (§447); idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:232.
Compare Solomon ibn Ayyub’s comment in the Introduction to his translation: ושם בתחלתו י"ד עקרים טובים
 ;ומבוארים הראה בהם בראיות ברורות שאין ראוי למנות המצות כי אם על צד שמנאם הוא בספרו הגדולMaimonides, Sefer ha-

Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 27 (introductory pagination).
101
The correspondence between Abraham Maimonides and Daniel ha-Bavli is preserved in a
unique manuscript, Oxford MS. Huntington 185; see Adolf Neubauer, Catalogue of the Hebrew
Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library and in the College Libraries of Oxford (Kessinger Publishing, 1886),
no. 628; and Malachi Beit-Arié, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library:
Supplement of Addenda and Corrigenda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), no. 628. This text was first
published as Abraham Maimonides and Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli, Brikat Avraham, hu Sefer Teshuvot
le-Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-Rambam, ed. Baer Goldberg (Lyck, 1859); and idem, Maʿaseh Nissim,
Sheʾelot Rabbeinu Daniel ha-Bavli ʿal Sefer ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Rambam u-Teshuvot Rabbeinu Avraham
beno Rabbeinu Moshe Maimon ʿal ha-Sheʾelot, ed. and trans. Baer Goldberg (Paris: Brill, 1867). For
reviews, see Abraham Geiger, “Recensionen. Alte Schriften zum ersten Male herausgegeben,” JZWL 2
(1863): 55-63; and idem, “Daniel ha-Babli und Abraham Sohn des Moses Maimonides,” JZWL 6 (1868):
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the Mishneh Torah, five about the Principles in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, and eight about that
work’s enumeration of the commandments. (Abraham appears to have responded in

155-56. Maʿaseh Nissim has been reprinted twice: Maʿaseh Nissim, Sheʾelot Rabbeinu Daniel ha-Bavli ʿal
Sefer ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Rambam ve-Teshuvot Rabbeinu Avraham beno Rabbeinu Moshe Maimon ʿal haSheʾelot, ed. and trans. Kalman Kahana, in Sefer Mishneh Torah le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon, veNilvah elav Sefer ha-Miṣvot, gam hu la-Rambam, ʿim Kol ha-Peirushim, Hosafot Ḥadashot mi-Khitvei Yad
(Tel Aviv: Pardes, 1958), 1-22 (repagination at the end of the volume); and Sefer Teshuvot Rabbeinu
Avraham ben ha-Rambam le-Sheʾelot Rabbi Daniel ha-Bavli, trans. David Zvi Hellman, in Sefer ha-Miṣvot
le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon ʿim Hasagot ha-Ramban, ed. David Zvi Hellman (Jerusalem: Hoṣaʾat
Shabbtai Frankel, 2002). Goldberg’s transcriptions of the manuscript are largely accurate. I thank Uri
Melamed for providing me with a new transcription and a translation of the first three queries and
responses in Maʿaseh Nissim. I utilize the unique manuscript and Goldberg’s editions; references will be to
both.
Joseph Karo quoted this correspondence sixteen times in his Kesef Mishneh; in addition to the lists
in Geiger, “Recensionen,” 57n1; and Abraham Maimonides, Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Reuven Margaliyot
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1952), 25, see Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 5:2; Hilkhot Shegagot, 2:12; and
Hilkhot Miqvaʾot, 4:4. Several of Daniel’s queries also overlap with questions sent to Abraham
Maimonides from Aden, Yemen; see Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot Rabbeinu Avraham ben haRambam, ed. A.H. Freimann and trans. S.D. Goitein (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1937), xv, 198-200,
esp. n1.
Note that Daniel actually referred to himself as Daniel ha-Bavli ben Saʿadya; see T.S. 24.41,
printed in Jacob Mann, Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union
College Press, 1931; Philadelphia: JPS, 1935), 1:409-411; and Salomo A. Birnbaum, The Hebrew Scripts
(London: Palaeographia, 1954), 2 no. 193; and MS. Hunt. 185, 5b; Birkat Avraham, 2.
There is ongoing debate as to whether Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli is to be identified with Daniel
Ibn al-Māshiṭa, author of a pietistic work titled Taqwīm al-Adyān (The Rectifications of Religion) and a
(lost) Commentary on Ecclesiastes, both of which criticize Maimonidean philosophy. See Samuel
Poznański, “Daniel Ibn al-Amschata: un adversaire litéraire de Maïmonide,” REJ 33 (1896): 308-311;
idem, Babylonische Geonim im nachgaonäischen Zeitalter: Nach Handschriftlen und gedruckten Quellen
(Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1914), 16-17; Abraham Maimonides, Peirush Rabbeinu Avraham ben haRambam ʿal Bereishit u-Shemot, ed. E.J. Wiesenberg (London, 1958), 104n10; Paul Fenton, “Le Taqwīm
al-Adyān de Daniel Ibn Al-Māšiṭa, nouvelle pièce de la controverse Maïmonidienne en orient,” REJ 144,
no. 3-4 (1986): 287-89; and idem, “Daniel Ibn Al-Māshiṭa’s Taqwīm al-Adyān: New Light on the Oriental
Phase of the Maimonidean Controversy,” in Genizah Research after Ninety years, 79-81. Fenton has found
what he called “a near decisive proof” that Daniel ha-Bavli was indeed Daniel Ibn al-Māshiṭa; idem, “A
Re-Discovered Description of Maimonides by a Contemporary,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 274n28;
idem, “The Literary Legacy of Maimonides’ Descendants,” in Moses Maimonides (1138-1204): His
Religious, Scientific, and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different Cultural Contexts, eds. Görge K.
Hasselhoff and Otfried Fraisse (Würzburg: Ergon, 2004), 103; and idem, “Moreshet ha-Sifrutit shel Ṣeṣaʾei
ha-Rambam,” Peʿamim 97 (2004): 12; accepted in Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “Masoret ve-Shinuy be-Defusei
ha-Pulmus shel Shoshelet beit ha-Rambam (Raʾvam ve-Ravda),” in Masoret ve-Shinuy ba-Tarbut haʿArvit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-ha-Beinayim: Divrei ha-Veʿidah ha-Shishit shel ha-Ḥevrah le-Ḥeiqer haTarbut ha-ʿArvit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-ha-Beinayim, eds. Joshua Blau and David Doron (Ramat Gan: Bar
Ilan University, 2000), 79. The conclusion in Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 451, 478-80, is unclear. See
also Elisha Russ-Fishbane, “Between Politics and Piety: Abraham Maimonides and His Times,” (PhD
Diss., Harvard University, 2009), 27-30, 115-20.
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relatively short order, but the precise date is unknown.102) Daniel posed his questions in
the languages of Maimonides’ works; his queries on the Mishneh Torah were written in
Hebrew, and those on Sefer ha-Miṣvot, in Arabic.103
In his Milḥamot ha-Shem (Wars of the Lord), Abraham Maimonides reported that
Daniel ha-Bavli was a student of Samuel ben ʿEli ibn al-Dastūr (Baghdad; d. c. 1194/7),
self-styled gaon of the reborn Baghdadi yeshiva who engaged in protracted battles with
Maimonides over political, halakhic, and philosophical matters.104 Daniel’s educational
pedigree led several scholars to conclude that his challenges to Maimonides’ halakhic

See Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Maḥloqet le-Sheim Shamayim: ʿIyunim be-Pulmus haTefillah shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam u-Vnei Doro,” Teʿudah 10 (1996): 264-66; idem, “Abraham
Maimuni’s Prayer Reforms: Continuations or Revision of His Father’s Teachings?” in Traditions of
Maimonideanism, ed. Carlos Fraenkel (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 150; and idem, “Abraham Maimonides on His
Leadership, Reforms, and Spiritual Imperfection,” JQR 104, no. 3 (2014): 508-510.
103
Noted in Dienstag, “ʿEin ha-Miṣvot,” 688; and Russ-Fishbane, “Between Politics and Piety,”
27n126.
104
Abraham Maimonides, Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Margaliyot, 54. On Samuel, see Simḥa Assaf,
“Qoveṣ shel Igrot R. Shmuel ben ʿEli u-Vnei doro,” Tarbiẓ 1, no. 1 (1929): 102-130; 1 no. 2 (1930): 43-84;
1 no. 3 (1930): 15-80; Simḥa Emmanuel, “Teshuvat Rav Shmuel ben ʿElī Gaon Baghdad le-Ḥakhmei
Ṣarfat,” Tarbiẓ 66, no. 1 (2007): 93-100; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 450-61. On Samuel and
Maimonides, see Daniel Jeremy Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy, 11801240 (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 58-65; Gerald Blidstein, “Maimonides on the Renewal of Semikha: Some
Historical Perspective,” Jewish Political Studies Review 10, no. 3-4 (1998): 29-34; idem, ʿEqronot
Mediniyim be-Mishnat ha-Rambam: ʿIyunim be-Mishnato ha-Hilkhatit (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University,
1983), 143-45; Sarah Stroumsa, “Twelfth Century Concepts of Soul and Body: The Maimonidean
Controversy in Baghdad,” in Self, Soul and Body in Religious Experience, eds. A.I. Baumgartern et al.
(Leiden, Brill: 1998), 313-34; idem, “Le-Pulmus ha-Rambam be-Mizraḥ: Meqomo shel Abū al-Barakat alBaghdadi,” in Ḥiqrei ʿEver va-ʿArav: Mugashim le-Yehoshua Blau, ed. Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai (Tel Aviv:
Tel Aviv University, 1993), 415-22; idem, Reishito shel Pulmus ha-Rambam ba-Mizraḥ: Igeret haHashtaqah ʿal Odot Teḥiyat ha-Meitim le-Yosef ibn Shimon (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1999); idem,
Maimonides in His World, 165-83; Y. Tzvi Langermann, Yemenite Midrash: Philosophical Commentaries
on the Torah (San Francisco: Harper, 1996), 297-302; idem, “Igeret R. Shmuel ben ʿElī be-ʿInyan Teḥiyat
ha-Meitim,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 15 (2001): 39-64; Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “The Maimonidean Dynasty –
Between Conservativism and Revolution,” in Maimonides After 800 Years: Essays on Maimonides and his
Influence, ed. Jay Harris (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2n5; Herbert A. Davidson,
“Maimonides and Samuel Ben Ali,” in Studies in the History of Culture and Science: A Tribute to Gad
Freudenthal, eds. Resianne Fontaine et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 171-88; and the studies cited in below,
n388.
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writings continued the battle waged by his teacher.105 (In fact, the son-in-law and
successor of Samuel ben ʿEli, Zekhariah ben Berakhel, wrote critiques of Maimonides’
Commentary on the Mishnah, though these are now lost.106) According to Menaḥem BenSasson, however, Daniel’s queries were an “accepted and legitimate genre” of halakhic
writing; he concluded that figures in the circle of Abraham Maimonides misinterpreted
Daniel’s goals.107 Ben-Sasson’s assessment may be supported by the fact that bitter
rhetoric is largely absent from Daniel’s questions, while Abraham’s responses are replete
with vituperative remarks (and praise).108
In an early version of his Taḥkemoni, the poet Judah al-Ḥarīzī (b. Toledo, d.
Aleppo; c. 1165-1225) wrote the following about Daniel ha-Bavli:
He is an ever-flowing spring (mAv 2:10) /
In his wisdom he smashes cedars (cf. Ps. 29:5) /
And exerts strength (Eccl. 10:10).109

105
Simon Eppenstein, Abraham Maimuni: Sein Leben und seine Schriften (Berlin: L. Lamm,
1914), 2; A.H. Freimann, “Teshuvot ha-Rambam le-R. Yosef ha-Maʿaravi Talmido ʿal Hasagot R. Shmuel
be-R. ʿElī Rosh Yeshivat Baghdad,” in Sefer ha-Yovel: Qoveṣ Torani Madaʿi Mugash le-Doqtor Binyamin
Menasheh Levin le-Yovlo ha-Shishim, ed. Judah Leib Maimon (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1939), 2829; Abraham Ben-Jacob, Yehudei Bavel: mi-Sof Tequfat ha-Geonim ʿad Yameinu (1038-1960) (Jerusalem:
Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1965), 30; and Russ-Fishbane, “Between Politics and Piety,” 27-28. See also Silver,
Maimonidean Criticism, 65-68.
106
See Poznański, Babylonische Geonim, 32. On Zekhariah, see also Assaf, “Qoveṣ,” 107-108,
128; Mann, Texts, 2:196, 2:240-42, 2:252; Maimonides, Igrot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. D.Z. Baneth
(Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1946), 31n2; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 459-63.
107
Ben-Sasson, “Masoret ve-Shinuy,” 79; see there, 80-82.
108
Margaliyot, in Abraham Maimonides, Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Margaliyot, 25-28, listed many
of the examples of praise and rebuke. See similarly A. Ovadiah, “Rabbi Avraham ha-Maimuni,” Sinai 2
(1937): 86-91. One important exception is Daniel’s accusation that Maimonides adopted a view of the
Qaraites; see below, n1236. I hope to return to this question. On polemic between Jewish jurists, compare
Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières, a Twelfth-Century Talmudist (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1962), 42, 178, 192.
109
 וַ חֲ יָלִ ים ְיגַבֵּ ר/ ּוב ָחכְ ָמתו אֲ ָרזִ ים ְמ ַשבֵּ ר
ְ /  הּוא ַמ ְעיָן ִמ ְתגַבֵּ ר/ יתי הֶ ָחכָם הַ גָדול ר' ָדנִ יֵּאל הַ בַ ְבלִ י
ִ  ;וְ ָשם ָר ִאJudah alḤarīzī, Taḥkemoni: o, Maḥberot Heman ha-Ezraḥi, eds. Yosef Yahalom and Naoya Katsumata (Jerusalem:
Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2010), 438 lines 124-25. See similarly idem, Kitāb al-Durar: ve-hu Sefer Peninei haMusarim ve-Shivḥei ha-Qehalim, eds. Yehoshua Blau et al. (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2009), 142 lines 22132. Al-Ḥarīzī considered Daniel “among the people of knowledge and virtue, masters of piety and
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While al-Ḥarīzī, a committed “Maimonidean partisan,”110 removed this passage in a later
version of the Taḥkemoni,111 his remarks about Daniel’s intellect are borne out in the
latter’s analytical questions.
Abraham Maimonides loyally defended his father, though, on several occasions,
he confessed to uncertainty regarding his father’s reasoning, suggested that his father had
later changed his mind, and even conceded that his father’s positions were difficult to
understand. At the outset of his comments, Abraham wrote that Daniel “challenged well
and asked appropriately”; his words, wrote Abraham, “are good and correct, and they
testify that [he is] among the intelligent.” On balance, however, Abraham deemed
Daniel’s questions “weak”; he felt compelled to respond to them, he wrote, because they
imply that Maimonides erred.112 Abraham twice reminded readers that Daniel himself did

intelligence” ( )ומן אהל אלעלם ואלפצ'ל ואבראב \ אלדיאנה' ואלע'לand wrote that Daniel’s “intelligence flashes like
a kindled fire” ( ;ילו<ח> ד'כאה כאלנזד אלוריtranslation there, 27*, 91*).
110
Robert Chazan, The Jews of Medieval Western Christendom: 1000-1500 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 272, used this term to describe the poets, philosophers, and jurists who
defended Maimonides’ legacy. On al-Ḥarīzī’s praise for Maimonides, see Samuel Miklós Stern, “Rabbi
Yehuda al-Ḥarīzī be-shivḥo shel ha-Rambam,” in Hagut ʿIvrit be-Eiropah, eds. Menahem Zohori and
Aryeh Tartakower (Tel Aviv: World Hebrew Union, 1969), 91-103; Twersky, “The Beginnings of Mishneh
Torah Criticism,” 167; idem, “Some Reflections on the Historical Image of Maimonides: An Essay on His
Unique Place in History,” in The Legacy of Maimonides, 3; and Angel Sáenz-Badillos, “Yĕhudah al-Ḥarizi,
admirador de Maimónides,” Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos 34, no. 2 (1985): 61-71. Compare
Bernard Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition: The Career and Controversies of Ramah
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 3, 40.
111
See Judah al-Ḥarīzī, Masʿei Yehuda: Ḥamishah Pirqei Masaʿ Meḥorazim le-al-Ḥarīzī, eds.
Yosef Yahalom and Joshua Blau (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2002), xiv-xv; idem, Kitāb al-Durar, 25*-28*;
idem, Taḥkemoni, xlviii-l; and Joshua Blau and Joseph Yahalom, “Kitāb al-Durar – ve-hu Sefer Ḥadash
shel al-Ḥarīzī ʿal Shivḥei ha-El ve-ʿal Qehilot ha-Mizraḥ,” Peʿamim 108 (2007): 30-31. Compare the
comments about Ḥarīzī’s temperament by a contemporary Muslim biographer in Joseph Sadan, “Rabbi
Yehuda al-Ḥarīzī ke-Ṣomet Tarbuti: Biographiyah ʿAravit shel Yoṣer Yehudi be-ʿEnei Mizraḥan,”
Peʿamim 68 (1996): 52; and idem, “Un intellectuel juif au confluent de deux cultures: Yehuda al-Harizi et
sa biographie arabe,” in Judíos y musulmanes en al-Andalus y el Magreb: Contactos intelectuales, ed.
Isabel María Fierro Bello (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2002), 139.
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ואם יפה אדוני הקשית וכענין שאלת במקומות ידועים הלא רוב הקושיות רעועים ובאמת דבריך טובים ומעידים עליך
 ;שאתה מן הנבונים אבל בלשון השאלות דברי גדולות ויראה מכללם שהרב זצ"ל נתפש בשבילם בטעיות רבותMS. Hunt. 185, 8a;

Birkat Avraham, 3 (introduction).
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not offer a precise enumeration of the commandments, as if to imply that, whatever its
difficulties, Maimonides had at least put forward a viable list.113

Outline of This Study
This dissertation is divided into two broad sections. The first three chapters
address Rabbanite reflections on the identity of the extra-scriptural material that God
gave the Israelites, and on the relationship of extra-scriptural traditions to written
revelation. The final two chapters explore theoretical and methodological problems
connected with the project of enumeration.
Chapter One examines geonic approaches to the Oral Torah, and notes that all
surviving pre-Maimonidean enumerations of the commandments consider post-Sinaitic
laws to be of divine origin. Though scholars have long assumed that geonic assertions
about the divine origin of the Oral Torah were designed to thwart Qaraism, I point out
that geonic-era presentations of the Oral Torah and of the origins of non-biblical
institutions share several features with the claims of contemporaneous Sunni Muslims,
who asserted that all religious practices must be firmly grounded in prophetic dicta. This
cross-cultural perspective suggests that the geonim portrayed the Oral Torah in terms that
were coherent in their day, informed by broader discussions of religious authority and its
sources. It also accounts for the surprising claims of Saʿadya Gaon and others, who

113
See MS. Hunt. 126a, 142a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 1 (introduction), 21 (§3). See Abraham’s comment
that the Ten Commandments are the “roots” (uṣūl) of the 613 commandments; Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg,
321-33; noted in Naḥem Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot ve-ʿEqronot Parshaniyim: Le-Ṭivo shel Peirush R.
Avraham ben ha-Rambam la-Torah,” in A Word Fitly Spoken, 56.
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described such non-biblical institutions as the mathematical calendar and the festival of
Hanukah as ones that were of divine authority.
Chapter Two examines Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah, as developed in
his Judeo-Arabic Commentary on the Mishnah, Judeo-Arabic Sefer ha-Miṣvot and
Hebrew Mishneh Torah. After uncovering previously unnoticed pre-Maimonidean
reflections on the Oral Torah composed in Andalusia, this chapter demonstrates that ideas
in the writings of Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth (Lucena [?], 1038-89) influenced claims about the
Oral Torah made by twelfth-century Andalusian Rabbanites. These, I suggest, spurred
Maimonides to reject the geonic approach to revelation. This chapter next traces two
themes in Maimonides’ works: the content of Sinaitic revelation and the role of the
rabbis. While many scholars have analyzed Maimonides’ presentations, I employ a
holistic approach that integrates Maimonides’ Hebrew compositions with his JudeoArabic writings. I show that while Maimonides sharply distinguished between laws of
divine and human origin, his attempt to align the content of revelation with precisely 613
commandments led him, on occasion, to blur his own neat definitions and conceptual
boundaries.
Chapter Three traces the writings of two thirteenth-century Judeo-Arabic jurists
who, for different reasons, engaged Maimonides’ theories of the Oral Torah: Daniel ben
Saʿadya ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides. While Daniel accepted that Maimonides
had successfully dismantled the geonic-era approach to the Oral Torah, he felt that
Maimonides had unduly minimized the scope of revelation – and vastly overstated the
role of the rabbis – in the establishment of Jewish law. Daniel exploited several
ambiguities in Maimonides’ works in order to criticize the ways that Maimonides
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diverged from classical rabbinic presentations of revelation. He also attempted to uphold
geonic conceptions of the Oral Torah, but the force of Maimonides’ arguments drove him
to reread geonic assertions through a Maimonidean lens. Analysis of his comments on
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot further demonstrates that Maimonides influenced Daniel’s
terminology and his understanding of the Oral Torah. In his responses to Daniel, which,
in all likelihood, constitute his earliest written reflections on the Oral Torah, Abraham
Maimonides staunchly defended his father’s system, at times with palpable bias. The
remainder of this chapter examines treatments of the Oral Torah in Abraham’s later
writings, with particular focus on his Kifāyat al-ʿĀbidīn (The Sufficient Guide for the
Servants of God) and responsa, building on earlier studies of Abraham’s Commentary on
Genesis and Exodus. This study demonstrates that Abraham applied and expanded his
father’s system in both pietistic and non-pietistic contexts. Maimonides’ understanding of
the Oral Torah enabled Abraham to argue that human reason may support particular legal
innovations and to defend his own pietistic reforms.
The final two chapters examine theoretical problems connected with the process
of enumeration itself and demonstrate how Rabbanites used this topic as a vehicle for
ruminating on larger, more speculative legal problems. Chapter Four highlights the
difficulties intrinsic to the project of reducing Jewish law to 613 commandments.
Because the number 613 bears no substantive relationship to the scope of Talmudic law,
enumerators of the commandments needed to formulate a system for identifying
“commandment-units” that could encompass numerous “laws.” The first thinkers to
tackle this problem, at least implicitly, were those who composed early azharot; later,
Saʿadya Gaon, Samuel ben Ḥofni, and Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ acknowledged this challenge.
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The most systematic Judeo-Arabic reflections on this problem – by Maimonides, Daniel
ben Saʿadya, and Abraham Maimonides – drew on formal logic, Islamic legal theory, and
qurʾānic exegesis. The complexity of their systems underscores the challenges posed by
enumeration and the creativity that such a project demanded.
Chapter Five examines Maimonides’ contention that the text of the Pentateuch
plays a decisive role in determining the 613 commandments. Though this claim has roots
in his earlier Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides fully developed it in his Sefer
ha-Miṣvot. Analysis of these writings shows that he drew on careful readings of
Scripture, rabbinic literature, earlier Rabbanite lexicographic and hermeneutical works,
and even on contemporary writings which affirmed the theory of spontaneous generation.
This problem also brings the development of Maimonidean halakhah into sharp relief.
This chapter closes by examining the debate between Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham
Maimonides concerning Maimonides’ assertions regarding the relationship between the
Pentateuch and the enumeration of the commandments, highlighting the ways that Daniel
forced Abraham to critically evaluate his father’s halakhic corpus.
The Conclusion reflects on the ramifications of Rabbanite attempts to systematize
the law on the historiography of medieval Judaism. I suggest that the themes examined in
this dissertation shed new light on central questions in the study of medieval Jewish life
and Jews in the Islamic world, in particular, the ways that scholars conceive of Jewish
law in its Islamic context.
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Chapter One: Geonic-Era Reflections on the Oral Torah
Introduction
Enumerators of the 613 commandments often wondered if the enumeration should
include laws instituted after Sinaitic revelation. For many, this problem touched on the
larger, more pressing question of the origin of the rabbinic tradition. Pre-Maimondiean
enumerations consistently include laws that later jurists considered post-Sinaitic. The
liturgical setting of many of these lists makes it difficult to determine if the authors –
among them great jurists – were asserting the divine origin of rabbinic law, or if they had
different goals, such as teaching or summarizing the law. Whatever the import of these
texts, geonic-era literature often claims that God authorized extra-scriptural traditions and
post-Sinaitic practices.
Geonic-era Rabbanites affirmed several, mutually-reinforcing themes. They
argued that both the Written and Oral Torahs derive from revelation and asserted that the
Written Torah is incomprehensible without the Oral Torah, they minimized the creative
role of late antique rabbis – whom they characterized as tradents charged with preserving
and transmitting traditions – and they deemphasized the talmudic distinction between
biblical (de-orayta) and rabbinic (de-rabbanan) law. Many modern scholars have
claimed that anti-Qaraite animus was the primary, if not exclusive, impetus for these
perspectives. Several writers have even suggested that geonic anti-Qaraite polemic led
the geonim to consciously adopt positions that were at variance with classical rabbinic
understandings of the Oral Torah. Rabbanites themselves made the polemical context of
their arguments clear, to be sure. However, I will argue that the scholarly focus on
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Qaraism’s causative role overlooks an important cross-cultural factor that helped shape
Rabbanite claims. In the very centuries that Rabbanites asserted the divine origin of the
Oral Torah, Muslim jurists jettisoned non-prophetic elements of religious law and argued
that only prophetic authority is valid. I will demonstrate that the geonim adopted both the
arguments and the assumptions found in contemporaneous Islamic texts. Situating geonic
claims in a broader historical context shows that geonic-era ideology was not merely a
response to Qaraite polemics. Rather, it was coherent in its own time and consistent with
larger societal views of religious authority.
This chapter focuses on a cluster of claims about the Oral Torah and non-biblical
institutions that, in my opinion, refer to “legal epistemology,” a phrase borrowed from
studies of Islamic legal theory.114 I begin with a review of scholarly understandings of
geonic-era legal epistemology, and then turn to Jewish and Islamic debates about the
authenticity and authority of traditions that supplement written revelation. Next, I trace
three topics in geonic-era texts – the scope of revelation, the role of the rabbis, and the
origins of non-biblical institutions – in order to establish that Rabbanites utilized tropes
from Islamic literature, and that they sought divine sources for all of their practices.
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E.g., Wael Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 125; Joseph Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī Have a Theory of ‘Four Sources’ of Law?” in
Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 43; idem, Early Islamic Legal
Theory, 1, 8; and Ashk Dahlén, Islamic Law, Epistemology and Modernity: Legal Philosophy in
Contemporary Iran (New York: Routledge, 2003), 4, 6. Joseph David has used this phrase in regards to
Jewish jurisprudence; see his “Legal Comparability and Cultural Identity: The Case of Legal Reasoning in
Jewish and Islamic Traditions,” Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 14, no. 1 (2010): 9; and idem,
Jurisprudence and Theology in Late Ancient and Medieval Jewish Thought (Cham: Springer, 2014), 86.
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This chapter primarily treats Rabbanite thought in the tenth and eleventh
centuries, from approximately the time of Saʿadya Gaon until that of Hayya115 ben
Sherira Gaon (939-1038),116 and it explores geonic and non-geonic sources from Iraq,
Palestine, Qayrawān, and al-Andalus.117 While occasional voices of dissent are heard,
and no single figure accepted all of the claims detailed in this chapter, the texts discussed
here represent a significant trend in Rabbanite literature of this period. These centuries
witnessed the crystallization of Qaraism (a Jewish movement that rejected the Talmud
and Oral Torah),118 the efflorescence of new types of Jewish literature,119 and the

Traditionally pronounced Hai; on this pronunciation, see Shlomo Morag, “Hayyey=Ḥayim (lemahut shmo shel Rav Hai Gaon),” Tarbiẓ 31, no. 2 (1961): 188-90, accepted in Brody, The Geonim of
Babylonia, 11n35.
116
Earlier post-talmudic centuries are quite murky. Salo Baron described the period from 500-850
as “dark and inarticulate”; SRHJ2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 6:132. According to S.D.
Goitein, these centuries “are the most obscure in Jewish history”; Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through
the Ages (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005), 95. For treatment, see Steven M. Wasserstrom,
Between Muslim and Jew: The Problem of Symbiosis under Early Islam (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995), 17-18. Regarding the geonic academies in particular, Brody wrote, “our knowledge of the
earlier Geonim and their doings is extremely limited”; Geonim of Babylonia, 10. On this last point, see also
Yaʿaqov Sussman, “Kitvei-Yad u-Mesorot-Nusaḥ shel ha-Mishnah,” Proceedings of the World Congress of
Jewish Studies 3, Studies in the Talmud, Halakha, and Midrash (1977): 237n90.
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Babylonia, 49, citing earlier scholarship.
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See Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Between Ananites and Karaites: Observations on Early Medieval
Jewish Sectarianism,” in Studies in Muslim-Jewish Relations, ed. R.L. Nettler (Chur: Harwood Academic,
1993), 19-29; idem, “Karaite Controversy – Scripture and Tradition in Early Karaism,” in
Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter, eds. Bernard Lewis and Friedrich Niewöhner (Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1992), 11-24; idem, “Return to the Scriptures in Ancient and Medieval Jewish Sectarianism
and in Early Islam,” in Les retours aux Écritures: fondamentalismes présents et passés, eds. Evelyne
Patlagean and Alain Le Boulluec (Louvain: Peeters, 1993), 327-28; and Moshe Gil, “Qadmoniyot haQaraʾim,” Teʿudah 15 (1999): 71-107; trans. in idem, “The Origins of the Karaites,” in Karaite Judaism: A
Guide to its History of Literary Sources, ed. Meira Polliack (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 73-118. Note Leon
Nemoy’s comments about the diversity of groups that came to be known as Qaraite; “Stroumsa’s Edition of
al-Muqammiṣ’s ʿIshrūn Maqālah,” JQR 82, no. 1-2 (1991): 233.
119
On Saʿadya’s role in expanding the Rabbanite library, see Rina Drory, Reishit ha-Magaʿim shel
ha-Sifrut ha-Yehudit ʿim ha-Sifrut ha-ʿArvit ba-meiʾah ha-ʿAsirit (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 1988),
156-78; Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 246; and Sarah Stroumsa, “Prolegomena as Historical Evidence: On
Saadia’s Introductions to his Commentaries on the Bible,” in Vehicles of Transmission, Translation, and
Transformation in Medieval Textual Culture, eds. Robert Winovsky et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 13134.
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development of new approaches to exegesis and extra-scriptural traditions in the Islamic
world. These and other factors inspired Rabbanite deliberations about the origins, scope,
and nature of the Oral Torah.120

Historiography of Geonic Approaches to the Oral Torah
Many have suggested that the need to parry Qaraism was the primary motive
behind geonic claims for the divine origin of the Oral Torah. This position builds on the
views of pre-modern writers such as Abraham Ibn Dāʾūd (Cordoba; 1110-80), who
celebrated Saʿadya’s anti-Qaraite activity, and Maimonides, who rebuked Saʿadya for
overstating the case for the mathematical calendar’s divine origin.121 Historians in the late

I use the term “rabbinic” to refer to rabbis of the talmudic period and their literary output and
“Rabbanite” to post-talmudic Jews who saw themselves as the intellectual descendents of the talmudic
rabbis.
121
See Abraham ben David Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition: A Critical Edition with a
Translation and Notes of the Book of Tradition (Sefer ha-Qabbalah), ed. and trans. Gerson D. Cohen
(Philadelphia: JPS, 1967), 42 lines 102-105, writing that Saʿadya “overcame (heretics)” (naṣaḥum); and
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, 2:317 (mRH 2:7); see also there, 5:161-62n32 (mMen 11:7); and idem,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9, 14n10, 136 and n40. Maimonides’ criticism may draw on comments of
Sherira and Hayya Gaon; see below, nn317-321. Alternatively, Maimonides drew his criticism of Saʿadya
from the eleventh-century Andalusian talmudist and astronomer R. Isaac ben Barukh al-Balīya, whose
criticisms of Saʿadya’s views are preserved in Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Herschell Filipowski
(London, 1851), 60-62 (2:8), see also there, 126 (3:5), 129 (3:7); and Isaac Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Baer
Goldberg (Berlin, 1848), 2:9b-10a (4:6). On Maimonides’ claim, see also Dror Fixler, “Lashon Taqifah beFeirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam: Leshono shel ha-Rambam be-Fesiqat Halakhah be-Meqomot
Mesupaqim, ule-Sheʾelat yaḥas ha-Peirush le-Talmud Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah,” Sinai 135-136 (2005):
188-90; and Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem: Teshuvah min ha-Genizah
ʿal Yom Tov Sheini shel Galuyot,” Tarbiẓ 83, no. 4 (2015): 584-85. Compare David Messer Leon, Kevod
Ḥakhamim, ed. S. Bernfeld (Berlin, 1899) 57-60.
Similar comments appear in other Jewish and non-Jewish chronographers. Saʿadya ben Maimun
ibn Danan (Spain, North Africa; fl. second half of 15 th c.) praised Saʿadya’s “victorious responses”
(teshuvot niṣaḥot) to heretics; Maʾamar ʿal Seder ha-Dorot, in Ḥemdah Genuzah, ed. Z.H. Edelman
(Königsberg, 1856), 28b; repr. in Judit Targarona Borrás, “Maʾamar ʿal Seder ha-Dorot de Seʿadyah ibn
Danan: edición, traducción y notas,” Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos 35, no. 2 (1986): 94; and
Saʿadya ben Maimun ibn Danan, Saadia ibn Danán: El orden de las generaciones ‘Seder ha-Dorot’, eds.
C. del Valle and G. Stemberger (Alcobendas [Madrid]: Aben Ezra, 1997), 112. Moses ben Isaac da Rieti
(Italy; d. c. 1460) claimed that Saʿadya entered paradise due to his rejoinders to sectarians; Miqdash Meʿat,
ed. Jacob Goldenthal (Vienna, 1851), 95a. And Ṣāʿid ibn Aḥmad al-Andalusī (Spain; 1029-70), a Muslim
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries picked up on this theme; their debates focused on
the question of whether all of Saʿadya’s writings can be ascribed to anti-Qaraism or just
most of them.122 Although Salo Baron downplayed the anti-Qaraite element of Saʿadya’s

historian and philosopher, called attention to Saʿadya’s engagement with theological argument and debate
(ṣināʿat jadal wa-ṭarīq al-tanāẓur); Ṭabaqāt al-Umam, ed. Ḥusayn Muʾnis (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1998),
112. Joshua Finkel first drew attention to this last passage; see “An Eleventh Century Source for the
History of Jewish Scientists in Mohammedan Land (Ibn Ṣaʿid),” JQR 18, no. 1 (1927): 54; and Bernard
Lewis, “Ha-Madaʿ ha-Yehudi le-fi Sofer ʿAravi ba-meiʾah ha-11 (ibn Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī),” Sinai 7 (1940):
25-29, repr. in Sofrim Muslemim ʿal Yehudim ve-Yahadut: ha-Yehudim be-Qerev Shkhenehem haMuslemim, ed. Ḥava Lazarus-Yafeh (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1996), 69-74. On this text, see
also David Wasserstein, “The Muslims and the Golden Age of the Jews in al-Andalus,” Israel Oriental
Studies 17 (1997): 188-96. Several of these sources are mentioned in Samuel Poznański, “The Anti-Karaite
Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” JQR 10, no. 2 (o.s.) (1898): 240.
For the attempts of Saʿadya’s sons Sheʾerit and Dosa to detail the scope of their father’s antiQaraite polemics in a topically arranged inventory of his writings (fihrist), see T.-S. 10 G 5.7, most recently
printed in Neḥemya Allony et al., Ha-Sifriyah ha-Yehudit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim: Reshimot Sefarim miGenizat Qahir (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2006), 313 lines 23-24. Jacob Mann used the earlier shelfmark T.S. 6 J91; see “A Fihrist of Saʿadya’s Works,” JQR 11, no. 4 (1921): 425 lines 24-25. See also Samuel
Poznański, “A Fihrist of Saadya’s Works,” JQR 13, no. 4 (1923): 394-96; Malter, Saadia Gaon, 421-28;
Alexander Scheiber, “Nusaḥ Shaleim shel Qeṭaʿ ha-Genizah ʿal Toldot Yemei Saʿadya Gaon,” Qiryat Sefer
40 (1965): 571; and Moshe Gil, Be-Malkhut Yishmael bi-Tequfat ha-Geonim (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv
University, 1997), 2:30-31. This text lists four polemical works; unfortunately, the document then cuts off.
122
Solomon Schechter, “Peirush 13 Middot me-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Beth Talmud: Zeitschrift fur
rabbinische Literatur und Geschichte 4 (1883): 237, claimed that anti-Qaraism motivated Saʿadya’s
commentary on the middot of R. Ishmael. Samuel Poznański rejected this view, but stated that “a great
portion of [Saʿadya’s] chequered life was devoted to combating the Karaite doctrines”; “The Anti-Karaite
Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” 240, 258-59. Hartwig Hirschfeld wrote, “it is no paradox that we owe the life
work of Saadya to the Karaites. All his writings, without exception, served the one purpose of defeating the
Karaites”; “Early Karaite Critics of the Mishnāh,” JQR 8, no. 2 (1917): 166. Hirschfeld was more cautious
in an earlier article, saying only, “to combat this Karaite interference was perhaps the main-spring of
Saʿadyah’s literary activity”; “The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. (Tenth Article.):
Further Saʿadyāh Fragments,” JQR 17, no. 4 (o.s.) (1905): 715. Citing Hirschfeld, Israel Davidson
identified “an intimate connection between Saadia’s polemical monographs and his Biblical
commentaries,” and wrote that Saʿadya’s “earlier writings, such as his polemics against Anan and Ḥiwi,
served him as a sketch for his later writings on Bible and philosophy”; Saadia’s Polemic Against Ḥiwi alBalkhi: A Fragment (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1915), 36, 37. Judah Rosenthal
concurred: “the literary activity of Saadia was to a great extent dedicated to combating the religious schism
which menaced Judaism”; “Ḥiwi al-Balkhi: A Comparative Study,” JQR 38, no. 3 (1948): 320-21; see also
idem, “Le-Toldot ha-Minut be-Tequfat Saʿadya,” Ḥorev 9 (1946): 37. In his biography of Saʿadya, Henry
Malter distanced himself from Hirschfeld, writing, “we need not go so far as to assume with one recent
investigator that everything Saadia has written in the numerous branches of Jewish literature had as its sole
purpose the refutation of Karaite doctrines.” Malter nevertheless declared that “polemic against heresies in
general and Karaism in particular, direct and indirect, is a very conspicuous feature in most of Saadia’s
writings”; Saadia Gaon, 262; see also there, 168. Alexander Marx wrote: “polemical works by the great
gaon fill an important part of his literary activity and are particularly characteristic of his fighting nature”;
Essays in Jewish Biography (Philadelphia: JPS, 1947), 30.
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activity,123 recent scholars have largely – though not entirely – asserted that anti-Qaraism
had an overwhelming impact on Saʿadya’s writings.124 Emphasis on the anti-Qaraite
aspects of Saʿadya’s oeuvre dovetails with the claim that Saʿadya’s arguments for the
divine origin of rabbinic tradition are “weak”125 or unconvincing.126 Many have
characterized Saʿadya’s approach to rabbinic tradition as “extreme,”127 or claimed that he
“exaggerated” in his arguments about the calendar.128 Several others have taken

Baron wrote that that Saʿadya “was not particularly alarmed” by Qaraism and that “many other
issues far overshadowed the struggle against these sectarians”; SRHJ2, 5:277; 5:415. See also idem,
“Saadia’s Communal Activities,” in Saadia Anniversary Volume, ed. Boaz Cohen (New York: American
Academy for Jewish Research, 1943), 9, 17-19.
124
Lawrence Hoffman wrote that “Saadiah’s anti-Karaite bias … marked his whole career” and
that “much of Saadiah’s geonic activity was directed at polemicizing against the Karaite heresy”; The
Canonization of the Synagogue Service (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 165, 15. See
the similar conclusions in Eliezer Schlossberg, “Ha-Pulmus be-Yeṣirato shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Sinai
126-127 (2000-2001): 305-324. Robert Brody more cautiously concluded that geonic approaches to
tradition “may be tinged by polemical motives”; “The Talmud in the Geonic Period,” in Printing the
Talmud: From Bomberg to Schottenstein, eds. Sharon Liberman Mintz and Gabriel M. Goldstein (New
York: Yeshiva University Museum, 2005), 35.
125
Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart (Leipzig:
Leiner, 1871), 5:270; trans. in idem, History of the Jews (Philadelphia: JPS, 1891-1898), 3:189.
126
Solomon Zeitlin claimed that Saʿadya put forward “untrue statements” that “gave the Karaites a
weapon to attack both him and the Rabbinites [sic] and also the excuse to attack the rabbis, saying that they
had distorted Jewish tradition”; “Saadia Gaon: Champion for Jewish Unity under Religious Leadership,”
JQR 33, no. 3 (1943): 394 (for a reaction to Zeitlin, see below, n307). Samuel Krauss likewise declared that
Saʿadya’s proofs for the claim that rabbinic tradition is necessary to understand biblical hapax legomena
“are not of the best kind”; “Saadya’s Tafsir of the Seventy Hapax Legomena, Explained and Continued,” in
Saadya Studies, in Commemoration of the One Thousandth Anniversary of the Death of R. Saadya Gaon,
ed. Erwin I.J. Rosenthal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1943), 47.
127
Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 98; Marina Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of Community: The
Jews of the Fatimid Caliphate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 25-26; Harris, How Do We Know
This, 79; Uriel Simon, Four Approaches to the Book of Psalms: From Saadiah Gaon to Abraham Ibn Ezra
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 39; and Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in
Maimonides,” 30.
128
See Davidson’s comments in Salmon ben Yeruḥim, Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem: Kolel Ṭaʿanot
ha-Qaraʾi Salmon ben Yeruḥim neged Rav Saʿadya Gaon, ed. Israel Davidson (New York: Beit Midrash
ha-Rabbanim be-America, 1934), 15; Cohen’s comments in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen,
liii; and Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of Community, 53. See further Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 24546. Howard Kreisel wrote that Saʿadya “exaggerates” about the scope of revelation; Prophecy: The History
of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 41.
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Saʿadya’s positions about the calendar as emblematic of the weakness of his defense of
the divine origin of the Oral Torah.129
Geonic assertions that halakhic midrash upholds laws known by tradition, but
does not generate new law, have been particularly troubling. This perspective has been
described as “thoroughly at odds”130 and “difficult to reconcile”131 with the selfunderstanding of the rabbis. But as Gerald Blidstein noted, the geonic position is only
radical if one concludes that the rabbis did, in fact, create law through exegesis, which is
a matter of significant debate.132 Furthermore, geonic assertions about the origins of
rabbinic tradition seem to echo what Blidstein termed “the dominant aggadic claim about
the origins of the tradition,” namely, its divine origins.133 Blidstein himself nevertheless
described the geonic approach, at least in the eyes of Maimonides, as “intellectually
untenable” and as “based on Karaitic premises … that only that which had heavenly

Abraham S. Halkin, “Saadia’s Exegesis and Polemics,” in Rab Saadia Gaon: Studies in his
Honor, ed. Louis Finkelstein (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1944), 140; Leon
Nemoy, “Early Karaism (The Need for a New Approach),” JQR 40, no. 3 (1950): 312; David Weiss
Halivni, “Reflections on Classical Jewish Hermeneutics,” PAAJR 62 (1996): 79-81; Schlossberg, “HaPulmus be-Yeṣirato shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” 306; and idem, “Hanhaguto u-Manhiguto shel Rav Saʿadya
Gaon,” ʿAmudot 5 (2013): 240. See also Marc Shapiro, Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism
Rewrites its History (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2015), 247-49.
130
Harris, How do we Know This, 80; Harris added that the encounter with Islamic exegesis and
lexicography also contributed to this, but this element is virtually absent from the remainder of his
narrative.
131
Mordecai Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 252. Note also José Faur’s claim that the
geonim defended the divine origin of the rabbinic interpretation of the lex talionis due to polemical
considerations; “Monolingualism and Judaism,” Cardozo Law Review 14, no. 6 (1993): 1736.
132
Gerald Blidstein, “Review of Jay Harris, How Do We Know This? Midrash and the
Fragmentation of Modern Judaism, Albany, 1995,” Qiryat Sefer 68, no. 4 (1998): 212.
133
Gerald Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution in Maimonides,” 175. See also Blidstein, “Review of
Jay Harris,” 213; and Berakhyahu Lifschitz’s argument that these geonic views have much in common with
talmudic claims about the Oral Torah; “‘Minhag’ u-Meqomo be-Midrag ha-Normot shel ‘Torah shebe-ʿal
Peh’,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 24 (2006-2007): 213. See below, n185.
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origins was sacred, significant, normative, and obligatory.”134 Based on this line of
reasoning, both Blidstein and Robert Brody questioned whether the geonim believed their
own rhetoric. Blidstein demurred, “we wonder whether we do not read the geonim too
simple-mindedly or too literally,”135 and Brody wrote, “we cannot say to what extent
Se‘adyah genuinely believed in the claims he advanced and to what extent he simply
chose apologetic arguments which he estimated to have the greatest chances of
success.”136 Brody concluded, “whether [Saʿadya] actually believed his own claims or
chose them for purely polemical purposes, a tendency to wax nostalgic over an idealized
past was certainly characteristic of him.”137
Others have taken a different approach. Yoḥanan Silman and, more recently,
Moshe Halbertal, have placed geonic claims in conversation with post-talmudic “models”
of revelation. Silman categorized geonic legal epistemology as part of “the preservation
approach” (ha-tefisah ha-meshammeret)138 to received knowledge, a perspective that
asserts the completeness and singularity of the Sinaitic revelation and downplays postSinaitic contributions to the law. Halbertal termed the geonic view a “retrieval” model of
the Oral Torah that sought to recover and preserve data that would otherwise have been

Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 176, 175 (emphasis in original). He added that
Maimonides “challeng[ed] the Karaites, rather than responding to them as the geonim had done” (179). See
also idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit le-Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Daʿat
16 (1986): 18. Compare Harris’ claim that by rejecting the creativity of halakhic midrash, Saʿadya refused
to battle the Qaraites “on their own turf”; How Do We Know This, 75-76.
135
Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 171-72.
136
Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 246.
137
Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, 35.
138
Silman, Qol Gadol ve-lo Yasaf, 39-69; see also idem, “Torah Elohit she-‘Lo ba-Shamayim
Hi’,” 263-71. Because Silman offered a typology of Jewish understandings of revelation, he mingled
talmudic and post-talmudic sources; his integration of the geonim into this view is apparent in the notes.
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lost over time. He focused particularly on the chains of transmission used by geonim to
defend the Oral Torah and on their claims that forgetful and lazy students were the cause
of talmudic debates.139 In their treatments of the geonic outlook as one of several posttalmudic approaches to the Oral Torah, Silman and Halbertal appear to assume that
geonic ideas are coherent beyond the context of Qaraite polemic.
The Islamic context of geonic writings offers another vantage point on geonic
claims about the Oral Torah’s divine origins. Moshe Zucker was one of the first scholars
to situate Qaraite and Rabbanite jurisprudence in the context of Islamic scriptural
interpretation and legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh);140 other studies have continued this
approach.141 Regarding the Oral Torah in particular, David Sklare detailed how the

Halbertal, People of the Book, 54-57. See also idem, Maimonides, 100-103; and idem, ʿAl
Derekh ha-Emet: ha-Ramban ve-Yeṣiratah shel Masoret (Jerusalem: Shalom Hartman Institute, 2006), 2122. Note Blidstein’s comment that the geonic approach “attempt[s] to recover aspects of the tradition lost
by forgetfulness or error”; “Oral Law as Institution,” 171. On the term “model,” see below, n448.
140
See above, n10.
141
See above, nn11-12. On the role of ijmāʿ in geonic presentations of the Oral Torah, see Gerald
Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh ve-Toldotav be-Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon,” Daʿat 4 (1980): 13;
repr. in “Oral Torah: Ideology and History in the Epistle of Sherira Gaon,” in Religious Knowledge,
Authority, and Charisma: Islamic and Jewish Perspectives, eds. Daphna Ephrat and Meir Hatina (Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press, 2014), 73-87 (references will be to the Hebrew version); idem, Samkhut uMeri, 148; Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lx-lxi; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms,” 19-20;
and Libson, “Halakhah and Reality in the Gaonic Period,” 95. Gerson Cohen compared the tools of
Rabbanite anti-Qaraite polemic to Islamic defenses of ḥadīth; see Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed.
Cohen, l-lvii. For other issues, see John Wansbrough, “Majāz al-Qurʾān: Periphrastic Exegesis,” BSOAS
33, no. 2 (1970): 260-65; Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Shiṭot ha-Maḥshavah ha-Datit shel Abū Yusūf Yaʿaqūb
al-Qirqisānī ve-Yefet ben ʿEli,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1977), 1:89-100; Diana Lobel, Between
Mysticism and Philosophy, 59-67; Gregor Schwarb, “Uṣūl al-fiqh im jüdischen ‘Kalám’ des 10. und 11.
Jahrhunderts,” 77-89; idem, “Capturing the Meaning of God’s Speech,” 111-56; idem, “Sahl b. al-Faḍl alTustarī’s Kitāb al-Īmāʾ,” Ginzei Qedem 2 (2006): 61-105; Joseph David, “Yediʿat davar ha-El: Ṭaʿut,
Heqqesh, Zikaron u-Mesirah be-Sifrut ha-Geonim ve-Hakhmei Sefard ha-Rishonim,” (PhD diss., Hebrew
University, 2005), 125-39; idem, Jurisprudence and Theology, 89-93; and Miriam Goldstein, “Abū l-Faraj
Hārūn (Jerusalem, 11th c.) on Majāz: Between Uṣūl al-Naḥw, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, and Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān,” Der
Islam 90, no. 2 (2013): 376-411. For an alternative approach, see Ḥava Lazuras-Yafeh, “Ha-Yaḥas leMeqorot ha-Halakhah ba-Islam be-hashvaʾah la-Yahadut,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish
Studies 8, Division C: Talmud and Midrash, Philosophy and Mysticism, Hebrew and Yiddish Literature
(1981): 47-49.
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geonic portrait of the late antique rabbis as “transmitters and not initiators of tradition”142
drew on notions of tradition current in the Islamic world. Placing geonic-era
understandings of the Oral Torah in their intellectual context brackets the question of
what the geonim “really” believed; instead, it looks for ways that geonic legal thought
can be contextualized within debates that engaged broader society – about Scripture,
extra-scriptural traditions, and the role of jurists after prophecy. As Sklare explained, the
geonic concept of tradition “had to make sense within [their] conceptual world.”143
There are distinct advantages to framing geonic legal epistemology as an outlook
that developed in conversation with concerns other than Qaraism. This approach helps to
explain why later geonim, whose writings contain far less anti-Qaraite invective than
those of Saʿadya, largely upheld his model of the Oral Torah.144 Moreover, the
assumption that Qaraism alone was responsible for geonic thinking about the Oral Torah
does not explain geonic embrace of positions that would not have been helpful in antiQaraite polemic.145 Researchers who did not place Saʿadya’s polemical writings in their

Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 43; see there, 43-47, 55-56, 158-65.
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 160.
144
On the paucity of anti-Qaraite polemic among later Baghdadi geonim, see Poznański, “The
Anti-Karaite Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” 274; Baron, SRHJ2, 5:269; Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 98-99,
242, 310-12; Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 56, 76-77, 280 (where Samuel ben Ḥofni besought divine
blessing for both Saʿadya and Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī); and Marina Rustow, “The Genizah and Jewish
Communal History,” in “From a Sacred Source”: Genizah Studies in Honour of Stefan C. Reif, eds. Ben
Outhwaite and Siam Bhayro (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 311-12. See also idem, “Rabbanite-Karaite Relations in
Fatimid Egypt and Syria: A Study Based on Documents from the Cairo Genizah,” (PhD diss., Columbia
University, 2004), 161-81. On a parallel development in eleventh-century Qaraism, see Ḥaggai BenShammai, “Major Trends in Karaite Philosophy and Polemics in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries,” in
Karaite Judaism, 354. See also Baron, “Saadia’s Communal Activities,” 18-19.
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Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 172, noted that the claim that forgetfulness accounts for
disagreements among the rabbis would not have been particularly helpful in disputes with Qaraites. This
claim likely draws on contemporaneous Islamic approaches to ḥadīth; see below.
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tenth-century context146 failed to note that literary rebuttals were a popular genre in this
period, and that authors who composed stylized critiques frequently revived the figures of
religious “deviants.”147 (This was particularly true, for example, of Saʿadya’s attacks on
Ḥayyawayh148 al-Balkhī [9th c.], the prototypical heretic in Qaraite and Rabbanite
writings.149) In short, while some writings of the geonic period were clearly polemical,
geonic arguments were hardly “mere polemic.” It would be wrong to think that authors
took positions that they knew to be false, merely to defeat their opponents.
Other scholars have interrogated the portrait of geonic theology as motivated
solely by polemics,150 and this chapter builds on their studies. It aims to illuminate the
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Davidson wrote, “the virulent expressions frequently met with in this polemic jar upon our
sense of decency. Some of them would shame an infuriated fishwife”; Salmon ben Yeruḥim, Sefer
Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, xliii. See also Rosenthal’s emphasis on Saʿadya’s attacks on Ḥayyawayh
al-Balkhī; “Ḥiwi al-Balkhi: A Comparative Study,” 320-21. Halkin drew attention to the fact that Saʿadya’s
writings reflect contemporary style; “Saadia’s Exegesis and Polemics,” 139; and Nemoy described the
tenth century as “an age and milieu of Sturm und Drang”; “Review of A Critical Edition, with a
Translation and Notes, of the Book of Tradition (Sefer ha-Qabbalah) by Gerson D. Cohen,” Jewish Social
Studies 31, no. 1 (1969): 49.
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See Norman Calder, “The Barāhima: Literary Construct and Historical Reality,” BSOAS 57, no.
1 (1994): 43-45. This motif likely has roots in the disputational nature of kalām discourse; see Steven
Wasserstrom, “Islamicate History of Religions?” History of Religions 27, no. 4 (1988): 409; Josef van Ess,
“Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie: Eine vorläufige Skizze,” Revue des Études Islamiques 44
(1976): 23-60; and idem, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra (Berlin: W. de
Gruyter, 1991) 1:48-55.
148
Earlier scholars transcribed his name as Ḥīwī; on this spelling see Ben-Shammai, “Major
Trends in Karaite Philosophy,” 352n75; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 318.
149
See Sarah Stroumsa, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam: Ibn al-Rāwāndī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and
Their Impact on Islamic Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 219-21; and Ezra Fleischer, “Sarid me-Hasagotav
shel Ḥiwi ha-Balkhī ʿal Sifrei ha-Miqra,” Tarbiẓ 51, no. 1 (1982): 50.
150
Sarah Stroumsa questioned Malter’s evaluation of Saʿadya’s eclectic approach to kalām as
“polemical”; see Malter, Saadia Gaon, 198-99; and Sarah Stroumsa, Saʿadya Gaon: Hogeh Yehudi beḤevrah Yam-Tikhonit (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2002), 35. Others have debated the role of polemics
in Saʿadya’s commentary on Sefer Yeṣirah; see Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Saadya’s Goal in his Commentary
on Sefer Yeẓira,” in Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture, ed. Jeremiah Hackett
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 6-7; Gyongyi Hegedus, “The Double
Path: The Two Layers of Thinking and the Twofold Nature of Knowledge in the Works of Saadya Gaon,”
in Reflecting Diversity: Historical and Thematical Perspectives in the Jewish and Christian Tradition, eds.
Péter Losonczi and Géza G. Xeravits (Vienna: Lit, 2007), 43-61; and idem, The Double Path of the Mystic
and the Rationalist (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 13-14. For discussion of the role that polemic played in Saʿadya’s
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context that provided the geonim with the tools to defend the Oral Torah and it notes
correspondences between Rabbanite claims of the geonic-era and the contemporaneous
Muslim assumption that the only valid source of religious authority is revealed material,
i.e., the Qurʾān and prophetic ḥadīth (extra-scriptural traditions). Throughout, I will
consider Rabbanite claims in light of earlier rabbinic writings and contemporaneous
Islam and Qaraism.

Historical Background
Tenth- and eleventh-century geonic defenses of the Oral Torah were in dialogue
with both Qaraite criticism of the rabbis and Islamic debates about extra-scriptural
traditions. The tenth-century Qaraite, Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī, reported that messianic figures
in the first half of the eighth century were the first to endorse practices at variance with
talmudic Judaism.151 The next well-known figures who opposed talmudic authority,
ʿAnan ben David and Benjamin al-Nahāwandī, also denied the authority of the Talmud,

understanding of Psalms, see Simon, Four Approaches to the Book of Psalms, 31-42; Ḥaggai BenShammai, “Review of Simon, Uriel. Arbaʿ Gishot le-Sefer Tehillim, me-R. Saʿadya Gaon ʿad R. Avraham
Ibn Ezra (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1982),” Qiryat Sefer 58, no. 2 (1983): 400-406; and idem,
“ʿAl Yesod Pulmusi be-Torat-ha-Nevuʾah shel Rasag,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 7 (1988):
130-32. Compare David I. Shyovitz, “Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Werewolf Renaissance,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 75, no. 4 (2014): 522: “medieval discourses of monstrosity were treated not
solely as founts of polemical rhetoric, but also as theological problems in pressing need of solutions.” In a
different context, Shaye Cohen wrote, “all is fair in love and polemics”; Why Aren’t Jewish Women
Circumcised: Gender and Covenant in Judaism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 92, 181.
This, I believe, is an overstatement in the context of geonic legal thought.
151
Qirqisānī mentioned Abū ʿĪsā of Iṣfahān and Yūdghān of Hamadan; see Kitāb al-Anwār walMarāqib, ed. Leon Nemoy (New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1939-1943), 1:51-53. On
the doctrines of these figures, see Israel Friedlander, “Jewish-Arabic Studies,” JQR 1, no. 2 (1910): 214-15;
3, no. 2 (1912): 295-99; and on the ʿIsāwīya specifically, Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and Jew, 84-88.
On seventh- and eighth-century messianic movements, see Aaron Aescoly, Ha-Tenuʿot ha-Meshiḥiyot beYisrael: Oṣar ha-Meqorot veha-Teʿudot le-Toldot ha-Meshiḥiyut be-Yisrael (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik,
1956), 1:115-55.
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but were more measured opponents of Rabbanite Judaism than were non-Rabbanites of
the later ninth century.152 The most vigorous early anti-Rabbanite figure was Daniel alQūmisī, who moved to Jerusalem from Iran around 880 and introduced anti-Rabbanite
polemic into nascent Qaraism.153 Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai has argued that al-Qūmisī’s
rejection of tradition as a source of legal authority made him the first true Qaraite
“scripturalist.”154 The term “Qaraism” covers a diverse group of tenth- and eleventhcentury thinkers,155 but leading figures such as Qirqisānī, Salmon ben Yeruḥim156
(Jerusalem; fl. mid. 10th c.), Sahl ben Maṣliaḥ (Jerusalem; fl. late 10th c.), and Yefet ben
ʿEli upheld earlier expressions of opposition to the Oral Torah and polemicized against

152
See above, n118. On ʿAnan’s legal methodology, see Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Babylonian
Aramaic in Arabic Characters: A Passage from ʿAnan’s Book of Precepts in a Work of Yeshuʿah B. Judah
the Karaite,” JSAI 32 (2006): 419-32. On al-Nahāwandī, see Yoram Erder, Avlei Ṣion ha-Qaraʾim uMegillot Qumran: Le-Toldot Ḥalufah le-Yahadut ha-Rabbanit (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibbuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 2004),
71-81.
153
Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Ha-Parshan ha-Qaraʾi ve-Savivato ha-Rabbanit,” Proceedings of the
World Congress of Jewish Studies, 9, Panel Sessions: Bible Studies and Ancient Near East (1985): 50-51.
On the absence of explicit polemic in ʿAnan’s writings, see also Leon Nemoy, “Anan Ben David: A ReAppraisal of the Historical Data,” in Semitic Studies in Memory of Immanuel Löw, ed. Sándor Scheiber
(Budapest: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1947), 246n37; repr. in Karaite Studies, ed. Philip
Birnbaum (New York: Hermon Press, 1971), 316n37.
154
Ben-Shammai, “Return to the Scriptures,” 327-28; and earlier, Moshe Zucker, ʿAl Targum
Rasag la-Torah: Parshanut Halakhah u-Polemiqah be-Targum ha-Torah shel R. Saʿadya Gaon (New
York: Feldheim, 1959), 168. On Daniel, see Jacob Mann, “A Tract by an Early Karaite Settler in
Jerusalem,” JQR 12, no. 3 (1922): 257-98; Leon Nemoy, “The Pseudo-Qūmisīan Sermon to the Karaites,”
PAAJR 43 (1976): 49-105; Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Fragments of Daniel al-Qūmisī’s Commentary on the
Book of Daniel as a Historical Source,” Henoch, 13, no. 3 (1991): 259-81; idem, “Seridei Peirush Daniel
le-Daniel al-Qūmisī ke-Meqor Histori le-Toldot Ereṣ Yisrael,” Shalem 3 (1981): 295-307; and Neḥemyah
Gordon, “Ha-Omnam raq Mashmaʿut aḥat la-Miqra? ʿIyun be-Gishato ha-Parshanit shel Daniel al-Qūmisī
be-‘Pitron Shenayim ʿAsar’,” Tarbiẓ 76, no. 3-4 (2007): 385-414.
155
Qirqisānī ascribed the diversity of contemporary Qaraites to their reliance on laws that are the
product of reason (nustakhrij al-ʿilm istakhrājan bi-ʿuqūlinā). Rabbanites, he claimed, should not allow
disagreement, given their assertion that they possess prophetic tradition (naql ʿan al-nubūwa); Kitāb alAnwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:63-64. On this passage, see Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 219-20. On the rise of
opposition to Rabbanite Judaism in this period, see in general, Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 83-95.
156
On the spelling of Salmon’s patronymic, see Michael G. Wechsler, The Arabic Translation and
Commentary of Yefet ben ʿEli the Karaite on the Book of Esther (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 125n9; and James
Robinson, Asceticism, Eschatology, Opposition to Philosophy: The Arabic Translation and Commentary of
Salmon Ben Yeroham on Qohelet (Ecclesiastes) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 3n1.
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Saʿadya and other Rabbanites.157 Qaraites rejected the divine origin of the Oral Torah,
accused the ancient rabbis of adding to revelation, and denied the authority of
contemporary Rabbanites.
Midrashic literature of the geonic-era contains what may be the earliest responses
to the sundry critics of Rabbinic Judaism.158 Defenders of the Talmud in this period used
midrashic literature to advocate on behalf of the geonic academies,159 to respond to al-

For background on these and other figures, see Samuel Poznański, The Karaite Literary
Opponents of Saadiah Gaon (London: Luzac, 1908), 4-65; Mann, Texts and Studies, 2:3-49; Gil, Jews in
Islamic Countries, 260-69; Daniel Frank, Search Scripture Well: Karaite Exegetes and the Origins of the
Jewish Biblical Commentary in the Islamic East (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1-32; and Yoram Erder, “The
Mourners of Zion: The Karaites in Jerusalem in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries,” in Karaite Judaism,
213-35.
158
See in general Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 203-218; and Myron B. Lerner, “The Works of
Aggadic Midrash and the Esther Midrashim,” in The Literature of the Sages, Second Part: Midrash and
Targum, Liturgy, Poetry, Mysticism, Contracts, Inscriptions, Ancient Science and the Languages of
Rabbinic Literature, eds. Shmuel Safrai et al. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2006), 2:153. On several relevant
passages in the Tanna de-vei Eliyahu, see Wilhelm Bacher, “Antikaräisches in einem jüngeren Midrasch,”
MGWJ 23, no. 6 (1874): 266-71; and Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 205-206. On the dating of this text, see
Hermann Leberecht Strack and Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, ed. and trans.
Markus Bockmuehl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 340-41. See also the Tanḥuma’s denigration of
those who sit in darkness on the Sabbath, treated in Leopold Zunz, Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der
Juden historisch entwickelt (Frankfurt, 1892), 236n; and Marc Bregman, Sifrut Tanḥuma-Yelammedeinu
(Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2003), 185.
This literature builds on earlier rabbinic polemics apparently directed against scripturalist critics of
Rabbinic Judaism. For example, Ben-Shammai dated bMak 22b to the early Islamic period and used it as
evidence of late talmudic-era scripturalism; see “Karaite Controversy,” 24-26; and idem, “Return to the
Scriptures,” 328. Yaakov Elman dated this passage and others like it to the fourth century; see “Middle
Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal
Tradition,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature, eds. Charlotte Elisheva
Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 176-80; idem,
“Acculturation to Elite Persian Norms and Modes of Thought in the Babylonian Jewish Community of Late
Antiquity,” in Netiʿot Ledavid: Jubilee Volume for David Weiss Halivni, eds. Yaakov Elman et al.
(Jerusalem: Orḥot Press, 2004), 38-43; and idem, “Rava as Mara de-Atra in Maḥoza,” Ḥakira 11 (2011):
68-75. For another late sugya that may respond to the Islamic environment, see Yaakov Elman, “The World
of the ‘Sabboraim’: Cultural Aspects of Post-Redactional Additions to the Bavli,” in Creation and
Composition: The Contribution of the Bavli Redactors (Stammaim) to the Aggada, ed. Jeffrey L.
Rubenstein (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 383-98. Yaʿaqov Sussman suggested that sugyot that relax
the prohibition on writing the Oral Torah are relatively late as well; “‘Torah shebe-ʿal Peh’ – Peshuṭa keMashmaʿa: Koḥo shel qoṣo shel yod,” in Mehqarei Talmud 3, Muqdash li-Zikhro shel Profesor Ephraim
Elimelekh Urbach, eds. Yaʿaqov Sussman and David Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2005), 325, 334-35.
159
See the Tanḥuma passage adduced in Zunz, Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge, 235-36n; treated
in Avigdor Aptowitzer, “Untersuchungen zur gaonäischen Literatur,” HUCA 8-9 (1931-1932): 415-17;
157
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Qūmisī and Yefet ben ʿEli,160 and to defend the Oral Torah more generally.161 (It is
noteworthy that scholars have identified numerous ḥadīth that respond to Muslim ḥadīth
critics.162) Brody has also identified a pro-Rabbanite/anti-scripturalist defense of the Oral

Benjamin Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim be-Lashon, be-Shirah uve-Sifrut (Tel Aviv: Hoṣaʾat Maḥbarot leSifrut, 1954), 333; and Bregman, Sifrut Tanḥuma-Yelammedeinu, 185-86, 192n8. Similar sentiments appear
in Mishnat R. Eliezer; see H.G. Enelow, ed., Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer o Midrash Shloshim u-Shetayim Middot
(New York: Bloch, 1933), 259; and in Otiyot de-R. Aqiva; see Abraham Joseph Wertheimer, Batei
Midrashot: ʿEsrim va-Ḥamishah Midreshei Ḥazal ʿal pi kitvei yad mi-Genizot Yerushalayim u-Miṣrayim
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1950), 2:415. On the dating of these texts, see Strack and Stemberger,
Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 22-23, 349; and below, n161.
160
Burton L. Visotzky, “Midrash Mishle: A Critical Edition Based on Manuscripts and Early
Editions with an Introduction and Annotated English Translation of Chapters One through Ten,” (PhD
diss., Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1983), 1:47-64; and idem, The Midrash on Proverbs:
Translated from the Hebrew with an Introduction and Annotations (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), 10-12.
161
See the linguistic similarities between Pirqoy ben Baboy’s defense of the Oral Torah and a
Tanḥuma passage that praises God for giving the Written and Oral Torahs at Sinai; treated in Aptowitzer,
“Untersuchungen zur Gaonäischen Literatur,” 417; Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim, 333; Jacob Mann,
“Genizah Studies,” The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 46, no. 4 (1930): 266;
Sussman, “Kitvei-Yad u-Mesorot-Nusaḥ shel ha-Mishnah,” 238n91; and Neil Danzig, Mavo le-Sefer
Halakhot Pesuqot: ʿim tashlum Halakhot Pesuqot (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-Rabbanim ba-America,
1993), 21n28. A similar phenomenon is detectable in the thirty-two middot ascribed to R. Eliezer ben Yossi
ha-Glili, which, in the words of David Stern, were probably compiled in order “to legitimate [rabbinic]
hermeneutical methods and to provide polemical documentation against competing exegetical schools”;
“Midrash and Indeterminacy,” Critical Inquiry 15, no. 1 (1988): 147. Zucker argued that this text belongs
to the period after Saʿadya; “Le-Pitron Baʿayat 32 Middot u-‘Mishnat R. Eliezer’,” PAAJR 23 (1954): 1-19;
and idem, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 250-60; accepted by Israel Ta-Shma, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-Qadmon: Ḥeiqer
ve-ʿIyun (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1992), 300-301. Others disagreed; see J.N. Epstein, “Le-‘Mishnat Rabbi
Eliezer beno shel Rabbi Yossi ha-Glili’,” Tarbiẓ 4, no. 4 (1933): 343-353; idem, “Mishnat R. Eliezer,”
HUCA 23, no. 2 (1950-1951): 1-15; Menaḥem Moreshet, “Le-Loshona shel ‘Mishnat R. Eliezer’ o
‘Midrash de-32 Middot’,” Bar Ilan Annual 11 (1973): 183-223; and Richard C. Steiner, “Muqdam uMeʿuḥar and Muqaddam wa-Muʿaḫḫar: On the History of Some Hebrew and Arabic Terms for Hysteron
Proteron and Anastrophe,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 66, no 1 (2007): 39-41. See also Naftali
Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism (London: East and West Library, 1958), 65-66; Ben-Shammai,
“Ha-Parshan ha-Qaraʾi,” 47n20; and Robert Brody, Pirqoy ben Baboi ve-Toldot ha-Pulmus ha-PenimYehudi (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2003), 30n49.
162
Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, ed. and trans. S.M. Stern (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1971), 2:126-31; Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1950), 53-56; Michael Cook, “ʿAnan and Islam: The Origins of Karaite Scripturalism,”
JSAI 9 (1987): 172-73; John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 22-25; and more generally, Aisha Y. Musa, Ḥadīth as
Scripture: Discussions on the Authority of Prophetic Traditions in Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), 11-14, 17-21. For examples, see Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed.
and trans. Joseph Lowry (New York: NYU Press, 2013), 75-77 (treated in Schacht, Origins, 46); and Cook,
“ʿAnan and Islam,” 173.
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Torah that formed the basis of Pirqoy ben Baboy’s Epistle (written at the turn of the ninth
century to advocate for the Babylonian tradition).163 By contrast, geonic texts with named
authors prior to the time of Saʿadya preserve relatively few responses to Qaraites and
others that the geonim deemed heretics.164 Although Saʿadya was not the first to engage
in polemics, his sustained criticisms of a wide range of opponents, most prominently
Ḥayyawayh and ʿAnan, was atypical among the Babylonian geonim.165
The period from the eighth to the tenth centuries also witnessed significant
changes in the framing, rhetoric, and sources of Islamic law. Prior to the ninth century,
prophetic authority was one of several competing and complementary sources of legal
practice. Jurists in this period freely cited ḥadīth ascribed to Muḥammad, his Companions
(i.e., contemporaries), and his Successors (i.e., the subsequent generation).166 Many

Brody, Pirqoy ben Baboi; based on the text in B.M. Lewin, “Mi-Shiyarei ha-Genizah,” Tarbiẓ
2, no. 4 (1931): 400-405; see also Louis Ginzberg, Ginzei Schechter (New York: Beit Midrash haRabbanim Asher be-America, 1928-1929), 2:571-72, 2:638-39. See Lewin, “Mi-Shiyarei ha-Genizah,”
394-97; Shalom Spiegal, “Le-Farashat ha-Pulmus shel Pirqoy ben Baboy,” in Sefer ha-Yovel li-khvod Ẓvi
Wolfson, ed. Saul Liberman (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965), 261-66; and
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 39. For background on Pirqoy’s Epistle, see Menaḥem Ben-Sasson,
Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit be-Arṣot ha-Islam: Qairawan 800-1057 (Jerusalem: Magnes; 1996), 24144; and idem, “Benei ha-Maghreb ve-Qishreihem le-Ereṣ Yisrael, Meʾot 9-11,” Shalem 5 (1997): 31-43.
164
A responsum ascribed to the eighth-century gaon Naṭronai ben Neḥemiah mentions two types
of people whom the author viewed as heretics: those who reject the Talmud and those who reject the Torah
entirely. See B.M. Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Shabbat, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 2:128-29 (§396); and
Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Yevamot, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 7:113-14 (§263). For authorship and
background, see Ben-Shammai, “Karaite Controversy,” 19; Robert Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot shel Rav
Naṭronai bar Hillay Gaon (Jerusalem: Ofeq, 2011), 31n18; and idem, Geonim of Babylonia, 84-85.
Another responsum, attributed to the ninth-century gaon Naṭronai bar Hilay, indicates that the author had
little direct knowledge of ʿAnan’s writings; see Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 256-58; and idem, Geonim of
Babylonia, 96.
165
See Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 96-98, citing earlier scholarship, for the claim the Saʿadya
“broke with geonic precedent”; see the modification of his view there, xii, based on the evidence cited
above, n163.
166
See Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), 15-16; idem, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law,”
Islamic Law and Society 8, no. 3 (2001): 389-90, 399, 402-405; idem, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (Oxford:
OneWorld, 2006), 20, 41, 49-50; Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge:
163
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jurists before the eighth century also employed raʾy, a term that might be rendered
“considered opinion”167 or legal rulings with an “element of human reasoning,”168 to
supplement received sources (both revealed and non-revealed), or to serve in their
stead.169 In this period, the word Sunna – which in the Qurʾān does not refer to prophetic
practices – denoted practices of Muḥammad or of early caliphs, or long-established
practices (especially in Medina, where Mālik ibn Anas [d. 795] and others understood
lived practice [ʿamal] as the best guarantor of prophetic tradition).170
Against this background, the insistence of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820
in Egypt)171 that only revealed sources may constitute “any law which lay claim to being

Cambridge University Press, 2005), 69-74; and Umar F. Abd-Allah Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina:
Islamic Legal Reasoning in the Formative Period (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 102-107. This is also the
conclusion of the quantitative studies in Harold Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan
Fiqh before the Classical Schools, trans. Marion H. Katz (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 107-108, 187, 209, 235,
242, 255-56, 295-96. See also Scott Lucas, “Where are the Legal Ḥadīth? A Study of the Muṣannaf of Ibn
Abī Shayba,” Islamic Law and Society 15 (2008): 238-314.
167
Following Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 68; or “discretionary opinion”
(44). See also Norman Calder, Studies in Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 12.
168
Joseph Schacht, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Aṣḥāb al-Raʾy,” 1:691 (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1986); see Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 386-87. Or, “the speculative elaboration of
norms”; Lowry, in Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. Lowry, xvi.
169
See the earlier treatments in Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:78-83; and Schacht, Origins, 98-132.
Later studies complicated this picture but confirmed the frequent use of raʾy; see, e.g., Melchert, The
Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 1-13; idem, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 385-88; Hallaq, The
Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 74-76; Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence, 288, 297;
idem, “The Jurisprudence of Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī. A Source-Critical Study,” in Analysing Muslim
Traditions: Studies in Legal, Exegetical and Maghāzī Ḥadīth (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 6, 13, 19, 25-29; and
Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina, 141-45.
170
See Schacht, Origins, 58-77; Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology before Šāfiʿī: A
Semantic Analysis with Special Reference to Kūfa,” Arabica 19, no. 3 (1972): 259-82; Patricia Crone and
Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 58-96; G.H.A. Juynboll, “Some New Ideas on the Development of Sunna as a
Technical Term in Early Islam,” JSAI 10 (1987): 97-118; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 167-69; and
Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina, 293-328.
171
For Shāfiʿī’s biography, see Kecia Ali, Imam Shafiʿi: Scholar and Saint (Oxford: Oneworld,
2011), 1-45.
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truly Islamic,”172 was a dramatic change. Shāfiʿī’s Risāla (Epistle), one of the earliest
texts to articulate a theoretical justification of Islamic law,173 argued that only revealed
texts constitute acceptable legal sources.174 Shāfiʿī maintained that the Qurʾān and the
(exclusively) prophetic Sunna constitute the entirety of revelation. He thus limited the
concept of Sunna to sunnat al-nabī, the Sunna of the Prophet, or sunnat rasūl Allāh, the
Sunna of God’s messenger,175 and he considerably reduced the role played by ḥadīth
from the Companions and Successors to Muḥammad.176 Shāfiʿī further insisted that the

172

This phrase belongs to Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 168, describing the views of the
critics of qiyās.
173
On Shāfiʿī and later uṣūl al-fiqh; see Wael Hallaq, “Was al-Shafiʿi the Master Architect of
Islamic Jurisprudence?” IJMES 25, no. 4 (1993): 587-605; idem, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 3035; Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī Have a Theory of ‘Four Sources’ of Law?” 23-50; idem, Early Islamic Legal
Theory, 51-59; idem, “The Reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s Concept of Amr and Nahy in the Thought of his
Student al-Muzanī,” in Law and Education in Medieval Islam: Studies in Memory of George Makdisi, eds.
Joseph Lowry et al. (Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2004), 128-49; and idem, “Some
Preliminary Observations on al-Šāfiʿī and Later Uṣūl al-Fiqh: The Case of the Term bayān,” Arabica 55,
no. 5-6 (2008): 505-527. Devin Stewart has identified traces of pre-Shāfiʿī uṣūl al-fiqh; see “Muḥammad b.
Dawūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence, al-Wuṣūl ilā Maʿrifat al-Uṣūl,” in Studies in Islamic Legal
Theory, 102-106; and idem, “Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ʿan Uṣūl al-Aḥkām and the Genre of
Uṣūl al-Fiqh in Ninth Century Baghdad,” in ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of
ʿAbbasid Studies, ed. James E. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 330-49. For the legal theory of
another early jurist, see Joseph Lowry, “The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ on Interpretation,
Authority, and the Structure of the Law,” JAOS 128, no. 1 (2008): 25-40. Norman Calder questioned
Shāfiʿī’s authorship of the Risāla; see Studies in Muslim Jurisprudence, 241-43. This has largely been put
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Islamic Law and Society 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-41; Ahmed El Shamsy, “From Tradition to Law: The Origins
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University, 2009), 265-77; and idem, “Al-Shāfiʿī’s Written Corpus: A Source-Critical Study,” JAOS 132,
no. 2 (2012): 199-220.
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Ahmed El Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī: The Traditionalist Legal Thought of Abū Yaʿqūb al-Buwayṭī (d.
231/846),” Islamic Law and Society 14, no. 3 (2007): 317-18; and idem, The Canonization of Islamic Law:
A Social and Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 151.
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Qurʾān and Sunna – written and oral revelation – are of equal standing, apparently
arguing against the view that non-Qurʾānic reports reflect a lower degree of revelation.177
Joseph Lowry showed that the Risāla is an extended argument about the interaction of
revealed sources;178 according to Shāfiʿī , although abrogation, naskh, may affect one
body of revelation, the Qurʾān may not abrogate the Sunna nor the Sunna the Qurʾān.
This position – apparently unique in the history of Islamic law – appears to result from
Shāfiʿī’s commitment to protect oral revelation as a valid source of law. Were it possible
for the Qurʾān to abrogate the Sunna, Shāfiʿī explained, one might claim that any
qurʾānic source should prevail over a Sunna that appears to modify it. Such reasoning,
noted Shāfiʿī, could render the Sunna entirely extraneous.179 Lastly, Shāfiʿī downplayed
non-divine sources of law, such as consensus (ijmāʿ); he used this only to corroborate
otherwise debatable interpretations of revealed texts.180
Many of Shāfiʿī’s contemporaries who preferred legal ḥadīth to speculative
reasoning continued to affirm the authority of ḥadīth ascribed to non-prophetic figures.
Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, one of the most prominent mid-ninth century authorities, reportedly

entirely from his legal thought, but one suspects that he would have liked to do since they interfere with the
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islamique (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 491-98.
177
Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 403-404.
178
Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 23-46.
179
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allowed ḥadīth from Muḥammad and from the first four caliphs. Others – including some
of Shāfiʿī’s followers – were even more lenient. Nevertheless, Shāfiʿī’s revelation-only
view of Islamic law became standard within Sunni Islam over the course of the late ninth
and early tenth centuries, and jurists generally came to limit ḥadīth to prophetic texts.181
The result of this process was “an exclusively textualist … conception of revelation,” in
which “the ultimate author of the Sunna was God himself.”182 The Muslim jurist
correspondingly sought to “salvage the authentic memory of the prophetic age and delegitimize the later accretions to the law,”183 so that prophetic traditions – as transmitted
through written and oral revelation – became the sole source of religious authority.
Many geonic claims become intelligible when read in light of this shift to a
revelation-only perspective of religious law in broader Islamic society. Saʿadya, whose
“highest aspiration” Brody described as “the restoration of a long-ago Golden Age,”184
first articulated these assertions. Despite some criticism from Sherira ben Ḥanina Gaon
(c. 906-1006), his son Hayya, and others, Rabbanites in Baghdad and North Africa
largely upheld this perspective, successfully integrating and manipulating earlier rabbinic
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sources, and augmenting them with arguments found in contemporary Islamic texts. They
thus established a doctrine that was consistent with many of the assumptions of the time.
Because Rabbanite Judaism and Sunni Islam asserted the doctrine of a dual revelation, it
is unsurprising that jurists in both communities defended their systems of religious law in
similar ways.

Late Geonic-Era Claims about the Scope of Revelation
Geonic affirmations that revelation encompassed both the Written and Oral
Torahs were largely continuous with claims about the origins of rabbinic tradition found
in rabbinic aggadah.185 These theological and homiletical assertions do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Tannaim, however; Azzan Yadin has argued that the Aqiva and
Ishmael schools debated the scope of extra-scriptural tradition,186 and others have noted
that the Mishnah and Tosefta do not claim to be divinely authorized documents.187
According to Martin Jaffee, the ambiguous relationship in these tannaitic documents
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between laws rooted in Scripture and laws established by the Sages gave rise to “a
pressing jurisprudential problem” of determining the relationship and hierarchy of legal
sources. In Jaffee’s view, the first to promulgate an ideology of the Oral Torah that
located all post-scriptural innovations in divine revelation were the authors of thirdcentury midrashic literature.188 Rabbanite defenses of the Oral Torah maintained this
ideological stance, but they did so in the language of contemporaneous Muslim defenses
of extra-scriptural traditions.

Enumerations of the Commandments
Geonic-era enumerations of the 613 commandments – all of which include postMosaic laws189 – are an important, if somewhat enigmatic, example of the ways that
Rabbanites located post-biblical legislation at Sinai. Rabbanites cited different versions
of the Talmud’s description of the 613 commandments (bMak 23b); some preserved a
reading that the 613 were “said to Moses at Sinai,” or simply “said to Moses,” and others,
that “Israel was commanded 613 commandments.” While some jurists after the twelfth
century claimed that the “correct” wording of this passage should dictate whether or not
the enumeration was intended to include post-Sinaitic laws, geonic-era works freely
quote various versions of this text.190 Geonic-era enumerations counted some, or all, of
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the following as commandments: the festival of Purim; the post-biblical festival of
Hanukah; the lighting of Sabbath candles; the recitation of one hundred blessings a day,
and the recitation of Hallel (Ps. 113-18) on celebratory days.191 Reflecting on this claim,
Abraham Ibn Ezra (b. Toledo; 1089-1164) observed: “There is no difference between
matters from them [i.e., the rabbis] and matters from the Torah where the commandments
are concerned. They [i.e., the former] are also given to us; they, too, are a tradition from
their fathers, and the fathers of their fathers from the prophets – all is from God to
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Moses.”192 It is possible, however, that enumerators of the commandments sought to
anthologize Jewish law and did not seek to limit themselves to laws of biblical (or divine)
origin.193 By the same token, an author’s exclusion of a law from the enumeration need
not have meant that he considered it rabbinic in origin, as the categories of biblical law
and enumerated commandments overlap but are not equivalent. It seems likely, however,
that enumerations of the commandments are consistent with a broader geonic-era trend in
legal epistemology to downplay human contributions to divine law.
Having said this, both Saʿadya and Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ, who were more cautious
about listing post-Mosaic laws than other Rabbanite enumerators of this period, also
counted laws that appear to be of rabbinic status.194 Ḥayim Sabbato recently argued that
Saʿadya only included three post-Mosaic laws in his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the
Commandments): Purim, Hanukah, and second-order prohibitions of forbidden sexual
relations (sheniyot le-ʿarayot).195 Elsewhere, Saʿadya claimed pentateuchal authority (for
Purim and Hanukah) or divine, extra-scriptural authority (naql; regarding the sheniyot)
for these laws;196 this seems to indicate that his enumeration of the commandments only
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included laws that he considered to be of divine origin. Judah Ibn Bilʿam (Toledo,
Seville; late 11th c.) reported that Ḥefeṣ had criticized the inclusion of rabbinic laws in the
enumeration but did count both Purim and Hanukah among the 613 commandments.197
Early enumerations of the commandments also included laws based on postMosaic prophecy, such as the requirement to clothe the naked; according to Maimonides,
this was rooted in Isa. 58:7 (“when you see the naked, clothe him”), further suggesting
that, for these enumerators, the 613 covered all divine laws.198 In his Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ
(Book on the Commandments), Samuel ben Ḥofni described laws found in the Prophets as
oral traditions from Moses (compare bTan 17b and parallels199), describing each as a
khabar (pl., akhbār; a prophetic report).200 Similarly, an anonymous geonic letter relied
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on laws found in the Prophets to defend rabbinic tradition as a whole.201 The author drew
the following analogy: Just as laws that are not found in the Pentateuch yet appear
elsewhere in Scripture were known before they were written, so too, laws reported by the
rabbis must have been known before they were written.202

Claims about the Scope of Revelation
Enumerations of the commandments that treat laws as Sinaitic in origin that
rabbinic literature appears to consider to be rabbinic in status are consistent with geonicera claims about the scope of revelation. Saʿadya’s writings contain the sharpest
formulations of the geonic view. He proclaimed that God revealed both the uṣūl (roots or
principles) and the furūʿ (branches or details) of the law,203 that the Mishnah and Talmud
were transmitted orally until they were compiled,204 and that all of the details of how to
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perform the commandments were transmitted as “the nation witnessed them from acts of
the messenger (i.e., Moses).”205 Saʿadya contended that just as the Pentateuch presented
the Tabernacle and its inauguration in great detail, so, too, God would not leave any of
the commandments “unexplained” (ghayr bayyin). Therefore, he concluded, explanations
that are not found in Scripture (al-maktūb) must be in the tradition (al-manqūl).206
Later Rabbanites endorsed many of Saʿadya’s views. An unknown student of
Saʿadya207 maintained that Ps. 19:8 (“The Torah of the Lord is perfect [temimah]”), a

33. Saʿadya claimed that the ʿulamāʾ (“scholars,” i.e., the rabbis) collected the orally transmitted diqduq
sharāʾiʿ and aḥkām fiqh (details of the law[s]; פאלעלמא אלד'ין אהמהם הם אלאמה חתי חצלו להא דקדוק שראיעהא
 ;)ואחכאם פקההא וסאיר אלאכ'באר אלתי לם תכון מכתובSefer Yeṣirah, ed. Kafiḥ, 142.
205
 ;שאהדתהא אלאמה מן פעל אלרסולZucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 15. Zucker suggested that
Saʿadya drew the emphasis on witnessing the prophet’s actions, as opposed to his words, from Muslim
sources (185n100). See also Saʿadya’s commentary on Proverbs 25:1; Mishlei: ʿim Tirgum u-Feirush haGaon Saʿadya ben Yosef Fayyūmī, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1976), 104. Note the report of
one Qaraite that Saʿadya said that “just as all of the commandments were ancient and unwritten, so too the
Mishnah and the Talmud are ancient and were unwritten” ( כל המצות היו מקדם ולא היו נכתבו כן משנה והתלמוד היו
 ;)מקודם ולא נכתבםSimḥa Pinsker, Liquṭei Qadmoniyot: le-Qorot Dat benei Miqra veha-Liṭeraṭur shelahem
(Vienna, A. della Torre, 1860), 1:94. These two sources were adduced in Shraga Abramson, “Ketivat haMishnah (ʿal Daʿat Geonim ve-Rishonim),” in Tarbut ve-Ḥevrah be-Toldot Yisrael bi-Yemei-ha-Beinayim,
eds. Robert Bonfil et al. (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1989), 38, 29. See also José Faur, ʿIyunim beMishneh Torah leha-Rambam (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1978), 95-96.
206
 ;בל ואג'ב אן יכן קד שרח ד'לך שרחא שאפיא פאד' לם יוג'ד פי אלמכתוב פהו פי אלמנקולZucker, “Qeṭaʿim miKitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 403; first published by Abraham Elijah Harkavy, “Me-Genizah Mizraḥit aḥat
beha-Biblioteqiyah ha-Qesarit be-Petersburg,” Ha-Qedem 1 (1906): 65; see also Abramson, “Ketivat haMishnah,” 29. Saʿadya’s central argument in the Introduction to his Commentary on Genesis is that the
Written Torah is incomprehensible without the Oral Torah; see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 13-15. For
analysis, see Samuel Poznański, “Zu dem Geniza-Fragment,” ZfhB 3 (1899): 173n8; Abraham Halkin, “MiPetiḥat Rav Saʿadya Gaon le-Feirush ha-Torah,” in Sefer ha-Yovel li-Khvod Levi Ginzberg li-Melot lo
Shivʿim Shanah, eds. Saul Liebermann et al. (New York: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1946),
132; Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 75; and Harris, How Do We Know This, 76. In his Essa
Meshali, Saʿadya suggested two options for the scope of revelation: the decoding (or: deciphering; piʿnuaḥ)
of the commandments can be derived entirely from Scripture, or “our Holy One established all of the
explanations” (kol peirushim kedoshenu konen). It is clear which he preferred; B.M. Lewin, “Essa Meshali
le-Rasag,” in Rav Saʿadya Gaon, 525 lines 20, 26. See Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 74-75;
and Harris, How Do We Know This, 77-78.
207
Samuel Poznański, suggested that the author was Jacob ben Samuel, the target of a lengthy
missive from Sahl ben Maṣliaḥ; “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s gegen Salmon b. Jerocham,”
ZfhB 10 (1906): 46-47. On these two figures, see idem, The Karaite Literary Opponents, 31; and Leon
Nemoy, “The Epistle of Sahl ben Maṣliaḥ,” PAAJR 38-39 (1970-1971): 145-77.
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verse that Qaraites cited to proves the Written Torah’s self-sufficiency,208 refers to both
the written and oral revelations (al-maktūb wal-manqūl jamīʿan).209 In his view,
revelation as a whole requires no human supplement.
Sherira’s famed Epistle tempers some of Saʿadya’s claims, but it also locates
rabbinic tradition in hoary antiquity and deemphasizes rabbinic legislative activity.
Against Saʿadya, for example, Sherira asserted that the Mishnah was transmitted with
linguistic diversity before it was compiled,210 and that the amoraic rabbis participated in
the development of the Talmud.211 Sherira, however, largely minimized the role of the
rabbis in developing Jewish law, declaring that while they used their intellects in order to
work out legal problems and followed the majority in order to determine a ruling, they
merely ascertained what earlier generations had already known.212 At the same time, the

208
Wieder termed this verse the “the battle-cry” of Qaraism; The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 5758. See also Salmon ben Yeruḥim, Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, 12.
209
Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 49.
210
B.M. Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon (Haifa, 1921), 18, 22. See the treatment in Blidstein,
“Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 6-10; see also there, 15n44. On the differences between Saʿadya and
Sherira, see Harry Fox, “Neusner’s The Bavli and Its Sources, A Review Essay,” JQR 80, no. 3-4 (1990):
353-54; and Abraham Rosenthal, “Gilyon Nosaf mi-‘Sefer ha-Galuy’ le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” in Osef haGenizah ha-Qahirit be-Geneva: Qatalog u-Meḥqarim, ed. David Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2010),
247-49. On Sherira’s ascription of divine origins to the Mishnah, see Talya Fishman, “Claims about the
Mishnah in the Epistle of Sherira Gaon: Islamic Theology and Jewish History,” in Beyond Religious
Borders: Interreligious Interaction and Intellectual Exchange in the Medieval Islamic World, eds. David
Freidenreich and Miriam Goldstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 65-77.
211
E.g., Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 52-54, 63-66. On the term “Talmud” in the Epistle, see
Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 14-15; and Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud:
Oral Torah as Written Tradition in Medieval Jewish Cultures (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011), 26-27. I do not find the argument in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 96, compelling.
212
E.g., Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 9 (citing the statement that R. Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was
aware of the debates [havayot] of Abaye and Rava; bBM 134a), 17 (concerning following the majority),
36-37, 43, 49, 52, 62. Note also Blidstein’s comment that while the Talmud uses the phrase lehitgader bo to
countenance the creation of a new law, Sherira used it to defend the replication of established norms;
“Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 15.
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Epistle repeats the talmudic notion that horaʾah (decision or instruction)213 existed
throughout the talmudic period (bBM 86a), accepts that “explanations and opinions
approximating horaʾah” continued into the Saboraic period,214 and tangentially describes
certain rabbinic and geonic ordinances (taqqanot).215
Among the North Africans, Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel of Qayrawān (c. 981-1053)
affirmed that the Mishnah was a received tradition and asserted the equivalence of the
oral and written traditions;216 his compatriot Nissim ben Jacob ibn Shāhīn (990-1062)
also asserted that the Mishnah and Talmud are received traditions.217

Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 192: “It is not certain how
horaʾah should be more precisely interpreted. Most likely it is to be regarded as a particular form of the
teaching and authoritative decision of the halakhah, which is limited to the time of the Amoraim.”
214
 ;אע"ג דהוראה לא הות הוה איכא פירושי וסבארי קרובים להוראה ואיקרו הנהו רבואתא רבנן סבוראיLewin, Igeret
Rav Sherira Gaon, 69; translation based on Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 5. See Avinoam Cohen, “LeOfyah shel ha-Halakhah ha-Savoraʾit: Sugyat ha-Bavli Reish Qiddushin u-Mesoret ha-Geonim,” Dine
Israel 24 (2004): 166-75, 203-210.
215
Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 75 (on the taqqanot of R. Yoḥanan ben Zakkai), 101, 105,
108 (on the taqqanot of the geonim). On the latter, see Robert Brody, “Kelum hayu ha-Geonim
Meḥoqeqim?” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 290-315. For the suggestion that Sherira
mentioned these two taqqanot because they were the only two geonic taqqanot, see Eliav Shoḥetman, “LeDerekh Qeviʿatan shel Taqqanot ha-Geonim ule-Mahutah shel Horaʾat ha-Geonim be-Din ‘Qim li beGavei,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 665. Sherira also mentioned that Rav Ashi
ordained “good ordinances” (taqnata shapirata) and festivals and fasts like the festival of the Reish Galuta
(Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 91); it is unclear how to categorize this activity. On the festival of the
Reish Galuta, see J.N. Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Amoraʾim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1962), 612; and
Mirsky, Sheʾiltot de-Rav Aḥai Gaon, 1:4-5.
216
Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Charles Ber Chavel
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1972), 9 (Gen. 18:4); treated in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 96.
Ḥananel also reiterated Sherira’s claim that later rabbis only stated laws that had been known to earlier
rabbis; see Gerald Blidstein, “Mashehu ʿal ha-Meimad ha-Idiologi shel Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel leTalmud,” Sidra 15 (1999): 9.
217
Nissim ben Jacob, Mafteaḥ shel Manʿulei ha-Talmud (Vienna, 1847), 2a. The Arabic Kitāb
Miftāḥ Maghālīq al-Talmūdh only survives in medieval Hebrew translation; see idem, Ḥamishah Sefarim:
Seridim me-Ḥiburav, ed. Shraga Abramson (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1965), 27-28. See there, 35354; Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 96; Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, liv; and Sklare,
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 164n80. For similar claims about the Mishnah (or what is apparently an imagined
Mishnah-like work), see Shaʿarei Teshuvah (Leipzig, 1858), 2b (§20); and Kalman Kahana, ed., Seder
Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim (Frankfurt, 1935), 8 lines 6-8. Note the claim in Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed.
Sayyid, 1:54, citing a “learned” Jew (rajulan min afāḍilihim) that the Mishnah (al-mishnā) is Mosaic (in
origin?). This may refer to the Talmud, as Ibn al-Nadīm described this as a Aramaic and Hebrew work.
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In Saʿadya’s view, the Oral Torah, as a divinely revealed body of knowledge, may
reinterpret the Written Torah. Saʿadya presented this claim in discussing when Scripture
should be read according to its apparent or manifest sense, known as its ẓāhir, and when a
non-“apparent” reading was warranted.218 Saʿadya argued that, just as the ẓāhir of
Scripture’s anthropomorphisms, and of verses that contradict reason, cannot be accepted,
received tradition may justify ignoring Scripture’s ẓāhir.219 For instance, whereas
Scripture limits punitive lashes to forty (Deut. 25:3), rabbinic tradition removed the ẓāhir
sense of that verse and set the maximum number at thirty-nine (mMak 3:10). Tradition

Some criticism of the attempt to portray the entirety of rabbinic tradition as Sinaitic appears in
Kitāb Istidrāk al-Sahw al-Mawjūd fī Kutub Raʾs al-Metība al-Fayyūmī (The Book of the Correction of the
Mistakes Caused by Forgetfulness found in the Books of the Head of the Academy al-Fayyūmī) of
Mubashshir ben Nissi ha-Levi ibn ʿUnāba. Mubashshir identified several places where he felt that Saʿadya
exaggerated by describing traditions as prophetic in origin (i.e., jāʾa al-āthār); see his Kitāb Istidrāk alSahw al-Mawjūd fī Kutub Raʾs al-Metība al-Fayyūmī, ed. and trans. Moshe Zucker (New York: Feldheim,
1955), 31-36. On Mubashshir, see Marina Rustow, “Mubashshir ben Nissi ha-Levi,” Encyclopedia of Jews
in the Islamic World, ed. Norman Stillman (Brill Online, 2014); and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 356.
Zucker described Mubashshir as seeking to undermine Saʿadya’s authority; Mubashshir, Kitāb Istidrāk, ed.
Zucker, 2-5. Others have viewed his critique as “in-family jousting”; Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon,
111n34; similarly, Shraga Abramson, “Teḥilat Sefer Hasagot Rav Mubashshir ʿal Rav Saʿadya Gaon,”
Sinai 57 (1965): 16-17. See also Samuel Miklós Stern, “The Beginning of Mubashshir’s Critique of
Saʿadya Gaon’s Writings,” REJ 126 (1967): 113-17; and Moshe Zucker, “Beirurim be-‘Hasagot Rav
Mubashshir’ ʿal Saʿadya Gaon,” Sinai 58 (1966): 95-98.
218
For the range of meanings of ẓāhir al-naṣṣ in Maimonides’ writings, many of which were
utilized in earlier Rabbanite texts, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 87-105. On the term
ẓāhir among Muslim writers, see Robert Gleave, Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation
in Islamic Legal Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 63-93.
219
See Moshe Zucker, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag la-Torah,” Sura 2 (1956-1957): 319-20; Ḥaggai
Ben-Shammai, “Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit-ha-Rabbanit be-Feirushei Rasag: Hemshekh ve-Ḥiddush,” in
Masoret ve-Shinuy ba-Tarbut ha-ʿArvit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-ha-Beinayim, eds. Joshua Blau and David
Doron (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 2000), 35; idem, “Haqdamat R. Saʿadya Gaon le-Yeshʿayah –
Mavo le-Sifrei ha-Neviʾm,” Tarbiẓ 60, no. 3 (1991): 379n38, and Simon, Four Approaches to the Book of
Psalms, 34-36. For parallels between Saʿadya and contemporary Qurʾān interpretation, see Ḥaggai BenShammai, “Ribbuy Mashmaʿuyot ha-Ketuvim be-Shiṭato ha-Parshanit shel Rasag,” in Minḥah le-Mikhael:
Meḥqarim be-Hagut Yehudit u-Muslemit Muqdashim le-Professor Michael Schwarz, eds. Sara KleinBraslavy et al. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2009), 26-29. On God as a “consuming fire” (Deut. 4:24),
see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 18; and Ben-Shammai, “Haqdamat R. Saʿadya Gaon le-Yeshʿayah,”
381-82. Anthropomorphism was a common reason to reject the ẓāhir of Scripture; see Binyamin
Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qurʾān in the Theology of al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm:
Kitāb al-Mustarshid (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 1-9.
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similarly removed the ẓāhir of the prohibition against cooking a kid in its mother’s milk
(Ex. 23:19, 34:26, and Deut. 14:21) when it forbade all mixtures of milk and meat (mḤul
8:1).220 This controlling and determinative role of extra-scriptural traditions parallels the
claim of Muslim jurists that the Sunna often establishes the meaning of the Qurʾān. They
argued that a Prophetic ḥadīth could narrow a broad Qurʾānic term to a limited set of
cases (i.e., from ʿāmm to khāṣṣ); for example, the general prohibition against the
consumption of carrion (Q. 5:3) was qualified by a ḥadīth that excludes fish from the
prohibition.221

The Widespread Nature of Rabbinic Tradition
In their defense of rabbinic tradition, geonic-era Rabbanites resorted to two other
(related) concepts found in contemporary Islamic texts, tawātur and ijmāʿ, which find
confirmation for extra-scriptural traditions in widespread knowledge or approval. A
mutawātir tradition is a “concurrent” report whose transmission by multiple individuals

Ben-Shammai, “Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit,” 36; but see idem, “Haqdamat R. Saʿadya Gaon leYeshʿayah,” 382n50. Despite Saʿadya’s view that rabbinic tradition overrides Scripture’s ẓāhir, Saʿadya
occasionally ignored rabbinic tradition where he could have integrated it into his Pentateuch translation
(tafsīr); Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 319-479; see also David M. Freidenreich, “The Use of Islamic Sources
in Saadiah Gaon’s Tafsīr of the Torah,” JQR no. 3-4 (2003): 368-69. On Qaraite use of ẓāhir and taʾwīl, see
Ben-Shammai, “Major Trends in Karaite Philosophy,” 347. On Qirqisānī, see Ben-Shammai, “The Tension
Between Literal Interpretation and Exegetical Freedom,” 42. On Yefet ben ʿEli, see Daniel Frank, “The
Limits of Karaite Scripturalism: Problems in Narrative Exegesis,” in A Word Fitly Spoken, eds. Bar-Asher
et al., 45.
221
On ʿāmm and khāṣṣ, see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 86-91; and Hallaq, A History of
Islamic Legal Theories, 45-47. For Shāfiʿī’s views, see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 69-87; on the
Sunna as an interpretative tool for the Qurʾān, see there, 104-118 (on jumla and naṣṣ); on ʿāmm and khāṣṣ,
see also idem, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba,” 7-20. On the relationship of the
Sunna and the Qurʾān, see Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law, 58, 77-78, 206, 219; and from a
different perspective, Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 174-77. Many argued that Muḥammad’s acts recorded
in ḥadīth clarify the Qurʾān; see Weiss, The Search for God’s Law, 452-53.
220
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in the generation of the Companions suffices to guarantee its authenticity. (This stands in
contrast with reports that have a single point of origin [khabar al-wāḥid] and are thus less
widespread; reports of this sort render “uncertain” knowledge).222 Saʿadya, Samuel ben
Ḥofni, Jacob ben Ephraim al-Shāmī (Palestine, 10th c.), and Judah ha-Levi (Spain, d.
1141) all repeated the trope, found in Islamic sources, that received tradition is mutawātir
because can never be mass collusion (tawāṭuʾ) on falsehood.223 Jacob, Nissim of
Qayrawān, and Judah ha-Levi also claimed that rabbinic tradition as a whole is
mutawātir,224 and Saʿadya argued that Hanukah is based on a mutawātir tradition.225
In pre-ninth century Islamic texts, ijmāʿ could denote practice supported by
scholars, ongoing practice in Medina, or universal consensus of all scholars or all
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See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 8-22; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 6064; G.H.A. Juynboll, “(Re)Appraisal of Some Technical Terms in Ḥadīth Science,” Islamic Law and
Society 8, no. 3 (2001): 326-31; and Hüseyin Hansu, “Notes on the Term Mutawātir and Its Reception in
Ḥadīth Criticism,” Islamic Law and Society 16, no. 3-4 (2009): 383-408.
223
For Saʿadya, see Saʿadya ben Yosef, Iyov: ʿim Tirgum u-Feirush Saʿadya ben Yosef, ed. and
trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1972), 100. For Samuel, see Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi shel
‘Mavo ha-Talmud’ le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni,” Sinai 85, no. 5-7 (1981): 216-17; Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat haMaḥloqet be-Masoret,” 320-21; and Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,” 2:183-84; and idem,
Samuel ben Ḥofni, 255, 257 (from Samuel’s ʿAshar Masāʾil). On the ascription of Zucker’s text to Samuel
ben Ḥofni, see Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 206-207; idem, “Heʿarot be-ʿInyan Shmuel ben
Ḥofni,” Sinai 92 (1982-1983): 25-29; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni, 17n58; see also Zucker, “ʿIyunim veHeʿarot,” 100-104; and Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lxi. For Jacob, see Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim
mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 410. See also Jospe, “‘Ha-Haggadah ha-Neʾemenet’ shel R. Saʿadya Gaon,”
8n16. On Jacob, see Mann, Texts and Studies, 2:26; Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim, 321n7; and Gil, Jews in
Islamic Countries, 254-55. For ha-Levi, see Ehud Krinis, “The Arabic Background of the Kuzari,” Journal
of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 21 (2013): 49. On Muslim views, see Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to
Islamic Theology and Law, trans. Andras Hamori (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 50;
Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 116; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 75-76; and Bernard
Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past: The Theory of Tawâtur According to Ghazâlî,” Studia Islamica 61 (1985):
92-93, 102-103.
224
Nissim, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 353-54; and Judah ha-Levi, Kitāb al-Radd walDalīl fī al-Dīn al-Dhalīl, eds. D.H. Baneth and Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1977), 12
(1:26), 26 (1:89); treated in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 133. See also Krinis, “The Arabic
Background of the Kuzari,” 49. For Jacob ben Ephraim, see the previous note.
225
Samuel Atlas and Moshe Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” PAAJR 14
(1944): 6 line 14.
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people.226 In later centuries, ijmāʿ was a tool to grant rulings based on sources of
questionable authenticity the certainty of the Qurʾān and mutawātir traditions.227 At least
two prominent Rabbanites dismissed the idea that rabbinic tradition was subject to ijmāʿ:
Saʿadya invoked ijmāʿ in several contexts,228 but explicitly rejected it as grounds for
defending the authenticity of the Oral Torah;229 and Sklare showed that Samuel ben
Ḥofni Gaon similarly considered ijmāʿ secondary to mutawātir traditions, a view that he
probably adopted from a Muslim contemporary.230
Some later Rabbanites, however, appealed to ijmāʿ-type authority for the Oral
Torah, though they did not always use the word ijmāʿ. An anonymous student of Saʿadya
asserted that the reason the Mishnah, which he seems to have ascribed to Moses, does not

Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology before Šāfiʿī,” 282-87; and Schacht, Origins, 82-87.
Mālik’s position is somewhat more complex, that the living practice in Medina stretched back to the time
of Muḥammad; see Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina, 131, 136n167.
227
Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 147-48; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 319-21; and
Norman Calder, “Ikhtilâf and Ijmâʿ in Shâfiʿî’s Risâla,” Studia Islamica 58 (1983): 72-81; see also above,
n180. Zysow rejected earlier claims that ijmāʿ formed the basis of Islamic law, see George F. Hourani,
“The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam,” Studia Islamica 21 (1964): 49-56; Weiss, “The
Primacy of Revelation,” 79-82; and Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 113-14.
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On the resurrection of the dead, see Saʿadya ben Joseph, Kitāb al-Amānāt wal-Iʿtiqādāt, ed.
and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1970), 218. In the standard version, Saʿadya emphasized this at the
beginning of this treatise, but in the other recension, it appears at the end; see Wilhelm Bacher, “Maʿamar
Teḥiyat ha-Meitim le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” in Festschrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstage Moritz
Steinschneider’s (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1896), 121 (Hebrew section). For background on this text, see
Ben-Shammai, “The Tension Between Literal Interpretation and Exegetical Freedom,” 36; and idem,
“Medieval History and Religious Thought,” in The Cambridge Genizah Collections: Their Contents and
Significance, eds. Stefan C. Reif and Shulamit Reif (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2002), 14647. On the Second Day of Festivals, see Hartwig Hirschfeld, “The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at
Cambridge. (Third Article.): Saadyāh Fragments,” JQR 16, no. 1 (o.s.) (1903): 103-104; and Zucker,
“Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 407; see also Samuel Poznański, Samuel Poznański, “Addenda and
Corrigenda to My Essay on ‘The Anti-Karaite Writings of Saadiah Gaon’ (JQR, X, 238-76),” JQR 20, no. 2
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actually cite Moses is because when Israel was gathered together (mujtamiʿa), they
preserved mishnaic traditions orally, only adding names after the exile.231 Sherira claimed
that all Israel accepted the Mishnah as authoritative,232 and his assertion that the Mishnah
was recited with “one mouth” (peh eḥad) was described, by Shraga Abramson, as an
ijmāʿ-type defense of that work.233 Hayya Gaon’s defense of the way that Rabbanites
blow the shofar (ram’s horn) on Rosh ha-Shanah also appears to invoke ijmāʿ; he argued
that this practice – and rabbinic tradition as a whole – rests on an unbroken chain of
transmission and on “the words of the multitudes” (divrei ha-rabim).234 Nissim of
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term ijmāʿ, in Saʿadya’s Sefer ha-Galuy, in Harkavy, Zikhron le-Rishonim: Ha-Sarid veha-Paliṭ mi-Sefer
ha-Egron ve-Sefer ha-Galuy, 153.
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Gaon, 21. See also Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Amoraʾim, 614; and Uziel Fuchs, “Meqomam shel haGeonim be-Mesoret ha-Nusaḥ shel ha-Talmud ha-Bavli,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 2003), 76-77,
102-103.
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 ;דברי הרבים המוכיח על כל משנה ועל כל גמראLewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah,
Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:62 (§117). Translation follows Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 50.
For the suggestion that Hayya’s claim is similar to claims for ijmāʿ, see there, 51; and Blidstein, Samkhut uMeri, 148. On this text, see also Daniel Sperber, “Divrei Rav Hayya Gaon ʿal Teqiʿat Shofar veha-Pulmus
ha-Qaraʾi,” in Bi-Heyoto Qarov: Asupat Maʾamarim la-Yamim ha-Noraʾim, eds. Elḥanan Ganzel et al.
(Merkaz Shapira: Or Eṣion, 2000), 246-54. For background, see Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah haYehudit, 173-74; Reuven Bonfil, “Mitos, Reṭoriqah, Hisṭoriyah? ʿIyun be-Megillat Aḥimaʿaṣ,” in Tarbut
ve-Ḥevrah, 119-23; and earlier, Samuel Poznański, Anshei Qayrawān, Mesudarim ʿal Seder Alef Bet
(Warsaw, 1909), 14-15. Hayya’s responsum echoes a partially preserved responsum of his father; see
Abramson, ʿInyanot be-Sifrut ha-Geonim (Jerusalem: Mosad ha Rav Kook, 1974), 192; and Ben-Sasson,
Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 46. On Hayya’s position, see also Menaḥem Kasher, “Yom Teruʿah –
Yom Yevava,” Ha-Darom 12 (1960): 211-13. For another example of ijmāʿ-type ideas in Sheira and
Hayya, see Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Berakhot, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 1:6 (§7).
For Qaraite opposition to Rabbanite shofar practices, see Bernard Revel, The Karaite Halakah and
its Relation to Saduccean, Samaritan and Philonian Halakah (Philadelphia: Cahan Print, 1913), 78-79;
Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 283-85; Philip E. Miller, “At the Twilight of Byzantine Karaism: The
Anachronism of Judah Gibbor,” (PhD diss., New York University, 1984), 94-111; and idem, “Karaite
Perspectives on Yôm Tĕrûʿâ,” in Ki Baruch Hu: Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Judaic Studies in
Honor of Baruch A. Levine, eds. Robert Chazan et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 537-41. For
talmudic background, see Ephraim Beṣalel Halivni, “Mi Tiqen Ribbuy Qolot be-Rosh ha-Shanah?’ Neṭuʿim
19 (2015): 131-35.
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Qayrawān, Ibn Dāʾūd, and Judah ha-Levi also turned to ijmāʿ to defend rabbinic
tradition.235

Geonic-Era Portrayals of the Role of the Rabbis
Portrayal of the ancient rabbis as transmitters of tradition, and not as its initiators,
is a second pillar of geonic-era Rabbanite legal epistemology. While late antique rabbinic
literature does not definitively state whether the rabbis generated non-scriptural laws, the
Rabbanite writers in Iraq, Palestine, and North Africa discussed below rejected the idea
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For Nissim, see Nissim ben Jacob, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 353 lines 10-12 (see
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni, 164n80); and A. Hirschfeld, “Be-Sefer Megillat Setarim,” in Festschrift zum
siebzigsten Geburtstage A. Berliner’s, eds. Aron Freimann and Meier Hildesheimer (Frankfurt: J.
Kauffmann, 1903), 47 (see Nissim ben Jacob, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 282n237; and BenSasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 51). On the ascription of this text Nissim, see Abraham
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Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 3 (English), 1 (Hebrew pagination); see there, lx-lxii, and
106n13. See also Simḥa Emmanuel, “Sarid Ḥadash mi-Sefer Megillat Setarim le-Rav Nisim Gaon,” in
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claim in its Islamic context; “Berakhah Bilti Yaduʿah ʿal Qriʾat Pereq ‘be-Mah Madliqin’ mi-tokh haGenizah,” Sinai 82 (1978): 206, repr. in idem, Hitgabshut Nusaḥ ha-Tefillah, 1:334. For ha-Levi, see
Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 60, 63; Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Science and the Kuzari,” Science
in Context 10, no. 3 (1997): 505-507; and Krinis, “The Arabic Background of the Kuzari,” 50. Ijmāʿ may
lie behind Natan ha-Bavli’s depiction of the geonim answering queries in the presence of the entire
academy; see Adolf Neubauer, Mediaeval Jewish Chronicles and Chronological Notes (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1887), 2:88. The Arabic original of this part of Natan’s report has not survived; for background, see
Israel Friedlaender, “The Arabic Original of the Report of R. Nathan Hababli,” JQR 17, no. 4 (o.s.) (1905):
747-61; and Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “Ha-Mavneh, ha-Megamot veha-Tokhen shel Ḥibur Rav Natan haBavli,” in Tarbut ve-Ḥevrah, 137-96. On this line, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 61-62; and Fishman,
Becoming the People of the Talmud, 62-63. Study of Rabbanite use of ijmāʿ remains a desideratum; as
noted in Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 13n34; and Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah haYehudit, 51n116. Qirqisānī reported that many ʿAnanites and Qaraites accepted ijmāʿ to verify knowledge
of the commandments, and that some even termed the body of knowledge known through ijmāʿ “naqlan”
(transmission); Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:141. On this last claim, see Ankori, Karaites of Byzantium,
229n48; and Wieder, “Three Terms for ‘Tradition’,” JQR 49, no. 2 (1958): 108-109; see also Geoffrey
Khan, “Al-Qirqisānī’s Opinions Concerning the Text of the Bible and Parallel Muslim Attitudes Towards
the Text of the Qurʾān,” JQR 81, no. 1-2 (1990): 59-73. For another claim from ijmāʿ, see Friedman,
“Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 564-65.
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that the rabbis had done so. Instead, they maintained that the ancient rabbis were tradents,
dedicated to transmitting received wisdom.
Geonic denial that the rabbis created law through exegesis, a corollary of their
affirmation of the Oral Torah’s divine origin, drew on Islamic debates about the validity
of qiyās to form a coherent anti-Qaraite argument.236 The Muʿtazilite Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm
al-Naẓẓām (d. c. 836) famously rejected qiyās, which, in this period, denoted the results
of any intellectual speculation;237 he seems to have done so because of revealed law’s
inconsistent and arbitrary nature, which precludes attempts to deduce new laws.238 Other

Non-Rabbanites held a range of views on the use of qiyās in the determination of law. Qirqisānī
reported that Benjamin al-Nahāwandī studiously avoided qiyās (yabʿudu minhu jiddan), preferring clear
texts (nuṣūṣ) over qiyās, but was willing to use qiyās to derive law if there were “two premises”
(muqaddimatayn) and not merely one. Qirqisānī described this as an “intermediate” position between the
use of qiyās and strict scripturalism (mutawassiṭ bayna al-qiyās wal-naṣṣ); Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy,
1:13. Qirqisānī also mentioned a group (jamāʿa) of ʿAnanites and Qaraites who utilized qiyās; Kitāb alAnwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:141. On ʿAnan’s use of qiyās, see also Zucker, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,” 323-27;
and idem, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 149. Note Saʿadya’s claim that ʿAnan used a great deal of qiyās; idem,
“Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 402. While there is some evidence for the persistence of Qaraite
opposition to qiyās, the use of qiyās became a feature of later Qaraite thought. See Ankori, Karaites in
Byznatium, 217n26; Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Jewish Thought in Iraq in the 10th Century,” in Judaeo-Arabic
Studies: Proceedings of the Founding Conference of the Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies, ed. Norman
Golb (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 29n48; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon,
218n141. On later use of qiyās, see Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 76-77; Klar, Meḥqarim veʿIyunim, 320-24; Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 86-92; and Erder, Avlei Ṣion ha-Qaraʾim, 326-27. On
Qirqisānī’s engagement with the middot, see Aviram Ravitsky, “Peirusho ha-Biqorti shel Ya‘qūb alQirqisānī le-ʿErqonot ha-Derashah ha-Talmudit: Targum ʿIvri le-Kitāb al-Anwār wal-Marāqib, ḥeileq 4,
peraqim 9-21, ʿim mavo ve-heʿarot,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 22 (2011): 123-57; and Frank,
Search Scripture Well, 9.
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Culture, ed. Gustave E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1970), 34-35. On qiyās as more
than just analogy, see Wael Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica 36, no.
3 (1989): 286-306; and below, n426.
238
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(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 20-21. See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 169; David
Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law
(New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2011), 71n37, 73n43; and Josef van Ess, The Flowering of
Muslim Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 175-77; see also George F. Hourani,
Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 188-89. On
debates about qiyās in general, see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 167-87; Hallaq, A History of Islamic
Legal Theories, 30-33; and idem, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 122-25.
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ninth-century figures rejected qiyās and speculative attempts to reconcile conflicting
ḥadīths, probably due to the uncertain nature of the interpretative process. Among them
were early “Ẓāhirīs,” whom medieval biographers depicted as committed to the “literal”
(ẓāhir) meaning of revealed texts.239

Creating New Laws through Midrash and Qiyās
Scholars have long debated whether halakhic midrash creates law or upholds law
through ex post facto linkages to Scripture. (These views are known, respectively, as
midrash yoṣer and midrash meqayem). Twentieth century scholars, who usually framed
this problem as a radical dichotomy, asked if halakhic midrash or apodictic rulings
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See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 173-84; Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic
Hermeneutics, 78-88; and Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 147-50. On the rise of Ẓāhirīsm, see Melchert, The
Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 178-90; and Amr Osman, The Ẓāhirī Madhhab (3rd/9th-10th/16th
Century): A Textualist Theory of Islamic Law (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 11-47; see also Stewart, “Muḥammad
b. Dawūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual,” 99-158; and Abū Ḥanīfa Nuʿmān ibn Muḥammad (al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān), The
Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory, ed. and trans. Devin J. Stewart (New
York: NYU Press, 2015), 212-67. On Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of qiyās, see Roger Arnaldez, Grammaire et
theologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue (Paris: Vrin, 1956), 165-93. On Ibn Ḥazm’s connection to earlier
Ẓāhirīs, see Camilla Adang, “The Beginnings of the Ẓāhirī Madhhab in al-Andalus,” in The Islamic School
of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress, eds. Peri J. Bearman et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2005), 117-25.
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viewed the Companions as untrustworthy; see Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 71-74;
and Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 13-14, 16. See al-Naẓẓām’s sharp criticism of conflicting ḥadīth in
Josef van Ess, “Ein unbekanntes Fragment des Naẓẓām,” in Der Orient in der Forschung: Festchrift für
Otto Spies, ed. Wilhelm Hoenerbach (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967), 171-72. On earlier rejection of
ḥadīth, which may be linked to Muʿtazilite theology and Khārijite thought, see Burton, The Sources of
Islamic Law, 22-23; Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 403-405; and Musa, Ḥadīth as Scripture,
6, citing earlier scholarship. On the Muʿtazilite background, see Michael Cook, “ʿAnan and Islam,” 165-69;
and Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 68-71. On Khārijites and scripturalism, see Cook,
“Anan and Islam,” 169-72; and Gerald R. Hawting, “The Significance of the Slogan ‘lā hukma illā lillāh’
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emerged first. Recent scholars, however, have shown that these two methods probably
coexisted in the early rabbinic period.240
Saʿadya’s discussion of this topic set the tone for tenth- and eleventh-century
Rabbanite discourse.241 Saʿadya argued that the rabbis listed the hermeneutical principles
ascribed to R. Ishmael (middot), not because they inferred (yastadillūn)242 laws using the
middot, but because the laws in their possession divided into (yanmāz ʿilā)243 thirteen
types (fann). He compared this to the activity of the Masoretes, who arrived at their

See Steven Fraade, “Interpreting Midrash 2: Midrash and its Literary Contexts,” Prooftexts 7,
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Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls, eds. David Goodblatt et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 105-126; Vered Noam,
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Contemporary Culture, eds. Adolfo Daniel Roitman et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 363-76; and above, n186.
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(Cincinnati, Hebrew Union College Press, 1951), 163-256; J.N. Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Tanaʾim:
Mishnah, Tosefta, u-Midreshei Halakhah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957), 501-515; Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal
Divrei Sofrim, 101-150; Albeck, Mavo la-Mishnah, 40-62; idem, “Ha-Halakhah veha-Derashot,” in Sefer
ha-Yovel li-Khvod Alexander Marx, ed. Saul Lieberman (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-Rabbanim, 1950),
1-8; Ephraim E. Urbach, “Ha-Derashah ke-Yesod ha-Halakhah u-Vaʿayat ha-Sofrim,” Tarbiẓ 27, no. 2-3
(1958): 166-82; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 12-21; Abraham Goldberg, “Ha-Midrash haQadum veha-Midrash ha-Meʾuhar,” Tarbiẓ 50 (1981): 99-100; David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah,
and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 1821; and Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:260-63. For further background, see Yaʿaqov Sussman, “Ḥeiqer
Toldot ha-Halakhah u-Megillot Midbar-Yehuda: Hirhurim Talmudiyim Rishnoim le-or Megillat ‘Miqṣat
Maʿaseh ha-Torah’,” Tarbiẓ 59, no. 1-2 (1990): 12-18. For treatment of earlier positions, see Harris, How
Do We Know This, 103-250; and Menaḥem Kahana, “The Halakhic Midrashim,” in The Literature of the
Sages, 2:64n289 and n292. On the ambiguity in rabbinic literature, see Robert Goldenberg, “The Problem
of Originality in Talmudic Thought.” In From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism; Intellect in Quest of
Understanding, eds. Jacob Neusner et al. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 2:19-27; and Shmuel Safrai,
“Oral Torah,” in The Literature of the Sages, 1:56-60.
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conclusions by examining received tradition.244 According to Sherira’s depiction, the
early rabbis “discovered” the laws of the Torah (le-giluyei taʿamei torah) by means of
scriptural interpretation (including the middot).245 Blidstein noted that this language is
somewhat ambiguous, but assumed that Sherira meant that the rabbis searched for proofs
for laws that they already knew from tradition. This is consistent with Sherira’s statement
that halakhic midrashim identify scriptural passages which hint at received laws (heikha
ramizan hilkheta be-qraʾi).246 In a well-known responsum, Hayya wrote that a certain
talmudic derivation is not a true proof (lav reʾayah hi); rather the law in question is a
received tradition (halakhah mequbelet).247 Israel son of Samuel ben Ḥofni (d. 1033)
asserted that since Scripture can be interpreted in many ways, one should heed “the
words of the rabbis, who have transmitted them (heʿetiqum) in order to explain each and
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2005), 173n2, 175n7. Saʿadya’s depiction appears to echo the notion of takhrīj, an activity which sought
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every commandment.”248 According to this perspective, the rabbis (often?) approached
Scripture having already reached their legal conclusions.
Though Jay Harris described the geonic position as a “stunning” break with
rabbinic precedent,249 it may be useful to focus on what the geonim affirmed, rather than
on what they rejected, in order to understand geonic legal epistemology on its own terms.
Saʿadya formulated his anti-qiyās views in several places. According to the rabbis, God
had punished Nadab and Abihu because they had made a halakhic ruling in Moses’
presence (Lev. 10; bYom 53a). Expanding on this, Saʿadya took a jab at the Qaraites’ use
of qiyās and taʾwīl ([subjective] interpretation), and asserted that Nadab and Abihu
followed their own raʾy (personal view) and taʾwīl. Noting that his contemporaries
similarly perform taʾwīl without consulting interpretations received from the messenger
(i.e., Moses; tafāsīr al-rasūl), Saʿadya warned that if Nadab and Abihu were punished for
disagreeing with “any single rule of the commandments” (farʿ min furūʿ al-sharāʾiʿ),
God would certainly punish those who ignore received traditions.250
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describe God’s word as “the burden of the Lord” (Jer. 23:38) as an argument that the responsibility to
interpret the law belongs to God’s messenger, not the people; ibid, 341. On the dating of Saʿadya’s antiqiyās work, Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ al-Samʿīya, see Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 386.
On the anti-Qaraite context of these arguments, see also Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 95-96. On the
pejorative use of raʾy, see below, n483.
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Like al-Naẓẓām, Saʿadya argued that, because the details of the revealed
commandments are, at times, inconsistent with reason, human reasoning cannot extend
their scope.251 What else, Saʿadya asked, accounts for the arbitrary distinctions between
men and women or for the laws of the red heifer?252 He added that the laws of the
Pentateuch are internally inconsistent: If the Torah could provide an alternative
opportunity to bring the paschal sacrifice for those who had missed its scheduled time
(Num. 9:9-12), why did it not do the same for those unable to fast on the Day of
Atonement?253 Those who utilized qiyās extended the rationale (ʿilla) of an original case
(aṣl) to a new case (farʿ), but skeptics of qiyās denied the possibility of identifying an
ʿilla with certainty.254 Expressing such skepticism, Saʿadya noted that the Pentateuch
sometimes contradicts an explicit ʿilla. For example, the Pentateuch condemns murder
because God created man in His image (Gen. 9:6), yet it ordains capital punishment for
numerous crimes!255
Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 388-89; see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon,
219n143. Samuel ben Ḥofni reported this view in Saʿadya’s name; idem, “The Religious and Legal
Thought,” 2:130-31. On the similarities between Saʿadya’s arguments and Muslim writers, see Zucker’s
notes throughout “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ”; see also idem, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,” 321-31;
George Vajda, “Études sur Qirqisani,” REJ 107 (1946-1947): 57-60; Ravitsky, Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 38n43;
and idem, “Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah shel ha-Heqqesh ha-Hilkhati ve-ʿal Gevulotav,” Masorah leYosef 6 (2009): 329.
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Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 395-400. See idem, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,”
327-29; Ravitsky, Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 39-42; and idem, “Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah,” 321-22. On
Saʿadya’s comments regarding biblical distinctions between men and women, compare Ilana Sasson,
“Gender Equality in Yefet Ben Eli's Commentary and Karaite Halakhah,” AJS Review 37, no. 1 (2013): 6265.
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Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 401.
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The classic example is the prohibition on wine: the ʿilla is identified as inebriation and the
prohibition is extended to other intoxicating beverages; see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 159; and
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 83-84. For the anti-qiyās view, see Shehaby, “ʿIlla and Qiyās
in Early Islamic Legal Theory,” 36; and Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 72-73n43.
255
Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 395. On the apparent contradiction between
this argument and other places in Saʿadya’s writings, see Ravitsky, Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 44-48; and idem,
“Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah,” 329-30. One important aspect of Saʿadya’s rejection of qiyās remains
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Rabbanite rejection of qiyās continued for some time. Samuel ben Ḥofni arrived
at the same conclusion as Saʿadya using a different claim; he rejected qiyās not because it
is epistemologically problematic but because there is no scriptural evidence that it is
allowed. (Contemporary Muslims made similar arguments.256) According to Jacob ben
Ephraim, “concurrent tradition” (al-khabar al-mutawātir) is preferable to qiyās. Qirqisānī
explained that Jacob accepted qiyās for laws that would have been known on the basis of
human reason (ʿaqlīya), without revelation, but not for laws that were derived solely from
revelation (samʿīya).257 Judah ha-Levi also spoke disparagingly about qiyās.258
unclear. Saʿadya distinguished between “rational” (ʿaqlīya) commandments and “revealed” (samʿīya)
commandments. As its title indicates, Saʿadya’s Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ al-Samʿīya (Book on Attaining the
Revealed Commandments) focused on whether jurists could extend the scope of samʿīya laws through
qiyās. Several scholars have claimed that this implies that Saʿadya accepted qiyās regarding the ʿaqlīya
commandments; Halkin, “Mi-Petiḥat Rav Saʿadya Gaon le-Feirush ha-Torah,” 133n30; and Yoav Elstein,
“Torat ha-Miṣvot be-Mishnat Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 38, no. 2 (1968): 131-33; see also Bloomberg,
“Arabic Legal Terms,” 29-30. However, Qirqisānī noted that while Saʿadya’s arguments should lead to this
conclusion, he did not explicitly state this; Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:87. Ravitsky concluded that
according to Saʿadya, jurists cannot apply qiyās to either the ʿaqlīya or the samʿīya; Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 4344; and idem, “Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah,” 326n29. See also Moses Ibn Ezra, Sefer ha-ʿIyunim
veha-Diyunim (Kitāb al-Muḥāḍarah wal-Mudhākarah), ed. and trans. Abraham Halkin (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei
Nirdamim, 1975), 204. For background on the division between ʿaqlīya and samʿīya, see Alexander
Altmann, “Saadya’s Conception of the Law,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 28 (1944): 320-21;
Arthur Hyman, “A Note on Maimonides’ Classification of Law,” PAAJR 46 (1979-1980): 323-31; and
Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Ḥaluqat ha-Miṣvot u-Musag ha-Ḥokhmah be-Mishnat Rasag,” Tarbiẓ 41, no. 2
(1973): 170-82.
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See Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 385; Sklare, “The Religious and Legal
Thought,” 2:133-34l; and idem, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 218-20. See also Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya,
23-24. For the arguments of Samuel’s contemporaries, see there, 220n143; compare Zysow, The Economy
of Certainty, 191.
257
Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 410; and Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed.
Nemoy, 1:86-87.
258
See Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 59-67. See more generally, Daniel Lasker,
“Judah Halevi and Karaism,” in From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism, 3:111-25; and Blidstein, Samkhut
u-Meri, 155. On the proposed anti-Qaraite intent of the Kuzari as a whole, see D.Z. Baneth, “LeOtographim shel Yehuda ha-Levi ule-Hithavut Sefer ha-Kuzari,” Tarbiẓ 26, no. 3 (1947): 297-303;
Langermann, “Science and the Kuzari,” 501n6; Mordecai Akiva Friedman, “Judah Ha-Levi on Writing the
Kuzari: Responding to a Heretic,” in “From a Sacred Source”, 157-69; and Yishai Glazner, “Le-Ketivato
shel Sefer ha-Kuzari,” Daʿat 77 (2014): 13-14n42. On ha-Levi’s affirmation of the divine origin of Jewish
law, see Naḥum Arieli, “Tefisat ha-Halakhah eṣel R. Yehuda ha-Levi: Rihal ke-Ish Halakhah,” Daʿat 1
(1978): 46-49. On ha-Levi and Qaraism, see also Yehuda Raṣhabi, “Shirim Ḥadashim le-R. Yehuda haLevi,” Sinai 113 (1994): 1-4; Shraga Feivel Kornbluth, “Rabbi Yehuda ha-Levi lo Katav Shir be-Shevaḥ
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The Ancient Rabbis as Transmitters
Rabbanites in this period used other tools to emphasize that the ancient rabbis had
transmitted received law. For example, they cited chains of transmission to demonstrate
the authenticity of rabbinic tradition. Like the Islamic isnād, a chain of transmitters that
traces the transmission of ḥadīths, Rabbanite isnāds assert the authenticity of received
tradition and affirm that it, alone, is valid.259 Some scholars have even hypothesized that
the chain of transmission at the outset of Mishnah Avot was composed in the Islamic
period. While this appears unlikely,260 mAv 1:1 was an important text for Jews living in

ha-Qaraʾim,” Sinai 114 (1994): 94-95; and Yehuda Raṣhabi, “R. Yehuda ha-Levi veha-Qaraʾim,” Sinai 114
(1994): 191.
David, “Yediʿat davar ha-El,” 140, questioned the extent to which anti-qiyās arguments are
representative of Rabbanite thought. While he correctly noted that several Andalusian Rabbanites were less
sweeping in their rejection of qiyās than Saʿadya, this is not especially significant from the perspective of
the geonim. Moreover, many of David’s sources come from beyod the Islamic world (150-52). He also
argued that Saʿadya’s “theological rationalism,” leading to a “rationalist paradox” of admitting the limited
ability of man’s mind, motivated Saʿadya’s arguments against qiyās (126-27, 138). This interpretation
ignores the explicitly polemical character of Saʿadya’s anti-qiyās writings.
259
On these lists, see Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, li-lii. On chains of
transmission in Heikhalot literature, which exhibit similar features, see Michael Swartz, Scholastic Magic:
Ritual and Revelation in Early Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 173-205;
and Meir Bar-Ilan, “Shalshelet ha-Qabbalah be-Sifrut ha-Heikhalot,” Daʿat 56 (2005): 5-37. Gerald
Blidstein wrote that in this period, “the unbroken Chain of Tradition itself becomes a guarantor of the
integrity of the Oral Law”; “Mishnah Avot 1:1 and the Nature of Rabbinic Authority,” in Judaism and
Education: Essays in Honor of Walter I. Ackerman, ed. Haim Marantz (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion
University Press, 1998), 57.
260
For this hypothesis, see Alexander Guttmann, “Tractate Abot: Its Place in Rabbinic Literature,”
JQR 41, no. 2 (1950): 181-93; Günter Stemberger, “‘Moses received Torah…’ (M. Avot 1,1): Rabbinic
Conceptions of Revelation,” in Jerusalem, Alexandria, Rome: Studies in Ancient Cultural Interaction in
Honour of A. Hilhorst, eds. Florentino García Martínez and Gerard P. Luttikhuizen (Leiden: Brill, 2003),
285-99; idem, “Mischna Avot: Frühe Weisheitsschrift, pharisäisches Erbe oder spätrabbinische Bildung?”
Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 96, no. 3-4 (2005): 243-58; and idem, “Die
innerrabbinische Überlieferung von Mischna Abot,” in Geschichte—Tradition—Reflexion: Festschrift für
Martin Hengel zum 70. Geburtstag, eds. Hubert Cancik et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 1:511-27.
For responses, see Amram Don Tropper, “Tractate Avot and Early Christian Succession Lists,” in The Ways
That Never Parted; Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, eds. Adam H. Becker
and Annette Yoshiko Reed (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 160-61n3; and Peter Schäfer, “Rabbis and
Priests, or: How to Do Away with the Glorious Past of the Sons of Aaron,” in Antiquity in Antiquity:
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the Islamic world. During the geonic era, Rabbanites began to recite tractate Avot in
synagogues.261 One pre-modern Yemenite text ascribes the significance of this passage to
its description of “the transmitted and the transmitters” (al-naql wal-nāqlīn),262 terms
familiar from Islamic descriptions of received traditions. Seder Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim, an
anonymous work that was probably composed in the ninth century, begins with a lengthy
chain of transmission whose chronological scope surpasses anything found in rabbinic
literature.263 This and other Rabbanite isnāds confirmed rabbinic tradition in
contemporary terms.
As Sklare showed, the geonim stressed that the authority of the rabbis in legal
matters rested on the accuracy of their transmission. He also noted that the geonim
depicted the rabbis’ halakhic dicta as prophetic traditions.264 Samuel ben Ḥofni’s
insistence that the talmudic rabbis were primarily tradents prompted him to prefer the
principle that the law follows later views (hilkheta ke-batrai) over the principle that the

Jewish and Christian Pasts in the Greco-Roman World, eds. Gregg Gardner and Kevin Lee Osterloh
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 169-70. Compare Adiel Schremer, “Avot Reconsidered: Rethinking
Rabbinic Judaism,” JQR 105, no. 3 (2015): 297-300. Stemberger focused on the denotation of the root q-b-l
in mAv 1:1; note Cohen’s discussion of this verb in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lvi-lvii.
261
Many scholars (and even one sixteenth-century Qaraite) attributed this to anti-Qaraism; see
Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 212; and Yaʿaqov Garṭner, “Lamah Hinhigu ha-Geonim Amirat
‘Avot’ be-Shabbat?” Sidra 4 (1988): 22-23. Brody questioned this; Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 202n6.
262
See Shimon Sharvit, “Minhag ha-Qeriʾah shel Avot be-Shabbat u-Toldot ha-Baraitot sheNispaḥu lah be-ʿIqvotav,” Bar Ilan Annual 13 (1976): 173.
263
See Kahana, ed., Seder Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim, 1-9. On this work see Shraga Abramson, “LeToldot Nusaḥ ‘Seder Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim,’ [kolel pirsum qeṭaʿei genizah ḥadashim shel ha-ṭeqst ve-khen
nispaḥim uva-hem tosefet meqorot mi-khitvei yad umi-defusim],” in ʿIyunim be-Sifrut Ḥazal, be-Miqra,
uve-Toldot Yisrael: Muqdash li-Prof. ʿEzra Ṣion Melamed, eds. Yiṣḥaq Dov Gilat et al. (Ramat Gan: Bar
Ilan University Press, 1982), 215-57; and Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 274-77.
264
This differed from the geonic approach to non-legal (aggadah) statements; see Sklare, Samuel
ben Ḥofni Gaon, 43-44, 159-60; Lifschitz, “‘Minhag’ u-Meqomo be-Midrag ha-Normot shel ‘Torah shebeʿal Peh’,” 193; above, n200, and below, n271. On the geonic approach to aggadah, see also idem,
“‘Aggadah’ u-Meqomah be-Toldot Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 (2001-2004):
233n4-5.
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law does not follow a student in the presence of his teacher (ein halakhah ke-talmid bemeqom rabbo). According to Samuel, only the existence of an authentic tradition could
motivate a later authority to disagree with an earlier one.265
Rabbanites often used the Arabic word riwāya, a technical term in ḥadīth
literature, to denote the act of transmission and to emphasize the role of the rabbis as
transmitters.266 This term is especially prominent in Samuel ben Ḥofni’s al-Madkhal ilā
ʿilm al-Mishnah wal-Talmud (The Introduction to the Study of the Mishnah and Talmud),
the most extensive geonic-era discussion of rabbinic tradition.267
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Zvi Stampfer, “‘Hilkheta ke-Batrai’ – Gishot Shonot be-Tequfat ha-Geonim,” Shenaton haMishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 (2001-2004): 428. See the text in Alexander Marx, “Kelalei ha-Talmud le-R. Beṣalel
Ashkenazi,” in Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage David Hoffmann’s, eds. Simon Eppenstein et al.
(Berlin: L. Lamm, 1914), 204-205 (§319). On the ascription to Samuel, see Shraga Abramson, “ʿAl Sefer
‘Darkhei ha-Talmud’ she-meyuḥas le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Qiryat Sefer 52 (1977): 381-82; idem, ʿInyanot
be-Sifrut ha-Geonim, 165-73; and Eliav Shoḥetman, “Kelalei ha-Talmud le-R. Beṣalel Ashkenazi,”
Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 8 (1981): 254n30.
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Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,” 2:176; and Ernst Roth, “Qeṭaʿ le-Shalshelet ha-Qabbalah miTequfat ha-Geonim,” Tarbiẓ 26, no. 4 (1957): 418. On the ascription of Roth’s text to Samuel, see Shraga
Abramson, “Le-Mavo ha-Talmud le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni,” Tarbiẓ 26, no. 4 (1957): 421-23; and Sklare,
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 18n59.
On the root Hebrew root ʿ-t-q to denote transmission, see Abraham Elijah Harkavy, Zikhron leRishonim ve-gam le-Aḥaronim: Zikhron Kamah Geonim uve-yiḥud Rav Sherira ve-Rav Hayya beno vehaRav R. Yiṣḥaq Alfasi (Berlin, 1887), 351; see also Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah,
Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:62n1. For use in Saʿadya, see Schechter, Saadyana, 5. For Israel ben Samuel ben
Ḥofni, see T-S Misc. 35.4, printed in Mann, Texts and Studies, 1:176 line 4; Ḥayim Hillel Ben-Sasson, Min
ha-Merkaz la-Qehilah ba-Maqom: Igrot u-Shṭarot (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar, 1977), 39 line 10; and Gil,
Be-Malkhut Yishmael, 2:178 line 10. For the translation of Samuel’s al-Madkhal, see the Mavo ha-Talmud,
printed in standard editions of the Babylonian Talmud, bBer, chap. 1. On the authorship of this text, see
Mordecai Margaliyot, ed., Hilkhot ha-Nagid: Kolel Seridei Sefer Hilkheta Gavrata u-Seridim shel Sheʾar
Ketavav ha-Hilkhatiyim (Jerusalem: Qeren Yehuda Leyb u-Mini Epstein, 1962), 68-73; and Shraga
Abramson, “Mi-Torato shel Rav Shmuel ha-Nagid mi-Sefard,” Sinai 100, no. 1 (1987): 22-23. On Qaraite
use of ʿ-t-q, see Wieder, “Three Terms for ‘Tradition’,” 113-17; and Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 22630. See also Henshke, “Le-Ṭaʿama shel Halakhah,” 47n10; and Neil Danzig, “Mi-Talmud ʿal Peh leTalmud be-Khetav: ʿAl Derekh Mesirat ha-Talmud ha-Bavli bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim,” Bar Ilan Annual 3031 (2006): 76n93.
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Consistent with the characterization of the rabbis as transmitters of tradition, and
not as its producers, Saʿadya portrayed rabbinic tradition as prophetic and of great
antiquity. He referred to rabbinic tradition as naql (tradition),268 naql al-aslāf (tradition of
the pious forbears), and āthār al-anbiyāʾ (traditions of the prophets).269 Saʿadya also
described rabbinic traditions as having “reached” him (using phrases such as jāʾa alāthār bi- and jāʾa fī al-fiqh).270 In his biblical exegesis, these claims were not limited to
legal topics, for as Ben-Shammai showed, Saʿadya cited rabbinic tradition in his
commentary on non-legal sections of Scripture as well.271
Sklare also showed that Saʿadya articulated his understanding of extra-scriptural
traditions in the terms of contemporary Muʿtazilites, who divided knowledge into
intuitive or “necessary knowledge” (ʿilm ḍarūrī) and “acquired knowledge” (ʿilm

See, e.g., Saʿadya’s introduction to his Pentateuch translation (tafsīr) in Joseph Derenbourg,
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Iosef al-Fayyoúmi (Paris, 1893), 4; the introduction to Kitāb al-Sabʿīn Lafẓa (Seventy Hapax Legomena), in
Neḥemya Allony, “Haqdamat Rasag le-sifro ‘Shivʿim ha-Milim ha-Bodadot’ be-Tirgum ʿIvri uve-ṣiruf
heʿarot u-mavo,” in Sefer Zaydel: Meḥqarim be-Ḥeiqer ha-Tanakh, ed. Eliezer Eliner (Jerusalem: haḤevrah le-Ḥeqer ha-Miqra be-Yisrael, 1962), 241 lines 8-9; the opening of Kitāb al-Mawārīth (Book of
Inheritances), in Robert Brody, Ḥiburim Hilkhatiyim shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav
Nissim, 2015), 12 line 2; and the text cited above, n196. Another translation of Saʿadya’s introduction to
his tafsīr appears in Kafiḥ, Peirushei Rabbeinu Saʿadya Gaon, 159-63. On this text see Ḥaggai BenShammai, “Ḥadashim gam Yeshanim: ‘ha-Haqdamah ha-Gedolah’ ve-‘ha-Haqdamat ha-Qeṭanah’ leTargum Rasag la-Torah,” Tarbiẓ 69, no. 2 (2000): 199-210; and Yitzhak Avishur, “Some New Sources for
the Study of the Text and Language of Saadya’s Translation of the Pentateuch into Judaeo-Arabic,” in
Genizah Research after Ninety Years, 5-13.
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271
See, e.g., Saʿadya, Iyov, ed. Kafiḥ, 23 (Job 1:1). See Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “The Tension
Between Literal Interpretation and Exegetical Freedom: Comparative Observations on Saadia’s Method,”
in With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, eds.
Jane Dammen McAuliffe et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 42. See more generally, idem,
“Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit,” 37-40; and above, n220. On midrashic literature in Saʿadya’s piyuṭim, see Yosef
Tobi, “Midreshei Ḥazal be-Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon uve-Feirusho la-Miqra,” Meḥqarei Yerushalayim beSifrut ʿIvrit 21 (2007): 91-131.
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muktasab; this was eventually adopted within mainstream Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh as well).
The first is acquired through perception, induction, or given by God; the second is the
product of reflection and consideration.272 Adopting the position of the Basran
Muʿtazilites, Saʿadya argued that received tradition, which he considered to be rabbinic
teachings, possesses the characteristics of ʿilm ḍarūrī.273

The Harmonization of Extra-Scriptural Traditions
According to several geonim and their followers, while the ancient rabbis were
largely passive tradents, they did take an active role in shaping the tradition by resolving
contradictions between earlier sources. The Talmud, of course, is replete with Amoraic
attempts to resolve contradictions between Tannaitic sources.274 Abraham Goldberg
demonstrated that the Amoraim were not troubled by the existence of disagreement per
se, but by contradictions between earlier and later generations and by internal
inconsistencies in the Mishnah.275 The presence of disagreements in the Talmud did
bother geonic authors, however; their resolutions of contradictions took place against the
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background of the Qaraite charge that disagreements in rabbinic literature undermine
claims of the Oral Torah’s unbroken transmission,276 and of attempts by Muslim jurists to
reconcile contradictions between legal ḥadīth. Shāfiʿī was perhaps the first to attempt to
harmonize ḥadīth systematically. While he rejected some ḥadīth in favor of others, he
also suggested ways to reconcile contradictions.277 For example, he suggested that
transmitters took earlier statements out of context or heard earlier statements only
partially.278 Abū Bakr Ibn Khuzayma (Khorasan; d. 923), a ḥadīth collector and jurist, is
reported to have said that he was unaware of any two sound ḥadīths that are genuinely
contradictory, and he boasted of his ability to reconcile all apparent contradictions.279
Saʿadya appears to have been the first Rabbanite to attempt to harmonize
conflicting traditions in the Talmud. Qirqisānī reported that Saʿadya identified three
reasons for disagreements among transmitters of the Oral Torah: (i) temporary
misunderstanding; (ii) a transmitter heard only one aspect of a prophetic report, and (iii) a
transmitter assumed that a statement was of general application (ʿāmm) when it actually
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See Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 240n77, writing that this began in the tenth century, based
on Qirqisānī’s statement that Qaraites had only recently began to call attention to such contradictions
(munāqaḍāt); Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:29. Salmon ben Yeruḥim used this claim to devastating effect
in his polemic against Saʿadya; see Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, 12-13. See also above, n155.
277
See Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:85-87; Schacht, Origins, 13-14; Calder, Studies in Muslim
Jurisprudence, 228-29; Gérard Lecomte, “Un exemple d’évolution de la controverse en Islam: de l’Iḫtilāf
al-Ḥadīṯ d’al-Šāfiʿī au Muḫtalif al-Ḥadīṯ d’Ibn Qutayba,” Studia Islamica 27 (1967): 26-29; and Musa,
Ḥadīth as Scripture, 53. On dating of Shāfiʿī’s Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth (Contradictory Ḥadīth), see Schacht,
Origins, 330. For background, see Joseph Lowry, “Al-Shāfiʿī,” in Islamic Legal Thought, 51-54; and idem,
Early Islamic Legal Theory, 125-42.
278
See Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 127, 141.
279
Cited in the thirteenth-century ʿUthmān ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Shahrazūrī, Kitāb
Maʿrifat Anwāʿ ʿIlm al-Ḥadīth (Medina: al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmīya, 1966), 285. Harmonization of ḥadīth was
distinct from isnād criticism, which identifies sound reports based on their transmitters; Eerik Dickinson,
The Development of Early Sunnite Ḥadīth Criticism: The Taqdima of Ibn Abī Ḥātim Al-Rāzī (240/854327/938) (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 5-6. See also Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 398; and John
Burton, An Introduction to the Ḥadīth (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 113-16.
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referred to a narrow set of facts (khāṣṣ).280 Zucker noted parallels between these
suggestions and those made in Islamic literature,281 such as the claim that some
transmitters assumed reports to be ʿāmm when they are actually khāṣṣ or vice-versa,282
and that forgetfulness accounts for discrepancies in prophetic reports.283 More important
than the specific parallels, however, is the shared assumption that contradictions and
debates are (frequently?) the result of errors in transmission and interpretation.
In addressing contradictions in rabbinic literature, the letter from Saʿadya’s
student noted that the Bible, too, contains contradictions. The author pointed out that,
according to 2 Sam. 24:9, King David’s army numbered eight hundred thousand, while
according to 1 Chron. 21:5, it numbered over one million. This “apparent” contradiction,
he wrote, must have a solution.284 He further claimed that the process of harmonization
began in the Mishnah. He asserted that when the anonymous sages in mNid 1:1 rejected
the positions of both Shammai and Hillel (lo ke-divrei zeh ve-lo ke-divrei zeh), they were,

Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:127. See also there, 1:115, reporting that Saʿadya
reconciled (waffaqa) traditions. Saʿadya’s student reported that Saʿadya referred to this problem in many of
his writings, including Sefer ha-Galuy: וקד ביין אסתאד'נא אידה אללה פי כתב כת'ירה כיף אלתופיק בין מכ'תלפאת
 ומת'ל להא מת'אלאת מן אלמקרא פי ספר הגלוי...  ;אלמקרא ובין מכ'תלפאת אלמשנהPoznański, “Die Streitschrift eines
Schülers Saadja’s,” 48. It is not clear where these claims would fit in Sefer ha-Galuy. For outlines of that
work, see Samuel Miklós Stern, “Qeṭaʿ Ḥadash mi-Sefer ha-Galuy le-R. Saʿadya Gaon,” Melilah 5 (1955):
135; and Yosef Tobi, “Daf Nosaf mi-Sefer ha-Galuy le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” in Meḥqarim be-Sifrut ʿAm
Yisrael uve-Tarbut Teiman, eds. Judith Dishon and Ephraim Hazan (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University,
1991), 56-58. For similar claims, see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 16.
281
Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret,” 324-25. I do not find all of the suggested
parallels between Saʿadya and Shāfiʿī convincing. On ʿāmm and khaṣṣ in geonic literature, see also Zucker,
ʿAl Targum Rasag, 260n.
282
Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. Lowry, 157. On the distinction between ʿāmm and
khaṣṣ in that work, see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 69-86. For background, see there, 69n11.
283
See Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. Lowry, 158; treated in Lowry, Early Islamic
Legal Theory, 92. See the similar argument in Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth, in Kitāb
al-Umm, ed. Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭallib (al-Manṣūra: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 2001), 10:44-45.
284
Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 48.
280

84

in fact, harmonizing the disagreement by saying that the law follows neither view on its
own (lo ke-divrei zeh waḥda) but, rather, both (kal-qawlayn majmūʿayn).285 In his view,
disagreements began because the students of Shammai and Hillel served their teachers
insufficiently (lo shimshu kol ṣorkhan; bSan 88b). For example, one student heard that
there are three obligatory prayers each day, another that there are four, and another that
there are five, without realizing that each statement referred to a different case: Regular
days require three prayers, Sabbaths, four, and the Day of Atonement, five.286
Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Madkhal contains the largest surviving discussion of
talmudic contradictions in geonic literature.287 Samuel also ascribed disagreements to
lackadaisical students who did not exert sufficient effort to understand their teachers (like
the trope in bSan 88b).288 Like Saʿadya, Samuel explained that some transmitters
interpreted statements as khāṣṣ when they were actually ʿāmm, and that
misunderstandings and forgetfulness accounted for other disagreements.289 Samuel
sought support for his theories in talmudic claims about disagreements, and he depicted
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Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 48. On this claim, see Zucker, “LeVaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret,” 325-26n27. This is not what this phrase seems to mean in the Mishnah;
see Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Tanaʾim, 429-30; and E.S. Rosenthal, “Mesoret-Halakhah ve-ḤidusheiHalakhot be-Mishnat Ḥakhamim,” Tarbiẓ 63, no. 3 (1994): 367-68.
286
Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 50. I have not found this example in
rabbinic literature.
287
See Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 197-98; and Samuel ben Ḥofni, Peraqim min
Sefer ‘Mavo ha-Talmud’, ed. Abramson, 193.
288
See Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 209-215; and Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet
be-Masoret,” 320. See also the table of contents of this work in Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,”
2:174.
289
Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 213; and Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet beMasoret,” 320.
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the later talmudic rabbis –the “ahl al-Talmud” (lit., people of the Talmud)290 – as figures
who reconciled (waffaqa) earlier traditions.291

Geonic-Era Portrayal of the Origins of Non-Biblical Institutions
Rabbanite claims about the origins of non-biblical institutions are perhaps the
most surprising component of their legal epistemology. This section traces their remarks
pertaining to the calendar, the Second Day of Festivals observed in the diaspora (yom tov
sheini shel galuyot), Hanukah, translations of the Bible (Targumim; sing., Targum), and
the geonic academies. As will be seen, Rabbanites resorted to similar arguments to
defend each of these institutions.
Many have noted that Saʿadya and others went beyond rabbinic claims when they
argued for the biblical origin of the obligation to pray,292 and rooted both the anonymous
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This phrase may be Samuel’s term for what are known today as the stamm or editorial layers of
the Babylonian Talmud. For other appearances in Samuel’s writings, see Simḥa Assaf, “Sheloshah Sefarim
Niftaḥim le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni,” in Zikaron le-Nishmat ha-Rav Avraham Yiṣḥaq ha-Kohen Kook, ed.
Judah Leib Maimon (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1945), 151; and Samuel ben Ḥofni, Sefer haGeirushin, Kitāb al-Ṭalāq, ed. and trans. Y. Zvi Stampfer (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ben-Ẓvi, 2008), 75.
291
Samuel ben Ḥofni, Peraqim min Sefer ‘Mavo ha-Talmud’, ed. Abramson, 195; see above,
n280. See Abramson’s evaluations of Samuel’s efforts in “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 210, 212. For
Sherira’s use of this idea, see Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 23. Geonic attempts to minimize
contradictions appear to relate to the idea that a rejected view is “objectively” wrong, a widely-held
position in this period; see Fuchs, “Darkhei ha-Hakhraʿa,” 103n16. Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal
Peh,” 7, noted the absence of talmudic passages that valorize disagreement in Sherira’s Epistle.
Others have treated attempts to harmonize rabbinic disputes as foreign or based on Qaraite
premises. Blidstein asked “is halakhah decided by verifying the traditions and their reliability, like in
Islam?”; “Masoret ve-Samkhut,” 15n16. Shapiro, Changing the Immutable, 249, repeated Blidstein’s
conclusion. Faur wrote that attempts to reconcile traditions are based on assumptions that are “the basis of
the Qaraite movement”; ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 38.
292
His sons included the relevant work among Saʿadya’s polemical writings; Allony et al., HaSifriyah ha-Yehudit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim, 313 line 24; see also Moshe Zucker, “Qeṭaʿ mi-Kitāb Wujūb alṢalawāt le-Rabbeinu Saʿadya,” PAAJR 43 (1976): 29-36; Saʿadya ben Joseph, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds.
Davidson et al., 1-10; and Shraga Abramson, “Qeṭaʿ Hadash min ha-sefer ‘Essa Meshali’ le-Rav Saʿadya
Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 32, no. 2 (1964): 166-67. For other Rabbanite views, see Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines
Schülers Saadja’s,” 51; Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 216; and Sklare, “The Religious and Legal
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ban (ḥerem stam) and the court oath (allah) in biblical texts.293 Yet, Saʿadya himself
wrote that it was not always appropriate or prudent to cite biblical prooftexts for every
practice. He recounted that, when he reached Iraq, he had encountered some nonRabbanites who demanded a scriptural source for every law. When their Rabbanite
interlocutor was unable to produce such sources, they dismissed Rabbanite views. It was
this experience, claimed Saʿadya, that led him to warn that one who seeks scriptural proof
(dalīl min al-miqra) for everything in the Mishnah will have, in effect, rendered the
Mishnah useless (abṭaltum al-mishnah) and adopted the Qaraite position (madhhab).294
Despite this warning, Rabbanites, Saʿadya among them, routinely appealed to prophetic
authority.

The Mathematical Calendar
The Mishnah depicts a calendar governed by sighting of the New Moon, and
intercalated in order to fulfill the requirement that Passover occur in the spring, aviv (Ex.

Thought,” 2:180. Saʿadya asserted the biblical status of prayer times; see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya,
183n95; idem, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 33n17; and Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, 35.
293
See Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law, 229n95; idem, “Gezerta ve-Ḥerem Stam be-Tequfat haGeonim uve-Reishit Yemei ha-Beinayim,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1979), 293n449; and
Berakhyahu Lifschitz, “Gilgulah shel Shevuʿat Beit Din be-Allah,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12
(1984-1986): 398. For further background, see Gideon Libson, “Ḥerem Stam be-Tequfat ha-Geonim uveReishit Yemei ha-Beinayim,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 (2001-2004): 125-28.
294
ENA 2818 43v; Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 8-9. Zucker identified this as part of Saʿadya’s
Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Sāqawayh (Refutation of Ibn Sāqawayh). On Ibn Sāqawayh, see Simḥa Assaf,
“Divrei Pulmus shel Qaraʿi Qadmon neged ha-Rabbanim,” Tarbiẓ 4, no. 1 (1932): 35-53; no. 2-3 (1933):
193-206; Poznański, The Karaite Literary Opponents, 4-8; Simon Eppenstein, Beiträge zur Geschichte und
Literatur im geonäischen Zeitalter (Berlin: L. Lamm, 1913), 107-109; Malter, Saadia Gaon, 265-67, 38285; Mann, Texts and Studies, 2:1469-70; Leon Nemoy, Karaite Anthology (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1963), 70; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 346.
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12:2, 13:4), i.e., after the vernal equinox.295 The Rabbanite calendar received its final
form in the 920s, during the controversy between Saʿadya and the Palestinian, Ben
Meir.296 It is based on a nineteen-year cycle that includes seven intercalated years along
with the postponements (deḥiyot) needed to prevent the first days of Rosh ha-Shanah and
Passover from falling on certain days of the week. Sacha Stern demonstrated that this
calendar developed throughout the rabbinic period, eventually rendering the Mishnaic
system obsolete.297
The two earliest references to a fixed Rabbanite calendar – a piyuṭ by the
Palestinian payṭan, Pinḥas ha-Kohen (8th c.), and the post-talmudic (8th/9th c.?) Pirqei deR. Eliezer – affirm its antiquity. Both texts trace calendrical intercalation and the
nineteen-year cycle to God, or to Moses and other prophets.298
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Sacha Stern, Calendar and Community: A History of the Jewish Calendar, Second Century
BCE – Tenth Century CE. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), is the most recent treatment. On the
Mishnaic system, see there, 155-64; on the requirement of aviv, 47-48.
296
Stern, Calendar and Community, 191-210, 264-75. Significant evidence suggests that the
Rabbanite calendar was not uniform even in the eleventh century; see Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of
Community, 58-64, 337-39; and idem, “Rabbanite-Karaite Relations in Fatimid Egypt and Syria,” 69-90.
On pre-Saʿadya calendrical diversity, see Stern, Calendar and Community, 182-88; idem, “Fictitious
Calendars: Early Rabbinic Notions of Time, Astronomy, and Reality,” JQR 87, no. 1-2 (1996): 117-29;
idem, “A Primitive Rabbinic Calendar Text from the Cairo Genizah,” JJS 67, no. 1 (2016): 68-90; Sacha
Stern and Piergabriele Mancuso, “An Astronomical Table by Shabbetai Donnolo and the Jewish Calendar
in Tenth-Century Italy,” Aleph 7 (2007): 13-41; and Marina Rustow and Sacha Stern, “The Jewish
Calendar Controversy of 921-22: Reconstructing the Manuscripts and their Transmission History,” in Time,
Astronomy, and Calendars in the Jewish Tradition, eds. Sacha Stern and Charles Burnett (Leiden: Brill,
2014), 81-82, 91-94.
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Stern, Calendar and Community, 182-90. On the claim that Hillel the Patriarch authorized
changes to the calendar in 358/59, see there, 176-79, 193; Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem beYadeikhem,” 600-601; and, e.g., Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski, 97 (3:7). Abraham bar
Ḥiya attributed this claim to Hayya, but this appears to be an interpolation; Mann, “Gaonic Studies I,” 23940; and Stern, Calendar and Community, 175n82.
298
For Pinḥas, see Shulamit Eliṣur, Piyuṭei Rabbi Pinḥas ha-Kohen (Jerusalem: World Union of
Jewish Studies, 2004), 725-26; and Stern, Calendar and Community, 197n164. For Pirqei de-R. Eliezer, see
Dagmar Börner-Klein, Pirke de-Rabbi Elieser (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2004), 70-83; and Stern, Calendar
and Community, 197. Compare the text in Schechter, Saadyana, 93-94. For the dating of this work, see
Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 329. For an early reference to the
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Saʿadya argued that the calendar was always determined by calculation and never
by observation.299 He wrote: “the intercalation (al-ʿibur) is ancient, from the time (ʿahd)
of the first prophets.”300 Two medieval writers reported that Saʿadya had claimed that
various elements of the Jewish calendar were given at Sinai or enacted at the time of the
Exodus.301 Similarly, a fourteenth-century work quoted the tenth-century Ḥananel ben
Ḥushiel as arguing, probably under Saʿadya’s influence, that Jews had always determined
new months by calculation. Ḥananel wondered how the Israelites could have seen the
New Moon, given that a pillar of smoke guided them during the day, and a pillar of fire at
night (Ex. 13:21). Thus, he asserted, the “primary commandment” (ʿiqar miṣvah) must
prescribe sanctification of the months by calculation.302 Similarly, in his Kitāb al-

nineteen-year cycle in non-Jewish literature, see Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Eimatai Nosad ha-Luaḥ ha-ʿIvri?
Qadmuto ʿal-pi Ḥiburo shel al-Khwārizmī,” Asufot 1 (1987): 164.
299
For background, see Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 16n6; idem, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl alSharāʾiʿ,” 375; idem, “Ḥelqo shel R. Saʿadya Gaon be-Fulmus mi-Maḥarat ha-Shabbat,” PAAJR 20 (1951):
1-26; Richard C. Steiner, “Saadia vs. Rashi on the Shift from Meaning-Maximalism to MeaningMinimalism in Medieval Biblical Lexicology,” JQR 88 no. 3-4 (1998): 220-21; and Stern, Calendar and
Community, 264-68. Compare Jacob Katz, “Rabbinical Authority and Authorization in the Middle Ages,”
in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 1, eds. Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 43-46. See also Mordecai Halperin, “Lamah Naṭah Rav
Saʿadya Gaon meha-Emet?” Yodʿei Binah 5 (2011): 44-57, 64-73; Aryeh Stern, “Shiṭat Rasag be-Qiddush
ha-Ḥodesh,” Teḥumin 23 (2003): 293-95; idem, “Shiṭat Rasag be-Qiddush ha-Ḥodesh,” Yodʿei Binah 3
(2006): 32-36; and Shai Walter, “Shiṭat Rasag be-Qeviʿut ha-Ḥodesh – ha-Baʿayah ha-Astronomit uPitronah,” Yodʿei Binah 3 (2006): 40-56.
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 ;אלעיבור אלא אנה קדים מן עהד אנביאנא אוליאtext from Schechter, Saadyana, 32 line 10. See also T.S. 10 K2; in Poznański, “Addenda and Corrigenda,” 234. Poznański identified this as part of Saʿadya’s
Kitāb al-Tamyīz. The heading of this fragment, however, states that it is a “polemical work regarding the
two months [for which the messengers] violate the Sabbath” ( )כתאב פיה גדל על שני חדשים מחללין את השבת.
301
Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski, 59-60 (2:8), 126 (3:5), citing the claim that
the calendrical postponements are Sinaitic and that the tequfot are from the time of the Exodus; 69 (2:9),
and implying that somebody, undoubtedly Saʿadya, held that the mathematical calendar (ḥeshbon) was
Sinaitic; and Isaac Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9a-9b (4:6), citing the claim that ḥeshbon,
postponements, and rules found in the Arbaʿah Sheʿarim (Four Gates; a Babylonian calendrical algorithm)
are Sinaitic in origin. On the Arbaʿah Sheʿarim, see Stern, Calendar and Community, 193, 268-70.
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Baḥya ben Asher ibn Ḥlava, Beiʾur ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Charles Ber Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad
ha-Rav Kook, 1966-1968), 2:87. In the remainder of this passage, Ḥananel repeated Hayya’s approach to
the calendar (see below); see Ḥayim Jehiel Bornstein, “Maḥloqet Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” in Sefer
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Sharāʾiʿ, Saʿadya wrote: “we are commanded that we learn something by which we know
the new month, and we are warned regarding this ‘You shall keep this institution (i.e.,
Passover) [at its set time from year to year]’ (Ex. 13:10).”303 Yosef Kafiḥ connected this
entry on Saʿadya’s list of the commandments with Saʿadya’s attempts to demonstrate the
Sinaitic origin of the mathematical calendar.304 (Other early enumerators of the
commandments listed a similar commandment.305)
As Saʿadya recognized that this approach diverged from the rabbinic system of
observation, he attempted to reinterpret the talmudic evidence.306 He dismissed as
theoretical talmudic discussions that suggest that the “postponements” were not in effect
in the rabbinic period.307 Though the Mishnah discusses the process of interrogating
witnesses regarding the appearance of the New Moon, one medieval work, which may

ha-Yovel li-Khvod Naḥum Sokolov (Warsaw, 1904), 147n1. On Ḥananel’s dependence on Saʿadya, see
Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 321; and the notes in Baḥya ben Asher, Beiʾur ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Chavel, 2:87.
303
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5563G.25b, following the transcription on the Friedberg Genizah Project. Saʿadya read the word keep to
imply a prohibition, in accordance with talmudic understanding of this word (bʿEiruv 96a and parallels).
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(Lev. 23:4); Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 41-42 (from Saʿadya’s Commentary on Genesis); 436-47
(from Kitāb al-Tamyīz); and the Maimonidean passages above, n121. I have not been able to locate the
final reference in Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 2:317n12 (mRH 2:7).
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See Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 78-79n358.
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Maimonides was one of the earliest to make this point, which may be based on Isaac al-Balīya
(see above, n121); see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 2:317 (mRH 2:7), with the correction in Friedman,
“Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 584-85.
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See Poznański, “The Anti-Karaite Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” 271-73; Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim miKitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 377; and Ezra Fleischer, “Pisqah Ḥadashah me-Essa Meshali le-Rav Saʿadya
Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 49, no. 1-2 (1979-1980): 106-107. Others quoted Saʿadya on this point as well; see Salmon
ben Yeruḥim, Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, 62; Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed.
Filipowski, 60 (2:8); and Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9b (4:6). Saul Lieberman, “Tiqunei
Yerushalmi,” Tarbiẓ 5, no. 1 (1933-1934): 102, claimed that Saʿadya’s approach is found in rabbinic
literature. Lieberman repeated his claim in “Mishnat Rishonim,” Talpiyot 2, no. 3-4 (1945-1946): 375-79;
and in a more polemical vein in two letters to Solomon Zeitlin published in Marc Shapiro, Saul Lieberman
and the Orthodox (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2006), 19-20, 22-24, 27-29. Stern, Calendar and
Community, 166, 175, disagreed with Lieberman’s interpretation of the relevant passages.
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quote Saʿadya, claims that the interrogation only concerned the moon’s form and its place
on the horizon, not its actual appearance.308 According to an eleventh-century author,
Saʿadya had also asserted that the court’s dispatch of messengers to announce new
months was only intended to confirm that the observed New Moon matched the
mathematical calculations. This source claims that they did so in order to counter the
criticism of Zadok and Boethus, who allegedly disagreed with the sages about how new
months are to be determined.309
Several tenth-century Rabbanites repeated Saʿadya’s position,310 and Qirqisānī
reported that a group of people (qawm) adopted Saʿadya’s view.311 Mubashshir ha-Levi, a
relatively unknown Rabbanite who wrote in Baghdad in 997, seems to have been the first

Schechter, Saadyana, 34 lines 14-16. In the middle of the manuscript of Saʿadya’s work on the
months when the messengers violate the Sabbath (see above, n300), a new work appears by an otherwise
unknown Nathan bar Isaac of Sicily. Poznański, “Addenda and Corrigenda,” 234n1, claimed that this part
of Nathan’s work quotes a lost part of Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Tamyīz. Even if Poznański was incorrect,
Nathan’s work was written in the spirit of Saʿadya’s calendar polemic.
309
Natan Av ha-Yeshiva, Peirush Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem,
1956), 96 (mRH chap. 2). On the authorship of this work, see Simḥa Assaf, Tequfat ha-Geonim ve-Sifrutah
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1967), 294-96; Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Responsa of R. Abraham
Maimonides from the Cairo Geniza: A Preliminary Review,” PAAJR 56 (1990): 40-45; Neil Danzig,
Qaṭalog shel Seridei Halakhah u-Midrash mi-Genizat-Qahir (New York: JTS, 1997), 47n170; and Naḥem
Ilan, “ʿIyunim be-Feirush le-Masekhet Avot ha-Meyuḥas le-Rav Natan Av ha-Yeshiva,” in ʿAteret Yiṣḥaq:
Qoveṣ Meḥqarim be-Moreshet Yehudei Teiman, ed. Yosef Tobi (Netanyah: ha-Agudah le-Tipuaḥ Ḥevrah
ve-Tarbut, 2003), 11-13. Since Kafiḥ published this text, many more manuscripts have been identified; see
Menaḥem Ẓvi Fuchs, “Ha-Mishnah be-Teiman: Ketav-Yad mi-Feirush Rav Natan Av ha-Yeshiva,” Asufot
8 (1994): 161-67; and Ilan, “ʿIyunim be-Feirush le-Masekhet Avot,” 11-13. This claim also appears in the
report of Saʿadya’s view in Isaac Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9b (4:6).
One opponent of the mathematical calendar challenged Saʿadya by invoking a Mishnaic narrative
of the calendar (mRH 2:8-9), in which R. Joshua’s disagreement with Rabban Gamliel resulted in different
dates for the Day of Atonement, which seems to imply that witnesses were accepted to testify to the moon’s
appearance. In a partially preserved response, Saʿadya claimed that there was no substantive disagreement
between the two rabbis; Schechter, Saadyana, 32 line 6.
310
See Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 52; and Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,”
19-21.
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Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 4:805; noted in Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 16n11. Isaac
Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9a-9b (4:6), also reported that a number of thinkers accepted
Saʿadya’s approach.
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to criticize Saʿadya, though his comments are not systematic and do not indicate a total
rejection of Saʿadya’s approach.312 Qirqisānī himself sharply criticized Saʿadya’s claims;
he merely had to quote the Mishnah – which he did at great length – to argue that the
“true” calendar is based on observation.313 Saʿadya’s responses to critics of the Rabbanite
calendar demonstrate that such criticism was a feature of debates before Qirqisānī as
well.314 It is easy to see why many have regarded Saʿadya’s claims about the calendar as
ones which feature his weaker arguments,315 yet other cases demonstrate that Saʿadya’s
position on this topic should be seen as part of the larger geonic practice of antedating of
non-biblical institutions.
Moreover, even later geonim who found fault with Saʿadya’s views upheld the
claim of divine authority for the Rabbanite calendar. A 994/95 responsum, presumably
jointly authored by Sherira and Hayya,316 dismissed some of Saʿadya’s views and
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Mubashshir, Kitāb Istidrāk, ed. Zucker, 59-60; see there, 108n237; and Ankori, Karaites in
Byzantium, 300-301n22. On Mubashshir, see above, n217.
313
Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 4:804-14. For other Qaraite citations of the relevant
passages, see Ofrah Tirosh-Becker, Ginzei Ḥazal ba-Sifrut ha-Qaraʾit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem:
Bialik, 2011), 2:517-72. For Qaraite criticism of postponements, see Samuel Poznański, “Remarks on
‘Early Karaite Critics of the Mishnah’,” JQR 11, no. 2 (1920): 237-44. On the Qaraite calendar, see Ankori,
Karaites in Byzantium, 292-353; and Judith Olszowy-Schlanger, Karaite Marriage Documents from the
Cairo Geniza: Legal Tradition and Community Life in Mediaeval Egypt and Palestine (Leiden: Brill,
1998), 248-50.
314
See Lewin, “Essa Meshali le-Rasag,” 496; Malter, Saadia Gaon, 263-65 (from Saʿadya’s Kitāb
al-Tamyīz); and above, n300.
315
See above, nn128-129.
316
Mann ascribed this responsum to Sherira based on a reference to “Mar Rav Yehuda
zaqeinenu,” which he interpreted as “grandfather”; “Gaonic Studies I,” 240; accepted in Moshe Gil, “LeToldot Geonei Ereṣ Yisrael,” Tarbiẓ 44, no. 1-4 (1975): 145n16. Mann further surmised that this
responsum is the basis of Abraham bar Ḥiya’s report of Hayya’s view (see Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski,
97-98 [3:7]). Shraga Abramson wrote that this letter is a “responsum of (Rav Sherira and) Rav Hayya” and
a “responsum of Rav Sherira (and Rav Hayya)”; Be-Merkazim uve-Tefuṣot be-Tequfat ha-Geonim
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1965), 29, 43n2. There are several reasons to assume co-authorship: the
Pumbeditan responsa between 984 and 1004 were usually authored by Sherira and Hayya together; there is
no reason to assume that Hayya would not have used the word zaqeinenu in a joint responsum; and
zaqeinenu could refer to an illustrious ancestor and not a “grandfather.” On the authorship of these
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concluded that his position was designed only to combat heresy, “like dismissing with a
reed” (kmo deḥiya be-qaneh hu). “He wrote it,” the author(s) proclaimed, “for students
and not scholars” (le-talmidim ḥibro ve-lo le-ḥakhamim).317 A later letter from Hayya to
Nissim of Qayrawān repeated that Saʿadya’s arguments were merely “a reed to rebuff
heretics” (qaneh hu she-daḥah et apiqeros). Hayya, by contrast, would endeavor to
explicate “the truth of the matter” (amitat ha-davar). Hayya wrote that God had entrusted
the court to intercalate the year318 and to keep the holidays in their seasons, “unlike those
whose months are lunar but have no intercalation,” referring to contemporary Muslims.319
In Hayya’s view, the rabbis had the prerogative to intercalate the calendar as necessary,
provided that they maintained the framework of the nineteen-year cycle, which, he wrote,
“was in Israel’s possession from the days of Moses.”320 He suggested that if the rabbis
deemed it necessary to add a month at variance with the cycle, they would remove a
month in subsequent years to ensure that only seven of nineteen years would contain an

Pumbeditan responsa, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 60-61n34; and idem, “Groner’s The Legal
Methodology of Hai Gaon,” JQR 76, no. 3 (1986): 239. I thank Robert Brody for his assistance on this
matter. For the identification of “Mar Rav Yehuda,” see Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 119.
317
Mann, “Gaonic Studies I,” 242-43, 246. The former phrase is based on yBer 9:1.
318
Simḥa Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot: ve-ʿIman Teshuvot, Pesaqim uFeirushim me-et Ḥakhmei Provence ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem: Ofeq, 1995), 148 (§116). For other printings,
see there, 147n1; references follow Emmanuel’s edition. On Hayya’s position, see Bornstein, “Maḥloqet
Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” 146-50.
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כי הכת' תלה את החגים בזמני השנה כדי שלא יקיפו המועדים מזמן לזמן כדרך שמקיפין [לאשר] חדשיהם חדשי הלבנה
 ;ואין להם עיבורEmmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 149-50. For the claim of a Byzantine author

that Passover must occur in the spring, “unlike the Ishmaelites,” see Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium,
271n54.
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 ;והחשבון הזה שבידינו שהוא סוד העיבור היה בידיהם של ישראל מימות משה רבינוEmmanuel, Teshuvot haGeonim ha-Ḥadashot, 150. This position is repeated in an anonymous geonic-era responsum, probably
from a Palestinian gaon; see Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 587; on the authorship of
that responsum, see there, 602-603.
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extra month. In his view, the rabbis thus integrated the cycle with the rules for
intercalation set forth in rabbinic literature.321
Several other Rabbanites followed Saʿadya to varying degrees. Ḥananel ben
Ḥushiel repeated many of Hayya’s claims.322 The Palestinian gaon Evyatar ha-Kohen (c.
1042 - c. 1112) repeated several assertions found in Saʿadya’s writings and in Pirqei deR. Eliezer,323 but held that the prerogative to intercalate the calendar was exclusively that
of Palestinian Jewry.324 Judah Ibn Bilʿam claimed that since David had said to Jonathan
that the New Moon (ḥodesh) would occur on the morrow (1 Sam. 20:5), the calendar
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Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 151. This position also appears in a letter that
Hayya sent to Elḥanan ben Shemariah of Fusṭāṭ; see B.M. Lewin, “Teshuvat Rav Hayya Gaon z"l ʿal Davar
Shenei Yamim Tovin Shelgaluyot, u-Teshuvat Rabbeinu Yosef,” Ginzei Qedem 4 (1930): 36; and idem,
Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:41 (§47). On Elḥanan, see Elinoar
Bareket, Fustat on the Nile: The Jewish Elite in Medieval Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 205-222.
322
See the lengthy quotation in Baḥya ben Asher, Beiʾur ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Chavel, 2:85-88 (Ex.
12:2); and the treatment in Bornstein, “Maḥloqet Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” 147n1. This position
appears in many places in Ḥananel’s commentary on the Talmud; see Kasher, Torah Shleimah, 13:46-48.
The same claims appear in Abraham bar Ḥiya’s report of Hayya’s views, adding that Moses taught the
mathematical calculation of the calendar to Israel; Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski, 97 (3:7). In this version,
Hayya argued that earlier generations adjusted the mathematical calculation of the calendar as necessary
and concluded that historical dates (seder ʿolam) cannot be known with certainty. Mann, “Gaonic Studies
I,” 239, suggested that this may be a criticism of the account in Pirqei de-R. Eliezer. He added that the
claim of Mosaic origin of the intercalated calendar is an interpolation; however, it is consistent with
Hayya’s statement in the letter to Nissim.
323
For the claim that the debate between R. Joshua and Rabban Gamliel demonstrates that the
head of the court, alone, possesses the “secret of intercalation” (sod ha-ʿibur); see Schechter, Saadyana, 95
line 22; and Moshe Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar – Maqor le-Toldot Maʾaviqah shel Yeshivat Yerushalayim bemeḥiṣat ha-sheniya shel ha-meiʾah ha-11 (qeriʾah ḥadashah shel ha-Megillah),” in Peraqim be-Toldot
Yerushalayim bi-Yemei-ha-Beinayim, ed. Benjamin Z. Kedar (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1979), 94 line 22.
(On the shift of meaning of sod ha-ʿibur from “council of intercalation” to “secret of intercalation,” see
Stern, Calendar and Community, 189-91.) For the claim that the court began accepting witnesses only after
the criticism of Zadok and Boethus, see Schechter, Saadyana, 97 lines 24-25; and Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar,”
96 lines 24-25. Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel also repeated this argument; see Baḥya ben Asher, Beiʾur ʿal haTorah, ed. Chavel, 2:88.
324
See Schechter, Saadyana, 102; and Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar,” 91. See the claim that the
Palestinian Rabbi Judah the Prince had instituted the Arbaʿah Sheʿarim; Schechter, Saadyana, 102; and Gil,
“Megillat Eviyatar,” 92-93; see also Schechter, Saadyana, 84n2. See the treatment in Bornstein, “Maḥloqet
Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,”149-51; and Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar,” 70. This is similar to a claim made
by Ben Meir; see Stern, Calendar and Community, 178n91. See also Rustow and Stern, “The Jewish
Calendar Controversy of 921-22,” 81-82.
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must have been based on calculation in their time. How else could David have known
when the New Moon would appear?325 The Byzantine Rabbanite, Tobias ben Eliezer of
Kastoria (late 11th c.), wrote that before the exile, months were based on testimony, but
afterwards, they were based on the mathematical calculation first employed by Adam.326
While Abraham Ibn Ezra rejected Saʿadya’s approach, he affirmed a tradition of the
sages, transmitted from the prophets, according to which the calendar follows the
mathematical calculation during the exile.327 In short, while some Rabbanites rejected
certain aspects of Saʿadya’s claims about the Rabbanite calendar, they agreed that many
of its elements originate with God, Moses, or the ancient prophets.

The Second Day of Festivals in the Diaspora
The practice of observing two days of biblical festivals other than the Day of
Atonement, in the diaspora, in order to eliminate any doubt about the dates of festivals,

Shraga Abramson, “Sefer ha-Tanjīs (‘ha-Ṣimud’) le-Rav Yehuda ben Bilʿam,” in Sefer Ḥanokh
Yalon: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim, eds. Saul Lieberman et al. (Jerusalem: Qiryat Sefer, 1963), 107-8. On antiQaraism in Ibn Bilʿam’s biblical commentaries, see there, 60. The reference to Ibn Bilʿam’s commentary
on Ezek. 18:6 should be to REJ vol. 45. See also Neḥemya Allony, “Ibn al-ʿAm, Balʿam, ve-Ibn Balʿam
ha-Balshan veha-Parshan ve-hu ha-Meshorer veha-Payṭan ve-hu baʿal ha-Halakhah veha-Pulmusim,” in
Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History: Presented to Alexander Altmann on the Occasion of
his Seventieth Birthday, eds. Siegfried Stein and Raphael Loewe (University of Alabama Press, 1979), 45
(Hebrew pagination). Bornstein reported that Poznański identified a manuscript of Ibn Bilʿam’s
commentary on 1 Sam. 20 that included this argument, but it is possible that this was a manuscript of Kitāb
al-Tanjīs; “Maḥloqet Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” 147n1. A nearly identical claim appears in the name
of the tenth-century R. Meshulam bar Qalonymos of Lucca in R. Moses ben Jacob of Coucy, Sefer Miṣvot
ha-Gadol (Venice, 1547), 123b, suggesting, perhaps, a shared geonic-era source.
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Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 270n53. See also Stern, Calendar and Community, 213, 23435. On anti-Qaraite polemic in this work, see Israel Ta-Shma, “‘Midrash Leqaḥ Tov’ – Reqaʿo ve-Ofyo,” in
Keneset Meḥqarim: ʿIyunim be-Sifrut ha-Rabbanit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute,
2004), 3:265-77.
327
Abraham Ibn Ezra, Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 3:79, 3:82 (Lev. 23:4). See also his
comments to Ex. 12:2 (2:70-74), and idem, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Solomon Zalman Ḥayim Halberstam (Lyck:
L. Silbermann, 1874), 11b.
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arose in a period when Jews outside of Palestine were uncertain that they would learn of
the New Moon’s arrival in a timely manner. An early talmudic statement linked this
practice (yom tov sheini shel galuyot) to doubts about the calendar, but a later view
suggested it was motivated by concerns about “persecution” (shemada) (bBeṣ 4b).328 In
the geonic period, Qaraites criticized the Second Day of Festivals, forcing Rabbanites to
justify its continued observance.329 How, asked Qirqisānī, could divine law admit
divergent practices (ikhtilāf), in which the Palestinians observe one day and Babylonians
two? He argued that, from the Palestinian perspective, Babylonians violate the
prohibition of adding to the law, while Babylonians perceive Palestinians as violating it
by subtraction (“Neither add to it nor take away from it”; Deut. 13:1)!330
Nissim of Qayrawān quoted Saʿadya’s Commentary on Exodus as having
dismissed the idea that there had ever been doubt about the dates of the festivals. Rather,
Saʿadya asserted, God instructed Moses that Jews in Palestine were to observe one day of
festivals and Jews in the diaspora, two.331 Elsewhere, Saʿadya offered the somewhat
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Stern proposed that the second defense was offered as the calendar became more predictable,
and that “persecution” refers either to breaks in communication between Palestinians who fixed the
calendar and Babylonians, or to attacks on local Babylonian experts; “The Second Day of Yom Tov in the
Talmudic and Geonic Literature,” World Congress of Jewish Studies 11, C: Thought and Literature, volume
1: Rabbinic and Talmudic Literature (1993): 49-55; and idem, Calendar and Community, 171, 174n79,
245-46. See also Jacob Katz, “The Orthodox Defense of the Second Day of Festivals,” in Divine Law in
Human Hands: Case Studies in Halakhic Flexibility (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1998), 255-60.
329
Nissim made the anti-Qaraite context explicit; see Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim haḤadashot, 148; and Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 173.
330
Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:57, 4:814. This was part of Qaraite exploitation of
discrepancies in practice between Palestinian and Babylonian Rabbanites; see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia,
110-13; Zeʾev Elkin, “Ha-Nusaḥ ha-Qaraʾi shel ‘Sefer ha-Ḥiluqim bein benei Ereṣ-Yisrael le-vnei Bavel’,”
Tarbiẓ 66, no. 1 (1997): 101-11; and Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “ʿAl Terumat ha-Genizah le-Ḥeiqer haHalakhah,” Madaʿei Yahadut 38 (1998): 279-80.
331
See Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 148. Zucker (“Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 16n6; and
“Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 403n64a) claimed that he found relevant fragments of Saʿadya’s
commentary to Ex. 12. In personal communication (Nov. 18, 2014), David Sklare confirmed the existence
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circular argument that Moses must have known about the Second Day of Festivals; had
he not, its observance would violate the prohibition of adding to the Torah. However,
wrote Saʿadya, this requirement was not fully revealed until Jews in exile needed it.332
In his Kitāb al-Tamyīz (Book of Distinction), Saʿadya may have gestured toward
consensus (ijmāʿ), at least rhetorically, claiming that the entire community (jamāʿa) had
heard from prophets and witnessed the prophetic practice of observing one day of
Festivals in Palestine and two in the diaspora. He justified the observance of different
practices in different places by pointing out that the requirement to offer the Paschal
sacrifice depends on one’s location (Num. 9:10).333 Saʿadya further emphasized that the
prohibition of adding to the law pertains only to “everything that I command you” (Deut.
13:1) and not to “everything that I write for you.” He maintained that since the Second
Day of Festivals is a transmitted tradition, and therefore included in “everything that I
command you,” its observance does not violate this prohibition.334
In a letter to the Jews of Qabīs, in the Maghreb, Hayya claimed that the prophets
had instituted the Second Day of Festivals,335 and in a letter to Elḥanan ben Shemariah (d.

of these fragments and that Saʿadya based the Second Day of Festivals on naql and āthār. On the supposed
lack of doubt regarding the calendar, see also Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 590.
332
Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 403.
333
Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 407.
334
Hartwig Hirschfeld, “The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. (Third Article.):
Saadyāh Fragments,” JQR 16, no. 1 (o.s.) (1903): 103-104. See also Poznański, “Addenda and
Corrigenda,” 233-34; Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, 35, 150-51; and Michael G. Wechsler, The Book of
Conviviality in Exile (Kitāb al-Ῑnās biʾl-Jalwa): The Judaeo-Arabic Translation and Commentary of Saadia
Gaon on the Book of Esther (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 377-79. Brief discussion of Saʿadya’s claims appears in
Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 574n134, 582-83.
335
 ; וזאת הגזירה מימות הנביאים הראשונים וכן הנהיגו את ישראל מתחלת הגליות שעושין ימים טובים שני ימיםA.
Marmorstein, Teshuvot ha-Geonim, ʿim Haqdamah ve-Heʿarot (Deva, 1928), 27; and Lewin, Oṣar haGeonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:38-39 (§43). For the addressee, see Emmanuel,
Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 148n15. On Qabīs, see Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “The Jewish Community
of Gabes in the 11th Century,” in Communautés juives des marges sahariennes du Maghreb, ed. Michel
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1026), he identified those prophets as Ezekiel and Daniel (probably because they lived in
Babylonia).336 In a responsum to Nissim of Qayrawān, Hayya reiterated Saʿadya’s view
about the prohibition of adding to the Torah. The prophets who began this practice, he
wrote, would never have dreamed of adding to the Torah. Hayya further argued that the
rationale for the Second Day of Festivals is analogous to the case of one lost in a desert.
Uncertain whether a given day is Wednesday or Thursday, the traveler would rest on two
days in order to avoid violating the Sabbath. Likewise, Jews beyond the borders of the
Land of Israel observe the Second Day of Festivals, lest they desecrate the day. Hayya
wrote that God commanded Israel to observe the Second Day of Festivals precisely in
order to avoid similar situations of doubt, perhaps through the prophet Joshua, for in
Joshua’s time, Jews first settled Palestine and began to travel from there.337 Hayya
tempered Saʿadya’s position about the origins of the Second Day of Festivals, explaining
it in a way that better accorded with historical events, but he affirmed both the prophetic
origin of this practice and the claim that only divine law is authoritative.338

Abitbol (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1982), 265-84. Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,”
600n246, argued that this responsum only repeats the claims of the letter to Qabīs but does not preserve the
original text.
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 ועמלת אלאמה בד'לך פי בבל ואלאנביא חאצ'רין פי גמיע אלבלדאן... פלמא כאנת אלגלות ואלאנביא חאצ'רין סנו לכל
 ;ובה עמל אלאנביא מת'ל יחזקאל ודניאלLewin, “Teshuvat Rav Hayya Gaon,” 36; and idem, Oṣar ha-Geonim,

Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:42 (§47). See also Assaf, Teshuvot ha-Geonim, 214
(§36). For another example of geonic-era use of the term Sunna, see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon,
82n51, 84. On Elḥanan, see above, n321.
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see further, 155-56.
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See similarly Lewin, “Teshuvat Rav Hayya Gaon,” 37. Lewin ascribed this responsum to R.
Joseph rosh ha-seder (Egypt; 12th / 13th c.); see however, Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,”
560n8. Further treatment of Hayya’s position appears there, 580n178, 585-86, 600. See also, Ben-Sasson,
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Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:136-37, treated briefly in Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem beYadeikhem,” 594-95. Compare also Gerald Blidstein, “Ha-Qesher bein Samkhut Taqqanot Ḥazal u-Veit
Midrash be-Maqor Ashkenazi Qadum,” Sinai 112 (1993): 163-65.
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Hanukah
The earliest geonic source that mentions the legal basis of Hanukah of which I am
aware, evinces no qualms about admitting its rabbinic status. It is by Ṣemaḥ ben Paltoy
Gaon (Pumbedita; 872-90), who was active prior to most geonic anti-Qaraite polemic.339
In response to the Qaraite charge that this holiday was a rabbinic innovation,340 however,
many Rabbanites either argued that Hanukah was divinely ordained, or that it was based
on Mosaic prophecy.
One early occurrence of this theme appears in Megillat Antiochus (Scroll of
Antiochus), a work whose date has been subject to dispute since the nineteenth century.341
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' ;דאורית' לא כל שכן וכי תימ' מאי טעמ' לא פרטי רבנן לא צריכה פרט ליה בנר של חנוכה דרבנן וכל שכן מצוה דאוריתEmmanuel,

Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 69 (§61). The beginning of this responsum appears in Marmorstein,
Teshuvot ha-Geonim, 49 (§12; not §1, as Emanuel has), and Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Sukkah,
Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 6:16 (§28). Emmanuel pointed out that R. Elijah Menaḥem ben Moses of London (c.
1220-84) cited this material in the name of the Sheʾiltot; see Elijah Menaḥem ben Moses, Peirushei
Rabbeinu Eliyahu mi-Londres u-Fesaqav, ed. Mordecai Yehuda Leib Sacks (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav
Kook, 1956) 34 (Hebrew pagination). See also J.N. Epstein, “Prishat Rabbeinu Eliyahu Menaḥem b-R.
Moshe me-Londres,” Madaʿei ha-Yahadut 1 (1926): 65.
340
See Ḥilluq ha-Qaraʾim veha-Rabbanim ascribed to Elijah ben Abraham (11th / 12th c.) in
Pinsker, Liquṭei Qadmoniyot, 102 (appendices, English pagination); this text is treated in Leon Nemoy,
“Elijah Ben Abraham and his Tract against the Rabbanites,” HUCA 51 (1980): 63-87; and Astren, Karaite
Judaism and Historical Understanding, 141-57. “What is more strange,” wrote Qirqisānī, “than a person
pronouncing a blessing over the Sabbath-eve lamp and saying in the blessing that God commanded it?
Likewise, over the lamp of Hanukah?”; Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:30; trans. in Leon Nemoy, “AlQirqisānī’s Account of the Jewish Sects and Christianity,” HUCA 7 (1930): 349. On Qaraite anti-Hanukah
claims, see Baron, SRHJ2, 5:226, 5:407; Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 282; Nemoy, Karaite Anthology,
xxiv; and Astren, Karaite Judaism and Historical Understanding, 73-74. Saʿd Ibn Kammūna listed
Hanukah among the differences between Qaraites and Rabbanites; see Leon Nemoy, “Ibn Kammūnah’s
Treatise on the Differences between the Rabbanites and the Karaites,” PAAJR 36 (1968): 110; JQR 63, no.
2 (1972): 115-16.
341
Also known as Megillat (or Sefer) Beit Ḥashmonai. For bibliography, see Meir Rafeld,
“Megillat Antiochus – Bibliografiya Nivḥeret,” in Minhagei Yisrael – Meqorot ve-Toldot, ed. Daniel
Sperber (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1995), 5:117-20. For a list of editions, see Strack and
Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 331-32; and Zeʾev Safrai, “Appendix: The Scroll of
Antiochus and the Scroll of the Fasts,” in The Literature of the Sages, 2:238n2-3. For dating, see Aryeh
Kasher, “The Historical Background of Megillath Antiochus,” PAAJR 48 (1981): 208-210; add Emil
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This work’s closing verses assert that the Hasmoneans and the entire people of Israel
vowed to observe Hanukah in order “to inform the Children of Israel to make these eight
days of happiness and joy, like the holidays that are written in the Torah (ke-yomei
modʿaya de-khtivin be-orayta).”342 As the rhetoric of this claim suggests that Megillat
Antiochus was written when the observance of Hanukah was contested, several scholars
date this text to a time after the rise of Qaraism.343 Similarly, the geonic-era Midrash leḤanukah asserts, “God arose and established eight days of Hanukah for them, which was

Schrürer, A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1897-1898),
165. Menaḥem Zvi Kadari showed that the Aramaic of Megillat Antiochus is similar to the Aramaic of
Onqelos; “Be-Ezo Aramit Nikhtavah Megillat Antiochus?” Lĕšonénu 23 (1959): 143-45; and idem,
“Megillat Antiochus ha-Aramit,” Bar Ilan 2 (1964): 210-13. Onqelos as it is known today was probably
compiled between the sixth and ninth centuries; see Safrai “Appendix: The Scroll of Antiochus and the
Scroll of the Fasts,” 239n15; Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 331; and the
views cited in Raphael Binyamin Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” Sidra 15 (1999): 96n2. Saʿadya was the first
to mention Megillat Antiochus; a reference in Halakhot Gedolot is suspect; Louis Ginzberg, “Antiochus,
Scroll of (Megillat Antiochus),” The Jewish Encyclopedia (New York, 1901), 1:637. The editio princeps of
Halakhot Gedolot ([Venice, 1548], 141b, repr. [Vienna, 1811], 104b) refers to Megillat Beit Ḥashmonai,
but the Rome manuscript (Ezriel Hildesheimer, ed. Halakhot Gedolot: ʿal pi Ketav-yad Romi [Berlin: H.
Itzkowski, 1888], 615) has Megillat Taʿanit. Hildesheimer preferred the latter reading in his vivarium
edition (3:335-36). Saʿadya referred to Megillat Antiochus in the Arabic version of his Sefer ha-Galuy; see
Harkavy, Zikhron la-Rishonim, Ha-Sarid veha-Palit mi-Sefer ha-Egron ve-Sefer ha-Galuy, 151 lines 15-18,
163 lines 6-8, 181 lines 4-10 (citing verse 25). For another early reference, see Julian Obermann, The
Arabic Original of ibn Shâhîn’s Book of Comfort, Known as the Ḥibbûr Yaphê of R. Nissîm b. Yaʿaqobh
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), 2; and Nissim ben Jacob, An Elegant Composition Concerning
Relief after Adversity, trans. William M. Brinner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 6.
342
 ;להודעא לבני ישראל למעבד הדין תמניא יומין חדוא ויקר כיומי מודעיא דכתיבין באוריתאMenaḥem Ẓvi Kadari,
“Megillat Antiochus ha-Aramit,” Bar Ilan 1 (1962): 101; see variants there. On the resemblances with Est.
9:18-32, which promotes the observance of Purim, see Kasher, “The Historical Background,” 218-19n32.
343
Adolf Neubauer, “Two Monographs by Dr. M. Gaster,” JQR 6, no. 3 (o.s.) (1894): 575,
followed by Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 331; Atlas and Perlmann,
“Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” 22; and Kasher, “The Historical Background,” 217, 229.
Alternatively, Robert Brody suggested to me that the comparison between Hanukah and the biblical
festivals may accept that Hanukah is a later creation which is to be observed as if it were of biblical origin.
100

not a holiday until now.”344 Inclusion of Hanukah in enumerations of the 613
commandments also affirms its divine origin.345
Saʿadya was among those who counted Hanukah among the 613 commandments,
both in his liturgical enumerations346 and in his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ.347 In his Introduction to
Megillat Antiochus, Saʿadya explained that he was inspired to defend Hanukah because
some Jews (i.e., Qaraites) rejected it.348 He claimed that the pious ancestors (aslāf)

344

 ;ועמד הק"ב וקבע להם שמונה ימי חנוכה שלא היה מועד עד עשכיוAdolf Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrasch:
Sammlung kleiner Midraschim und vermischter Abhandlungen aus der ältern jüdischen Literatur (Leipzig,
1853), 1:135. Mirky’s edition of the Sheʾiltot (1:185) contains a homily that claims that God established
Hanukah and that King David prophesied about it. On this text, see Moshe Ḥayim Leiter, “Sheʾilta de-Rav
Aḥai be-ʿInyanei Ḥanukah,” Yeshurun 19 (2007): 25-26. Robert Brody suggested that it is unlikely that this
passage is original to Aḥai’s Sheʾiltot, as it is only preserved in one manuscript; see his Le-Toldot Nusaḥ
ha-Sheʾiltot (Jerusalem: ha-Aqademiyah ha-Ameriqaʾit le-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut, 1992), 92n106. On the
sheʾilta genre, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 202-207.
345
See above, n191. Note the comments of Eliezar of Metz, Sefer Yireiʿim, 496 (§429 [§100]); and
Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 85n378. See also Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag,
1:507-508.
346
Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 158 line 20 (piyuṭ), 202 line 245
(azharot). Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:507, argued that Saʿadya counted a commandment to observe
Hanukkah, not a commandment to light the Hanukkah candles. See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 9n58.
347
וצ'מן אלאת'אר אן יכון יום יפריג לנו מן ולד עמלק יתכ'כד'ונה עידא וכתב זאת זכרון בספר ואד'א נצר אללה אלבני לוי
 ;פי חרבהם למקאמיהו ם אן תצ'לון ד'לך אלוקת כ'ק' ברך ה' חילו ופועל ידיו תרצה ולם נג<ד>הום חארבו אלא אליונינייהOxford

MS Heb. e.45.65a, following the Friedberg Genizah Project transcription; published by Zucker, “ʿIyunim
ve-Heʿarot,” 98. Zucker offered the shelfmark 21.165 from the Cambridge collection, which does not exist.
Zucker’s text did not include the last sentence; it is published in translation in Sabbato, “Ha-Im hekir haRambam,” 760; and Y. Zvi Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah? ʿIyun be-Kivtei
Rav Saʿadya Gaon uve-Pulmosav,” in Nero Yaʾir: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim le-Ḥanukah le-Zikhro shel Oded
Ḥamadi, eds. Ariel David and Yosef Parḥi (Qiryat Ono: Mekhon Mishnat ha-Rambam, 2013), 418-19.
Saʿadya wrote that “tradition obligated” (wa-ḍammana al-āthār) the observance of Purim.
Sabbato, “Ha-Im hekir ha-Rambam,” 760, translated ḍammana as “guaranteed,” reading ḍamana (form I);
Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah,” 419n34, preferred the form II meaning of
“included.” Zucker, “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 98, agreed with Stampfer. Blau preferred “obligated”;
Dictionary, 388, s.v. ضمّن. Note Saʿadya’s use of the fifth form of ḍ-m-n to state “tradition included”
(taḍammanat al-āthār) that the weekday prayer is comprised of 18 blessings, based on the number of
verses in the Song at the Sea (Ex. 15:2-19); Ben-Shammai, “Meṣiʾah aḥat she-Hi shetayim,” 325. On this
root, see Adrian Gully, “Taḍmīn, ‘Implication of Meaning,’ in Medieval Arabic,” JAOS 117, no. 3 (1997):
466-80.
348
Atlas and Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” 6 lines 9-11. See Franz
Rosenthal, “Saadyah’s ‘Introduction to the Scroll of the Hasmoneans’,” JQR 36, no. 3 (1946): 299. This
Introduction is preserved in two recensions. (1) Atlas and Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the
Hasmoneans,” 6-21; repr. in Yosef Kafiḥ, Daniel ʿim Targum u-Feirush Saʿadya ben Yosef Fayyūmī u101

transmitted Hanukah through a concurrent tradition (naqalahu naqlan mutawātiran),349
but wondered if the prophets had also announced (bashshara) it. Unsurprisingly, he
identified several prophecies for the Maccabean victory (Deut. 33:11, Joel 4:7-8, and
Zekh. 9:13-16) and endeavored to prove the relevance of these verses.
According to Saʿadya, a phrase in Moses’ final blessing to the tribe of Levi (Deut.
33:11), “Smite the loins of his foes, and let his enemies rise no more,” concerns a future
victory of the Levites over their enemies. Saʿadya engaged in the following excursus in
order to demonstrate that these “enemies” are the Greeks. Noting that the usual object of
the verb “smite” is the head (e.g., Hab. 3:13, Ps. 110:6), Saʿadya focused on the verse’s
specification of “loins,” and linked it to Nebuchadnezzar’s vision of the Four Kingdoms
(Dan. 2:37-45). According to Saʿadya, Moses highlighted the loins because they are the
“most solid” (muʿtamad) part of the leg,350 and the legs and thighs in Nebuchadnezzar’s
vision represent the third kingdom, namely the Greeks.351 Furthermore, wrote Saʿadya,
“let his enemies rise no more” must refer to the Greeks because Megillat Antiochus

Feirush Tanḥum ha-Yerushalmi (Jerusalem: Mekhon Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1994), 221-25. See Rosenthal’s
comments on this text; “Saadyah’s ‘Introduction to the Scroll of the Hasmoneans’,” 297-302. (2) T-S
A45.15, in Simon Hopkins, A Miscellany of Literary Pieces from the Cambridge Genizah Collections: A
Catalogue and Selection of Texts in the Taylor-Schechter Collection, Old Series, box A45 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Library, 1978), 50-53; and Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et haḤanukkah,” 424-26; see there, 410n1, for publication history. Zucker claimed to have found a fragment of
Saʿadya’s commentary to Daniel that makes similar arguments, which he listed under shelfmark T.S. 6.121
(“ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 98). This shelfmark does not exist. Zucker’s transcription largely matches Atlas and
Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” 8-12.
349
See Cohen’s comments in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lii.
350
Translation based on Hopkins, A Miscellany of Literary Pieces, 53.
351
“The messenger [i.e., Moses] specifically referred to them [i.e., the Greeks]” ( אלרסול אליהם
 ;)אשאר כ'אצהHopkins, A Miscellany of Literary Pieces, 52, fol. 3r lines 11-12.
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reports that the Greek kingdom ceased after the revolt of the Maccabees, who were
themselves Levites.352
Later Rabbanites asserted Hanukah’s divine origins. Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ included
Hanukah in his enumeration of the 613 commandments.353 A passage from Nissim of
Qayrawān’s Megillat Setarim, preserved in Naḥmanides’ Commentary on the Torah,
quotes a midrash which asserts that God promised Aaron that his descendents, the
Hasmoneans, would “make for Israel miracles, salvations, and a dedication (ḥanukah)
that is called by their names.”354

See the variant readings to verse 65 in Kadari, “Megillat Antiochus ha-Aramit,” 101. I have
reconstructed Saʿadya’s argument from both recensions of this text. Stampfer noted that part of Saʿadya’s
interpretation appears in Julius Theodor and Ḥanokh Albeck, eds., Midrash Bereishit Rabbah (Jerusalem:
Wahrmann Books, 1965), 3:1274 (§99). Citing unpublished Genizah fragments, Stampfer also explained
that Qirqisānī, Yefet ben Eli, and Jeshua ben Judah read Deut. 33:11 to refer to Koraḥ, Uzziah, or Jeroboam
(“Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah,” 411-12). Jeshua ben Judah even quoted Sifrei ʿal
Devarim, ed. Louis Finkelstein (New York: Beit ha-Midrash ha-Rabbanim be-America, 1969), 409 (§352),
for support.
353
See above, n194 and n197.
352

354

אמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא למשה דבר אל אהרן ואמרת אליו יש חנוכה אחרת שיש בה הדלקת הנרות ואני עושה בה
 ;לישראל על ידי בניך נסים ותשועה וחנוכה שקרויה על שמם והיא חנוכת בני חשמונאיYosef Ofer and Jonathan Jacobs,

Tosafot Ramban le-Feirusho la-Torah: she-Nikhtevu be-Ereṣ Yisrael (Jerusalem: ha-Mikhlalah haAqademit Herzog, 2013), 428; see also Naḥmanides, Peirush ha-Ramban ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Charles Ber
Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1962), 2:220 (Num. 8:2). Naḥmanides only had access to this text
after arriving in Palestine, and this comment was a later addition to his Commentary; Ofer and Jacobs,
Tosafot Ramban le-Feirusho la-Torah, 429-30; and Jonathan Jacobs, “Sefarim Ḥadashim she-Hitagalu laRamban be-Hagiʿo le-Ereṣ Yisrael,” JSIJ 11 (2012): 111-12. This text was first noticed by Samuel
Poznański, Liquṭim min Sefer Megillat Setarim le-Rabbeinu Nissim be-Rav Yaʿaqov mi-Qayrawān
(Budapest, 1922), 49-50, who noted that Nissim’s midrash is not found elsewhere. Simḥa Assaf published
an index to this work by one of Nissim’s contemporaries. Under chapter 139, that text reads: “the fact that
the Torah placed the section of be-haʿalotekha [Num. 8:1] next to zot ḥanukat ha-mizbeaḥ [Num. 7:88] is
for a reason (yesh lo taʿam)” (“ ;)וזה שהסמיך הכת' פרשת בהעלותך לזאות חנוכת המזבח יש לו טעםSefer Megillat
Setarim le-Rav Nissim bar Yaʿaqov mi-Qayrawān,” Tarbiẓ 11, no. 3 (1940): 254 line 139; repr. in
Nissim ben Jacob, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 280.
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Aramaic Bible Translations (Targumim)
The claim that God authorized all non-scriptural practices is also found in geonicera ascriptions of prophetic authority to the Aramaic translations of the Bible, known as
Targumim. These claims may have been triggered by the decline in the use of Targumim,
as they were rendered obsolete by the rise of Arabic,355 or by Qaraite criticisms of
Targum Onqelos, the Aramaic translation of the Pentateuch.356
Naṭronai bar Hilay (Sura; mid. 9th c.) penned an early defense of Targum
Onqelos, writing that the “rabbis linked it to verses” (ʿal qraʾi asmakhuhu rabannan),
and that “the sages were meticulous in the Targum” (diqdequ ḥakhamim be-targum).357
References to prophetic authority appear later in the geonic period. Qirqisānī reported
that unnamed Rabbanites viewed Jonathan ben ʿUzziel, the presumed author of the
Targum of the Prophets, as occupying the same “rank” (ṭabaqa) as Moses,358 and Hayya

See Phillip Alexander, “Notes on some Targums of the Targum of the Song of Songs,” in
Targum and Scripture: Studies in Aramaic Translations and Interpretation in Memory of Ernest G. Clarke,
ed. Paul V.M. Flesher (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 159; Avigdor Shinan, Targum va-Aggadah bo: ha-Aggadah
be-Targum ha-Torah ha-Arami ha-Meyuḥas le-Yonatan Ben ʿUzziel (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1992), 198;
Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 154n7; Leeor Gottlieb, “Composition of Targums after the Decline of
Aramaic as a Spoken Language,” Aramaic Studies 12, no. 1 (2014): 1-2; and below, n359. On continued
use of the Targumim in Arabic-speaking communities, see Stefan Reif, “The Cairo Genizah and its
Treasures with Special Reference to Biblical Studies,” in The Aramaic Bible: Targums in Their Historical
Context, eds. D.R.G. Beattle and M.J. McNamara (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 42-43.
356
See Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:39-40, 1:121-22; treated in Meira Polliack, The
Karaite Tradition of Arabic Bible Translation: A Linguistic and Exegetical Study of Karaite Translations of
the Pentateuch from the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries C.E. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 67-69. See also
Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” 102-105. On the use of the Targumim in the synagogue, see Zeʾev Safrai,
“The Targums as Part of Rabbinic Literature,” in The Literature of the Sages, 2:245-47.
357
Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Megillah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:30-31 (§107); Daniel
Goldschmidt, Seder Rav ʿAmram Gaon (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1971), 76-77; Brody, Teshuvot
Hilkhatiyot, 152-53 (§45). On this passage, see also Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” 100-102. On the similar
phrase ḥakhamim dayqanim, see Fuchs, “Meqomam shel ha-Geonim,” 79-81. For an example of Naṭronai
locating liturgical practices in prophetic antiquity, see Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 130 (§24).
358
Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:121.
355
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Gaon claimed that the Targumim are “an inherited halakahah from the days of the
prophets.”359

The Origin of the Geonic Academies
The claim that divine input accompanied the establishment of the geonic
academies appears in some of the earliest post-talmudic texts. The Tanḥuma, Mishnat R.
Eliezer, and Pirqoy’s Epistle repeat the claim that God founded the two academies.360 A
responsum ascribed to Ṣemaḥ ben Ḥayim Gaon concerning Eldad ha-Dani, a ninthcentury pseudo-messianic figure, also asserts that the “the most essential (ʿiqar) of the
sages and prophets were exiled to Babylonia and they established the Torah and instituted
the academy at the Euphrates. … They constituted the chain of wisdom and of
prophecy.”361

359
 ;הלכה ירושה מימות הנביאיםGinzberg, Ginzei Schechter, 2:87; see there, 2:74-75. Halakhah here
could mean “tradition” or “norm.” Mann assumed that the questioner in this responsum was from
Qayrawān; “Addenda to ‘The Responsa of the Babylonian Geonim as a Source of Jewish History’ (JQR N.
S., Vols. VII-X),” JQR 11, no. 4 (1921): 467. For similar claims, see Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet
Berakhot, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 1:18-20 (§33), 1:29 (§54); Masekhet Megillah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:5
(§8); Masekhet Qiddushin, 9:129-31 (§295-96); Louis Ginzberg, Geonica (New York: Jewish Theological
Seminary of America, 1909), 2:61-62; Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 63-64 (§55); and the
sources in Kasher, Torah Shleimah, 17:315-19. Several of these sources are treated from a different
perspective in Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” 100-106. Note also Samuel ibn Naghrella ha-Nagid’s ascription
of heretical motives to those who did not recite Targum Onqelos; Margaliyot, Hilkhot ha-Nagid, 92-94.
However, Judah Ibn Quraysh identified lack of familiarity with Aramaic as the cause for decline of use of
the Targums; Dan Becker, Ha-‘Risāla’ shel Yehuda Ben Quraysh: Mahadurah Biqortit (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv
University Press, 1984), 117.
360
See above, n159; and Lewin, “Mi-Shiyarei ha-Genizah,” 395-96.
361

שעיקר החכמים והנביאים לבבל גלו והם יסדו את התורה וקבעו ישיבה בנהר פרת מימי יהויכין מלך יהודה ועד היום
 ;הזה והם היו שלשלת החכמה והנבואהAbraham Epstein, Eldad ha-Dani: Sipurav ve-Hilkhotav (Pressburg: Adolf

Alkalay, 1891), 8. On the authorship of this responsum, see Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 336n203; and
David J. Wasserstein, “Eldad ha-Dani and Prester John,” in Prester John, the Mongols and the Ten Lost
Tribes, eds. C.F. Beckingham and B. Hamilton (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), 223-24n17. On this line, see
also Mann, “Gaonic Studies I,” 257; and Adiel Kadari, “‘All Drink from the Same Fountain’: The Initial
Acceptance of the Halakhot of Eldad Ha-Dani into the Halakhic Discourse,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism
13, no. 2 (2010): 224-25.
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Somewhat later, Sherira Gaon recounted that exiles to Babylon built the
academies from bricks and dirt of the destroyed First Temple, and presented this as
evidence that God moved from the Temple to the academies.362 Writing from Spain,
Judah ben Barzillay declared that the heads of the academies who (orally) transmit the
Talmud in each generation received their traditions from Ezekiel, who had accompanied
them in exile.363 The claims of divine guidance certainly aided in fundraising for the
academies,364 and they were neither as expansive, nor as consequential, as claims about
the origins of the Oral Torah. Common to both geonic-era claims however, was the
legitimation of non-biblical institutions by claiming for them prophetic authority.365

Conclusion
Despite the fact that Sherira and Hayya occasionally criticized Saʿadya’s portrait
of rabbinic tradition, and reached somewhat different conclusions, the “maximalist”366
attempts of geonic-era Rabbanites to ascribe divine authority to the entire body of Jewish
law left little room for forms of legislation that are of undeniably human origins, such as
rabbinic decrees and ordinances (gezeirot and taqqanot).367 Ibn Dāʾūd seems to have

362

Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 72-73. Sherira claimed that even after Jews returned to
Palestine, Exilarchs from the Davidic line continued to guide the Babylonian academies. On Exilarchic
claims of Davidic descent, see Arnold Franklin, The Noble House: Jewish Descendants of King David in
the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 41-43.
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Judah ben Barzillay, Peirush Sefer Yeṣirah, ed. Halberstam, 187.
364
This was Mann’s approach; “Gaonic Studies I,” 257.
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See similarly Joseph David, “‘Kede-Mefaresh be-Sifro shel Adam ha-Rishon’: Toldot haHalakhah veha-Tefisah ha-Mitit shel ha-Historiyah eṣel Aḥaronei Geonei Pumbetida,” Tarbiẓ 74, no. 4
(2005): 582n18.
366
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 206n98.
367
Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lvii; and Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal
Peh,” 15-16. See also Harris, How Do We Know This, 78. Compare above, n215.
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noted the omission of rabbinic enactments from legal epistemological thought of the
geonic era. In the prologue to his Sefer ha-Qabbalah (The Book of Tradition), he
explained rabbinic decrees gesturing toward ijmāʿ: “The sages … never taught anything
… of their own invention, except for the enactments (taqqanot) that were made by
universal agreement (haskamat kulam).”368
Ibn Dāʾūd’s perspective sheds little light on Rabbanite understandings of the
talmudic distinction between de-orayta (biblical) and de-rabbanan (rabbinic) laws, terms
that are widespread in geonic halakhic writings and responsa.369 Despite the fact that the
geonim rarely enacted formal ordinances (taqqanot), and despite their depiction of
themselves as passive transmitters of tradition, geonic authors clearly used their intellects
when they applied received tradition to new cases, as authors of responsa and interpreters
of the Talmud.370
Reading geonic-era legal epistemology in concert with contemporaneous Islamic
thinking about oral tradition helps account for the central Rabbanite theses that revelation
was all-encompassing, covering (almost) all subsequent legal innovations, and that
specific non-biblical institutions are grounded in divine authority. The ideas that
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 ;ולעולם חכמי תלמוד וכל שכן חכמי משנה אפילו דבר קטון לא אמרו מלבם חוץ מן התקנות שתיקנו בהסכמת כלםIbn
Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 3 (English), 1 (Hebrew pagination). Translation follows Cohen,
with slight changes. See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 159-60n65.
369
Halbertal suggested that for the geonim, the terms “biblical and rabbinic [do] not set boundaries
on the revelation, but merely [make] internal legal differentiations”; Maimonides, 113.
370
On geonic enactment of taqqanot, see Brody, “Kelum hayu ha-Geonim Meḥoqeqim?”; idem,
Geonim of Babylonia, 39, 62-64; Shoḥetman, “Le-Derekh Qeviʿatan shel Taqqanot ha-Geonim,” 655-67;
and Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 58-60; see however Lifschitz, “‘Minhag’ u-Meqomo beMidrag ha-Normot shel ‘Torah shebe-ʿal Peh’,” 242n351. On geonic innovations and interpretations that
were not based on legislative authority, see Brody, “Kelum hayu ha-Geonim Meḥoqaqim?” 279-90,
315n79; and idem, Geonim of Babylonia, 163-66.
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Rabbanites used any means necessary to battle Qaraites, and that they only deployed
Islamic terms and concepts under polemical pressures is problematic for a number of
reasons. It assumes, among other things, that defenses of the Oral Torah were insincere,
and fails to account for the fact that later geonim adopted a different attitude towards
Qaraites than Saʿadya did.371 The examination of Rabbanite approaches to tradition from
a broader perspective demonstrates that Rabbanites and Muslim jurists appealed to the
same kind of authority and proposed similar defenses of post-scriptural traditions. In
other words, the geonic-era portrayal of the Oral Torah was coherent in the tenth and
eleventh centuries, given broader societal assumptions.372 The Rabbanite encounter with
the Jewish and non-Jewish “other,” in polemical and non-polemical settings, provided
geonic-era authors with a new vocabulary for systematizing rabbinic tradition and
reconsidering it. Nevertheless, this study leaves open the question of the extent to which
Saʿadya and others “genuinely believed”373 their own claims. Rabbanite authors clearly
benefited from rabbinic assertions that denied or downplayed human contributions to
Jewish law, but surviving sources do not indicate to which extent, if any, they recognized
any dissonance between their own rhetoric and that of the tradition that they sought to
defend.374

Compare Marina Rustow, “The Qaraites as Sect: The Tyranny of a Construct,” in Sects and
Sectarianism in Jewish History, ed. Sacha Stern (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 149-86.
372
See Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 177: “the significant parallel between the Judaic and
Muslim traditions was insistence upon a single source of legislation, which was divine.” Ben-Shammai
explained that although Qaraites and Rabbanites argued about the authority of the rabbinic tradition, all
“agree[d] on the general principle that transmitted knowledge … is a valid source of knowledge”; “Jewish
Thought in Iraq in the 10th Century,” 27.
373
See above, n136.
374
This could equally apply to the rabbinic tradition itself: to what extent did rabbinic rhetoric
about the scope of revelation reflect what the rabbis “really” thought about their legal activity?
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This study of the Rabbanite conceptualization of the Oral Torah in Islamic terms
should complicate another longstanding historiographic emphasis on Qaraism’s
supposedly Islamic origins. Saʿadya was probably the first to claim that Islamic thought
influenced ʿAnan375 – a polemical jab, though perhaps with some basis in reality – and
critical scholars since Graetz have tried to identify Islamic influences on Qaraism.376 This
line of inquiry, however, obscures the impact that Islamic thought, and other
developments in the Islamic world, had on all Jews.377 Rabbanite legal epistemology in
the tenth and eleventh centuries is a prime example of how all medieval Jews, Rabbanites
as well as Qaraites, reshaped Judaism in the Islamic world.

See Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 145-46.
For a review, see Meira Polliack, “Rethinking Karaism: Between Judaism and Islam,” AJS
Review 30, no. 1 (2006): 67-69. See also Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “The Attitude of Some Early Karaites
Towards Islam,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge:
Harvard University Center for Jewish Studies, 1984), 2:4-5; Daniel Lasker, “Islamic Influences on Karaite
Origins,” in Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions II, eds. William M. Brinner and Stephen D. Ricks
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 23-47; and Fred Astren, “Islamic Contexts of Medieval Karaism,” in
Karaite Judaism, 145-77.
377
Compare Ben-Shammai, “Karaite Controversy,” 15: “As to the question of a relationship
between the beginnings of Karaism and Islam, it should be noted that since the majority of Jewish
communities, and the major centers of Jewish autonomy and learning in the eighth century found
themselves within the boundaries of Islam, one would expect that most of the important events in the
history of Judaism at the time would have taken place within those boundaries.”
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Chapter Two: Maimonides on the Scope of Revelation and the Role of the Rabbis
Introduction
Moses Maimonides addressed the origins and workings of the Oral Torah
throughout his writings, and, for more than eight centuries, readers have explicated and
challenged his system. This chapter engages Maimonides’ earlier discussions, focusing
particularly on his Commentary on the Mishnah and Sefer ha-Miṣvot, two Judeo-Arabic
works that have not received as much attention as has the Hebrew, Mishneh Torah. This
more inclusive analysis of Maimonides’ halakhic oeuvre facilitates a reevaluation of his
legal theory and underscores the importance of situating his ideas in their Islamic context.
In the words of Gerald Blidstein, “Maimonides, far more than any predecessor or
contemporary, was keenly (perhaps obsessively?) interested in the status of the different
sources of Law and their interrelationship.” According to Blidstein, this fascination
motivated Maimonides’ lengthy analyses of the content and nature of revelation, his
consideration of the role of the rabbis in developing Jewish law, and his ongoing concern
with the classification of particular laws.378 One could add that Maimonides was dogged
in his attempts to defend his views on the Oral Torah; these defenses hold pride of place
at the outset of his three main halakhic treatises.
In marked contrast with geonic-era presentations of rabbinic tradition as wholly
divine, Maimonides narrowed the corpus of Jewish law that was known through

Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 13. See also idem, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 108; and
idem, “Halakhic Authority in Maimonides,” 31-32. Haym Soloveitchik argued that Maimonides’ interest in
distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law and anti-Qaraite polemic motivated what Soloveitchik
considered the odd structure of Hilkhot Shabbat; “Mishneh Torah: Polemic and Art,” in Maimonides After
800 Years, 327-32; repr. in idem, Collected Essays (Oxford: Litmann, 2014), 2:378-84. Note also
Stroumsa’s categorization of Maimonides as a “fundamentalist”; Maimonides in His World, 83.
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revelation and spoke proudly of rabbinic expansions of divine law. These claims met with
protest in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. One critic, Abraham ben David of
Posquières (Rabad; c. 1128-95) wrote with exasperation, “I have seen [that for] this man
[i.e., Maimonides], [regarding] everything that is difficult for him in the words of our
rabbis, he says that it is rabbinic (mi-divreihem) and not biblical (din torah).”379 Daniel
ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli also attacked Maimonides’ claims, and Naḥmanides (Catalonia;
1194-1270) described Maimonides’ perspective as “nasty and bitter” (raʿ u-mar).380 By
the fourteenth century, however, an apologetic tradition had emerged, one that attempted
to bring Maimonides’ views in line with those of his critics.381 Despite differences among
these apologists, and despite the fact that some late medieval and early modern readers
upheld the earlier, more “radical” reading of Maimonides,382 Jay Harris identified “a
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 ;ראיתי זה האיש כל מה שיקשה עליו בדברי רבותינו יאמר מדבריהם הוא זה ואינו דין תורהHilkhot Tumat Meit,
5:5. See Urbach, “Halakhah u-Nevuʾah,” 21n177; Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 27n31; and
Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 13. See also Rabad’s comments to Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2, and 3:20; treated in
Twersky, Rabad of Posquières, 136n16. Moses ha-Kohen, another Provençal critic of the Mishnah Torah
who probably lived after Rabad, wrote similar challenges; see his comments to Hilkhot Ishut there. See also
Yaʿaqov Sussman, “Shenei Qunṭresim be-Halakhah me-et R. Moshe Boṭarel,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 16 (1966):
299-300, esp. n21-22.
The relationship of Rabad and Moses ha-Kohen is unclear; as Twersky wrote in the revised edition
of Rabad of Posquières (348), “the relation of the hassagot of R. Moses ha-Kohen to those to Rabad needs
to be studied carefully”; see Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 76-79; Twersky, Rabad of Posquières, 128,
179, 239; idem, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 37, 103; and Shalem Yahalom, Bein Gironah leNarbonah: Avnei Binyan le-Yeṣirat ha-Ramban (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2012), 102-103. Sources about
Moses ha-Kohen’s life are collected in J. Kohn, Hagahot ha-Ramakh: Hagahot she-Hegiyah ʿal Sefer
Mishneh Torah leha-Rambam (Jerusalem, 1970), 201-208.
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Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 51 (Prin. Two).
381
The beginning of this tradition is usually associated with Simeon ben Ṣemaḥ Duran; Neubauer,
Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 33; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam,
47n50; and Yosef Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei Sofrim’,” in ʿIyunim be-Sifrut Ḥazal, 251. I am not convinced by
Levinger’s attempt to attribute this tradition to Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Adret. For interpretations of Ibn
Adret’s view, see the standard commentaries to Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 17:5. For the suggestion that
there are textual problems in the relevant responsum, see Ibn Adret, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot (Jerusalem:
Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1997), 3:146n2 (§255). On the role of Vidal Yom Tov of Tolosa in reinterpreting
Maimonides, who predated Duran by several decades, see Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 30-31.
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See below, n640.
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veritable industry” that deflected criticism of Maimonides and minimized his
disagreements with Naḥmanides, whose own perspectives on the Oral Torah largely
prevailed.383 The arguments in this chapter are mostly aligned with academic studies that
read Maimonides on his own terms, that is, according to the earlier, “radical”
interpretation, and that ignore later “harmonizing” apologetics.384
This chapter begins with a review of the historiography of Maimonides’ approach
to the Oral Torah, with particular focus on the various explanations that have been
offered for his terminology. It then assesses what can be recovered from preMaimonidean Andalusian Rabbanite jurisprudence. It next turns to the two topical pivots
of Maimonides’ theories: the scope of revelation, i.e., what material was given to Moses,
and the role of post-Mosaic jurists. Its final section examines the relevant statements in
Sefer ha-Miṣvot; they are ambiguous, problematic, and controversial. Throughout this
chapter, I make use of all of Maimonides’ halakhic writings in an attempt to shed light on
his classification of specific laws. For the most part, this method reveals that
Maimonides’ presentations throughout his life were consistent.385
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Harris, How Do We Know This, 92-94. The most thorough treatment remains Neubauer, HaRambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 21-79. For brief critique, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit,
45n44.
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As Neubauer noted, Maimonides’ adversaries usually understood him better than his supporters
did. Neubauer also suggested that as Joseph Karo’s Shulḥan ʿArukh overtook the Mishneh Torah as the
definitive guide for halakhic practice, readers felt more liberty to reject Maimonides’ views; Ha-Rambam
ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 72, 46-47.
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On the relationship of the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah, see Yuval
Sinai, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam ke-Kli le-Viʾur Halakhot be-Mishneh Torah,” Shenaton haMishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 23 (2005): 225-51; idem, “Bein Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam le-vein Mishneh Torah:
Heqef ha-Ḥomer ha-Hilkhati, Shiṭat ha-Miyun veha-Fiṣul ha-Musagi,” HUCA 80 (2009): 21-37 (Hebrew
pagination); idem, “‘Ḥaqirot’, ‘Derishot’ u-‘Bediqot’ – Pereq be-Gibush Hilkhot ha-Rambam,” Sidra 21
(2006): 35-51; idem, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 203, 205-208, 243-45 esp.
n158, 245-50; and Dror Fixler, “Hilkhot Miqvaʾot – ʿal Ḥazarah aḥat be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,”
Maʿaliyot 12 (1992): 65-78.
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Historiography and Background
Interpreters of Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah have largely focused on
the Hebrew translation of Principles One and Two in his Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
and on a series of technical terms in the Mishneh Torah that classify non-scriptural laws.
Less attention has been paid to the Judeo-Arabic Commentary on the Mishnah and to the
Judeo-Arabic original of Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Below, I review technical terminology used by
Maimonides in his Hebrew and Judeo-Arabic writings, his so-called “model” of the Oral
Torah, and the view of Jacob Levinger, who claimed that Maimonides held esoteric
beliefs about the Oral Torah.

The Classification of Laws in the Mishneh Torah and Problems of
Terminology
The Mishneh Torah’s classificatory lexicon is diverse and novel. Technical terms
include: (mi-)divrei sofrim, i.e., (from) words (or: matters) of the scribes; (mi-)divrei
qabbalah, i.e., (from) words (or: matters) of tradition; ba ba-qabbalah and mi-pi haqabbalah, i.e., comes from tradition and “from the mouth of tradition”; mi-pi hashemuʿah, i.e, from aural tradition; and halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, i.e., law given to
Moses at Sinai. As criticism of these usages first arose in Maimonides’ lifetime,386
Maimonides himself addressed these terms, particularly in his correspondences with two
figures, Pinḥas ben Meshulam ha-dayan (fl. late 12th c.), a Provençal émigré and judge
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Noted in Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 45.
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active in Alexandria, probably in the mid-1180s or early 1190s,387 and Samuel ben ʿEli,
with whom he exchanged a series of epistles.388
The difficulty of mapping these terms onto the categories of “biblical” and
“rabbinic” law is borne out in the array of interpretations proposed. One approach to
determining the meaning of these terms has highlighted “classic” cases in the Mishneh
Torah, but, as Jacob Neubauer showed, discussions of the term divrei sofrim that address
only a handful of cases led to the (dubious) claim that divrei sofrim (sometimes) denotes
biblical law.389 A more philologically sound investigation would examine all appearances

Text appears in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-54; dating is Shailat’s; 2:434. This letter
considers the Mishneh Torah a finished work, so it must be after 1178; see Solomon Gandz, “Date of the
Composition of Maimonides’ Code,” PAAJR 17 (1947-1948): 1-7; accepted in Twersky, “The Beginnings
of Mishneh Torah Criticism,” 167n29; and Davidson, Maimonides, 203-206. For treatment, see Levinger,
Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 45n46; and Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 105. Maimonides wrote several
letters to Pinḥas; see the references in Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 3:217, with the correction in idem,
Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:433n8. On Pinḥas, see idem, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 3:45, with references to earlier
literature; idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:433-34; Joel Kraemer, Maimonides: The Life and World of One of
Civilization’s Greatest Minds (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 266-67, 280-83; Davidson, Maimonides,
72n311; and Miriam Frenkel, ‘Ha-Ohavim veha-Nedivim’: ʿIlit Manhigah be-Qerev Yehudei Aleqsandriyah
bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2007), 121-27; see also Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “HaRambam u-Minuyav shel R. Anaṭoli le-Muqaddam Aleqsandriyah,” Tarbiẓ 83, no. 1-2 (2015): 142. On
Maimonides and Pinḥas, see Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “Maimonides in Egypt: the First Stage,” Maimonidean
Studies 2 (1992): 25; and Stefan Reif, Problems with Prayers: Studies in the Textual History of Early
Rabbinic Liturgy (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2006), 217; repr. in “Problems with Prayers,” in Traditions of
Maimonideanism, 84.
388
See Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:275-76, 1:378-79. For treatment, see Jacob Katz, The
“Shabbes Goy”: A Study in Halakhic Flexibility, trans. Yoel Lerner (Philadelphia: JPS, 1989), 25-26, 38,
idem, “Plugta be-Davar ha-Haflagah be-Yam uve-Naharot,” Tarbiẓ 60, no. 4 (1991): 667-72; Israel TaShma, “Teshuvat ha-Rambam be-ʿInyan ha-Haflagah be-Naharot be-Shabbat,” Maimonidean Studies 1
(1990): 23-42; idem, “ʿAl ha-‘Plugta’ be-Davar ha-Haflagah be-Yam uve-Naharot,” Tarbiẓ 60, no. 4
(1991): 673-76; Dror Fixler, “Isur Teḥumin be-Rambam: Shamranut Hilkhatit ke-fi she-baʾah le-yedei
biṭuy be-Dimaniyut Penimit,” Sinai 138 (2006): 52-54; Shlomo Zalman Havlin, “Bein Rishonim leAḥaronim be-ʿInyanei Nusaḥ,” Meḥqarei Moreshetenu 1 (2009): 127-41; David Henshke, “Kelum
Neʾeman ha-Rambam le-Haʿid al Nusaḥ Sifro?” Sinai 104 (1999): 76-80; and idem, “Ha-Rambam keMefaresh Divrei ʿAṣmo,” Sefunot 8 (23) (2003): 119-46, 159-62. See also Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau,
3:171-77.
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Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 2-3; see also Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah haHilkhatit, 47-48.
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in the Mishneh Torah.390 However, Maimonides’ frequent use of this term and related
ones poses a considerable challenge. According to the Bar Ilan Responsa Project, the
phrase divrei sofrim appears more than 230 times in the Mishneh Torah, mi-pi hashemuʿah, 190 times, mi-pi ha-qabbalah, 30 times, and mi-divrei qabbalah, 20 times.391
Many of Maimonides’ programmatic statements about these terms are ambiguous.
In the Commentary on the Mishnah, he wrote: “The phrase ‘mi-divrei sofrim’ denotes
(yaqtaḍī)392 all matters that are transmissions of the scribes (riwāyat al-sofrim), like these
interpretations (al-tafāsīr) and the transmitted laws (al-halakhot al-manqūla) from
Moses, or ordinances of the scribes.”393 He also asserted that even laws designated as
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai are mi-divrei sofrim because “everything that is not a verse
(or: clear text; naṣṣ)394 is termed ‘divrei sofrim’.”395 In Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he wrote in a
more constrained manner, that “anything that was not explicitly (bi-bayān) heard at Sinai

Neubauer wrote: “The idea of interpreting Maimonides according to Maimonides himself
remained strange” to most pre-modern readers (Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 79, with the notable
exception of Allegri and some of his followers). See also Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 1n1; and Marc
Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides and his Interpreters (University of Scranton Press, 2008), 74.
391
This text combines the 1881 Warsaw edition and more recent edition of Shabbtai Frankel.
Kafiḥ wrote that there are 170 appearances of mi-pi ha-shemuʿah and 80 appearances of the word qabbalah
with and without the modifiers mi-pi and (mi-)divrei; Maimonides, Sefer Mishneh Torah: Yoṣei la-Or
Paʿam Rishonah ʿal-pi Kitvei Yad Teiman ʿim Peirush Maqif, ed. Yosef Kafiḥ (Qiryat Ono: Mekhon
Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1983-1997), 21:251. I did not count the word qabbalah without a modifier because
of the variety of possible meanings; see n400.
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See Blau, Dictionary, 551, s.v. قضي.
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 ;סופרים מת'ל אלתקנות ואלגזרותMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:162 (mKel 17:2).
394
The term naṣṣ in Judeo-Arabic can mean “verse,” “Scripture,” or “clear text.” Translations of
this term will therefore vary. On this term as “texts that do not require interpretive intervention,” see
Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 105; and Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 45.
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 ;כל מא ליס הו נץ יסמונה דברי סופריםMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:563 (mMik
6:7). This relies on the comment in the Introduction to the Commentary that halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai
laws have no connection to Scripture; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:18; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed.
Shailat, 338. See the letter to Pinḥas:  ;שאפילו דבר שהוא הלכה למשה מסיני מדברי סופרים קרינן ליהidem, Igrot, ed.
Shailat, 2:453.
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is mi-divrei sofrim.”396 These definitions raise many questions. Does the perspective
expressed in Sefer ha-Miṣvot contradict earlier Maimonidean claims by implying that no
Sinaitic laws are mi-divrei sofrim? Or is it consistent with them, acknowledging that even
some Sinaitic laws are mi-divrei sofrim? Why are rabbinic ordinances and Sinaitic laws
in the same category? To complicate matters, several scholars have contended that the
Commentary addresses mishnaic terminology, and that Maimonides did not rely on these
definitions in his own works;397 other scholars have rejected this theory, implicitly and
explicitly.398 It would have been surprising for Maimonides, who relied on the Mishnah
as a linguistic and structural model,399 to have refashioned (his understanding of) the
mishnaic term divrei sofrim in his Mishneh Torah.
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York: Sepher-Hermon Press, 1978), 254; Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel haRambam, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Maʿaliyot, 1998), 105; and Eliav Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’
ve-‘Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai’: ʿIyun be-Leshonot ha-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22
(2001-2004): 379-80, 382. See also Isaac Bekhor David of Constantinople, Divrei Emet (Constantinople,
1760), 83a.
399
See Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 238-45; idem, “Maimonides and Eretz
Yisrael: Halakhic, Philosophic, and Historical Perspectives,” in Perspectives on Maimonides;
Philosophical and Historical Studies, ed. Joel L. Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 26869; Shamma Friedman, “The Organizational Pattern of the Mishneh Torah,” Jewish Law Annual 1 (1978):
37-41; Davidson, Maimonides, 211-17; Moshe Halbertal, “What is the Mishneh Torah? On Codification
and Ambivalence,” in Maimonides After 800 Years, 83-94; and Yiṣḥaq Hershkowitz, “Mishneh Torah
veha-Mishnah – Hashlamah Tokhnit u-Mavnit,” Maʿaliyot 25 (2005): 355-74. See the praises of R. Judah
the Prince collected in Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 88; and Dror Fixler, “Pesiqat
Halakhah be-Feirush ha-Rambam la-mishnah,” Mesorah le-Yosef 8 (2014): 363n2. See also Twerksy,
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 238-39 and n2, 242-44.
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The phrase (mi-)divrei qabbalah usually denotes a Sinaitic tradition, but it can
also refer to the Prophets and Writings.400 In at least one instance, Maimonides referred to
both divrei qabbalah and to decrees and preventative measures (gezeirot ve-harḥaqot) as
“divrei sofrim” (Hilkhot Tumat Meit, 19:6). This apparent blurring of boundaries prompts
further questions. Does each term denote a unique type of knowledge, or does
Maimonides have stylistic reasons for choosing one over another? If each phrase does
have a unique denotation, any attempt to correlate Maimonides’ lexicon with the
categories of biblical law and rabbinic law must account for the variety of terms he used.
These issues point to a larger methodological quandary. Jacob Levinger and Marc
Shapiro have challenged the traditionalist assumption that the Mishneh Torah is
exceedingly exact in its language,401 while Isadore Twersky emphasized “Maimonides’
relentless quest for exact conceptual classification, … repeated insistence that he wrote
with great care and … statements about sustained and relentless review of difficult
matters.”402 Support for this latter perspective – especially regarding issues related to the

E.g., Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:13, Hilkhot Taʿaniyot, 4:7; see Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim beMishnato shel ha-Rambam, 106. Kafiḥ also noted this; see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 21:27684 passim.
401
Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 13-33; and Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides,
57-68. Both Levinger (21) and Shapiro (67) called attention to the claim that the Mishneh Torah is intended
for “young and old”; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: hu ha-Yad ha-Ḥazaqah le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben
Maimon, ʿal pi Defus Kushṭa 269, eds. Jacob ben Eliezer Cohen et al. (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook,
1964), 14 line 163. Text and references to the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah and Sefer ha-Maddaʿ
follow this edition. For an opposing view, see Yuval Sinai, “Rimzei Leshono shel ha-Rambam [ḥeileq 2],”
Sinai 128 (2001): 111; and idem, “Setirot Penimiyot Medumot be-Divrei ha-Rambam,” in Rambam:
Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 174-76. See also Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel haRambam, 52-69.
402
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 311; see further, 311-20.
400
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sources of the law – may be found in the fact that particular cases that troubled
Maimonides his whole life.403
The Mishneh Torah also leaves unclear important distinctions between biblical
law and rabbinic law. As Levinger noted, Maimonides mentioned the principle that where
there is some element of doubt in contested cases of biblical law, the ruling follows the
more stringent perspective (Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:5), but he did not explicitly generalize
this rule to all cases of doubt.404 Two other assumptions, frequently adopted by
Maimonides’ readers, have complicated the interpretation of Maimonides’ positions: (1)
biblical sins are the only ones that incur biblically-mandated punishments;405 and (2)
marriage and divorce can only be effectuated through biblically-authorized means. These
principles led Maimonides’ commentators to pose many questions, including the
following three: If a woman who married through the exchange of money, a method of
acquisition which Maimonides regarded as mi-divrei sofrim (Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2, 3:20),
subsequently committed adultery, why should she incur capital punishment? A similar
problem concerns the priest whose wife has died. Since the biblical prohibition of priestly

On Hilkhot Ishut 1:2, see Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 153-54; Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 14 (introductory pagination), 167-68n17; idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ,
3:280-81n15 (mQid 1:1); idem, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 7:13-15, 17-21; and Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei
Sofrim’,” 250-52. On Hilkhot Sheḥitah, 5:3, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 31-32;
Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 114-23, 144-45; and Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 404n117. See
further Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 412-25; and below, nn602, 695.
404
Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 35n1. Levinger noted that Maimonides did hint
to this principle elsewhere in the Mishneh Torah and in his responsa. Maimonides also ruled that the
prohibition of doubtful cases is rabbinic in status; see, e.g., Hilkhot Isurei Biʾah, 18:17; Hilkhot Tumat
Meit, 9:12. Note that in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides explained that doubtful cases of
divrei sofrim impurity are treated leniently, except an impurity from an overarching category of impurity
(avot ha-tumot) whose status is divrei sofrim; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:507 (mToh 4:11). He
repeated this there, 6:543-44 (mMik 2:2), 6:510 (mToh 5:6). In the Mishneh Torah, he seems to have
changed his mind about exceptions to this rule; see Hilkhot Shar Avot ha-Tumah, 13:10-13.
405
See below, nn689-697.
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contact with a corpse applies to all those who are not blood relatives (an obligation that
remains operative even in the absence of the Temple), how can the widowed priest be
obligated to engage in the burial of his dead wife, a requirement which Maimonides
considered merely mi-divrei sofrim. (Hilkhot Aveil, 2:7)? A third problem concerns the
validity of a marriage if it is effectuated in the presence of witnesses who are disqualified
by dint of family relationships. Could such a marriage be “biblically” valid if the
witnesses are maternal relatives, whose disqualification Maimonides regarded as rooted
“in their words” (mi-divreihem; Hilkhot ʿEdut, 13:1; as opposed to paternal relatives, a
biblical law [din torah])?406
Problems like these prompted claims that divrei sofrim denotes, or may denote,
biblical law.407 Yet most academic interpreters, along with Yosef Kafiḥ, perceive the

406
See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 34-35. The first issue may be complicated
by the suggestion that rabbinically ordained transactions affect biblical status (qinyan de-rabbanan moʿil
de-orayta); see the next note. Naḥmanides was the first to systematically note many of these problems; see
Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 34-40 (Prin. Two). See the list of distinctions between biblical
and rabbinic law in Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon
z"l, ed. David Zvi Hellman (Jerusalem: Hoṣaʾat Shabtai Frankel, 2002), 29-31 (Prin. One).
407
See Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 30-45. Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah haHilkhatit, 85-86, argued that marriages effectuated through money are a rabbinic “detail” rooted in biblical
law; see also there, 44. Henshke resorted to the principle that rabbinically ordained transactions affect
biblical status; see his “ʿAl ha-Meṣiʾut ha-Mishpaṭit,” 229-31; idem, “Lavin she-Ein Loqin ʿalehem leShiṭat ha-Rambam,” Ha-Maʿayan 24, no. 2 (1984): 34n6; and idem, “Sheniyot le-‘Divrei Sofrim’,” Sinai
108 (1991): 59. For responses, see Shimshon Ettinger, “Shetei Heʿarot le-Darkho shel ha-Rambam beMishneh Torah,” Sinai 106 (1990): 234-37; and Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 9394. As Rabinovitch noted, Henshke’s solution is similar to the one proposed by Isaac Halevy, Dorot haRishonim: Divrei ha-Yamim le-Vnei Yisrael, ed. Salomon Bamberger (Jerusalem, 1967), 4:530.
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term divrei sofrim as one that denotes rabbinic law.408 Others maintain that divrei sofrim
may, at times, denote biblical law, and, at other times, rabbinic law.409
Similar debates concern Maimonides’ use of the terms, mi-pi ha-shemuʿah, mi-pi
ha-qabbalah, and divrei qabbalah.410 Kafiḥ argued that shemuʿah denotes widely
accepted post-Sinaitic scriptural interpretations, while qabbalah usually denotes Sinaitic

Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 81-89; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah haHilkhatit, 46-50; Moshe Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 464n12; Henshke, “ʿAl ha-Meṣiʾut haMishpaṭit,” 229-31; idem, “Le-Darkhei Pitronan shel Setirot be-‘Mishneh Torah’ le-Rambam,” Sinai 112
(1993): 61; Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 383n53, 388; Ettinger, “Shetei Heʿarot,” 234-37;
and Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei Sofrim’.” See also Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:13-15, 5:17-21.
409
Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 91-105; Fixler, “Ha-Munaḥim haHilkhatiyim,” 291-303; Moshe Koppel, “ʿAl ha-Munaḥim ‘Divrei Sofrim’ ve-‘Divrei Qabbalah’ beRambam,” Higayon: Meḥqarim be-Darkhei Ḥashivah shel Ḥazal 5 (2001): 63-64; and Shailat’s comments
in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-52. See also Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 25-32. Compare
David Weiss Halivni, Peshat and Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis (New York:
Oxford, 1991), 83-88: “What exactly (divrei sofrim) is, is not clear. In terms of its binding nature, it is less
binding than a biblical law but more binding than a rabbinic ordinance. It is neither biblical nor rabbinic. …
The concept remains elusive” (83).
410
Adolf Schwarz, Der Mischneh Thorah: Ein System der mosaisch-talmudischen Gesetzeslehre
(Vienna, 1905), 142-229, argued that mi-pi ha-shemuʿah and mi-pi qabbalah are different types of
knowledge, but Wilhelm Bacher, “Zum sprachlichen Charakter des Mischne Thora,” in Moses ben
Maimon, 2:280-305, demonstrated that Schwarz overplayed the distinction. Levinger, Darkhei haMaḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 16n11, agreed with Bacher. See also Michael Guttmann, “Die Bedeutung der
Tradition für die halachische Bibelexegese bei Maimonides,” MGWJ 80, no. 3 (1936): 211-12. Several
recent writers have argued that shemuʿah denotes biblical law, while qabbalah denotes biblical or rabbinic
law; see Dror Fixler, “‘Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai’ be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” Sinai 118
(1996): 257; idem, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 324-32; Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,”
371-74, 407-408; and Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 140-44. For the claim that qabbalah has a broad meaning,
see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 21; Henshke, “Le-Havḥanat ha-Rambam,” 206n2; and
Koppel, “ʿAl ha-Munaḥim,” 63. See also David Henshke, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’: Pereq be-Tefisat
ha-Halakhah shel ha-Rambam,” in Tiferet le-Yisrael: Jubilee Volume in Honor of Israel Francus, eds. Joel
Roth et al. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 2010), 243n37. Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 200n68,
wrote that the categories are indistinguishable; Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 11012, that shemuʿah and qabbalah refer to traditional laws whose origin is unclear; Shimshon Ettinger, “ʿAl
Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah be-Mishneh Torah le-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 14-15 (19881989): 21n86, that both can denote biblical or rabbinic law; and Friedberg that he is “less confident” that
shemuʿah denotes biblical law; Crafting the 613 Commandments, 231; see there, 228-40, for treatment of
the use of the term shemuʿah regarding the Positive Commandments.
408
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laws.411 Others have argued – convincingly, in my view – that the term shemuʿah denotes
Sinaitic interpretations of biblical verses that control Scripture’s meaning.412
The term halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai deserves special consideration. As noted,
Maimonides explained in Sefer ha-Miṣvot that divrei sofrim includes anything that was
not explicitly heard at Sinai. On the other hand, he wrote in his Commentary on the
Mishnah that the term divrei sofrim covers laws designated as halakhah le-Moshe miSinai.413 Maimonides’ programmatic statements about the term halakhah le-Moshe miSinai are also controversial. In the longest discussion, which appears in his Introduction
to the Commentary on the Mishnah, he asserted that these laws admit no disagreement
(khilāf) and that one cannot find “true” scriptural inferences (istidlāl) for them.414 When
rabbinic literature provides a link to Scripture, he wrote, this is merely a “sign” (siman)
or an asmakhta, that is, an aide-mémoire or justification after the fact. Moreover, no laws
in this category can be derived through reasoning (here: qiyās) and the rabbis did not

See Kafiḥ’s case-by-case discussion in Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 21:251-84.
Elsewhere, Kafiḥ wavered on this definition of shemuʿah; see there, 3:749, §13 (Hilkhot Shevitat ʿEsor,
1:4).
412
Henshke, “Lavin she-Ein Loqin ʿalehem,” 33; idem, “Le-Yesodei,” 140; Shoḥetman,
“‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 410-15, 435; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 392-94.
See Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 240: “Maimonides relies on certain interpretive traditions
… even when these intrepretations fail to offer the most contextual, and therefore plainest, readings.” Note
Blidstein’s comments in “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 17; and idem, “Oral Law as Institution,” 170.
413
Above, nn393-396. For rabbinic background, see Christine Hayes, “‘Halakhah le-Moshe miSinai’ in Rabbinic Sources: A Methodological Case Study,” in The Synoptic Problem in Rabbinic
Literature, ed. Shaye J.D. Cohen (Providence: Brown University, 2000), 61-117; idem, “Rabbinic
Contestations of Authority,” Cardozo Law Review 28, no. 1 (2006): 131-32; Shmuel Safrai, “Halakhah leMoshe mi-Sinai – Hisṭoriyah o Teʾologiyah?” in Meḥqarei Talmud 1, eds. Yaʿaqov Sussman and David
Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1990), 11-38 (for views of medieval jurists, see there, 15-16); and idem,
“Halakha,” in The Literature of the Sages, 1:180-85.
414
 והד'ה איצ'א ממא לא כ'לאף פיהא... ;אלחכאם אלתי קיל פיהא אנהא הלכה למשה מסיני ולא אסתדלאל עליהא
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:19; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339. See the
similar statement about interpretations transmitted from Moses (tafāsir marwīya ʿan Moshe) in idem, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 28 (Prin. Eight).
411
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develop other laws (tafaqqahū) from them.415 Maimonides also claimed to list “most …
or perhaps all” of these laws.416 In the Mishneh Torah, he wrote that “debate never
occurred regarding matters of tradition (divrei ha-qabbalah)” (Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:4).417
Later writers, R. Yair Ḥayim Bacharach (Worms and Metz; 1639-1702) most thoroughly,
showed that it is difficult to square the claim that laws designated by Maimonides as
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws were never subject to debate within rabbinic
literature.418
Scholars attempting to determine whether laws designated as halakhah le-Moshe
mi-Sinai have the status of biblical or rabbinic law have approached the question in
different ways, and the debate about their status continues.419 Some interpreters of
Maimonides have wondered whether biblical punishment is incurred for violation of

Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:18; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 338.
On the use of this form of the verb f-q-h, see below nn488, 569-570, 921-944.
416
 ;מעט'ם אלאחכאם אלתי קאלוא פיהא הלכה למשה מסיני בל קד רבמא אנהא כלהאMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:18; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 338. Levinger highlighted differences
between the lists of halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws in the Commentary and the Mishneh Torah, and
argued that Maimonides distinguished between the phrase halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai and other modifiers
of the word halakhah, such as halakhah mi-pi ha-qabbalah or halakhah ish mi-pi ish; Darkhei haMaḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 51-54, 206-209. For criticism, see Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,”
400-404. It is unclear how to align Levinger’s careful – or hairsplitting – argument with his caution (see
above, n401) not to make too much of slight changes in Maimonides’ language.
417
 ;דברי הקבלה אין בהם מחלוקת לעולםthis broad statement refers to halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws
and other matters. Gerald Blidstein noted that Maimonides admitted doubt in two issues: how to blow the
shofar and astronomical knowledge required to calculate the calendar; Samkhut u-Meri, 49-53.
418
Yair Bacharach, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot Ḥavvat Yair (Frankfurt, 1699), 175a-187a (§192). For
discussion, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 50-51; and Halbertal, People of the Book,
67-72. I have not found any satisfactory ways to align Maimonides’ views with rabbinic literature. For
recent discussion, see Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 126-41; Fixler, “‘Halakhah leMoshe mi-Sinai’,” 258-61; and idem, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 317-20; see also Levinger, Darkhei
ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 190-205. Kalman Kahana, Ḥeqer ve-ʿIyun: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim (Tel Aviv,
1960), 1:7-57, remains useful. I do not find the argument in Koppel, “ʿAl ha-Munaḥim,” 66-68,
compelling. On Shailat’s interpretation in Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 90, see
Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 47n3.
419
Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 50-61, felt that Maimonides was unsure about
their status. See the reaction in Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 376; and Dror Fixler, “HaBiṭuy ‘Ḥakhamim/Ḥasidim Rishonim’ be-‘Mishneh Torah’ le-Rambam,” Sinai 109 (1992): 82n43.
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these laws.420 According to one view, the fact that they are of divine origin and termed
divrei sofrim means that this term cannot refer to rabbinic laws. Others have argued that
laws designated halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai are of rabbinic status, and that only laws
directly connected to Scripture are of biblical status.421
As with the Hebrew terminology in his Hebrew writings, Maimonides employed a
set of Judeo-Arabic terms to classify the sources of the law. Study of Maimonides’
Judeo-Arabic halakhic writings has lagged behind research on the Mishneh Torah,422 and
the meaning of the technical Judeo-Arabic terms has been obfuscated by the fact that
some scholars have only read these works in Hebrew translation. Mordechai Cohen
recently reiterated Simon Rawidowicz’s warning that “the distinctiveness of
[Maimonides’ terminology…] is unfortunately lost in most if not all Hebrew

420

Naḥmanides also raised this point; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 32 (Prin. Two).
Note the claim that God gave these laws; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:17-18; Haqdamot
ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 338.
421
For the view that halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws are biblical in status, see Fixler, “‘Halakhah
le-Moshe mi-Sinai’,” 252-57; and idem, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 304-340. For the view that they
are rabbinic in status, see Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 105-123; Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,”
375-88; and earlier, Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 63 (Prin. Two).
Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 465n14, described Maimonides’ position as “problematic.”
422
Blidstein wrote: “Deficiency in the study of Maimonidean law lies in the relative neglect of
works other than the Mishneh Torah”; “Where Do We Stand,” 19. Shapiro explained that traditional
commentators placed the Mishneh Torah “on a much higher pedestal than any of Maimonides’ other
works” (Studies in Maimonides, 4). On neglect of the Commentary on the Mishnah, see Michael Guttmann,
“The Decisions of Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishna,” HUCA 2 (1925): 229; Aaron Adler,
“Yaḥaso shel ha-Rambam le-Talmud ha-Yerushalmi (Pereq be-Ḥeiqer Peirush ha-Mishnah lehaRambam),” in Sefer Zikaron le-Rav Yosef ben David Kafiḥ, eds. Zohar Amel and Ḥananel Sari (Ramat
Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2001), 205 and n20; Neryah Goṭel, “Derekh ha-Melekh be-Mishnah: LeVeirur Darkho shel ha-Rambam be-Feirusho la-mishnah,” Sinai 135-136 (2005): 89-91; and Sinai, “Setirot
Penimiyot,” 159n16. Some have blamed the neglect of the Commentary on the fact that Maimonides wrote
it in Arabic; Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 19; and Judah Leib Maimon, Rabbi Moshe
ben Maimon: Toldot Ḥayav ve-Yeṣirato ha-Sifrutit (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1960), 66. Menaḥem
Azariah da Fano claimed that the Commentary contains errors because Maimonides wrote it in his youth;
Sefer Teshuvot u-Feirush Sugyot (Venice, 1600), §117. Joseph Korkos explained that Maimonides was “not
careful” (lo diqdeq) in this work; see his comments to Hilkhot Terumot, 11:11, in Maimonides, Sefer
Mishneh Torah, ed. Shabbtai Frankel (Jerusalem: Hoṣaʾat Shabbtai Frankel, 1975-2007), 6:219; see also
below, nn597, 639.
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translations.”423 Long ago, Wilhelm Bacher showed that the term tafsīr marwī, i.e., a
transmitted interpretation, denotes a Sinaitic interpretation of Scripture,424 and several
other scholars, from Bacher’s time onward, have discussed Maimonides’ use of the
concept of ijmāʿ (consensus).425
Another important term used by Maimonides is qiyās. Recognizing the broad
meanings of this word, Joshua Blau’s Judeo-Arabic dictionary offers as viable definitions
analogy, deduction by analogy, correct reasoning, authentic explanation, and proper
inference.426 In their Hebrew translations of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Moses Ibn Tibbon
consistently translated qiyās as heqqesh (analogy; a cognate word), and Solomon ibn
Ayyūb (fl. mid. 13th c.) usually translated it as sevarah (logic or reasoning).427 Kafiḥ
insisted that Maimonides only used the word qiyās with regard to employment of the
thirteen middot (hermeneutical rules) of R. Ishmael;428 he connected the translation
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Simon Rawidowicz, “On Interpretation,” PAAJR 26 (1957): 102n38. Cohen cited this in
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, xv; and “Ha-Biṭuy ‘Bāb/Abwāb al-Taʾwīl’ be-Torato ha-Parshanit
shel ha-Rambam,” in ʿIyunim be-Tarbut ha-ʿAravit-ha-Yehudit, eds. Yoram Erder et al. (Tel Aviv: Tel
Aviv University, 2014), 156.
424
Wilhelm Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1897), 27-28;
Ha-Rambam Parshan ha-Miqra, trans. Alexander Siskind Rabinovitz (Tel Aviv: Defus Aḥdut, 1931), 3132. Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 33, 38-41, reached the same conclusion.
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See Ludwig Blau, “Das Gesetzbuch des Maimonides historisch betrachtet,” in Moses ben
Maimon, 1:351-54; Daniel Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” Sefunot 5 [20] (1991): 154,
158n73; Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 23n21, 145-49; Gideon Libson, “Zikat ha-Rambam la-Halakhah haMuslemit ʿal Reqaʿ Tequfato,” in Ha-Rambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 1:278-83; and
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denotes analogy” (“Non-Analogical Arguments,” 289), and dismissed the “misconception … that qiyās
amounts to no more than analogy” (A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 101).
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See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 5 (introductory pagination); and Cohen, Opening
the Gates of Interpretation, 468n31.
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E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10 (Prin. One), 13, 15 (Prin. Two), 55
(supplemental introduction), 147 (Pos. 174), 211 (Neg. 60); and idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ,
1:33n71, 3:11n28 (mYeb 1:4), 4:7-8n5 (mBQ 1:1), 5:109n23 (mMen 2:2), 6:54n1 (mKel 2:1). See also
idem, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 21:251-52. The middot appear at the outset of the Sifra; for background,
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heqqesh with Qaraites.429 Yet Kafiḥ himself often used din (argument) or a similar term
as a translation for qiyās;430 in one place, he admitted that Maimonides used the term to
denote all sorts of reasoning.431 Most scholars agree with this latter conclusion.432 In his
recent discussion of the specific terms from logic that relate to the late antique rabbis’ use
of “qiyās,” Aviram Ravitsky noted that Maimonides compared rabbinic qiyās to
dialectical syllogisms, and not to apodictic ones.433 I would add that any translation of the
term qiyās runs the risk of masking Maimonides’ positive understanding of this term. In
this sense, Maimonides thought very differently from Saʿadya.434
Study of Maimonides’ Judeo-Arabic terminology is also important for
understanding his scriptural exegesis. It has long been clear that Maimonides read

see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 15-30. The authors noted (20) that
thirteen is the traditional count; others have counted more (see above, n52).
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145; idem, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’,” 250n67; and Aviram Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi ʿal
Hitpatḥut ha-Halakhah,” in ʿIyunim Ḥadashim be-Filosophia shel ha-Halakhah, eds. Aviezer Ravitsky and
Avinoam Rozenak (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2008), 212n6; see below, n581. Maimonides wrote that it is
difficult to assert that a post-talmudic judge erred regarding “legal qiyās” (al-qiyāsāt al-sharīʿa); ואן לם יוג'ד
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 ;קיאסה ממכןMishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:242 (mBek 4:4). Qiyās here cannot mean “laws derived by

the middot”; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 27. Shailat followed Kafiḥ’s translation;
see Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 28-29n14.
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Aviram Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim ke-Heqqeshim Diyaleqṭiyim be-Mishnat haRambam veha-Middot sheha-Torah Nidreshet ba-hen ke-τόποι Arisṭoṭiliyim,” Tarbiẓ 73, no. 2 (2004): 197213. See also Joel Kraemer, “Maimonides’ Use of (Aristotelian) Dialectic,” in Maimonides and the
Sciences, eds. Robert S. Cohen and Hillel Levine (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 115-16. On dialectical and
apodictic syllogisms, see below, n582. On the authorship of the Treatise on Logic, see below, n930. Ijtihād
also deserves detailed treatment; see Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 158n73; and Cohen,
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 460, 470-72.
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Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms,” 31, wrote: “Maimonides’ constant use of the term qiyās
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biblical verses differently than did the rabbis of late antiquity; one sixteenth-century
writer exclaimed, “[Maimonides] is not careful with [scriptural] proofs and derashot of
verses; even though a [scriptural] proof was rejected [by the rabbis], he will write it (in
the Mishneh Torah).”435 In other words, if the rabbis derived a law from one verse, what
license did Maimonides have to identify a different scriptural source? This problem is
closely connected to Maimonides’ understanding of revelation and the role of the
rabbis.436
Several scholars have noted the problematic uses of the phrase peshaṭeh di-qera
in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, which impinge directly on Maimonides’ understanding of rabbinic
scriptural exegesis.437 Mordechai Cohen devoted a lengthy monograph to Maimonidean
terms which have been understood to refer to Scripture’s apparent, literal, or “plain”
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Shemiṭah ve-Yovel, 1:1, in Mishneh Torah, ed. Frankel, 6:495. For a list of Korkos’ similar comments, see
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Dine Israel 13-14 (1988): 115-22, 140; Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides, 79-80n324 (with reference to
earlier studies); Eliav Shoḥetman, “Le-Sheʾelat ha-Yaḥas bein ha-Halakhah u-vein Peshuṭo shel Miqra,”
Sinai 139 (2008): 45-46; idem, “Le-Shimusho shel ha-Rambam be-Meqorot shebe-Miqra,” in Mi-Birkat
Moshe, 1:428-34; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 317. For a different approach, see
Binyamin Zeʾev Benedikt, Asupat Maʾamarim (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1994), 184-90. Noting
Maimonides’ “creative attainments in exegesis” and his “original explication and application” of Scripture,
Twersky wrote that “the study of Scripture and its relation to the Oral Law is a leitmotif of the Mishneh
Torah”; Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 57, 150; see there, 145-50. Subsequent scholars have
taken up Twersky’s call “to identify and appraise Maimonides’ original exegesis” (150n172). For a review,
see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 2-14; add Moshe Greenberg, “The Uses of Scripture in
Classical Medieval Judaism: Prooftexts in Maimonides’ Code,” in Return to Scripture in Judaism and
Christianity: Essays in Postcritical Scriptural Interpretation, ed. Peter Ochs (New York: Paulist Press,
1993), 197-219, 224-32; Sykes, “‘Seṭiyotav’ shel ha-Rambam”; Goṭel, “Derekh ha-Melekh be-Mishnah,”
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sense: the Arabic ẓāhir al-naṣṣ and the Aramaic, peshaṭeh di-qera (or Hebrew, peshuṭo
shel miqra). Cohen argued that Maimonides distinguished between Scripture’s ẓāhir
(Arabic) and its peshaṭ (Hebrew). Cohen noted that the geonim used the term ẓāhir to
denote Scripture’s “elementary” or “basic” sense, and that Andalusian exegetes were the
first to endow the term peshaṭ with special significance.438 Because there is no objective
“peshaṭ,” argued Cohen, scholarly notions of peshaṭ, largely developed in connection
with the oeuvre of northern French exegetes, may not be fully congruent with
Maimonides’ use of this term.439
According to Cohen, it was only in Sefer ha-Miṣvot that Maimonides used peshaṭ
as a “technical term.”440 Maimonides’ invocation of the talmudic statement, “a biblical
verse does not leave the realm of (yoṣei mi-yedei) its peshaṭ” (bSab 63a etc.), in Principle
Two led Cohen to label this Principle “the rule of peshaṭ.”441 Cohen also argued that
Maimonides understood Scripture’s ẓāhir to be its “straightforward” or “plain” sense
(one use of the term peshaṭ).442 Seeking to account for the fact that Maimonides
interpreted many verses according to their “plain” sense, and not according to their
rabbinic readings, Cohen claimed that, for Maimonides, the ẓāhir sense of Scripture may
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those writings; see there, 291, 296n50, 386-89, 500-509.
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 ;אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטוtranslation follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 495-99.
On Principle Two as “the rule of peshaṭ,” see there, 293-94n41. Add Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 91-92 (Prin. Two). See below, n445.
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have halakhic import even if it conflicts with rabbinic interpretations.443 Cohen concluded
that Maimonides understood peshaṭ to be the meaning of Scripture as rendered by the
tafsīr marwī (transmitted interpretation). In Cohen’s words, peshaṭ denotes “what is
known … to be the meaning of the text, either because the text is explicit or because it is
an interpretation from Sinai.”444 Using the language of Islamic law, Cohen wrote that
peshaṭ combines all manṣūṣ (explicitly stated) sources, i.e., written and oral
revelations.445

For the term ẓāhir in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 117-27.
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 297; or peshaṭ is the “text of Scripture itself, the
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interpretation” (334-35). Elsewhere, peshaṭ is “the object of interpretation, not its result” (296), i.e., the
interpreter interprets the ẓāhir of Scripture as rendered by the tafsīr marwī.
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subsequently derived from them. He noted that this “two-tiered legal system” (Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 260) parallels Islamic legal theory, which makes a distinction between revealed texts and
laws derived from those texts. The former are often termed uṣūl (roots) and the latter furūʿ (branches).
Maimonides used these and other terms from uṣūl al-fiqh to frame both revelation and the work of the
rabbis (254-76, 488-89). However, Cohen insisted that the “most natural and immediate impetus” for
Maimonides’ use of peshaṭ was not Islamic legal theory but Andalusian exegesis” (489, see also 267n93).
This contention is surprising because Cohen claimed that, for Maimonides, peshaṭ is “jurisprudential,” not
“fundamentally exegetical” (335). Several of Cohen’s conclusions are summarized in his “Hirhurim ʿal
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Jewish Bible Exegesis,” in Interpreting Scriptures in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: Overlapping
Inquiries, eds. Mordechai Z. Cohen and Adele Berlin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 21922.
I often find Cohen’s argument compelling, but am unsure that Principle Two is “the rule of
peshaṭ.” As Cohen noted, the term peshaṭ appears only late in this Principle (see above, n441). I understand
Principle Two to address instances in which the tafsīr marwī creates distinct commandments; see below. I
am also not convinced that the term peshaṭ in Sefer ha-Miṣvot always adheres to Cohen’s definition. As he
noted, three of the nine appearances of this term outside of Principle Two are not based on rabbinic texts
and probably should not be equated with the tafsīr marwī, and another three could easily be called the ẓāhir
al-naṣṣ (307). See also below, n1173. Friedberg has offered other criticisms of Cohen’s approach and
another intpretation of Maimonides’ use of peshat; Crafting the 613 Commandments, 339-45.
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Maimonides’ “Model” of the Oral Torah
According to the early modern English rabbi David Nieto (1654-1728),
Maimonides’ views on the Oral Torah were in agreement with those of the geonim.446
Several recent studies uphold this view,447 yet most contemporary scholars perceive
Maimonides as having rejected the geonic “model”448 of the Oral Torah, which
emphasized the revealed nature of Jewish law.449 Moshe Halbertal described Maimonides
as having adopted a “cumulative view” of the Oral Torah in which “each generation
add[s] substantive norms … to the given, revealed body of knowledge.”450 Echoing
Maimonides’ Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Halbertal wrote that, for
Maimonides, “interpretation is not meant to retrieve but to derive” and that “controversy
arises out of the process of derivation rather than through a crisis in transmission.”451
Blidstein, who focused on the “institutional” roles of the Sanhedrin and of elite

446
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Jewish Tradition (New York: Ktav, 1970), 69-98.
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Perspective,” Cardozo Law Review 14 (1993): 1660; idem, “Monolingualism and Judaism,” 1729-31
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261, 264, 267n95, 389.
449
Blidstein credited Abraham Joshua Heschel as one of the earliest to point this out; Torah min
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interpreters of the law in Maimonidean jurisprudence (esp. in Hilkhot Mamrim, chaps. 14452), emphasized that for Maimonides, only the elite may interpret revelation. He
explained that these “men of knowledge” prevent communal debate,453 transmit the Oral
Torah,454 and preclude post-Mosaic prophecy as a possible source of legal norms.455
Blidstein added that, for Maimonides, the Sanhedrin had a monopoly on legal rulings,
tolerated little deviance, and issued enactments that were difficult to revoke because they
ensured “social stability and order.”456 As Blidstein noted, Maimonides’ “institutional”
emphasis may have served his own need to rebuff contemporary claimants to have
inherited the authority of the Sanhedrin, such as the Baghdadi Gaon, Samuel ben ʿEli.457
Jacob Levinger’s Straussian claims about Maimonides’ approach to the Oral
Torah lie beyond the scope of this chapter, but will be briefly mentioned. According to
Levinger, inconsistencies in Maimonides’ presentation of laws designated halakhah leMoshe mi-Sinai indicate Maimonides’ need to present a “dogmatic,” “necessary belief,”
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of Israel, and the Oral Law,” Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, eds. Alfred L. Ivry et al.
(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), 442-43. Note that Maimonides’ anti-Qaraite polemic
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Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:408-410.
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as Institution,” 179. On tension between this model and Maimonides’ historical situation, see Halbertal,
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rather than one that reflected his true position.458 Levinger also claimed that Maimonides’
Guide purveyed an esoteric view of the Oral Torah, because of its attempt to base its
explanations of the commandments on “the verses (al-nuṣūṣ) and not the pronouncements
of the law (taʿlīl al-fiqh).”459 The fact that Maimonides read the lex talionis “literally,”
when the rabbis did not, was particularly problematic. Levinger asked: If Maimonides
considered rabbinic interpretations of the lex talionis to be Sinaitic (as Maimonides wrote
elsewhere), what authority did he have to read it literally, divorced from the divinelygranted interpretation? Levinger noted other contradictions between the Guide’s
declarations of the immutability of divine law and assertions that it can change, and
concluded that Maimonides must have secretly held that the Oral Torah was post-Sinaitic
and devoid of divine authority.460
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Although many have accepted Levinger’s claims,461 others have argued that
Maimonides only admitted temporary changes to the law.462 Halbertal accounted for
Maimonides’ divergent readings of Scripture by claiming that the Guide offers a
“philosophical” reading of the law, while Maimonides’ other writings are “halakhic” in
nature.463 Mordechai Cohen argued that the Guide follows Scripture’s ẓāhir, rather than
the divinely authorized peshaṭ (which includes the tafsīr marwī).464 Blidstein
demonstrated that presentations of the law as static and dynamic are interwoven in
Maimonides’ writings,465 and he observed that the Mishneh Torah incorporates the
straightforward meaning of Scripture, even when it is not the halakhic meaning.
Regarding the lex talionis in particular, Blidstein noted that the Mishneh Torah
understands “the injury he inflicted on another shall be inflicted on him” (Lev. 24:20) to
mean, “the injurer deserves (raʾuy) to be deprived of a limb or to be wounded to the same
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Morashah ve-Yaʿad, ed. Ella Belfer (Ramat Gan: Mekhon le-Yahadut ule-Maḥshavah bat-Zemaneinu,
1982), 302-303n30.
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Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 478-80; similarly, Shoḥetman, “Le-Sheʾelat haYaḥas,” 51-65.
464
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 130-37, 449-52.
465
Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 120n33; and idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 53-54; see also
there, 48.
461

132

extent” (Hilkhot Ḥovel u-Maziq, 1:3)466 – thereby integrating the verse’s apparent (or
ẓāhir) meaning. Blidstein also showed that Maimonides assimilated rabbinic tradition
into the Guide’s discussion of reasons for the commandments.467

Maimonides’ Andalusian Predecessors
Recent scholars have demonstrated that several eleventh- and twelfth-century
Andalusian rabbis broke from Saʿadya’s depiction of the Oral Torah, and portrayed qiyās
and other human contributions to divine law in positive terms. This widespread
Andalusian tradition anticipated and contributed to Maimonides’ rejection of geonic legal
epistemology and to his perspective on the Oral Torah.468
Qaraite activity is far more difficult to document in Andalusia than in Iraq and
Palestine; only one name, (Sayyid?) Abū al-Ṭarās (or al-Aṭrās) survives, and there are no
known texts. Nevertheless, Qaraism loomed large in Andalusian Rabbanite writings and
several local Rabbanites proudly recounted having persecuted Qaraites in their region.469

466

 ;אינו לחבול בזה כמו שחבל בחברו אלא שהוא ראוי לחסרו אבר או לחבול בו כמו שעשה ולפיכך משלם נזקוunless
otherwise noted, texts of the Mishneh Torah follow Kafiḥ’s edition. Translation follows Maimonides, The
Code of Maimonides, Book 11: The Book of Torts, trans. Hyman Klein (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1954), 160.
467
Blidstein, “‘Maṭarati ʿAkhshav Latet Ṭaʿamim le-Ketuvim.” Blidstein noted his debt to
Lorberbaum, “Ha-Rambam ʿal ha-Aggadah, Halakhah ve-‘Ḥoq Elohi’,” 263n35, for some examples. For an
alternative suggestion, see Benedikt, Asupat Maʾamarim, 186-90; followed by Yiṣḥaq Isaac and Alexander
Klein, “Torah shebe-ʿal Peh: Gidrah, Meqorah ve-Goralah ʿal pi ha-Rambam,” BDD 25 (2001): 126-27.
See also Sykes, “‘Seṭiyotav’ shel ha-Rambam,” 121-22. For an alternative reading of this passage, see
Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 200-201n75.
468
Unfortunately, othan than one brief comment (see below), I have found little indication that
Maimonides’ Andalusian heroes in the realm of halakhah – Isaac ben Jacob Alfasi and Joseph ben Meir haLevi Ibn Migash – reflected on the sources of the law.
469
For background, see Daniel Lasker, “Karaism in Twelfth-Century Spain,” Journal of Jewish
Thought and Philosophy 1 (1992): 179-195; see there, 179n2 for earlier studies; repr. in idem, From Judah
Hadassi to Elijah Bashyatchi: Studies in Late Medieval Karaite Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 125-40.
Add Judah Rosenthal, “The Talmud on Trial: The Disputation at Paris in the Year 1240,” JQR 47, no. 1
(1956): 65-67. Subsequently, see Ben-Shammai, “Between Ananites and Karaites,” 25; Camilla Adang
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Given the paltry knowledge of Andalusian Qaraism, little can be said about its impact on
Andalusian Rabbanite presentations of the Oral Torah. Yet other features of the
Andalusian milieu can be reconstructed. Mordechai Cohen’s above-mentioned study of
peshaṭ, the “philological-contextual” understanding of Scripture, traces the influence of
Andalusian writers on Maimonidean biblical exegesis.470 The examination of
jurisprudential comments that follows draws attention to a unqiue Andalusian perspective
on rabbinic tradition.
To the best of my knowledge, the earliest Andalusian Rabbanite reflection on the
human expansion of divine law appears in the Introduction to Kitāb al-Zuhd (The Book of
Continence), a commentary on Ecclesiastes by Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth.471 The author began by
repeating geonic assertions about the Oral Torah. He explained that Deut. 17:8-9, which
commands Israel to bring doubtful cases to the “Levitical priests and judge in charge at
the time,” demonstrates that “the obligated servants” (al-mukallafīn al-mutaʿabbidīn)
must turn to the “sages of the tradition” (aʾimmat al-talqīn). Noting that these verses

“Élements karaïtes dans la polémique anti-judaïque d’Ibn Ḥazm,” in Diálogo filosófico-religioso entre
cristianismo, judaísmo e islamismo durante la edad media en la Península Iberica, ed. Horacio SantiagoOtero (Turnhout: Brepols, 1994), 419-41; idem, “The Karaites as Portrayed in Medieval Islamic Sources,”
in Karaite Judaism, 187-90; Daniel Lasker, “Maimonides and the Karaites: From Critic to Cultural Hero,”
in Maimonides y su época, eds. Carlos del Valle et al. (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones
Culturales, 2007), 313-14; Friedman, “Judah Ha-Levi on Writing the Kuzari,” 162-64; Rustow, “The
Qaraites as Sect,” 152-56; Bernard Septimus, “‘Nevarekh (le-)Eloheinu’: Ṭaharanut Leshonit ve-Hisṭoriyah
Hilkhatit,” in Ta Shma: Meḥqarim be-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut le-Zikhro shel Yisrael Ta-Shma, eds. Avraham
Reiner et al. (Alon Shvut: Tevunot, 2012), 2:578-79 and Sarah Stroumsa, “The Muʿtazila in al-Andalus:
The Footprints of a Phantom,” Intellectual History of the Islamicate World 2 (2014): 93-96. On Abū alṬarās, see Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 94-95. On Qaraite persecution in Andalusia, see
Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 148n19.
470
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 54-85, 359-62, 365-75. See the summary, 83-85.
471
Yosef Kafiḥ ascribed this work to Saʿadya; see his Ḥameish Megillot: Shir ha-Shirim, Rut,
Qohelet, Esther, Eikhah ʿim Peirushim ʿAtiqim (Jerusalem, 1962), 147-48. On the ascription to Ibn
Ghiyāth, see Hagit Mittelman, “Peirush le-Sefer ‘Qohelet’ be-ʿAravit-Yehudit ha-Meyuḥas le-R. Yiṣḥaq
Ibn Ghiyāth: Hebeiṭim Filosofiyim u-Farshaniyim,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1999), 43-80.
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command that a judge be consulted, but make no mention of a prophet, Ibn Ghiyāth
argued that, since prophecy’s cessation, Israel has fulfilled this requirement by relying on
“the students of the prophets, who fill their place.”472 As evidence, he cited “the authentic
tradition” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ) that understands “Incline your ear and listen to the words of
the sages” (Prov. 22:17) as a verse that refers to the period after prophecy’s end.473
Ibn Ghiyāth, however, presented the role of “obligated servants” differently than
did the geonim. He explained: “An obligated individual is only commanded if he
possesses intellect and understanding, [and is capable of] extracting branch and deduction
(farʿ wa-natīja).” “Through sound reflection,” he continued, “I have found that the
masters of the tradition (shuyūkh al-talqīn) are preferred over those who convey
prophecy,” in keeping with the talmudic claim, “a sage is greater than a prophet” (bBB
12a).474 In Ibn Ghiyāth’s view, the sages are superior to prophets because they use their
natural abilities (gharāʾiz wa-qarāʾiḥ) to “extract deductions from its [i.e., the tradition’s]

472
473

 ;תלאמד'ת אלאנביא אלקאימין מכאנהםKafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 162.
 ;משמת חגי זכריה ומלאכי נסתלקה שכינה מישראל מכאן ואילך הט אזנך ושמע דברי חכמיםKafiḥ, Ḥameish

Megillot, 162. I could not find this exact language in any rabbinic text; the closest parallel is Chaim
Milikowsky, Seder ʿOlam: Mahadurah Madaʿit, Peirush u-Mavo (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2013) 1:322
lines 21-22 (chap. 30); see there, 2:522-23. On this passage, see Nehemia Polen, “The Spirit Among the
Sages: Seder Olam, the End of Prophecy, and Sagely Illumination,” in “It’s Better to Hear the Rebuke of
the Wise than the Song of Fools” (Qoh 7:5): Proceedings of the Midrash Section, Society of Biblical
Literature, volume 6, eds. W. David Nelson and Rivka Ulmer (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2015), 8394. Translation of talqīn follows Blau, Dictionary, 638, s.v. تلقين. Blau also offered oral torah.
474

 וענד אלאעתבאר אלצחיח וגדת לשיוך' אלתלקין את'רה... לא מכלף מאמור אלא ד'ו עקל ופהם מתחצל מן פרע ונתיגה
 ואלי הד'י אלנוע נוע אלקאיל חכם עדיף מנביא...  ; מזידה עלי חמלת אלוחי ויהתדון מן מואד אלנבהוKafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot,

162-63; first noted in Moses Ibn Ezra, Sefer ha-ʿIyunim veha-Diyunim, ed. Halkin, 36-37n29. Kafiḥ’s text
differs slightly from Halkin’s, which is from JTS MS. L1011 (EMC 203), fol. 148b. Halkin’s text should
read מזידה, instead of זידה. On “a sage is greater than a prophet,” see Alon Goshen-Gottstein, “‘Ḥakham
ʿAdif mi-Navi’: Tefisat ha-Torah be-Reʾi Parshanut ha-Pitgam le-Doroteha,” in Limud ve-Daʿat beMaḥshava Yehudit, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University Press, 2006), 37-42; and
Elliot Wolfson, “‘Sage is Preferable to Prophet’: Revisioning Midrashic Imagination,” in Scriptural
Exegesis: The Shapes of Culture and the Religious Imagination, Essays in Honour of Michael Fishbane,
eds. Deborah A. Green and Laura S. Lieber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188-90.
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principles, and extend branches from its roots” (yastanbiṭūn al-natāʾij min ummātihā475
wa-yastamiddūn al-furūʿ min uṣūlihā). By comparison, the knowledge of Prophets is
deficient because it is “external”; prophets are unable to generate it themselves. To
illustrate this, Ibn Ghiyāth contrasted King David with King Solomon: Notwithstanding
prophetic assurances of divine guidance (2 Sam. 7), David failed to build the Temple. It
was built instead by Solomon, the archetypal “sage,” who relied on internal wisdom to
correctly adjudicate a case of disputed motherhood (1 Kings 3).476
When viewed in the light of earlier Jewish discussions of the talmudic aphorism
“a sage is greater than a prophet,” Ibn Ghiyāth’s arguments are striking. The tenthcentury Qaraite polymath Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī had cited this phrase to challenge
Saʿadya’s claim that Moses had received “explanations and meanings” of Scripture at
Sinai.477 In Qirqisānī’s view, this dictum testifies to Saʿadya’s distance from the selfunderstanding of the rabbis, in that it expresses a preference for sages over prophets.
According to the Talmud, Qirqisānī claimed, sages produced (mustanbiṭīn) knowledge
through the intellect, yet Saʿadya claimed that sages (merely) transmitted received

Following Kafiḥ’s text; Halkin (above, n474) has אמהאתהא, an alternative plural.
Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 162-63. Abraham bar Solomon, a fifteenth-century Yemenite, quoted
this passage and added further comments that may also be from Ibn Ghiyāth. According to his report, Ibn
Ghiyāth explained that a prophet cannot add even a single word to what God revealed, but a sage
“innovates over and over” ( ;)ובדברי חכמה הרבה והרבה הוא מחדשPeirush Neviʾim Rishonim, ed. and trans.
Yosef Kafiḥ (Qiryat Ono: Mekhon Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1999), 3:59. The wording of Abraham’s report
differs slightly from the text of Ibn Ghiyāth that Kafiḥ published. On Abraham bar Solomon, see Eliezer
Schlossberg, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham ben Shlomo le-Sefer Yoel,” in Meḥqarim ba-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit
uve-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut, eds. Aharon Ben-David and Isaac Gluska (Jerusalem: ha-Agudah le-Tipuaḥ
Ḥevrah ve-Tarbut, 2001), 209-210.
477
ل وع ّّز لمّا دفع التورية الى موسى عليه السالم في סיני عرّفه تفاسيرها ومعانيها
ّّ  ;زعموا ان البارئ جQirqisānī, Kitāb alAnwār wal-Marāqib, 1:111 (I.13.1).
475
476
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knowledge.478 Though I have not found a response to this assertion in geonic texts,
Nissim ben Jacob attempted to limit the import of the talmudic saying. Addressing those
who, he reported, took umbrage at the rabbis’ devaluation of the status of biblical
prophets, i.e., Qaraites, Nissim offered a rejoinder to those “who rejoice in doing evil”
(Prov. 2:15). Nissim explained that this talmudic dictum refers only to prophets who are
not sages. By contrast, he wrote, biblical prophets, who were also sages, are “the most
preferred and honored” (al-afḍal wal-ashraf). A sage is only greater than “a temporary
prophet,” that is, one whose prophecy is not preserved in Scripture.479 Knowingly or not,
Ibn Ghiyāth read the saying “a sage is greater than a prophet” in the manner of Qirqisānī.
In using Islamic legal theory’s image of extracting “branches” from “roots,”480 he
defended the rabbis and rejected Saʿadya’s claims.
Baḥya ben Joseph ibn Paqūda (Saragossa; fl. c. 1050-90)481 cited the dictum “a
sage is greater than a prophet” with approval and he applied it to all intellectual
endeavors. He claimed that God guides all who undertake to learn a new discipline

478
فان كان الحكماء هم هؤالء الذين زعموا انهم الربانيّون فليسوا بحكماء اذ كان انما أخبروا بما قيل لهم وما علموا وان كانوا حكماء
 ;مستنبطينَّ لجميع ماقالوه فما الذي نقلواQirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār wal-Marāqib, ed. Nemoy, 1:116-17 (I:13.3)

Hirschfeld, “Be-Sefer Megillat Setarim,” 47-48. For background, see Nissim ben Jacob,
Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 282n237; and Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 51. On the
ascription to Nissim, see Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, xii, with reference to earlier
scholarship. For a slightly different treatment, see Goshen-Gottstein, “‘Ḥakham ʿAdif mi-Navi’,” 52-54.
See also Shraga Abramson, Bava Batra ʿim Targum ʿIvri u-Feirush Ḥadash, Ḥilufei Girsaʾot u-Marʾei
Meqomot, ed. Jacob N. Epstein (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1953), 209.
480
See Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 2223; and Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 153. See al-Ghazālī’s expansion of this metaphor in
al-Mustaṣfa min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl (Beirut, 1948), 1:8, trans. in Ahmad Zaki Mansur Hammad, “Abū Ḥāmid alGhazālī’s Juristic Doctrine in al-Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, With a Translation of Volume One of alMustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl,” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1987), 2:315. Hallaq discussed this passage
there, 117.
481
See Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 1-2.
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beyond what a human teacher offers.482 Baḥya’s analysis of rabbinic legal activity also
aligns with Ibn Ghiyāth’s depiction of the rabbis. In his view, whenever possible, the
rabbis applied (anfadhū) principles that were transmitted from the prophets (uṣūlihim almanqūla ʿan al-anbiyāʾ). However, when a new question arose about the details (furūʿ)
of the law, the rabbis resorted to qiyās and raʾy (subjective reasoning) – controversial
terms that Baḥya apparently used synonymously;483 along with naẓar (speculation), these
enabled them to extract (istanbaṭū) rulings from received uṣūl.484
Several other Andalusian Rabbanites explained this talmudic dictum in the same
manner as Ibn Ghiyāth. Moses Ibn Ezra (Grenada and Lucena; c. 1055 - d. after 1138)
explained that God graced (laṭafa) the Jews with sages to replace the prophets. The
assertion, “a sage is greater than a prophet,” he wrote, indicates that the sages’ knowledge
is double that of the prophets, because a prophet simply fulfills his mission, but a sage
derives (yufarriʿu) new laws, extends (yastamiddu) that which is known, and deduces

Baḥya ibn Paqudah, Sefer Torat Ḥovot ha-Levavot: Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yosef
Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1973), 363 (8:3); see Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 185.
483
Noted by Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 253n43. On these terms, see Goldziher,
Muslim Studies, 2:78-83, 2:201-202; Schacht, Origins, 98-132; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal
Theories, 15, 18-19; and idem, Origins, 113-18. On raʾy, compare above, n250.
484
Baḥya, Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ, 28-29 (introduction). See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni,
161n67, noting Baḥya’s claim that Torah study examines both written and logical (al-maktūb wal-maʿqūl)
components of tradition (ed. Kafiḥ, 150 [3:4]); see also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 25253. Cohen’s suggestions that “it is reasonable to assume that Bahya did not depart from Saadia’s model on
his own authority, since he was not known as a particularly distinguished or innovative Talmudist” and that
“it is also possible to explain Bahya’s positive attitude toward qiyās simply as a reflection of what seems to
occur in the Talmud itself” (253 and n44) rely on arguments from silence. Baḥya acted as a judge (as
Cohen noted), and must have had more than passing familiarity with legal texts.
482
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(yuntiju) from known intellectual premises.485 Joseph ben Meir ha-Levi Ibn Migash486
(Seville and Lucena; 1077-1141), offered a similar explanation; sages, he wrote,
understand divine dicta that they have not heard, but prophets merely repeat what God
has told them.487 Maimonides’ fellow Andalusian refugee, Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn (Barcelona
and Fez; 12th c.), similarly affirmed that a prophet merely conveys a message (yuʾaddī alrisāla), while a sage expands (yatafaqqahu) revelation.488
Andalusian Jewish uses of the distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ to explain
rabbinic activity sheds new light on a well-known comment of Abraham Ibn Dāʾūd. In
the prologue to his Sefer ha-Qabbalah, Ibn Dāʾūd wrote that the rabbis always agreed
about the “principle” (ʿiqar) of a commandment; their debates concerned only “its

485
ֿואלתעויץ' מן אלאנביא במא יכון עלמהם אצ'עאפא מן אלאנביא כמא קאלו חכם עדיף מנביא פאן אלנבי יודי אלרסאלה
חסב מא חמל איאהא אן אלנבוהֿ עלי מא נבי בהא ואלחכם יקול ען אלאנביא ויפרע מא אבאח לה אלשרע תפריעה פיסתמד מן פכרתה
 ;וינתג' מן מקדמאתה אלעקליהֿ פלה פצ'ל אלאבדאעMoses Ibn Ezra, Sefer ha-ʿIyunim veha-Diyunim, ed. Halkin, 36.

For treatment see Abraham Halkin, “Hashqafat R. Moshe Ibn Ezra ʿal ha-Miṣvot,” in Meḥqarim be-ʿAravit
uva-Islam, ed. Yaʿaqov Manṣur (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1973), 2:29-32; and David,
“Yediʿat davar ha-El,” 143-44. Moses Ibn Ezra cited Saʿadya’s criticism of qiyās; Sefer ha-ʿIyunim vehaDiyunim, ed. Halkin, 204. Moses Ibn Ezra even characterized rabbinic contributions as ibdāʿ, a term that
usually describes improper religious innovations; on bidʿa, see Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:33-37.
486
On the spelling of Migash, see Israel Ta-Shma, “Yeṣirato ha-Sifrutit shel Rabbeinu Yosef haLevi Ibn Migash,” in Keneset Meḥqarim, 2:16n1.
487

ואע"ג דהך גברא לא שמעה להך מילתא מעולם הרי חכם עדיף מנביא דאלו נביא לא אמר אלא מה דשמע ויהבי בפומיה
 ;למימר ואלו חכם קאמר מאי דאתמר למשה מסיני ואע"ג דלא שמעה ע"כ משיטת הר"י ן' מיגש ז"לthis appears in the Shiṭṭa

Mequbbeṣet on tractate Bava Batra by Beṣalel ben Abraham Ashkenazi, which preserves a significant
number of Ibn Migash’s comments. Text follows the first edition (Sefer Asifat Zeqenim [Livorno, 1774],
8b). On Ibn Migash and Ashkenazi’s Shiṭṭa Mequbbeṣet, see Ta-Shma, “Yeṣirato ha-Safrutit shel Rabbeinu
Yosef ha-Levi Ibn Migash,” 2:23n21; and Louis Ginzberg, “Post Scriptum,” REJ 67 (1914): 150-51
(referenced by Ta-Shma). Without any evidence, Faur repeatedly insisted Ibn Migash was the source of
many ideas of later Andalusian Rabbanites. See Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 4, 33, 38. On Judah haLevi’s opposition to qiyās, see above, n258.
488

וכמא קאלוא רבותינו ז"ל חכם עדיף מנביא לאן אלנבי יודי אלרסאלה חסב מא תלית עליה ואלחכם יתפקה כלאם אלנבי
 ;פלאג'ל הד'א אלוג'ה פצ'להJoseph ibn ʿAqnīn, Inkishāf al-Asrār wa-Ẓuhūr al-Anwār, ed. and trans. Abraham S.

Halkin (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1964), 458. As far as I know, other than Maimonides, ibn ʿAqnīn is
the only writer to use the fifth form of the verb f-q-h to denote detailing or expanding the law; see below.
On ibn ʿAqnīn and Maimonides, see Abraham S. Halkin, “Ibn ʿAḳnin’s Commentary on the Song of
Songs,” in Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, ed. Saul
Lieberman (New York: JTS, 1950), 396-401; and idem, “Le-Demuto shel R. Yosef ben Yehuda ibn
ʿAqnīn,” in Sefer ha-Yovel li-khvod Ẓvi Wolfson, ed. Saul Lieberman (Jerusalem: American Academy for
Jewish Research, 1965), 103-105.
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offshoots” (toldoteha; or as Gerson Cohen translated the term in this context, “its
details,”) and debates arose only due to inattentive students.489 Though some scholars
have regarded Ibn Dāʾūd’s claim as a restatement of geonic-era explanations of rabbinic
disputes,490 earlier texts did not connect the trope of lackadaisical students with the
distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ.491
The discovery of David ben Saʿadya al-Ger’s Kitāb al-Ḥāwī (The Comprehensive
Book) has transformed scholarly understanding of eleventh-century Andalusian
Rabbanite legal theory. Little is known about the author of this enormous, well-organized
judges’ manual.492 David Sklare suggested that David ben Saʿadya’s father may have
emigrated from northern (Christian) Spain or southern France after embracing Judaism, a
relocation made by contemporaneous converts.493 David ben Saʿadya appears to have
been the first Andalusian Rabbanite to engage the discipline of uṣūl al-fiqh at length.494
Echoing geonic claims, he affirmed that Moses “soundly related” (ḥadīthan ṣaḥīḥan) “the

Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 1 (English), 3 (Hebrew). This distinction clearly
relies on the division between uṣūl and furūʿ, as noted in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 20n6; and
Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 214. See, however, Cohen’s comments in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of
Tradition, ed. Cohen, 107.
490
Halbertal, People of the Book, 54-56; idem, Maimonides, 100-102; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam
ve-al-Fārābi,” 214-15.
491
See above, nn286, 288.
492
On the scope of this work, see Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 103-109; on the identity
of the author, see there, 109-116, with reference to earlier scholarship. See also Israel Ta-Shma, Ha-Sifrut
ha-Parshanit la-Talmud be-Eiropah uve-Ṣfon Afriqah: Qorot, Ishim ve-Shiṭot (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2004),
1:170-73; Friedman, “Responsa of R. Abraham Maimonides,” 40-42; Y. Zvi Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ haʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 217-20; and idem, “On the Spanish Source of Short Halakhic Works Attributed to Hayya
Gaon,” in Judæo-Arabic Culture in al-Andalus, ed. Amir Ashur (Cordoba: Cordoba Near Eastern Research
Unit, 2013), 245-53. On the Kitāb al-Ḥāwī as a judges’ manual, see Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,”
104; and Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 220; for the structure of this work, see Sklare, “R.
David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 109n19.
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Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 119-20. On the possibility of Provençal influence on
the Kitāb al-Ḥāwī, see Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 226-27n40.
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Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 104-105; and Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri beSefarad,” 221.
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authentic transmission” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ), including the principles of the laws (al-uṣūl
al-fiqhīyāt) and the “meanings of aspects of the commandments” (maʿānī fuṣūl alsharʿiyāt).495 Nonetheless, David presented a more nuanced picture of the sources of
Jewish law than had the geonim496 by identifying three sources: revealed Scripture (naṣṣ
al-kitāb al-manzūl [sic]), transmitted traditions (al-ḥadīth al-manqūl), and explanations
of the “people of the Talmud” (sharḥ al-maʿānī li-ahl al-talmud).497 He similarly
differentiated between transmitted explanations (sharḥ manqūl) and explanations inferred
(al-mustadall; or elsewhere, al-mustakhraj, derived) by means of qiyās and raʾy. The
author even explained that the talmudic phrase “his view is more logical” (mistaber
ṭaʿamei) refers to laws created by logic.498 Like Baḥya, David’s failure to distinguish
between the terms raʾy and qiyās underscores his positive portrayal of human reasoning
and his break with the geonim. Moreover, as Sklare noted, David often cited rabbinic
works to prove his arguments, while his geonic predecessors seem to have preferred
Scriptural proofs.499
The writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra provide further insight into Andalusian
thinking about rabbinic tradition. Mordechai Cohen has detailed similarities between the
approaches to peshaṭ in the writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra and Maimonides,500 but it is

Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 222.
Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 105-106; and Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri beSefarad,” 221-24. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 253-54.
497
Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 221. On the meaning of “Talmud,” see there, n17.
For one possible meaning of ahl al-Talmud, see above, n290.
498
Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 223, 224.
499
Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 105. On Saʿadya’s citations, see however Abramson,
ʿInyanot be-Sifrut ha-Geonim, 231-32; Brody, Ḥiburim Hilkhatiyim, 15-16 (Hebrew pagination), 3-4
(English pagination).
500
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 74-83, 365-75. On Ibn Ezra’s approach to peshaṭ,
see also Uriel Simon, “Le-Darkho ha-Parshanit shel Rabiʿ ʿal-pi Sheloshet Beiʾurav le-Pasuq Eḥad,” Bar
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difficult to discern if Abraham influenced Maimonides or if they shared a common body
of knowledge.501 Abraham Ibn Ezra divided law into three categories: written, received,
and ordained by the ancestors.502 The last designation suggests that Abraham was willing
to acknowledge post-Sinaitic legal innovations.
In over thirty places in his scriptural commentaries, Abraham Ibn Ezra labeled a
rabbinic interpretation that he rejected “a lone opinion” (divrei yaḥid) or claimed that it
was subject to debate.503 In one instance, he contrasted a minority view or a debated
interpretation with “tradition” (qabbalah), implying that most sages were privy to the

Ilan Annual 3 (1965): 92-138; and Sarah Japhet, “Ha-Meitaḥ bein Peshuṭo shel Miqra u-vein Midrash haHalakhah: Baʿayah le-lo Pitron,” in Dor va-Dor u-Farshanav: Asupat Meḥqarim be-Farshanut ha-Miqra
(Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2008), 37-47.
501
Isadore Twersky wrote that Abraham Ibn Ezra “exerted considerable influence on
Maimonides,” a position he later modified; see “Review of Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed
by Moses Maimonides, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Shlomo Pines. With an Introductory
Essay by Leo Strauss,” Speculum 41, no. 3 (1966): 558; and idem, “Ha-Hishpiʿa Rabiʿ ʿal ha-Rambam?” in
Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, eds. Isadore
Twersky and Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 21-48. In his Introduction
to the Code of Maimonides, 252n33, Twersky appears to have accepted a “link” between Ibn Ezra and
Maimonides, “especially in connection with philosophy.” Blidstein, “Where do We Stand,” 26, rejected the
possibility of influence. Others adopted Twersky’s early view; see Saul Lieberman, “Mishnat Shir haShirim,” in Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition, by Gershom Scholem (New
York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1965), 124; Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod
Mora ve-Sod Torah: ha-Shorashim le-Minyan ha-Miṣvot shel Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra,” Dine Israel 22
(2003): 177-78; Davidson, Maimonides, 175n214; Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 26n88, 36869, 510-13; and Norman Roth, “Abraham Ibn Ezra and Mysticism,” Iberia Judaica 4 (2012): 141 (writing
“Maimonides … was very much influenced by Ibn Ezra”). Twersky, “Ha-Hishpiʿa Rabiʿ ʿal ha-Rambam?”
39, suggested that the Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah may not have reached Maimonides in time to impact Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, because Abraham composed that work in London. Norman Roth, “Abraham Ibn Ezra –
Highlights of his Life,” Iberia Judaica 4 (2012): 33n39, however, placed the composition of Yesod Mora in
Provence. See also Howard Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides,” Maimonidean Studies 2
(1991): 97-98; and Tamás Visi, “Ibn Ezra, A Maimonidean Authority: The Evidence of the Early Ibn Ezra
Supercommentaries,” in The Cultures of Maimonideanism: New Approaches to the History of Jewish
Thought, ed. James Robinson (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 90-93.
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 ;כי כל המצות הכתובות בתורה או המקובלות או התקונים שתקנו האבותAbraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora veSod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 140 (7:7). See the editors’ introduction, 35-37; and Cohen, Opening the
Gates of Interpretation, 510-13. Compare, however, above, n192.
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Yeshayahu Maori, “ʿAl Mashmaʿut ha-Munaḥ ‘Divrei Yaḥid’ be-Feirush Rabiʿ la-Miqra: leYaḥaso shel Rabiʿ le-Midreshei Ḥazal,” Shenaton le-Ḥeiqer ha-Miqra veha-Mizraḥ ha-Qadum 13 (2002):
201-246. For examples, see there, 231-46. Surviving evidence does not always support this claim; see
there, 217-22.
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latter.504 Uriel Simon suggested that this approach relates to Maimonides’ claim that there
are no debates about received traditions.505 When taken together, these discussions
establish a long Andalusian tradition that anticipated many Maimonidean claims about
the Oral Torah.

The Scope of Revelation
Maimonides began both the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah
with lengthy discussions of revelation and its transmission that describe the compilation
of the Written Torah and the characteristics and scope of its accompanying oral
traditions, the Oral Torah.506 Affirming the divine source of both Torahs, Maimonides
defined the latter, quite significantly, as a circumscribed set of revealed traditions.
At the outset of the Commentary, Maimonides focused on the commandments and
neglected the non-legal parts of Scripture, stating: “God revealed every commandment
(sharīʿa) … with its explanation (tafsīrihā).”507 In the subsequent discussion, he wrote
that God told Moses a verse (naṣṣ), its tafsīr and taʾwīl (two terms for commentary or
explanation that are sometimes considered to be equivalent, and at other times, placed in

504

Abraham Ibn Ezra, Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 2:265 (Short Commentary to Ex. 13:18);
see Maori, “ʿAl Mashmaʿut ha-Munaḥ ‘Divrei Yaḥid’,” 212-13n40.
505
Abraham Ibn Ezra, Shenei Peirushei R. Avraham Ibn Ezra le-Trei-ʿAsar, ed. Uriel Simon
(Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 1989), 178. See above, n417.
506
The Prophets and Writings are conspicuously absent; see below, esp. n568.
507
] ;[אעלם אן] כל שריעה אנזל אללה עלי משה רבינו אנהא אנזלת מע [תפסירהאMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:1; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327. On sharīʿa, which here means
commandment, see Joel Kraemer, “Nomos ve-Sharīʿa be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Teʿudah 4 (1986): 185202.
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opposition), and what “the unambiguous (or: clear) verse” (al-naṣṣ al-muḥkam) covers.508
The distinction between unambiguous and ambiguous verses is qurʾānic (3:7); these
terms figured prominently in medieval Muslim and Jewish exegesis.509 The insistence
that revealed commentary accompanied even “unambiguous” verses underscores the
omnipresent need for tradition.
In the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides elaborated
on a talmudic legend (bʿEiruv 54b) stating that, after each experience of revelation,
Moses returned to his tent and transmitted his knowledge to Aaron, then to Aaron’s sons,
then to the Seventy Elders, and finally to what Maimonides termed “the multitude of
people” (jumhūr al-nās) who “sought God” (Ex. 33:7). In his telling, Moses would then
depart, and each participant would repeat the verse and depart, until each had heard the
revelation four times. After this procedure, wrote Maimonides, the people wrote the
verses in scrolls and memorized the tradition (al-naql).510 Before his death, wrote
Maimonides, Moses composed thirteen Torah scrolls, one for each of the twelve tribes,
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Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:1-2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327.
Cohen noted the surprising word taʾwīl: not only is this at odds with Saʿadya’s use, Maimonides himself
focused on tafsīr marwī, not taʾwīl; Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 473; see there, 114-15.
509
For Muslim writers, see Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 148-70; Leah Kinberg, “Muḥkamāt and
Mutashābihāt (Koran 3/7): Implication of a Koranic Pair of Terms in Medieval Exegesis,” Arabica 35, no.
2 (1988): 143-72; and Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “Quranic Hermeneutics: The Views of al-Ṭabraī and Ibn
Kathīr,” in Approaches to the History of Interpretation of the Qurʾān, ed. Andrew Rippin (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988), 51-53. For Jewish writers, see Richard C. Steiner, “Saadia vs. Rashi,” 216-17;
Goldstein, “Abū l-Faraj Hārūn,” 382-83; and Mordechai Cohen, Three Approaches to Biblical Metaphor:
From Abraham Ibn Ezra and Maimonides to David Kimhi (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 41-42, 83-84. Numerous
appearances of these terms are collected in Blau, Dictionary, 140, s.v. محكم, 325, s.v. شبهة. Note the use of
muḥkam in Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:201 (Introduction to mSan10); Haqdamot haRambam, ed. Shailat, 363; and Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:126 (mKel 12:7).
510
On Maimonides’ claim that the oral nature of extra-scriptural traditions guarantees its
perfection and authenticity, see Halbertal, “What is the Mishneh Torah,” 89-90.
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and one for the Levites, and the people verified (ṣaḥḥaḥū) the received traditions with
Moses.511
Maimonides made very similar claims in the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah:
“All of the commandments that Moses received at Sinai,” he wrote, “were given together
with their interpretation (be-feirushan nitnu).” Citing Ex. 24:12, “I will give you the stone
tablets with the teaching (ha-torah) and the commandment (ha-miṣvah)” as evidence,
Maimonides explained:
‘The teaching,’ refers to Written Torah, ‘and the commandment,’ to its
interpretation. God bade us fulfill (laʿasot) in accordance with ‘the
commandment’. This “commandment” refers to that which is called the Oral
Torah.512
The Introduction to the Mishneh Torah also repeats the claims that Moses copied thirteen
Torahs before his death and that the transmission was preserved orally.513 In this text,
however, Maimonides omitted the talmudic narrative regarding Moses’ four-fold
repetition of revelation and the unique role of Aaron and his sons. Instead, he provided a
long isnād (chain of transmission) linking Moses with his own time. Through the time of
Hillel the Elder, the phrase “and his court” (u-veit dino) accompanies each name; after
this, names of particular rabbis replace “and his court.”514 The Introduction concludes

Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:2-3; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 32728. Maimonides did not consistently mention Scripture and its tafsīr; he wrote that Moses recited a verse
and taught its tafsīr to Aaron, but for the others, Moses only recited the verse. He only mentioned the tafsīr
again when describing how the people shared revelation.
511
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כל המצות שניתנו לו למשה בסיני בפירושן ניתנו שנאמר ואתנה לך את לוחות האבן והתורה והמצוה תורה זו תורה
 ;שבכתב והמצוה זו פירושה וצונו לעשו' התורה על פי המצוה ומצוה זו היא הנקראת תורה שבעל פהMaimonides, Mishneh

Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 1 lines 2-4. For sources of this midrash, see the notes there. Translation follows
Isadore Twersky, A Maimonides Reader (New York: Behrman House, 1972), 35, with slight changes.
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Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 1 lines 4-9; see above, n510.
514
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 2-8. In the letter to Pinḥas, he explained that
“his court” indicates that many in each generation knew the Oral Torah; idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:442.
Compare the comments about the list of transmitters in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 1-2. See also
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with a list of the forty generations that made up the period between Moses and the end of
the Talmud.515
Despite their differences, both Introductions emphasize that revelation was twofold, consisting of written texts and their interpretations. In his formulation of the
Principles of Faith in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides similarly affirmed
the divine origin of both the Written Torah and “its transmitted interpretation” (tafsīrihā
al-marwī).516 By the same token, the Mishneh Torah asserts that those who reject Mosaic
authorship of the Pentateuch or “deny its explanation, which is the Oral Torah” have no
portion in the World to Come (Hilkhot Teshuvah, 3:8).517 And in the Epistle to Yemen, he
explained that one may neither add to nor subtract from the Written Torah, or from “its
transmitted interpretation (tafsīrihā al-marwī), which is what the Sages transmitted – that
is, the Oral Torah.”518 Maimonides’ son, Abraham, explicated the midrash cited in the
Introduction to the Mishneh Torah similarly. He explained that the Talmud’s (bBer 5a)

Blidstein, “Mishnah Avot 1:1,” 60-62. On the term “his court,” see also Twersky, Introduction to the Code
of Maimonides, 98n3.
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Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 2-8; see Salo W. Baron, “The Historical
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be-Hishtalshalut ha-Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Haqdamat Mishneh Torah le-Rambam,” JSIJ 7 (2008): 105-25.
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House: Jewish Descendants of King David in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2013), 73, 84, 94. Perhaps as a restatement of the entire law, the Mishneh Torah demanded a
complete isnād. The Commentary does contain a brief isnād (to R. Judah the Prince); see Maimonides,
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:14-15; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335-36.
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Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:214-15 (Introduction to mSan); Haqdamot haRambam, ed. Shailat, 372-73; see Shailat’s comments there, 211; Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal haRambam,” 150n28; and idem, “Maimonides and the Karaites,” 313n8.
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' וכן הכופר בפרושה והוא תור... שלשה הן הכופרי' בתורה האומ' שאין התורה מעם ה' אפי' פסוק אחד אפי' תיבה אחת
 ;שבעל פהsee similar formulations in Hilkhot Sheḥiṭah, 4:16, Hilkhot ʿAvodat Yom ha-Kippurim, 1:7, and

Hilkhot Mamrim, 3:3.
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כמא לא זיאדה פי שריעה משה ולא נקצאן אבדא פי נצוצהא וכד'לך פי תפסירהא אלמרוי והו אלד'י רווה אלחכמים ז"ל
 ;והי תורה שבעל פהMaimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:98. See also the statement that aspects of certain

sacrificial rituals are known by scriptural verse (naṣṣ al-torah) and others are “transmitted [and] appended
to the verses” ( ;)מנקולה מסנדה אלי נצוץidem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:127 (mMen 5:5).
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gloss of the word, “the commandment” (Ex. 24:12) as “the Mishnah,” and his father’s
explanation of the same word as “the Oral Torah,” were, in effect, identical, for both
referred to “the unwritten, transmitted explanation of the commandment.”519 According
to Abraham, even the rabbis referred to “the principles of tradition (uṣūl al-naql), rather
than [to] the text of the Mishnah.”520
Maimonides’ deployment – and transformation – of another midrash in the
Commentary on the Mishnah underscores his impulse to narrow the scope of oral
revelation. According to the Sifra, the discussion of the Sabbatical year in Lev. 25, begins
with “The Lord spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai,” in order to teach that just as the
Sabbatical year’s “general rules, details, and particulars” (kelaloteha u-peraṭoteha vediqduqeha) were given at Sinai, so all of the other commandments were similarly
revealed at Sinai.521 Medieval and modern interpreters have usually understood this as a
reference to written details of the law,522 but Maimonides offered a different reading.
Equating the “general rules, details, and particulars” with the Oral Torah,523 he linked
these to the revealed tafsīr no less than three times. (Maimonides chose as his example
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 ;לחת האבן והתורה והמצוה ובד'לך ינחל כון שרח המצוה ען אלנקל אלגיר מסטורAbraham Maimonides,

Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 383.
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 ;פאלקצד בה אצול אלנקל לא נץ אלמשנהibid., 385. In Hilkhot Sheḥiṭah, 1:4, Maimonides glossed
“commanded you” (ṣivitikha; Deut. 12:21) as orally transmitted laws. See also Blidstein, “Masoret veSamkhut Mosdit,” 11.
521
This is Maimonides’ version. See Sifra de-Vei Rav, Sefer Torat Kohanim, ed. Isaac Hirsch
(Vienna, 1862), 105a (parashat be-har, §1). For background, see Michael Chernick, “Kelaloteha uPeraṭoteha mi-Sinai,” in Gevurot ha-Romaḥ: Divrei Ḥakhamim ka-Darbonot ukhe-Mazmerot Kutetu leRomaḥ, le-R. Moshe Ḥayim Weiler, ed. Zeʾev W. Falk (Jerusalem: Mesharim, 1987), 107-119; and
Shamma Friedman, “Mah ʿInyan Har Sinai eṣel Shemiṭah? Temurot be-Shiṭat ‘R. Ishmael ve-R. Aqivah’
be-Hitgalut ha-Torah,” Sidra 24-25 (2010): 387-425.
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See Chernik, “Kelaloteha u-Peraṭoteh,” 109; and Friedman, “Mah ʿInyan Har Sinai eṣel
Shemiṭah,” 394-95n24.
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Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327.
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the identification of “fruit of the goodly tree” [Lev. 23:40] as the citron as the paradigm
of unanimously accepted interpretations contained in the Oral Torah.524) Maimonides
even suggested that the phrases “general rules” and “details” refer to use of the middot
(hermeneutical rules; among which are the rules of kelal u-peraṭ and peraṭ u-kelal) and
other interpretive tools to discover “prooftexts (isnādāt), allusions (talwīḥāt), and hints
(ishārāt)” to transmitted interpretations.525 A similar idea appears in the Introduction to
the Mishneh Torah, where Maimonides wrote that the 613 commandments “were orally
imparted to Moses at Sinai, together with their general rules, details, and particulars. All
these general rules, details, particulars, and expositions (veha-beiʾurin) of every
commandment constitute the Oral Torah, which each court received from its
predecessor.”526
Maimonides’ repeated emphasis on the two-fold revelation of the commandments
and their explanations suggests that he structured revelation itself around the 613
commandments (as mentioned in the Introduction), and that he viewed the revealed text
of Scripture as a vehicle for their transmission.527

Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16-17; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
336-37. Shailat, there, 89-90, noted Maimonides’ rereading of this midrash in the Commentary. See also
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 263-64. Compare Hilkhot Shofar ve-Sukkah ve-Lulav, 7:2.
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Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:17; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 337.
Translation follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 271. On these terms, see there, 272-76.
See the similar statement at the outset of Principle Two; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12.
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אלו הם תרי"ג מצות שנאמרו לו למשה בסיני הן וכללותיהן ופרטותיהן ודקדוקיהן כל אותן הכללות והפרטות והדקדוקין
 ;והביאורין של כל מצוה ומצוה היא תורה שבעל פה שקיבלו בית דין מפי בית דיןMaimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen

et al., 65 lines 503-505. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 40-41, with slight changes.
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above, nn82, 87); “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 459-61; and idem, Maimonides, 107-111. For an
alternative explanation of Maimonides’ interest in the 613 commandments, see Friedberg, Crafting the 613
Commandments, 28-29, 134-53.
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The Oral Torah and the Tafsīr Marwī
Maimonides did not use the term “Oral Torah” (torah shebe-ʿal peh) in a
consistent manner throughout his writings. In its one appearance in the Commentary on
the Mishnah, Maimonides equated the “Oral Torah” with “the tradition” (al-naql) and the
revealed tafsīr, and he contrasted it with Scripture (naṣṣ).528 In the Introduction to Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, “Oral Torah” refers to Sinaitic laws. Maimonides asserted that “all of the laws
of the Torah (sharīʿa), in their entirety – which is the Oral Torah – were transmitted from
so-and-so, and so-and-so from so-and-so, to Ezra [and] to Moses.”529 In the Introduction
to the Mishneh Torah, “Oral Torah” usually denotes traditions that originated with
Moses: Moses transmitted the Oral Torah to Joshua,530 and “the great sages of Israel”
were also its “transmitters” (maʿatiqim).531 In certain places in that work, however,
Maimonides included post-Mosaic laws in the term “Oral Torah.” Thus, for example, he
claimed that the Mishneh Torah covers the entire Oral Torah,532 and he described the
Sanhedrin as the “essence (ʿiqar) of the Oral Torah” (Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:1).533

528
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:1-2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327.
See also idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:98, 1:320. Kafiḥ usually translated naql and the passive participle
manqūl as torah shebe-ʿal peh; e.g., idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:148 (mSan 1:3), 5:175 (mHul
1:2).
529
 ; אחכאם אלשריעה כלהא והי תורה שבעל פה מרויה ען פלאן ופלאן ען פלאן אלי עזרא אלי משה רבנוMaimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 2 (introduction).
530
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 2 lines 11-12.
531
 ;גדולי חכמי ישראל המעתיקים תורה שבעל פהMaimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 10 line
109. This denotation appears elsewhere, as in the division between the Written Torah, Oral Torah, and
Talmud (Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:11-12); see below.
532
 ;עד שתהא תורה שבעל פה כולה סדורה בפי הכלMaimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 13 lines
158-59.
533
בית דין הגדול שבירושלים הם עיקר תורה שבעל פה. Note the narrow use of “Oral Torah” in the Short
Enumeration in the Introduction to the Mishnah Torah, Negative Commandment #313 (hereafter the Short
Enumeration), where Maimonides defined the Oral Torah as “the explanation” of the Written Torah

149

In the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides asserted that
the tafsīr marwī (transmitted interpretation) contains “meanings of ambiguous
expressions” (jumal maʿānī).534 Referring to Lev. 23:42, “You shall sit in booths seven
days,” he wrote that the tafsīr marwī relates divine clarifications of this verse: who is
obligated to sit in a booth, how to construct it, and how to “sit” in it.535 According to
Maimonides, there could be no disagreement (ikhtilāf) over a matter of tafsīr; nobody
ever denied that “fruit of the goodly tree” (Lev. 23:40) is the citron or that “an eye for an
eye” (Ex. 21:24; Deut. 19:21536) imposes financial, and not physical, punishment. Any
“sources” for these readings in rabbinic literature, he claimed, are merely hints to laws
that are known by means of the tafsīr.537 By the same token, asserted Maimonides, a
prophet may neither add to nor subtract from either the verses (nuṣūṣ) or the tafsīr marwī.

(peirushah); Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 61 lines 431-32. At the outset of Hilkhot Mamrim, this
prohibition is “Not to add to the Torah, neither the written commandments nor their explanation (befeirushan) that we learned mi-pi ha-shmuʿa” and “Not to subtract from the entirety (min ha-kol).”
According to Hilkhot Megillah ve-Ḥanukah, 2:18, unlike the rest of the Prophets and Writings, the Book of
Esther will never be annulled, “like the Five Books of the Torah and the laws (halakhot) of the Oral
Torah.” Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 8:15, forbids benefit from forbidden foods “unless Scripture exempts it
… or it is explicated (she-yitparesh) in the Oral Torah.” See the usage in the Epistle to Yemen; above, n518.
Discussion of the Mishneh Torah sources largely relies on Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 168; idem,
“Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,”13n8; and idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 27; Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 114n91, 260n71, accepted Blidstein’s view. It is possible to read Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:1,
more narrowly. Henshke claimed Maimonides always used this term in the narrow sense; “Le-Yesodei,”
128-29n78. See Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 488-92, who discussed many of these
sources; and Chernick, “Kelaloteha u-Peraṭoteha mi-Sinai,” 119.
534
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327.
See Shailat’s notes there, 27n3, 327n2. On the term mujmal, see Weiss, The Search for God’s Law, 440-50;
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 43-44; and Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 106-108. For
other Maimonidean use of the term mujmal, see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:21; Haqdamot haRambam, ed. Shailat, 340 ( וג'א אלנקל...  ;)אמר אללה ביפעלהא בכלאם מג'מלand Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ,
2:175 (mPes 4:6). Elsewhere, the phrase jumal (al-)maʿānī appears to mean “groups of matters”; see Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 337 (Neg. 349); and Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:341 (mKer 1:1).
535
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:3; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 328.
536
See Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16n50.
537
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16-17; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
336-37; see above, n524. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 161-64, 276-80.
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For example, a prophet cannot read Deut. 25:12, “You shall cut off her hand,” literally
(ḥaqīqa), according to its ẓāhir meaning, because “the tradition brought” (jāʾa al-naql)
teaching that “cut off” refers to the imposition of financial punishment.538 Material
designated as naql, i.e., tradition, can also play an interpretive role. For example, one
teaching which Maimonides described as having “brought to us by the tradition” (jāʾnā
al-naql),539 is designated in the Mishneh Torah as mi-pi ha-shemuʿah, from aural
tradition (Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 9:3).540 This underscores Maimonides’ claim that
rabbinic exegesis often records Sinaitic traditions that are not contained in Scripture.541
These uses of the term tafsīr resemble ways in which the term was used by certain
qurʾānic exegetes, as Mordechai Cohen noted.542 For example, both Abū Manṣūr alMāturīdī (d. c. 944) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (15th c.) used “tafsīr” to denote traditional,
transmitted exegesis.543

Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:6; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 330.
The verb jāʾa, to reach or arrive, was Maimonides’ preferred way to describe the transmission of extrascriptural traditions.
539
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:13; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 334.
540
למדנו מחכמי' ראשונים מפי השמועה. In the Introduction to the Commentary, Maimonides also termed
this a “statement of the Sages (naṣṣ lil-ḥakhamim) in the Talmud”; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:12;
Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 334. This may relate to the uncommon phrase “the early Sages taught
us” here. The tradition is a gloss of Deut. 18:15 found in bSan 90a.
541
See Guttmann, “Die Bedeutung der Tradition,” 211-12; and the similar point in Rabinovitch,
ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 132-35. Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 262-63,
coordinated Maimonides’ Hebrew and Arabic classificatory terms. See the examples there, 392.
542
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 457-58; and idem, “Ha-Biṭuy ‘Bāb/Abwāb alTaʾwīl’,” 163.
543
See Andrew Rippin, “Exegesis of the Qurʾān: Classical and Medieval,” Encyclopaedia of the
Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 2:100-101; and Wansbrough, Quranic Studies,
154. While the term tafsīr marwī usually refers to legal matters, Bacher collected several examples in
which it denotes non-legal material; Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s, 28n1; Ha-Rambam
Parshan ha-Miqra, 32n1; and idem, “Die Agada in Maimunis Werken,” in Moses ben Maimon, 2:160.
Bloomberg described the tafsīr marwī as the “traditional interpretation of a verse as revealed to Moses”;
“Arabic Legal Terms,” 33.
538
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In the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides subtly
distinguished between the terms tafsīr marwī and halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, both of
which denote Sinaitic traditions that were never subject to debate. Because of the
“wisdom of the revealed speech” (ḥikmat al-kalām al-munzal),544 he claimed, later
generations were able to use qiyās to derive (istikhrāj) hints to the tafsīr. By contrast, he
wrote, a hint about a law designated as halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai is more tenuous, and
is designated an asmakhta (support) or siman (sign). Hints of this sort did not discern the
“intent” (gharaḍ) of Scripture.545

Post-Mosaic Legal Activity
According to Maimonides, religious leaders who transmitted Sinaitic traditions
after revelation passed on the innovations of previous generations and expanded the law
through their own intellectual exploration. This process, he claimed, continued without
interruption from the time of Joshua until that of Ravina and Rav Ashi, which is
designated (bBM 86a) as the “end” of authoritative teaching (sof horaʾah).546 PostMosaic expansion utilized qiyās and intellectual speculation; prophecy was excluded
from this process.
Maimonides asserted that the Mishnah and the two Talmuds comprise both the
received traditions and their expansions. In the Introduction to the Commentary on the

544
Compare Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two). See also Bacher, Die
Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s, 28-29n6; Ha-Rambam Parshan ha-Miqra, 32n4.
545
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:17-19; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
336-39. See Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s, 29n1; Ha-Rambam Parshan ha-Miqra, 33n1. On
gharaḍ, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 278n126.
546
On the term horaʾah, see above, n213.
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Mishnah, he explained that R. Judah the Prince, the second-century redactor of the
Mishnah, “collected the transmitted material (al-riwāyāt), doctrines, and stated debates
from Moses until his time.”547 The Mishnah, wrote Maimonides, includes three
components: (1) the explanation of the written commandments (tafsīr al-sharāʾiʿ almanṣūṣa), meaning traditions transmitted (riwāyāt marwīya) from Moses; (2) material
whose validity or authority is unanimously agreed on that is derived (mustakhrājāt)
through qiyās; and (3) material debated by those who perform qiyās (al-qiyāsīyīn).548 Rav
Ashi, claimed Maimonides, did the same for the Talmud; he collected the doctrines,
details (tafaqqah; see below), and the explanation (tafsīr)549 of the law. In so doing, he
wrote, Rav Ashi verified the accuracy of the transmitted material (ṣaḥḥaḥa al-riwāyāt).550
In his comments on “the rebellious elder,” Maimonides posited that this fractious figure
is one who disagrees either with a transmitted matter (al-shayʾ al-marwī) or with a
product of the Sanhedrin’s qiyās and speculation (naẓar). Interpreting the scriptural
instruction (Deut. 17:11) to obey the High Court, Maimonides pointedly identified these
two categories: “In accordance with the instruction given you and the ruling handed
down to you” refers to derived laws while “the verdict that they announce to you” to
received interpretations.551

547

 ; וג'מע אלרואיאת ואלאקאויל ואלאכ'תלאפאת אלמקולה מן לדן משה רבינו אלי איאמהMaimonides, Mishnah
ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:15; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336.
548
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336.
549
Kafiḥ translated this word using the plural (Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:34), but Shailat,
the singular (Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 51).
550
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:34; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 348.
551
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:221 (mSan 11:2). See also Hilkhot Mamrim,
1:2; and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10 (Prin. One). According to Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 45, the
similar interpretation of Deut. 17:11 in Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:2, is not found in rabbinic literature; see
however below, n578. On the rebellious elder, see also Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,”
158.
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Maimonides also drew attention to these two sources of law in the Introduction to
the Mishneh Torah. He claimed that the jurists who lived prior to R. Judah the Prince had
written for themselves “the exposition of the Torah and of its laws … and the new
matters innovated (she-nitḥadshu) in each generation, which had not been received by
aural tradition (mi-pi ha-shemuʿah) but had been deduced by application of the thirteen
middot (hermeneutical rules).”552 R. Judah the Prince, he wrote, collected the Mosaic
traditions (shmuʿot) and the material that the court of each generation derived (lamdu).553
Similarly, wrote Maimonides, the two Talmuds include matters innovated after the time
of Moses, along with the law “transmitted in an unbroken chain (she-heʿetiqu ish mi-pi
ish) from the time of Moses, as he received it from Sinai.”554

The Transmission of Received Material
Maimonides used the Arabic root r-w-y to denote the act of transmission and the
noun riwāya to denote transmitted material; this root also appears in the phrase tafsīr
marwī (a transmitted interpretation).555 Muslim writers used this root similarly, often
referring to the study of ḥadīth as ilm al-riwāya (lit., the science of transmission).556 In

552

כל אחד ואחד כותב לעצמו כפי כוחו מביאור התורה ומהלכותיה כמו ששע ומדברים שתנחדשו בכל דור ודר בדיני' שלא
 ;למדום מפי השמועה אלא במדה משלש עשרה מדותMaimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 6 lines 49-51;

see also there, 9-10 lines 97-105. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 36, with slight
changes.
553
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 6 lines 52-54.
554
 ;כמו שהעתיקו איש מפי איש מפי משה רבינו מסיניMaimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 9
lines 96-97. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 37, with slight changes. See also Hilkhot
Mamrim, 5:2.
555
See in detail, Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms,” 38-40; and below.
556
Gregor Schoeler, The Oral and the Written in Early Islam, trans. Uwe Vagelpohl and ed. James
E. Montgomery (London: Routledge, 2006), 41-42; and Eerik Dickinson, The Development of Early
Sunnite Ḥadīth Criticism: The Taqdima of Ibn Abī Ḥātim Al-Rāzī (240/854-327/938) (Leiden: Brill, 2001),
107-109.
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the Mishneh Torah, the Hebrew root ʿ-t-q is used to denote the transmission of Sinaitic
materials557 and the sages are referred to as “the transmitters” (ha-maʿatiqim) or “the
transmitters of aural tradition” (maʿatiqei ha-shemuʿah).558
The Commentary on the Mishnah occasionally refers to large groups of people
who transmitted the Oral Torah, and, at other times, to individuals who did so.
Maimonides claimed, for example, that before Moses died, “the people” verified
(saḥḥaḥū) the riwāya or tafsīr.559 On the other hand, Moses is said to have conveyed
(ḥamala) the traditions to Joshua and the Elders (zeqeinim),560 and the first of ten closing
chapters in the Introduction to the Commentary contains a list of 91 rabbis who
transmitted Mosaic traditions and other laws.561 Transmissions by elites and by groups
are conflated in Maimonides’ comment that mAv 1:1 proves “the veracity of the chain of
authorities (ṣiḥḥat al-sanad) and the tradition (al-naql) – that it is authentic (or, sound;
ṣaḥīḥ), the masses (or: community; al-kāffa) from the masses.”562 The same two types of

557

See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 9 line 97; Hilkhot Tefilin u-Mezuzah veSefer Torah, 7:8; Hilkhot Shabbat, 27:1; and Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot, 2:15. Compare above, n267.
558
See above, n531; and Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:9. See Bacher, “Zum sprachlichen Charakter,”
288; and Henshke, “Le-Ṭaʿamah shel Halakhah,” 47n10.
559
See above, n511.
560
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 328.
Maimonides implied that some Elders received parts of the tradition independently of Joshua, a claim
reminiscent of the assumption in ḥadīth literature that no single Companion received the entire tradition.
561
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:50-52; Shailat did not include these chapters.
R. Judah the Prince is the most celebrated figure; elsewhere, Maimonides enumerated his isnād to Moses;
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:15-16; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336. See the praise for R.
Judah the Prince cited above, n399. Compare the second of these closing chapters, which lists 37 lesser
figures who did not transmit tradition but were involved in various events, taught a moralistic statement
(adab), or a derashah.
562
 ;ליעלמך צחה אלסנד ואלנקל אנה צחיח אלכאפה ען אלכאפהMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ,
1:29; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 345. Blau, Dictionary, 600 s.v. كافّة, preferred “community” here,
but my sense is that Maimonides excluded the Jewish collective. Kafiḥ offered ḥaburah (group) and Shailat
rabbim (many), Michael Schwarz has ṣibbur (community); Maimonides, Shemonah Peraqim: ve-hem
Haqdamat ha-Rambam le-Feirusho le-Masekhet Avot, trans. Michael Schwarz, intro. Sara Klein-Braslavy
(Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2011), 3n2. See also Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:221n6
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transmission are also noted in the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, which states that
the Oral Torah passed from Moses, to Joshua, etc., and was also transmitted by the courts
of certain individuals, such that “thousands and tens of thousands” were involved.563
Maimonides was sensitive to the fact that the Mishnah’s naming of tradents
weakened his assertion that its contents were of Sinaitic origin. Echoing claims found in
Sherira’s Epistle, he explained that the original style of transmitting traditions –
associated with Simeon the Just (fl. c. 200 BCE), whose statements are “brief, containing
many matters”564 – proved adequate for earlier generations, but later ones required more
detail.565 Moreover, according to Maimonides, certain legal positions which the Talmud
ascribes to individual rabbis were actually matters of consensus, for the view of the one
was accepted by others. Maimonides also asserted that the talmudic ascription of
anonymous mishnaic passages to R. Meir (bʿEiruv 96b; bSan 86a) simply means that R.
Meir was the tradition’s final transmitter. In most cases, claimed Maimonides, there was
unanimity regarding these derived laws, or Moses himself was their transmitter.566

(mSan 11:2). This comment appears to relate to the idea of tawātur; see above, n222. Compare the
comment that mAv 1:1 highlights a narrow group of transmitters; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed.
Kafiḥ, 1:15-16; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335-36. See Blidstein, “Mishnah Avot 1:1,” 60-61.
563
 ;ועמהם אלפים ורבבות ששמעו מהםMaimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 1-9, at 9 lines 9091. For Maimonides’ explanation of the term “court,” see above, n514.
564
 ;וג'על כלאמה פיה אעני פי אלמשנה כלאמא וג'יזא משתמלא עלי מעאן כת'ירהMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:33; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 348. See the repeated praise for Simeon the
Just; idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:15, 1:50, 1:52; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336; and
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:169 (mMen 13:10). Compare Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq
le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem, Kitāb Kifāyat al-ʿAbidin (Part Two, Volume Two), ed. Nissim Dana (Ramat Gan: Bar
Ilan University, 1989), 310: שמעון הצדיק על' אלס' והו כמא קד עלם משירי כנסת הגדולה רפיק אלאנביא חגי זכריה ומלאכי
וגירה והו שימש כהן גדול פי אול בית שני. On Simeon the Just in Abraham’s Kifāya, see Gerson Cohen “The
Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” PAAJR 35 (1967): 96-98; 36 (1968): 40-44.
565
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:33-34; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
348. See Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 8-9.
566
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:55. Compare Sherira’s claim that R. Meir did
not create anonymous mishnahs but received them from R. Aqivah, who received them from his teachers;
Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 26-27.
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Post-Mosaic Legal Creativity
According to Maimonides, leaders from Joshua until the close of the Talmud
developed new laws in a consistent fashion. “What Joshua and Pinḥas did in the realm of
speculation (maʿnā al-naẓar) and qiyās (here: reasoning),” he wrote, “is that which
Ravina and Rav Ashi did.”567 The intellect – not prophecy – is the source of all postMosaic laws.568
In his characterization of the activities that resulted in expansion of the legal
corpus, Maimonides used several verbs, whose meanings overlap considerably: istikhrāj

567

 ; מא יפעלה יהושע ופנחיס פי מעני אלנט'ר ואלקיאס הו אלד'י יפעל רבינא ורב אשיMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim

Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 329.
568

 ;אלנבוה גיר מפידה פי אלנט'ר פי תפסיר אלתורה ואסתכ'ראג' אלפרוע בשלש עשרה מדותMaimonides, Mishnah
ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 329. Maimonides claimed that prophecy is
only of use for temporary laws (horaʾat shaʿah); Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:12; Haqdamot haRambam, ed. Shailat, 334. See also Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:212 (mHul 7:6), and Hilkhot Yesodei
ha-Torah, chap. 9.
On the unique role of Mosaic prophecy for halakhic matters, see Levinger, Darkhei haMaḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 37-38; idem, Ha-Rambam ke-Filosof ukhe-Foseq, 29; Twersky, Introduction to
the Code of Maimonides, 455n239; Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 114-15; idem, “Masoret veSamkhut Mosdit,” 12; idem, “Mi-Yesod ha-Nevuʾah,” 25-28; Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,”
462-68; idem, ʿAl Derekh ha-Emet, 33-35; Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 129-34; idem, “‘Ein Neharagin min haDin’,” 252n74; idem, “Miṣvot ha-Avot u-Miṣvot Sinai: Parashat Gid ha-Nasheh ke-Fereq be-Tefisat haHalakhah shel ha-Rambam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 2:619-46; Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation,
259-60, 486n17; Daniel Lasker “Maimonides’ Influence on Karaite Theories of Prophecy and Law,”
Maimonidean Studies 1 (1990): 105n21; and Aviram Ravitsky, “Maduʿa Neʿerkhu Hilkhot Aveil be-Sefer
‘Shoftim’? ʿAl Samkhuto shel Moshe be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” in Samkhut Ruḥanit: Maʾavaqim ʿal Koaḥ
Tarbuti be-Hagut ha-Yehudit, eds. Howard Kreisel et al. (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University, 2010), 7182. On Mosaic prophecy in general, see the sources in Mor Altshuler, “Rabbi Joseph Karo and SixteenthCentury Messianic Maimonideanism,” in The Cultures of Maimonideanism, 198n35. Add Faur, ʿIyunim beMishneh Torah, 13-18; Kalman Bland, “Moses and the Law According to Maimonides,” in Mystics,
Philosophers, and Politicians: Essays in Jewish Intellectual History in Honor of Alexander Altmann, eds.
Jehuda Reinharz et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982), 49-66; Israel Yuval, “Moshe redivivus: HaRambam ke-‘ʿOzer le-Melekh’ ha-Mashiaḥ,” Ẓion 72, no. 2 (2007): 161-78; and Yidiel Waldman,
“Maʿamadan shel Shevaʿ Miṣvot Benei Noaḥ Qodem Matan Torah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Mesorah leYosef 8 (2014): 443-75. Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 13n1, noted the emphasis on Mosaic prophecy in
Maimonides’ father Maimon’s Igeret Neḥamah; see L.M. Simmons, “Maimun’s Letter of Consolation.
Arabic Text,” JQR 2, no. 3 (o.s.) (1890): 5, 9. On the authorship of this text, see, however, David J.
Wasserstein, “The Date and Authorship of the Letter of Consolation Attributed to Maymūn b. Yūsuf,” JSAI
32 (2006): 410-18.
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(to derive or deduce), tantīj (to infer or draw out), tafaqqah (“to treat the specifications
and ramifications of a religious law”569), and occasionally, instinbāṭ (to draw out or
extract).570 He also referred to legal “speculation” (naẓar), qiyās, and “deductions”
(natāʾij) of furūʿ, i.e., branches, from uṣūl, i.e., roots.571 These terms echo usages among
earlier Andalusian Rabbanites, especially Ibn Ghiyāth’s interpretation of “a sage is
greater than a prophet,” discussed above, and in Qaraite writings.572 Maimonides called
the rabbis “the people (ahl) of qiyās (reasoning)” and “the people of speculation
(naẓar).”573 In the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, he referred to non-Sinaitic law as
having been “innovated” (ḥ-d-sh) or “ordained” (t-q-n) by various individuals.574
Maimonides portrayed legal creativity as having begun immediately after Moses’
death, for Joshua and the Elders derived new laws through qiyās by means of the middot

Blau, Dictionary, 512 s.v.  ;فقهsee the next note.
On istikhrāj, see Sarah Stroumsa, “Ha-Im haya ha-Rambam Hogeh Muwaḥidi?” in ʿAlei
ʿAshor: Divrei ha-Veʿidah ha-ʿAsirit shel ha-Ḥevrah le-Ḥeiqer ha-Tarbut ha-ʿAravit ha-Yehudit shel Yemei
ha-Beinayim, eds. Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai and Daniel Lasker (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University Press,
2008), 157; Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 470n23; on istikhrāj and instinbāṭ, see Ravitsky,
“Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 212n5; and on many of these terms, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 264-67, 469-71. The verb tafaqqah is particularly important for Sefer ha-Miṣvot, though in
that work, it is used differently than in the Commentary on the Mishnah; see below, below, nn921-944.
Note also the use of tafaqqah, apparently to denote extracting new laws, in Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:417 (intro to mAv).
571
See esp. Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4, 14-15, 20; Haqdamot ha-Rambam,
ed. Shailat, 329, 335-36, 339. On natāʾij, note the comment in Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,”
213n7.
572
Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 150; idem, “Maimonides and the Karaites,”
313; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 215. Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 137, wrote that
Maimonides agreed with Qaraites on several theological matters. See also Blidstein, “Oral Law as
Institution,” 171.
573
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:14; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335;
idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:609. Noted in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 138.
574
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 6 line 50, 9 line 100, 65 line 509,. Maimonides
termed these laws “clearly established judgments and rules” (mishpaṭim ve-dinim peliʾim); 10 line 102
(following the reading found in the majority of manuscripts). See idem, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
89n1. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 37. This claim was central to Faur’s
presentations; see “De-Orayta, de-Rabbanan ve-Dinim Muflaʾim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam,” Sinai 67
(1970): 20-35.
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(hermeneutical rules). These middot, he asserted, were Sinaitic.575 Some of the
derivations were accepted by consensus (ijmāʿ); “the analogizers” (al-qiyāsīyīn)
developed other derived laws through debate. Debates were resolved according to the
majority, based on “Follow the majority” (Ex. 23:2), and each generation derived new
furūʿ, branches, from received traditions.576 The Torah itself made it clear that the law
could not be changed by any post-Mosaic developments; after all, wrote Maimonides, the
phrase “it is not in the heavens” (Deut. 30:12) precludes later prophecy.577 In lieu of
prophecy, Maimonides asserted, God “assigned us” (aḥālnā), that is, the post-Mosaic
community, to sages, or “the people of qiyās,” alluded to in the biblical phrase, (Deut.
17:9) “The judge in those days.”578 Subsequent generations treated laws derived by
earlier ones as “principles” (uṣūl), extracting new rules from them.579 As Halbertal and
Mordechai Cohen noted, these claims parallel the definition of “talmud” (or “gemara”)
offered in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah. Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:11, defines talmud as

Louis Finkelstein argued that Maimonides retracted the claim that the middot are Sinaitic; “HaDeʿah ki 13 ha-Middot hen Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai,” in Sefer ha-Zikaron le-Rabbi Shaul Liberman,
ed. Shamma Friedman (New York: Beit Midrash ha-Rabbanim de-America, 1993), 81-84, building on
Elijah Alfandari, Seder Eliyahu Rabbah ve-Zuta (Constantinople, 1719), 69b. Finkelstein’s arguments are
not convincing; see Kassierer and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 89-90n154. Maimonides
termed them thirteen qawānīn (canons or principles). On qawānīn, see Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah,
132n61, 138n25; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 214. Maimonides intimated that even
Moses derived laws; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two). He also posited that Moses originated
several ordinances; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:22; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 340;
Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 14 line 165; Hilkhot Tefillah, 12:1, 13:8; and Hilkhot Aveil, 1:1. See
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 111.
576
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 328.
The Maimonidean (and rabbinic) reading of Ex. 23:2 is, of course, acontextual. For background, see
Ephraim Urbach, “ʿAl ha-Kelal ‘Aḥarei Rabbim le-Haṭot’,” in Meḥqarim be-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut, eds.
Moshe David Herr and Yonah Frankel (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1998), 503-509.
577
See above, n568.
578
His reading of this verse is strikingly similar to that of Ibn Ghiyāth; see above, n472. I have not
found this reading in rabbinic literature; see above, n551.
579
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:14; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335.
575
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“deducing conclusions from premises, developing implications of statements, comparing
dicta, and understanding the middot by which the Torah is interpreted.”580
The relationship between qiyās and the middot in Maimonides’ writings is not
entirely clear. In many places, Maimonides connected qiyās with the middot, but qiyās
often has broader denotation.581 As Aviram Ravitsky noted, Maimonides compared legal
qiyās to dialectical syllogisms (al-maqāyīs al-jadalīya), and he contrasted these with
demonstrative syllogisms. Dialectical syllogisms are based on one or more mere
conventions (mashhūrāt) and therefore subject to disagreement, but demonstrative
syllogisms are based on perceptions, primary intellegibles, and experience. Conclusions
from these syllogisms are apodictic (burhān).582 Disagreements in rabbinic literature are
to be expected, according to Maimonides, because rabbinic derivations are akin to
dialectical syllogisms.583 Maimonides cited as a paradigmatic example a rabbinic debate

580
 ;יבין וישכיל אחרי' דבר מראשיתו ויוציא דבר מדבר וידמה דבר לדבר ויבין במדות שהתורה נדרשת בהןMaimonides,
Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 179 lines 42-43. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader,
65, with slight changes. Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 470-71; and Cohen, Opening the Gates
of Interpretation, 469. See also Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 489-500. Compare
Sherira Gaon’s definition of “talmud,” analyzed in Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 23-28.
581
See above, nn426-434.
582
Translations based on Israel Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic (Maḳālah fi-Ṣinʿat alManṭiḳ): The Original Arabic and Three Hebrew Translations,” PAAJR 8 (1937-1938): 47-48 (English
pagination). Treatment in Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 198-200; and Arthur Hyman,
“Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophistic Arguments in the Philosophy of Moses Maimonides,” in Moses
Maimonides and his Time, ed. Eric L. Ormsby (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1989), 42-51. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 250-51, 268-69. On
disagreements resulting from dialectical syllogisms, see Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophistic
Arguments,” 41-43, citing Guide, I:31, II:22. On mashhūrāt, see Israel Efros, “Maimonides’ Arabic
Treatise on Logic,” PAAJR 34 (1966): 22 (Hebrew pagination; chap. 8). For Aristotelian background, see
Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 202.
583
See Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
328. Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 203-205, 208n59; see also Arthur Hyman, “A Note on
Maimonides’ Classification of Law,” PAAJR 46 (1979-1980): 335-38. On al-Fārābi as the source for the
broad understanding of mashhūrāt, see Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 19 (English pagination);
Kraemer, “Maimonides’ Use of (Aristotelian) Dialectic,” 128n20; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim haHilkhatiyim,” 204n38.
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(mBer 8:4) about whether to clean the house and then wash one’s hands, or the reverse.
Asserting that Moses transmitted neither view, Maimonides labeled these and similar
debates as “branches of the branches of the branches” (furūʿ furūʿ al-furūʿ).584 Ravitsky
suggested that this debate is emblematic because it concerns, like dialectical syllogisms, a
matter of convention.585
One of Maimonides’ goals for his Commentary on the Mishnah was “the
clarification of the reasons that a position was adopted and the occurrence of
disagreement between the disputants.”586 One example, concerning cases of restitution, is
the rabbinic debate (mGiṭ 5:1) over the meaning of the repayment from “the best of his
field” (Ex. 22:4). Does “his” refer to the victim or to the offender? Maimonides classified
this verse as an instance of “ḍamīr,” a term from qurʾānic exegesis (where it is usually

Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:20; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339.
Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 207-208.
586
; ואט'האר אלעלל אלתי לאג'להא אתצ'ע ד'לך אלכלאם ואלעלל אלתי לאג'להא וקע אלאכ'תלאף בין אלמכ'תלפין
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:48; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 358. On the
passive meaning of eighth form verbs, see Joshua Blau, Diqduq ha-ʿAravit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-haBeinayim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961), §84. Compare Maimonides’ comment about the Talmud’s goals
when clarifying the Mishnah; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:34-35; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
349.
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termed iḍmar; lit., ellipsis) meaning “incomplete” or “requiring a supplemental
object,”587 and he often noted that other debates turn on similar questions.588
In short, Maimonides understood that the purpose of rabbinic qiyās was to
elucidate unclear statements and that many rabbinic disagreements had arisen while

Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:221 (mGiṭ 5:1). On iḍmar, see C.H.M.
Versteegh, Arabic Grammar and Qurʾanic Exegesis in Early Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 146-51; Kinga
Dévényi, “ʾIḍmar in the Maʿānī of al-Farrāʾ: A Grammatical Approach between Description and
Explanation,” in Approaches to Arabic Linguistics: Presented to Kees Versteegh on the Occasion of his
Sixtieth Birthday, eds. Everhard Ditters and Harald Motzki (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 45-65; and Michael C.
Carter and Kees Versteegh, “ʾIḍmār,” in Encyclopedia of Arabic Linguistics, ed. Kees Versteegh (Leiden:
Brill, 2006), 2:300-302. For similar uses of the term ḍamīr, see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:415
(mʿOrl 3:9), 5:50 (mZev 5:8), 5:85 (mZev 13:3), 6:275 (mOhal 7:2), 6:359 (mNeg 5:4); idem, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240 (Neg. 131), 279 (Neg. 199); idem, Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Munk and Joel, 32 (I:21),
326 (III:13); and below, n668. For one use in Saʿadya, see Meira Polliack and Marzena Zawanowska,
“‘God Would not Give the Land, but to the Obedient’: Medieval Karaite Responses to the Curse of Canaan
(Genesis 9:25),” in The Gift of the Land and the Fate of the Canaanites in Jewish Thought, eds. Katell
Berthelot et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 141n20. See also the references in Cohen,
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 541.
Compare Maimonides’ use of taqdīr (“restoring lost elements”) to translate the talmudic phrase
ḥasorei miḥasra; see Ḥanokh Gamliel, “‘Ḥasorei Miḥasra’ – le-Darkho shel ha-Rambam be-Feirush haMishnah,” Neṭuʿim 8 (2002): 65-72. On taqdīr in Maimonides’ writings, see also Hadassa Shy, “Targumo
shel ha-Rav Yosef Kafiḥ le-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” in Sefer Zikaron le-Rav Yosef ben David
Kafiḥ, 148-54; idem, “Taqdīr and its Counterparts in Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic,” in Genizah Research after
Ninety Years, 149-50, 153; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 399-400, 401n48
588
A similar disagreement arose concerning the requirement that “the congregation” (Lev. 4:10)
offer a sin following communal transgression. Does “congregation” mean each tribe, the High Court, or
both (mHor 1:6)? Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:475 (mHor 1:6). This type of
explanation recurs in several other passages. Preliminary examination has uncovered: idem, Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:18 (mBQ 3:9), 5:265 (mBek 7:6), 6:572 (mMiq 8:4); see also 5:353 (mKer 2:3). One
fascinating example appears in a non-halakhic context. The Mishnah (mʿEd 8:7) records four views about
Elijah’s role in the eschaton. R. Joshua states, “I received from Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who heard
from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, as a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai” that Elijah will
distance those drawn close through violence and draw close those who were distanced by violence.
Translation follows Herbert Danby, The Mishnah: Translated from the Hebrew, with Introduction and Brief
Explanatory Notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), 436, with slight changes. R. Judah states that
Elijah will bring close the distant; R. Simeon that he will remove disagreement; and the Sages that he will
make peace. The phrase halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai presented a problem for Maimonides because he
denied the possibility of debate about such dicta. He explained that the disputants did not hear this language
(naṣṣ) from Moses, but simply that God will gather “outcasts at the ends of the world” (Deut. 30:4) and that
Elijah will remove iniquities. The rabbis only disagreed about which iniquities Elijah will eradicate;
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:336-37 (mʿEd 8:7). Heschel, Torah min ha-Shamayim,
2:232, called attention to this passage; see also Shlomi Adler, “Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai,” Maʿaliyot 25
(2005): 324-25. Compare the claim that debate only arises if there is no transmission (riwāya); Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:19; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339.
587
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interpreting ambiguous texts. This claim parallels the thesis set forth by Ibn Rushd (b.
Cordoba, d. Marrākush; 1126-98) in the Introduction to his Bidāyat al-Mujtahid. Ibn
Rushd explained that legal disagreements arose due to lexical ambiguity in revealed
texts,589 and he attempted in this book to demonstrate this claim for every recorded
disagreement among the jurists.590 As Ibn Rushd wrote the Bidāya between the late 1160s
and 1188,591 this text could not have influenced the Commentary, which Maimonides
completed in 1167/8.592 Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that the elements of
Almohad thought that shaped the perspective of Ibn Rushd did not also affect
Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah.593

589

Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid (Beirut: Dar
al-Maʿrifa, 1982), 1:3-4; see the translation of this passage in Yasin Dutton, “The Introduction to Ibn
Rushd’s ‘Bidāyat al-Mujtahid’,” Islamic Law and Society 1, no. 2 (1994): 200.
590
Robert Brunschvig, “Averroès Juriste,” in Etudes d’orientalisme dédiées à la mémoire de LéviProvençal, ed. Emilio García Gómez (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1962), 1:36-37; and Dutton,
“The Introduction to Ibn Rushd’s ‘Bidāyat al-Mujtahid’,” 191-92.
591
Brunschvig, “Averroès Juriste,” 37; Maribel Fierro, “The Legal Policies of the Almohad
Caliphs and Ibn Rushd’s Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid,” Journal of Islamic Studies 10, no. 3 (1999): 242, 244; and
Dutton, “The Introduction to Ibn Rushd,” 191.
592
Davidson, Maimonides, 147. See however Simon Hopkins, Peirush ha-Rambam le-Masekhet
Shabbat: Ṭiyuṭat ha-Peirush le-fi Qeṭaʿim Oṭografiyim me-Genizat Qahir (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2001),
xix n37. Of course, Maimonides continued to edit the Commentary throughout his life.
593
Fierro, “The Legal Policies of the Almohad Caliphs,” 245; idem, “Proto-Malikis, Malikis, and
Reformed Malikis in al-Andalus,” in The Islamic School of Law, 74; Anna Akasoy, Philosophie und Mystik
in der späten Almohadenzeit: die Sizilianischen Fragen des Ibn Sabʿīn (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 163-64; idem,
“Ibn Sabʿīn’s Sicilian Questions: The Text, Its Sources, And Their Historical Context,” Al-Qanṭara 29, no.
1 (2008): 141-42. See also the discussion of qiyās in the Bidāya in Abdel Magid Turki, “La Place
d’Averroès juriste dans 1'histoire du mālikisme et de 1'Espagne musulmane,” in Multiples Averroès: Actes
du Colloque Internationale organize à l’occasion du 850e anniversaire de la naissance d’Averroès, Paris
20-23 septembre 1976, ed. J. Jolivet (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), 37-39. Comparisons of the Bidāya
and the Mishneh Torah include David Gonzalo Maeso, “Averroes (1126-1198) y Maimonides (1135-1204),
dos glorias de Cordoba (Paralelo),” Miscelanea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos 16, seccion hebreo (1967):
153-54; Noah Feldman, “War and Reason in Maimonides & Averroes,” Journal of Islamic Law and
Culture 9, no. 1 (2004): 65-86; and Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World, 68. On these and other grounds,
the Commentary may be a better comparison. See also Libson, “Zikat ha-Rambam la-Halakhah haMuslemit,” 1:264-67; Anna Akasoy, “Ibn Sabʿīn, Maimónides y la emigración andalusí,” in Maimónides y
el pensamiento medieval: VIII Centenario de la muerte de Maimónides 9, 10 y 11 de diciembre de 2004,
ed. José Luis Cantón Alonso (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2007), 118-19; and compare Domnique
Urvoy, “La pensée d’Ibn Tūmart,” Bulletin d’études orientales 27 (1974): 33-37.
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Maimonides rejected the geonic-era claim that disputes in rabbinic literature arose
due to lackadaisical students of Shammai and Hillel, writing that this assertion served to
“besmirch the individuals who transmitted (ḥamalat) the law (al-sharīʿa).”594 Rereading
the talmudic prooftext (bSan 88b) favored by the geonim, Maimonides claimed that
Shammai and Hillel had very few disagreements, because they shared many principles
(uṣūl) and their qiyās, reasoning, led to similar results. Their students argued more,
however, because they were weaker in the discipline of qiyās. For Maimonides, such
debates were not indicative of spiritual crisis. This perspective is a leitmotif of the
Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah.595
Maimonides’ distinction between revealed law and manmade law underlies his
interpretation of the biblical prohibition against adding to, or subtracting from, the law
(Deut. 4:2, 13:11), as Blidstein noted. While the Talmud and geonim understood this
verse as prohibiting any change to revelation, Maimonides understood it differently: legal
innovations that are not based in prophecy, he claimed, do not violate this prohibition.596

For comparisons of Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah and al-Fārābi’s claims about the
development of religious law, see Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 218-22.
594
 וטאען פי אלאשכ'אץ אלד'ין חמלת ענהם אלשריעה...  ;מן קביח אלקולMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush,
ed. Kafiḥ, 1:20; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339. On the geonic position, see above, nn286, 288.
595
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:20-21; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,
339. See Moshe Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret,” 2:327; Twersky, “Maimonides and Eretz
Yisrael,” 267-68n21; Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 171; idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 14;
idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 38; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 25-26; Halbertal, “Sefer haMiṣvot le-Rambam,” 474; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 267-71.
596
See especially Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 65-66 lines 509-520. Blidstein,
“Oral Law as Institution,” 169; idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 13; idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 159-62.
See also Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 477.
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Maimonides’ Presentation in Sefer ha-Miṣvot
Though the first two Principles in Maimonides’ Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot
explicitly draw on the Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, the later work’s
concise formulation made it the focal point of subsequent debates.597 Principles One and
Two argue that non-Mosaic laws cannot constitute distinct commandments. Principle
One focuses on post-Sinaitic enactments, such as Purim, Hanukah, and the festive Psalms
recited liturgically on holidays (hallel). Principle Two disentangles midrashim that
contain tafsīr marwī, i.e., a transmitted interpretation, from those midrashim that create
new law.
The overlapping categories of biblical law and enumerated commandments are
central to this discussion. Sefer ha-Miṣvot often cites the term (mi)de-orayta (Aramaic for
“from the Torah”) in rabbinic literature to identify laws that constitute distinct
commandments. In Principle Two, Maimonides claimed that if the Talmud labels a law
“de-orayta,” then it is a distinct commandment.598 The same is often true of the phrase
“min ha-torah” (Hebrew for “from the Torah”),599 and he often contrasted min ha-torah
with rabbinic law.600 The opening Principles likewise distinguish between laws that are

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two). Ḥananya ben Menaḥem Qazes’
conjectured that Naḥmanides was unaware of this Introduction because it had not yet been translated; Qinat
Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 57 (Prin. Two); compare the critique of Solomon
Luria, there, 77 (Prin. Two). On early use of the Commentary, see Kalman Kahana, “Peirush ha-Mishnah
shel ha-Rambam be-Khtav yado?” Ha-Maʿayan 26, no. 1 (1986): 55-56; no. 2: 58; Yaʿaqov Ḥayim Sofer,
“ʿAl Sefarim ve-Sofrim,” Ṣefunot 2, no. 3 (1990): 77-80; and Yaʿaqov Shmuel Spiegel, “Ha-Im Raʾu haRashba veha-Rav ha-Magid u-vaʿal Hagahot Maymoniyot et Peirush ha-Mishnayot le-Rambam?” Ṣefunot
3, no. 1 (1991): 82-84; compare above, n422.
598
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13, 15 (Prin. Two).
599
E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 68 (Pos. 19), 162 (Pos. 203).
600
This is explicit in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 87 (Pos. 56), 243 (Neg. 135), and
implicit eleswhere, e.g., 121 (Pos. 122), 125 (Pos. 130), 276 (Neg. 193). Note that the signs of kosher birds
are not mentioned min ha-torah but are “inferred through induction” (ḥuṣṣilat bil-istiqraʾ) from non-kosher
597
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(mi)de-rabbanan (Aramaic for “[from] the rabbis”) or (mi-)divrei sofrim (Hebrew for
“[from] the words of the scribes”), on the one hand, and biblical law and enumerated
commandments, on the other.601 In the enumeration itself, Maimonides cited rabbinic use
of the terms de-orayta or min ha-torah to indicate that a given law constitutes a distinct
commandment; however in all but three cases, those laws are based on what he termed
“clear” verses (see below; on the problem of combining discrete laws into larger
“commandment-units,” see Chapter Four).602

birds; there, 133-34. As far as I can tell, Maimonides never used the word istiqraʾ to classify post-Mosaic
legal derivations. It appears to be a term borrowed from formal logic for this type of intellectual activity.
He used an identical phrase (ḥuṣṣil bi-ʾistiqrʾi) to describe the identification of the signs of kosher fish;
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:614 (mNid 6:10). See Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 9n6; and
Joshua ben Abraham ha-Nagid, Teshuvot R. Yehoshua ha-Nagid: al-Masāʾil, ed. and trans. Yehuda
Raṣhabi (Jerusalem: Mekhon Moshe, 1989), 109. In chap. 6 of the Treatise on Logic, he termed “induction”
istiqraʾ. Compare Levinger’s claim that according to Maimonides, laws deduced from biblical laws are
biblical; Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 38-39. This example seems more germane than the one
adduced by Levinger.
601
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8-14 passim (Prin. One and Two). For the
enumeration, see there, 79 (Pos. 37), 240 (Neg. 131), 243 (Neg. 135). For (mi)de-rabbanan as rabbinic
laws, see there, e.g., 100 (Pos. 78), 243 (Neg. 135), 290 (Neg. 230).
602
Two of these are likely among the “three [or] four” exceptions to Principle Two that
Maimonides mentioned in his letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan (discussed at length below): the prohibitions
against an uncircumcised priest consuming heave offerings (terumah) and against consuming wine used in
idolatrous practices (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 242 [Neg. 135], 276 [Neg. 194]). The third example of
a de-orayta law that is not based on an explicit verse is the obligation to mourn for one’s relatives, included
in the commandment obligating priests to render themselves impure through involvement with the corpse
of a deceased relative:  פקד באן אן אלתזאם אלאבילות דאוריתא ואנה מצות עשה לכן ביום... אבילות יום ראשון דאוריתא
 ;הראשון פקטSefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 79 (Pos 37). Compare Hilkhot Aveil, 1:1; see there, chaps. 1-2,
where these prohibitions are closely intertwined. See Moritz Peritz, “Das Buch der Gesetze, nach seiner
Anlage und seinem Inhalte untersuchht,” in Moses ben Maimon, 1:456n3; Friedberg, Crafting the 613
Commandments, 123-25 (showing that Maimonides struggled with the source of the obligation to mourn in
his later writings); Lawrence Kaplan, “The Unity of Maimonides’ Religious Thought: The Laws of
Mourning as a Case Study,” in Judaism and Modernity: The Religious Philosophy of David Hartman, ed.
Jonathan W. Malino (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 393-412. Compare Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed.
Kafiḥ, 5:27 (mZev 2:1).
In my view, Maimonides used the phrases min ha-torah and din torah to mean both “distinct,
enumerated commandment” and “law of biblical status” in his letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan; Igrot, ed. Shailat,
2:453-54. I hope to expand on this elsewhere.
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Principle One: To Exclude Rabbinic Commandments from the
Enumeration
The opening summary of Principle One reads: “It is inappropriate to enumerate in
this grouping (jumla) the miṣvot that are rabbinic (mide-rabbanan).”603 Maimonides
directed this Principle against earlier enumerators of the commandments, who, he
reported, had caused him “pains” (ālām) in his youth.604 Though laws that Maimonides
deemed rabbinic appear in all earlier enumerations,605 it may be possible to identify his
specific target. It was probably not Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ, whom Maimonides praised for
counting only a few rabbinic laws.606 Rather, the focus of Maimonides’ criticism was
probably Saʿadya Gaon. As Moshe Zucker demonstrated, Principle One’s attack on the
claim that Moses prophesied about Hanukah quotes from Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ.607
Indeed, later in this Principle, Maimonides asserted that the inclusion of rabbinic laws in
the count of 613 is unacceptable, “no matter who said it.”608 Given the standing of
Saʿadya in Maimonides’ world,609 Maimonides may well have been reticent to name the

603

 ;אנה לא ינבגי אן תעד פי הד'ה אלג'מלה אלמצות אלתי הי מדרבנןMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ,
8, 9 (Prin. One). The categorization of rabbinic laws as miṣvot is unusual; this term usually denotes biblical
commandments in Sefer ha-Miṣvot (but not necessarily in the Mishneh Torah); see below, n952. Compare
the discussion of miṣvot “instituted” (nitḥadshu) after revelation; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al.,
65 lines 505-506; see the full discussion, lines 509-513; and there, 73 line 133.
604
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 4, 5 (introduction). See above, n95.
605
See above, nn189-193.
606
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 5 (introduction). Judah Ibn Bilʿam’s commentary on
Deut. 30:2-6 may have been Maimonides’ source for knowledge of the otherwise lost part of this work; see
above, n197.
607
Zucker, “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 97-98. On Maimonides’ access to Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ,
see below, n631.
608
 ;קאלה מן קאלהMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two).
609
See the Andalusian praise for Saʿadya in Malter, Saadia Gaon, 277-79. On Saʿadya’s influence
on Maimonides, see Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides,” 98-99, 101; Robert Brody,
“Hashpaʿat Ḥiburei ha-Halakhah shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal Mishneh Torah shel ha-Rambam,” in HaRambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 1:211-22; Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation,
22-23, 33-34; and idem, “Maimonides’ Disagreement with ‘The Torah’ in his Interpretation of Job,” Zutot
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offending enumerator. (He was similarly coy when he dismissed Saʿadya’s claims about
the origin of the calendar.610)
Noting that earlier enumerators were inconsistent in their inclusion of rabbinic
laws, Maimonides suggested that they had been confused by the Talmud’s discussion
(bSab 23a) of the benedictory formula in which God is said to have commanded the
performance of rabbinically-ordained rituals. Maimonides acknowledged that the rabbis
understood Deut. 17:11, “In accordance with the instruction given you,” as a passage
demanding obedience to all decrees of the High Court. Still, he argued, if every rabbinic
ordinance were included in the count, the sum would far exceed 613. Thus, he reasoned,
the enumeration must only include biblical nuṣūṣ (texts or verses). In setting forth this
position, Maimonides ignored the Saʿadyanic claim – that he had just quoted! – that the
commandment to observe Hanukah was revealed by God to Moses.611
Maimonides declared that laws created after the time of Moses were to be
regarded as being of rabbinic status. This, he noted, is why the Talmud describes as
“rabbinic” and “from the words/matters of the Scribes” laws instituted by King Solomon
(see bSab 14b; bSab 34a; bʿEiruv 5b; mYad 3:2). On these grounds, he faulted earlier
enumerators for counting laws established by post-Mosaic prophets, such as clothing the
naked (claiming that their source was Isa. 58:7; “When you see the naked, clothe him”).

4, no. 1 (2004): 75-78; see also Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 28-30. Note
Maimonides’ praise for Saʿadya in his Epistle to Yemen, in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:100.
610
See above, n121.
611
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10, 12 (Prin. One). On this last claim, see Cohen,
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 287, 291-92, 306, 432. This rhetoric is typical; the Principles often
manipulate geonic-era texts. Compare Maimonides’ presentation of this blessing in Hilkhot Berakhot, 6:2,
11:3; see also Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 34n1.
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Laws of this sort, wrote Maimonides, are “subsumed under” (dākhil taḥta) the
pentateuchal charge to provide for the poor (Deut. 15:8).612
Maimonides also identified pentateuchal sources for other post-Mosaic, scriptural
commandments, such as Ezek. 44:20, which forbids a priest to enter the Temple with
unkempt hair. Both the Commentary on the Mishnah and Sefer ha-Miṣvot consider this
prohibition subsidiary to the command that Aaron’s sons not mourn for their brothers
(Lev. 10:6). In the latter work, Maimonides wrote that Ezek. 44:20 “clarified” (bayyana)
the meaning of Lev. 10:6 (rosheikhem al tifraʿu; NJPS offers “do not bare your heads”
and “do not dishevel your hair”).613 Maimonides also appears to have sought a

612
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10-11 (Prin. One). He emphasized that reading the
Book of Esther is not de-orayta, perhaps because it is based on Est. 9:28 (see bMeg 2b). He added that it is
as if “for them, the Talmud was compiled ‘In a stammering jargon and an alien tongue’ (Isa. 28:11)” ( נץ
)אלתלמוד ענד האולא מולפא בלעגי שפה ובלשון אחרת. In the Principles, dākhil taḥta denotes rabbinic law (see there,
10, 11, 14), but biblical law in the enumeration (210, 286, 337; see 285-86n47). The Commentary does not
use this phrase consistently to denote one type of law. On some of the challenges with Maimonides’
analysis of Deut. 15:8 and his criticism of laws “subsumed under” this verse that appear in earlier
enumerations, see Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 297-98n41. On geonic-era understandings
of laws found in the Prophets, see above, nn198-202.
613
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:195 (mSan 9:6); idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 256 (Neg. 163). He was noncommittal, however, in the Mishneh Torah, initially citing Ezek. 44:20,
but then equating this prohibition with the prohibition of serving with torn clothing, as both appear in Lev.
10:6 (eḥad hu; Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 1:8, 1:14); note the parallel statement in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 257 (Neg. 164): חכם פרועי ראש וקרועי בגדים ואחד. In addition to the standard commentaries; see
Bacharach, Ḥavat Yair, 181a (§192, no. 48); Jacob Ettlinger, ʿArukh la-Ner Masekhet Sanhedrin
(Jerusalem, 1931), 68b, s.v. u-faruʿei rosh (bSan 83b); Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 2:491-93, 3:171;
and Isaac Simḥah Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Miṣvot ʿim Peirush Yad ha-Levi (Jerusalem, 1926), 225a §3. Others
struggled with the relationship of Lev. 10:6 and Ezek. 44:20; see the sources in Maimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Heller, 137-38n25. Add the view of Rabad cited in Naḥmanides, Kitvei Rabbeinu Moshe ben
Naḥman, ed. Charles Ber Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1963), 2:214 (Torat ha-Adam). The
talmudic claim that these laws were transmitted orally from Moses to Ezekiel may have been compatible
with Maimonides’ system, but he seems to have preferred Mosaic verses. Isaac Leon ben Eliezer ibn Ṣur
Sefardi argued that Maimonides understood the Talmud’s claims, literally; Megillat Esther, in Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 92 (Prin. Two).
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pentateuchal source for the prohibition, found in Ezek. 44:9, against an uncircumcised
priest from serving in the Temple.614
Maimonides’ claims about rabbinic law influenced a ruling that he sent to the
students of R. Ephraim of Tyre (d. before 1177).615 Ephraim (or his students) had
inquired if a nazirite, who must abstain from wine (Num. 6:3), may drink wine for the
sanctification of the Sabbath. Maimonides forbade this because the nazirite’s vow not to
drink wine was biblical in origin, while the obligation to consecrate the Sabbath over
wine is (merely) of rabbinic status.616 He explained, in a second responsum, that the
mishnaic statement that Jews were “adjured from (the time of) Mount Sinai” (mShev 3:6)

614

The Mishneh Torah indicates that the prohibition forbidding an uncircumcised priest from
serving in the Temple has biblical force (see Hilkhot Sanhedrin 19:4, no. 31; Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash,
6:8; 9:15, no. 4; Hilkhot Ḥagigah, 2:1; Hilkhot Maʿaser Sheini ve-Netaʿ Ravʿai, 3:4; this law is absent from
Sefer ha-Miṣvot). In the Commentary, Maimonides cited Ezek. 44:9 to show that an uncircumcised priest
has the status (mazila) of an alien (ben nekhar) for the purpose of Temple service; Mishnah ʿim Peirush,
ed. Kafiḥ, 5:29 (mZev 2:1). This comparison appears in the Mishneh Torah, where Maimonides added that
one who violates this prohibition incurs lashes, “like a non-priest (zar) who serves” in the Temple (Hilkhot
Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 6:8; based on Num. 1:51 etc.). However, the latter prohibition is a distinct
commandment and a capital crime, but the prohibition of an uncircumcised priest serving in the Temple is
neither. The role that Ezek. 44:9 played is unclear; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 220 (Neg.
74); and Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 9:1. In addition to the standard commentaries; see David ibn Abi
Zimra, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz (Jerusalem, 1882), 5:30 (§56 [§1459]); Bacharach, Ḥavat Yair,
180b, 181a (§192, nos. 33, 49); Judah ben Manoaḥ Sayid, Ner Miṣvah (Salonika, 1810), 69a-69b; Ettlinger,
ʿArukh la-Ner Masekhet Sanhedrin, 69a, s.v. be-Rashi d"h lo yavo (bSan 84a); Joseph ben Moses Babad,
Sefer ha-Ḥinukh: ʿim beiʾur Minḥat Ḥinukh (Jerusalem: Mekhon Yeruahalayim, 1988-1991), 2:105-106;
Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 2:425; Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 18n28; and Henshke, “LeYesodei,” 123n61.
615
Very little is known about Ephraim. His community appears in Benjamin of Tudela, The
Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela, Critical Text, Translation and Commentary, ed. and trans. Marcus Nathan
Adler (London: H. Frowde, 1907), 18 (English), 20 (Hebrew). Scholars have debated if Ephraim was from
Fusṭāṭ or southern France; see Avigdor Aptowitzer, Mavo le-Sefer Ravyah (Jerusalem: Sifrei Yahadut,
1984), 325; Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fātimid Caliphs (New York: Ktav,
1970), 2:325n7; Joshua Prawer, The History of the Jews in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988), 52-54; Kraemer, Maimonides, 134-35; Yosef ben Yiṣḥak Sambari, Sefer
Divrei Yosef, ed. Shimon Shtober (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1994), 218n366; Maimonides, Igrot, ed.
Shailat, 1:90-92, 1:195, 1:203; and Abraham David, “Teshuvah Ḥadashah shel ha-Rambam el R. Ephraim
ha-Dayan mi-Ṣur,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 14-15 (1988-1989): 107-111. On the exchange with
Ephraim and his students, see Davidson, Maimonides, 204.
616
Text appears in David, “Teshuvah Ḥadashah shel ha-Rambam,” 111-12.
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to observe the law, applies only to biblical law.617 Accordingly, the nazirite’s vow, which
is of biblical status, overrides the requirement to consume rabbinically-ordained wine for
the consecration of the Sabbath.618

Principle Two: To Exclude (Most) Derived Laws from the Enumeration
Principle Two relies heavily upon Maimonides’ Introduction to the Commentary
on the Mishnah in declaring that the enumeration of the 613 commandments excludes
most laws that are not explicit in the Pentateuch. Because this claim depends on
assumptions that flout centuries of Rabbanite thought, and according to many of
Maimonides’ critics, even the Talmud itself, the interpretation of Principle Two has been
the subject of robust debate since the thirteenth century.
While other Principles in Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s Introduction address entire categories
of law, Principle Two opens with the statement: “Not everything known through one of
the thirteen middot (hermeneutical rules) by which the Torah is interpreted, or by a
redundancy (ribbuy), is appropriate to count.”619 This formulation implies that some laws
known through the middot do constitute distinct commandments. Invoking the
Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides wrote that most laws that

617

On this concept, see Tzvi Novick, What is Good, and What God Demands: Normative
Structures in Tannaitic Literature (Leiden: Brill 2010), 83-85.
618
Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:212-16 (§120). As far as I can tell, Allegri was the first to
note the importance of this responsum; see Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 3840 (Prin. One). See also Isaac Bekhor David, Divrei Emet, 81b-82b; and Kassierer and Glicksberg, MiSinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 120-22. In setting forth this argument, Maimonides deviated from a ruling of Ibn
Migash, who wrote that the biblical command to follow the High Court (Deut. 17:11) dictates that no oath
can preclude the observance of rabbinic laws; Meir ha-Levi Ibn Migash, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot, 23b (§148).
619
 ; אן ליס כל מא יתעלם באחדי שלש עשרה מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן או ברבוי ינבגו עדדהMaimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8, 12 (Prin. Two). Translation follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 288,
with changes.
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are derived from the middot are often, though not always, subject to debate.620 Thus,
nothing about a law’s origin can be discerned from the presence of debate or from its
linkage to the middot. Maimonides explained that many disagreements among the rabbis
concern the precise scriptural passage that supports the tafsīr marwī (transmitted
interpretation); he termed this “istidlāl,” adducing a proof, through the middot.
Maimonides asserted that a non-explicit law is assumed to be rabbinic unless “the
transmitters” (al-rāwīn) testify that it is “de-orayta” (biblical) or “guf torah” (essence of
the Torah).621 Principle Two thus, primarily, identifies exceptions to Principle One’s
assertion, that the enumeration consists entirely of Pentateuchal verses (al-jumla hiya
kulliha nuṣūṣ torah).622
Charging earlier enumerators with having misunderstood the conclusions outlined
in Principle Two,623 Maimonides wrote: “Even worse” (ashadd) than counting middotbased laws, they counted commandments derived from rabbinic derashot, violating the

On this statement, see Blidstein, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 17.
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12-13 (Prin. Two). It is not entirely clear if these laws
constitute distinct commandments; I am inclined to think that they do. The term guf torah appears most
prominently in mḤag 1:8; my translation follows Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, 85. For background, see
there, 85-87; Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-Feshutah: beiʾur Arokh la-Tosefta (New York: Beit ha-Midrash
le-Rabbanim sheba-America, 1955-1973), 3:470; David Weiss Halivni, Meqorot u-Mesorot: Beiʾurim baTalmud (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1968-), 2:591-93; and Michal Bar-Asher, “Mountains Hanging by a Strand? ReReading Mishnah Hagiga 1:8,” Journal of Ancient Judaism 4, no. 2 (2013): 239-40. On the Arabic terms
here, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 271-72, 276, 289-90. On the term de-orayta in the
Talmud, see Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 30 (Prin. Two); Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 7n8; ibn Ṣur Sefardi, Megillat Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman,
52 (Prin. Two); Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, there, 52-54 (Prin. Two); Henshke, “Le-Havḥanat ha-Rambam,”
208-210; and Gruber, “The Meaning of אורייתא.”
622
 ;הד'ה אלג'מלה הי כלהא נצוץ תורה ליס פיהא שי מדרבנןMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12
(Prin. One). Compare Maimonides’ statements that he would establish the enumeration based on the verses
(nuṣūṣ) of the Torah and the sages’ statements in explaining it ( ואסתדל עלי ד'לך בנצוץ אלתורה ובאקאויל אלחכמים
)פי תפסירהא, and that the commandments are all included in the Torah itself ( ג'מלהֿ אלמצות אלתי ישתמל עליהא
 ;)ספר התורה אלתי שרענא אללה בהא הי שש מאות ושלש עשרה מצותibid, 6, 7 (introduction.)
623
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two).
620
621
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rule (bSab 63a etc.) “a verse does not leave the realm of its peshaṭ.”624 In so doing, he
claimed, these enumerators failed to acknowledge that these readings are actually
“commentary” (sharḥ) or “inference” (istidlāl), and, thus, cannot constitute distinct
commandments. According to Maimonides, a talmudic passage (bBQ 100a) that glosses
each phrase in Ex. 18:20 as a distinct act625 misled his predecessors, causing them to
enumerate, as distinct commandments, the requirements to visit the sick, bury the dead,
and comfort the bereaved (the last-mentioned is not included in the talmudic passage).
They failed to realize that all of these acts are “subsumed under” (dākhila taḥta) the
commandment of “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18).626
It may be possible to identify the enumerators criticized in Principle Two, for in
the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides chided the author of Halakhot Gedolot
– whose enumeration spawned many offshoots627 – for counting as distinct
commandments the acts of visiting the sick and comforting the bereaved.628 Principle
Two also decried the identification of calendrical intercalation (ḥishuv tequfot) as a

624
On the term derashot, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 8-9, 99n39, 276-80,
310-11; and James A. Diamond, “The Use of Midrash in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed: Decoding
the Duality of the Text,” AJS Review 21, no. 1 (1996): 59-60.
625
“Make known to them the way they are to go in and the practices they are to follow.” The
talmudic glosses read: The way – this is deeds of loving-kindness; they are to go – this is visiting the sick;
in – this is burying the dead; the practices – these are the laws (ha-dinim); they are to follow – this is
exceeding the letter of the law (lifnim mi-shurat ha-din; את הדרך זו גמילות חסדים ילכו זה בקור חולים בה זו קבירת
 ;)מתים ואת המעשה אלו הדינין אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדיןtext follows Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ,
14 (Prin. Two), which differs slightly from the printed text. See idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 8n15.
626
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 14-15 (Prin. Two). See Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 299-300; and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 297-98n41. On dākhila taḥta,
see above n612. He added that many derived laws are “appended to” (muḍāfa ilā) larger commandments.
This phrase is rare in Sefer ha-Miṣvot; see below, nn1006, 1056, 1068.
627
See above, n55.
628
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 5 (introduction). He praised Ḥefeṣ for omitting these
laws.
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distinct commandment. According to Maimonides, the source for this claim was a
rabbinic gloss on Deut. 4:6, “It will be proof of your wisdom and discernment to other
peoples.” According to the Talmud (bSab 75a), the admiration of the nations is elicited
by Israel’s system of intercalation.629 This passage, argued Maimonides, hardly supports
the identification of calendrical intercalation as a distinct commandment.630 Since
Naḥmanides, commentators have assumed that the target of Maimonides’ critique was the
count in Halakhot Gedolot, but Kafiḥ suggested that the target was actually Saʿadya.631
Anticipating criticism of Principle Two, Maimonides speculated that a reader
might charge him with believing that derived laws are, by nature, “uncertain” (ghayr
mutayaqqina), or that they are either “true” (or: authentic; ṣaḥīḥ) or “untrue.” Such a
criticism would be incorrect, he countered, for laws of this category are actually branches
(furūʿ) from the 613 roots (uṣūl). This claim is reminiscent of one made in his
Commentary, that each generation extracted furūʿ from earlier uṣūl.632 He concluded by

The Talmud asks, “How do we know that it is a miṣvah for an individual to calculate the cycles
and planetary courses?” ()מנין שמצוה על האדם לחשב תקופות ומזלות. This text appears in all manuscripts on the
Lieberman database, but Baḥya had “obligated” (ḥayav) instead of miṣvah; Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ,
100 (2:3).
630
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9 (Prin. One), 14 (Prin. Two).
631
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 14n10. Maimonides’ shift from the plural to the
singular may indicate a specific target ( ;)ולו אנה עד מא הו אבין מן הד'א ויוהם אנה ינבגי אן יעד או אכת'רSefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two). Kafiḥ’s translation does not note this shift; Ibn Tibbon’s does. See
however, Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:466-67. Sabbato, “Ha-Im hekir ha-Rambam,” claimed that
Maimonides did not have access to Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ. Zucker “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 97-98, and
Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah,” 420-21, suggest otherwise. Maimonides
interpreted Deut. 4:6 as a reference to the general wisdom of the Torah; see Twersky, Introduction to the
Code of Maimonides, 385-86; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 180. Twersky (386n78)
noted that Abraham Maimonides repeated this reading. Add now Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq,
ed. Dana, 152.
632
Compare the similar statement in Maimonides’ Treatise on Resurrection; in Igrot, ed. Shailat,
1:320-21; see Stroumsa, “Ha-Im haya ha-Rambam Hogeh Muwaḥidi,” 157n27; and Cohen, Opening the
Gates of Interpretation, 246n12. On furūʿ, see Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 20n6; and Ravitsky, “HaRambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 212-13. This imagery is important in another way: labeling the opening Principles
uṣūl implies that the 613 commandments are furūʿ of these Principles; compare below, n944. Halbertal
629
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stating that only the tafsīr marwī, “known through tradition (naql) and not qiyās,” i.e., not
through human derivations, may create distinct commandments. Rabbinic linkage of the
tafsīr marwī to Scripture through qiyās or istidlāl simply makes manifest the “wisdom of
Scripture.”633 In order to prove that post-Mosaic derivations cannot be enumerated,
Maimonides cited an aggadic passage (bTem 16a) claiming that Israel forgot seventeen
hundred a fortiori arguments (qalin ve-ḥamurin), analogies from verbal congruity
(gezeirot shavot), and scribal specifications (diqduqei sofrim) after the death of Moses.
He reasoned that if this volume of learning was lost, the total number of derived laws
clearly exceeded 613; the need for consistency would have required that either all these
laws, or none of them, be counted as commandments. Therefore, he insisted, no derived
law may constitute a distinct commandment.634

Applying Principle Two to the Enumeration of the Commandments
Principle Two does not address one important question: If a middot-based law is
not included in the enumeration of the commandments, is its source something other than
tafsīr marwī? In other words, does Principle Two imply that any law omitted from the
enumeration is the product of post-Sinaitic exegesis? I believe that the answer is no. As I
read it, Principle Two only addresses distinct commandments that are created by tafsīr

linked this distinction to the process of interpretation; see “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 468-72; ʿAl
Derekh ha-Emet, 47-52; and Maimonides, 120-23. I believe that it has more to do with the scope of
revelation. See also Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 44-46; and note Cohen’s insight that
the Commentary does not explicitly state that only Scripture and transmitted interpretations produce
biblical law; Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 288.
633

ֿעלם באלנקל לא באלקיאס ואנמא ד'כר אלקיאס פיה ואלאסתדלאל עליה באחד שלש עשרה מדות לאט'האר חכמה
 ;אלנץMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two); see above, n544.
634

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two).
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marwī. Crucially, other laws of biblical status may be excluded from the enumeration
despite Maimonides’ belief that their origin is revealed tafsīr.
The centuries-long controversy over Principle Two was closely related to this
question. Spanish jurists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries adopted the view of
Naḥmanides,635 who bitterly dismissed Principle Two and concluded that laws identified
by midrash are biblical in status until proven otherwise.636 Declaring that the meaning of
Principle Two “was revealed” (nitgaleh) to him,637 Simeon ben Ṣemaḥ Duran (b.
Majorca, d. Algiers; 1361-1444) argued that Principle Two only addressed middot-based
laws that constitute distinct commandments. He further claimed that Principle Two uses

Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 29-33, 78-79; and see above, n381. Add the novellae
of R. Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli to bSuk 43a s.v. ve-iqka, which has Maimonides in mind. See also
Harris, How do We Know This, 92-93; and the comments of Menaḥem ha-Meiri treated in Henshke, “LeHavḥanat ha-Rambam,” 207-208.
636
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 34; full comments appear there, 29-51
(Prin. Two). For additional criticism of Principle Two, see there, 398-99, 400-401 (identified in Kassierer
and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 45n44). My formulation of Naḥmanides’ position
intentionally elides the question of whether Naḥmanides held that halakhic midrash creates or upholds law.
For early treatment of this problem, see Zecharias Frankel, Darkhei ha-Mishnah (Leipzig, 1859), 17; Isaac
Halevy, Dorot ha-Rishonim, 4:504-508; and Chaim Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-Halakhah (New York, 1949),
1:49-50. For treatment, see Harris, How do We Know This, 190-202 (on Frankel), 233-34 (on Halevy); and
Kassierer and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 46-47n47. More recently, see Neubauer, HaRambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 160-63; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 11; Meyer S. Feldblum,
Peirushim u-Meḥqarim ba-Talmud (New York: Yeshivah University Press, 1969), 5n9; Silman, “Torah
Elohit she-‘Lo Bashamayim Hi’,” 274-75; idem, Qol Gadol ve-lo Yasaf, 108-109; Blidstein, “Oral Law as
Institution,” 172-73; idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 21; idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 275-85; Halbertal,
“Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 471-74, 480; idem, People of the Book, 63-65, 84-85; idem, ʿAl Derekh haEmet, 59-62; idem, Maimonides, 120-26; Harris, How do We Know This, 90-91; Avi Sagi, “Models of
Authority and the Duty of Obedience in Halakhic Literature,” AJS Review 20, no. 1 (1995): 13-15; idem,
“Halakhic Praxis,” 320-21; idem, “Ha-Ṭeqst ha-Miqraʾi ha-Qanoni veha-Etgar ha-Hermenuti: ʿIyun Biqorti
be-ʿIqvot ha-Ramban,” Daʿat 50-52 (2003): 122-32; idem, “Baʿayat ha-Hakhraʿah ha-Hilkhatit veha-Emet
ha-Hilkhatit: li-Qrat Filosofyah shel ha-Halakhah,” Dine Israel 15 (1989-1990): 31-37; idem, Elu ve-Elu,
188-89, 209-210, 219-20; Feintuch, Sefer Piqudei Yesharim, 19-20; Elliot Wolfson, “By Way of Truth:
Aspects of Nahmanides’ Kabbalistic Hermeneutic,” AJS Review, 14, no. 2 (1989): 128; Michael Abraham,
“Indiqaṣiyah ve-Analogiyah be-Halakhah (ʿIyun be-Shoresh 2 shel ha-Rambam),” Ṣohar 15 (2003): 27-29;
and Kassierer and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 51, 92-93, 229-31. See there, 46-47, 51-52, 5859, 94-98, 140n268, 168-69, 192-94, for treatment of several of these views.
637
Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 13 (introductory pagination; Prin. Two).
635
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the terms “rabbinic” (mide-rabbanan) and “divrei sofrim” in a relative sense, because the
middot-based laws in question are “details” of larger commandments. Though excluded
from the count of 613, wrote Duran, such derived laws are actually biblical in status.638
Jacob Neubauer’s Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim shows that most subsequent jurists
accepted Duran’s approach.639 A group of early modern writers, chiefly Abraham Allegri
(Constantinople, 1560-1652), reconsidered Duran’s position.640 Following Naḥmanides,
these authors understood Principle Two to mean that all post-Sinaitic derivations are
rabbinic in status, a position that is widely accepted in academic treatments.641 Among
many challenges to Duran’s view, Neubauer noted that other Principles, and not Principle

Duran formulated this in a few places, see Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ha-Tashbeṣ (Jerusalem: Mekhon
Yerushalayim, 2007), 1:18-19 (§1), 1:326-28 (§151); and Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 10-13 (introductory pagination;
Prin. Two). He did not apply this approach to the prohibition not to eat a torn animal (ṭreifah), which seems
to be an outcome of Principle Two, but instead followed Naḥmanides on this issue; Teshuvot ha-Tashbeṣ,
1:153 (§67); idem, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 122 (Neg. §30); and Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed.
Chavel, 46-47 (Prin. Two). For treatment of Duran’s approach, see Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei
Sofrim, 32-33, 53 and above, n381.
639
Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 65 (Prin. Two), even
erroneously guessed that de-rabbanan and divrei sofrim are mistranslations from the Judeo-Arabic. This
claim is repeated in Malakhi ben Jacob ha-Kohen, Sefer Yad Malakhi (Livorno, 1767), 2:181b (kelalei haRambam, §22). See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 145n10; and Levinger, Darkhei haMaḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 38n21.
640
See Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 57-61 (Prin. Two);
and the influential comments of Jacob ben David Tam ibn Yaḥya, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot Ohalei Tam: miTokh Qoveṣ Tumat Yesharim (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ketav, 1999) 168-69 (§83); treated in Neubauer, HaRambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 47-48, 51-59, 81. In addition, see Isaac Bekhor David, Divrei Emet, 80a-85b,
not mentioned by Neubauer. Ibn Ṣur Sefardi also reconsidered some of Duran’s claims; see Megillat
Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 76 (Prin. Two).
641
Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 81-82; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah haHilkhatit, 38-43, 86; Harris, How do We Know This, 88-89; Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei Sofrim’,” 251; and Cohen,
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 264-70, 287-304. See also Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,”
113 (“all mizvot were interpreted at Sinai, but not all interpretation is Sinaitic”); idem, “Where Do We
Stand,” 13 (“midrash does not produce Torah-law …. It will produce rabbinic law, and it will confirm
revealed interpretation”); idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 14; and Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah,
30. For restatement of Duran’s approach, see Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 99, 102n20;
idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-53; and Ben-Menaḥem, “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 20-25.
638
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Two, address non-enumerated “details.”642 The thrust of the Commentary on the Mishnah
and the use of furūʿ in Sefer ha-Miṣvot both support this interpretation.
To my mind, the “radical” reading of Naḥmanides, Allegri, Neubauer, and others,
comes closest to explaining Maimonides’ understanding of rabbinic midrash.
Nevertheless, I believe that Duran and his supporters were correct when they noted that,
for Maimonides, numerous revealed laws did not count as distinct commandments, and
that Maimonides overwhelmingly emphasized scriptural sources, as opposed to extrascriptural Sinaitic traditions, as the basis for enumerated commandments.643

Non-Explicit and Non-Enumerated Laws of Sinaitic Status in Sefer haMiṣvot
In order to reconsider Duran’s claims, three elements in Sefer ha-Miṣvot must be
closely analyzed: (1) the exceptions covered by Principle Two; (2) Maimonides’ use of
qiyās to identify biblical prohibitions; and (3) a cluster of Arabic terms used by
Maimonides to denote Sinaitic law. These investigations will lead to a culminating
question: How did Maimonides determine which midrashim contain tafsīr marwī?

Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 33. Neubauer specifically mentioned Principle Nine,
but other Principles are more important. See also there, 8, 17-19, 85-86. I address this problem in Chapter
Four.
643
Of course, Naḥmanides and others well understood that an enumerated commandment may
include numerous laws (see, e.g., Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 32; [Prin.
Two]), but their reading of Principle Two largely focused on the question of whether or not middot-based
laws are biblical or rabbinic in status. I believe that Principle Two deals primarily with exceptions to
Principle One, i.e., those commandments that are not based on pentateuchal verses. On the problem of
reducing Jewish law to 613 “commandment-units,” see Chapter Four.
642
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In asking whether Maimonides regarded the product of halakhic midrash as
biblical law or rabbinic law, interpreters of Principle Two usually assumed that
Maimonides approached all midrashim in a uniform manner.644 Yet there is reason to
think that he classified midrashim in a variety of ways; after all, he claimed that some
midrashim create rabbinic law while others hint at Sinaitic law, and the Introduction to
his Commentary on the Mishnah sets forth a five-fold classification of the Oral Torah.645

The “Three or Four” Exceptions Addressed by Principle Two
What may be Maimonides’ most important comment on Principle Two appears in
his letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan:
Not every matter derived by analogy (heqqesh), a fortiori argument (qal vaḥomer), analogy from verbal congruity (gezeirah shavah), or any of the thirteen
middot by which the Torah is interpreted is biblical law (din torah), unless the
Sages explicitly say that it is from the Torah (min ha-torah). … Nothing is
biblical except for what is explicit (meforash) in the Torah, such as mixtures of
linen and wool, intermixing of species, the Sabbath, and forbidden sexual unions,
or something that the Sages said is from the Torah – and those are only three [or]
four things.646

644
645

Harris also followed this approach; see How do We Know This, 86-89.
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:19-22; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat,

338-40.
646

שאין כל דבר שלמדין אותו בהקש או בקל וחמר או בגזרה שוה או במדה משלש עשרה מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן הוא
 ואין שם מן התורה אלא דבר שהוא מפרש בתורה גכון שעטנז וכלאים ושבת ועריות או... דין תורה עד שיאמרו חכמים שהו מן התורה
 ;דבר שאמרו חכמים שהוא מן התורה והן כמו שלושה ארבעה דברים בלבדsome manuscripts read “”;שלושה או ארבעה

Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-53. Translation mostly follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 7, with the notable change that he has “no matter,” where a more accurate translation is “not
every matter.” On heqqesh, note the remark in Moses ben Joseph di Trani, Qiryat Sefer (Venice, 1551), 7b
(§2), who called attention to Hilkhot Bekhorot, 7:5, and the comments of Abraham de Biton there (ed.
Frankel, 7.2:121).
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The assertion that all biblical laws are “explicit” demands explication. After all, Sefer haMiṣvot regularly relies on the rabbis to determine Scripture’s meaning.647 The
commandment to serve God constitutes a typical example; according to Maimonides,
while several verses that command divine service (ʿ-v-d)648 appear to be broad (ʿāmma;
or, unrestricted) instructions, which are excluded from the enumeration by Principle
Four,649 a “specification” (takhṣīṣ) interprets these commands to require prayer, rendering
them a distinct commandment with particular, not unrestricted, subject matter.
Though Maimonides did not identify the “three [or] four” commandments that he
mentioned in his letter to Pinhas ha-dayan, scholars have assumed that he was referring
to Negative Commandment #135, which prohibits consumption of the heave offerings
(terumah) by an uncircumcised priest; Negative Commandment #194, which prohibits
consumption of wine used in idolatrous practices; and Negative Commandment #336,

647
Davidson, Maimonides, 183: “Even scriptural verses that might seem crystal clear and
unproblematic are read through Oral Torah spectacles.”
648
For the verses, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 60n32; ed. Heller, 36n18.
649
That ʿāmma verses do not constitute distinct commandments; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 18-19 (Prin. Four), 60-61 (Pos. 5). See Ettinger, “ʿAl Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah,” 21-22; and
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 339-40. Despite this “specification,” I understand this is as a
commandment to serve God, not only to pray. Compare the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #5
(Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 15 line 6), and Hilkhot Tefillah u-Virkat Kohanim, 1:1.
Another typical example is the prohibition against imposing capital punishments on the Sabbath.
Maimonides cited Ex. 35:3, “You shall kindle no fire in your settlements on the Sabbath day,” as the
source, and numerous rabbinic texts to explain that this verse prohibits the court from implementing the
capital punishment of (sreifah) on the Sabbath (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 330 [Neg. 322]; see also 51
[Prin. Fourteen]). Maimonides could hardly have reached this conclusion without rabbinic interpretation.
For treatment of this phenomenon, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 40; Ettinger, “ʿAl
Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah,” 21-25; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 335-40, who modified
Ettinger’s approach.
On takhṣīṣ in medieval Islamic texts; see Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 191; David S. Powers,
“On the Abrogation of the Bequest Verses,” Arabica, 29, no. 3 (1982): 262-64; Aron Zysow, The Economy
of Certainty, 78-79, 243-54; idem, “Muʿtazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafi Legal Theory,” in Studies in
Islamic Legal Theory, 248-51 (on “specialization of the cause”), 256n91 (on takhṣīṣ more generally); and
Muḥammad Bin ʿĀrifīn, “The Principles of ʿUmūm and Takhṣīṣ,” (PhD diss., The University of Edinburgh,
1988), chaps. 6-8. On ʿāmm as “unrestricted,” see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 69n11.
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which prohibits sexual relations between father and daughter.650 Of these, the last best
displays the characteristics relevant to these three commandments. Maimonides noted
that while there is no specific verse prohibiting sexual relations between father and
daughter, they must be prohibited, because relations with a man’s granddaughter are
forbidden. Though the Talmud (bKer 5a) based this prohibition on a double gezeirah
shavah, i.e., two analogies based on verbal congruity,651 Maimonides emphasized that the
Talmud explained that this prohibition is “taught” (limdah) by Scripture, and not “derived
for us” (lemadnuha) by the rabbis. In his words, it is “a tradition from the messenger
(naql ʿan al-rasūl) and a tafsīr marwī. … But Scripture refrained from mentioning it

650

Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 41; Davidson, Maimonides, 176n219; Fixler,
“Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 288-90; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 340. Davidson
and Fixler included Negative Commandment #76 (see below) and Levinger (41n35) mentioned it as a
possibility. Levinger also suggested the commandment “to enter a marriage” because there is only a “hint”
(tanbīh) to it. The word tanbīh, however, is common in this work, and frequently denotes laws known by
tradition; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 45, 110, 137, 250; see also idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed.
Kafiḥ, 4:263 (mShev 4:12). I have translated the phrase ʿaqd al-nikāḥ as “to enter a marriage,” but it may
be more nuanced; see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 167n11; Blau, Dictionary, 447 s.v.  ;عقدand
Reinhart Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1881), 2:147 s.v. عقد. Compare the
use of muṣāhara in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 208-209 (Neg. 53-55), and nikāḥ, 208, 332-34 (Neg. 52,
330-37); the latter may be used specifically for forbidden marriages. For another suggesion, see Friedberg,
Crafting the 613 Commandments, 125-26n68 (see above, n602). Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 127-28n76,
argued that the “three or four” are found in the Mishneh Torah, a difficult position to maintain; see Fixler,
“Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 288n8.
The approach in Avraham Feintuch, “Ha-Munaḥ ‘de-Orayta’ veha-Middot sheha-Torah Nidreshet
ba-hen: ʿIyun Ḥozer be-Shoresh ha-Sheini,” Sinai 119 (1997): 154-60; and idem, Sefer ha-Misvot leRambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei Yisharim, 1:38-40, 41-45, is similar to my own, but Feintuch conflated the
term guf ha-torah with laws of biblical status, and therefore indentified more than “three or four” such
prohibitions.
651
“Never let a gezeirah shavah be insignificant in your eyes, for the prohibition of relations with
one’s daughter is one of the gufei torah, but Scripture only taught (limdah) it through a gezeirah shavah:
‘they are’ ‘they are’ (Lev. 18:10, 18:17), and ‘depravity’ ‘depravity’ (Lev. 18:17, 20:14); אל תהי גזרה שוה
קלה בעיניך שהרי בתו אחד מגופי תורה ולא למדה הכתוב אלא בגזרה שוה אתיא הנה הנה אתיא זמה זמה. Text follows Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 330 (Neg. 336); translation based on Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 341.
Several manuscripts add le-isura and le-sreifah to explain that the import of each gezeirah shavah. See also
bYeb 3a.
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because it may be learned (tataʿallam) from a gezeirah shavah.”652 Maimonides also
suggested that the Talmud’s use of the term gufei torah, “essences of Torah,” marks this
prohibition as an independent commandment.653
Similar thinking pertains to the other “three [or] four” commandments to which
Maimonides alluded. The Talmud’s exclusion of an uncircumcised priest from eating the
heave offerings was based on a gezeirah shavah, but Maimonides highlighted the fact
that the “transmitters” (nāqilīn) labeled this law de-ʿorayta (see bYev 72a).654 The
prohibition against drinking wine used in idolatrous worship was derived, in the Talmud
(bAZ 29b), from the biblical comparison of idolatrous offerings and libation wine in
Deut. 32:38, but Maimonides asserted that the prohibition lacks a “plain, explicit verse”
(naṣṣ jalī bi-bayān).655 He added that the Talmud (bAZ 73b) elsewhere lists this among
biblical prohibitions (isurim sheba-torah), indicating that it is a distinct commandment.656

652
 ואנמא סכת אלנץ עך ד'כרהא לכונהא ימכן אן תתעלם בזגרה שוה... ;כלהא נקל ען אלרסול והי תפסיר מרוי
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 334 (Neg. 336). The argument that Scripture did not mention
obvious prohibitions appears elsewhere, occasionally modifying earlier claims. Compare the following: (1)
this passage; the Short Enumeration, Negative Commandment #336 (Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 63
lines 464-66); and Hilkhot Isurei Biʾah, 2:6; (2) Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:244 (mOhal 1:9); 6:259
(mOhal 2:4); and Hilkhot Tumat Meit, 1:2; (3) Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:735 (mʿUqṣ 3:9); Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 263-64 (Neg. 172); and Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:1; and (4) Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:300 (mQid 2:9), 5:361 (mKer 3:4); Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 272-73 (Neg. 187);
and Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 9:2. See the partial treatment of some of the Mishneh Torah passages in
Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 126-27 and n74. I hope to treat this subject elsewhere.
653
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 333-34 (Neg. 336). See Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 340-42; and Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 73 (Prin.
Two).
654
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 242-43 (Neg. 194). Compare similar explanations in
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:32-33 (mYeb 8:1); the Short Enumeration, Negative
Commandment #135 (idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 45 lines 183-85); and Hilkhot Terumot,
7:10. See Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 75 (Prin. Two).
655
Compare the phrase naṣṣ jalī in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 328 (Neg. 318); and
Abraham Maimonides in MS. Hunt. 185, 130a, 132b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6, 9 (§1).
656
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 276 (Neg. 194). Compare the use of Deut. 32:38 in
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:20 (intro. to Toharot). Note that in the Short Enumeration, Negative
Commandment #194, he cited Deut. 32:38 without comment. He mentioned libation wine in Negative
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In this case, he used talmudic terminology to count a revealed, yet not-explicit,
prohibition as a distinct commandment.657
If Maimonides was thinking of a fourth commandment within this grouping, it
was probably Negative Commandment #76, which bars a priest from serving in the
Temple if he is a ṭevul yom, that is, one who has ritually bathed but will only be fully
purified at sunset. Maimonides cited Lev. 21:6 (“they [the priests] shall not profane the
name of their God”) as the source for this commandment, but noted that this is not an
“explicit verse” (naṣṣ bayyin); rather, this prohibition is taught by the tafsīr marwī.658 The
Commentary on the Mishnah identifies this law as a naql, i.e., tradition, linked to
(masnūd li-) Lev. 21:6,659 and the Mishneh Torah claims that it was relayed mi-pi hashemuʿah, as an aural tradition interpreting that verse (Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 4:4).660
Perhaps the dual sources for this commandment, Scripture and tradition, shed light on the
tentative formulation “three or four.”661

Commandment #25 there, a claim that is absent from Sefer ha-Miṣvot; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 51
line 273, 36 lines 33-34; see also Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 11:1-2.
657
See Kafiḥ’s similar explanation; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 242-43n97.
658
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 221 (Neg. 76). Maimonides quoted “if it has no
bearing on its own subject … apply it elsewhere” (im eino ʿinyan le-gufo … teneiho ʿinyan le-) in bSan 83b
to identify the subject of this verse. Translation of this phrase follows Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 61-63.
659
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:195 (mSan 9:6); see Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in
idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 83 (Prin. Two). Masnūd li- could mean “proved by”; see above, n525.
660
He cited this verse without qualification in the Short Enumeration; Maimonides, Mishneh
Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 40 line 106.
661
See above, n650. Cohen (who only found three examples) suggested that Maimonides wrote
this responsum from memory or that “three or four” means “a few”; Opening the Gates of Interpretation,
340; see similarly Feintuch, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei Yisharim, 1:45.
The Short Enumeration merits careful examination; Maimonides usually identified a scriptural
verse, but added exegetical comments or mi-pi ha-shemuʿah interpretations more than “three or four”
times. See Feintuch, “Ha-Munaḥ ‘de-Orayta’,” 150-52; and idem, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush
Piqudei Yisharim, 1:36-38.
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If the above analysis is correct, it may not be a coincidence that the non-scriptural
laws that constitute distinct commandments are all Negative Commandments, because
Maimonides insisted that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the number of
punishments a sinner incurs and the number of negative commandments that he violates
(as will be seen in Chapter Five). As a result, the fact that the violation of each of these
“three or four” commandments results in punishment662 may have motivated Maimonides
to identify exceptions to the rule that all commandments are based on nuṣūṣ torah,
pentateuchal verses.

Prohibitions Identified Through Qiyās
Following the rabbis, Maimonides identified a scriptural warning (azharah) and a
penalty (ʿonesh) for every prohibition.663 Throughout his writings, he cited the rule
“[Scripture] did not punish unless it warned” (bYom 81a, bSan 56b, etc.), labeling it an
aṣl (principle).664 In an addendum to the Principles that comprise the Introduction to Sefer

662

For Negative Commandment #76, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 221; for
Negative Commandment #135, see Hilkhot Terumot, 7:10; for Negative Commandment #194, see
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 276; and for Negative Commandment #336, see above n651.
663
See, e.g., Sifra, ed. Weiss, 88b (parashat kedoshim, §2); bSan 54b, 60b. On this distinction, see
Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. azharah, 1:418-19; P. Dykan, “ʿAnishah, Azharah, Hatraʾah,” Proceedings of
the World Congress of Jewish Studies 4, no. 1 (1965): 195-96; and Devora Steinmetz, Punishment and
Freedom: The Rabbinic Construction of Criminal Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2008), 16-17; note also Azzan Yadin, Scripture as Logos, 184n8. Scholars have debated if this distinction
helped the rabbis account for duplicate verses or corresponds to the legal principle nullum crimen sine lege
(“no crime without law”); see Jacob Z. Lauterbach, “A Significant Controversy Between the Sadduccees
and the Pharisees,” HUCA 4 (1927): 182n8; repr. in Rabbinic Essays, 59-60n8; and Emmanuel Bulz, “HaHatraʾah be-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies 6, vol. 3, div. C
(1973): 42-43. See also below, n881.
664
 ;לא ענש [הכתוב] אלא אם כן הזהירsee Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:236 (mMak
3:1); Hilkhot Shevitat ʿEsor, 1:4; Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot, 18:4; Hilkhot Mamrim, 5:4, 5:8, 7:1; and,
e.g., idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 193 (Neg. 26), 227 (Neg. 90), 328 (Neg. 318), 329 (Neg. 319), 33637 (Neg. 347). Compare there, 211 (Neg. 60), and the Short Enumeration, Negative Commandment #60;
Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 39 line 83-86. The Talmud also finds “warnings” through the middot
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ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides explained that “legal qiyās”665 may be the source of a warning
when a punishment appears in Scripture and when its derivation (istikhrāj) accords with
the rule “[Scripture] did not punish unless it warned.” In cases like this, qiyās does not
create new law; rather, it clarifies the “warning” for a prohibition that is already
known.666
Maimonides made such an argument regarding Negative Commandment #132,
which forbids sacrificing an animal while intending to eat it after its appointed time
(piggul). While the warning against piggul is scriptural,667 he wrote, the punishment for it
is not. Though the Talmud (bKer 5a) derived the punishment of excision (karet) from a
gezeirah shavah, Maimonides described this as “a tradition [that] reached us as an
interpretation of this verse.” Quoting the talmudic admonition (bKer 5a) not to take
lightly an analogy based on verbal congruity (gezeirah shavah), he asserted that the

(e.g., bKer 3a). An earlier version of this phrase appears to be in jYeb 11:2 (12b; מלמד שאין הקב'ה עונש אלא
)אם כן הזהיר. Maimonides’ extensive use of such rabbinic dicta and the appellation aṣl deserve attention; for
now, see Dror Fixler, “Lashon ve-Signon be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” Maʿaliyot 25 (2005): 21740; and Yuval, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” 243.
665
Maimonides called this qiyās min al-maqāyīs al-fiqhīhi. On qiyās fiqhī, see Ravitsky, “HaHeqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 197-205; see also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 268n97. For
this term in al-Fārābī, see Joep Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic
Practice (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 233-58.
666
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 54-55; in standard editions, this addendum is part of
Principle Fourteen. See ibn Ṣur Sefardi, Megillat Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 8284 (Prin. Two); Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, there, 77-79 (Prin. Two); and Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, there, 89 (Prin.
Two). See also Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 70-72 (§65). The only scholarly treatment
that I know of is Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 14; and Henshke, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’,” 25051. Maimonides explained that his conclusion does not violate the rule “a warning cannot be ascertained
through logic” (ein mazhirin min ha-din; bMak 5b, etc.) because the punishment is evidence of the
existence of a prohibition and rabbinic qiyās only identifies the prohibiting verse. On post-talmudic use of
the latter rule, see Henshke, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’.” Naḥmanides was surprised that Maimonides
cited rabbinic derivations in order to identify scriptural warnings, arguing that this flew in the face of
Maimonides’ claim that midrash does not generate law of biblical status; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam,
ed. Chavel, 43-44 (Prin. Two), 337-38 (Neg. 195).
667
Maimonides appears to have misquoted Ex. 29:33; see Hilkhot Pesulei ha-Muqdashin, 18:10;
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 128n7; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240n71; Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 13:117;
and Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides, 41.
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prohibition of piggul is one of the “essences of Torah” (gufei torah) known only by a
gezeirah shavah. This claim establishes the existence of a prohibition in the case of
Negative Commandment #336; here, it relates only to the nature of the punishment.668
In his enumeration of the commandments, Maimonides invoked Principle Two
only once, with regard to three commandments pertaining to priestly impurity: (1) A
regular priest may not touch the corpse of non-family members; (2) the High Priest may
not enter the tent of a corpse; (3) and the High Priest may not touch a corpse.669 Citing
Principle Two, he explained that there is no distinct commandment that prohibits a
regular priest from entering the tent of a corpse, because this law is derived by a gezeirah
shavah.670 (This prohibition appears to be rabbinic, but the Mishneh Torah is unclear
about its status.671) This passing reference to Principle Two underscores Maimonides’

668

 ;ג'אנא אלנקל פי תפסיר הד'ה אלפסוקMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240-41 (Neg. 132).
Strikingly, regarding the third example in bKer 5a, the prohibition against leaving sacrificial meat beyond
its proscribed time (notar), Maimonides cited a verse that requires supplemental interpretation (ḍamīr) and
not the gezeirah shavah; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240 (Neg. 131). On ḍamīr, see above, n587. He did
not cite the last example in bKer 5a (gezeirah shavahs that identify stoning as the mode of punishment).
See however the comment that the tafsīr marwī identifies some capital punishments; idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 50 (Principle Fourteen).
669
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 259-60 (Neg. 168). He based the prohibitions
pertaining to the High Priest on Lev. 21:11: “He [the High Priest] shall not go in where there is any dead
body; he shall not defile himself even for his father or mother.” He argued that “he shall not defile himself”
is not an “explanation” (tabyīn) of “he shall not go in” but a distinct prohibition because the Sifra (ed.
Weiss, 94b [parashat emor, §2]) explains that the High Priest is “guilty” (ḥayav; see below, n1115) for
both actions. In the Short Enumeration, Negative Commandment #168, he labeled this derivation mi-pi hashemuʿah; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 49 lines 241; compare Hilkhot Aveil, 3:6. On tabyīn in
qurʾānic exegesis, see Jonathan Owens, Early Arabic Grammatical Theory: Heterogeneity and
Standardization (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), 127, 130, 131; and Jaroslav Stetkevych, “Arabic
Hermeneutical Terminology: Paradox and the Production of Meaning,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 48,
no. 2 (1989): 90-92.
670
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 260 (Neg. 168). The Sifra (Ibid.) derived these from a
gezeirah shavah. Compare Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 282 (Neg. 208); and Hilkhot Nezirut,
5:18.
671
Hilkhot Aveil, 3:1-3, 3:6, subsumes the prohibitions against a regular priest and the High Priest
entering the tent of a corpse into one. The status of this law is unclear; see Judah ben Samuel Rosanes,
Derekh Miṣvotekha (Warsaw, 1930), 9b-10a; and Elyaqim ben Yiṣḥaq Gaṭinyo, Beit Yisḥaq (Salonika,
1792), 144b.
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conviction that a law derived through a gezeirah shavah is different from a law set forth
in explicit biblical verses, and that Maimonides’ enumeration centered on
commandments based on those verses.

Tafsīr Marwī and Naql in Sefer ha-Miṣvot
For Maimonides, the terms naql, tradition, and tafsīr marwī, transmitted
interpretation (or simply tafsīr and less frequently, marwī), are often equivalent. For
example, Maimonides read five phrases in Deut. 12:17 as ones that prohibit the eating of
five types of sacrifices outside of Jerusalem. In so doing, he followed the rabbis and
variously ascribed this interpretation to the Sifrei, tafsīr (twice), and naql (twice).672
Likewise, where the rabbis offer the same gloss on Deut. 7:2, Maimonides referred to it
as naql and tafsīr.673 Nevertheless, the term naql occasionally carries broader
signification; he used it, at times, to denote traditions that are not explanations of
scriptural terms.674

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 246-48 (Neg. 144-48). These are: “You may not
partake in your settlements of … (1) of the firstlings of your herds (2) and flocks, (3) or of any votive
offerings that you vow, (4) or of your freewill offerings, (5) or of your contributions.”
673
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 206-207 (Neg. 50). The second instance does not
mention Deut. 7:2. In Hilkhot ʿAvodat Kokhavim ve-Ḥuqqot ha-Goyim, 10:1, 10:4, Deut. 7:2 is the basis for
both. He labeled the second interpretation a naql in Mishnah ʿim Peirush ed. Kafiḥ, 1:152 (mDem 6:2),
4:341 (mAZ 1:8). See Maimonides, Tiqun Mishnah: Hashlamot ve-Tiqunim le-Feirush ha-Mishnah
Mahadurat ha-Rav Y. Kafiḥ, Masekhtot ʿAvodah Zarah ve-Horayot, ed. and trans. Isaac Shailat (Jerusalem:
Maʿaliyot, 2002), 37. For other examples, see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 137 (Pos. 153), 241 (Neg.
132), 334 (Neg. 336).
674
I count more than fifty appearances of tafsīr and almost thirty of naql in the enumeration. This
misses some uses because (1) Maimonides commented that a series of commandments are based on the
tafsīr (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 141 [Pos. 159]) and (2) the first example in this paragraph shows that he
considered rabbinic interpretations tafsīr or naql without using these terms. The word marwī appears
without a modifier there, 2 (introduction), 325 (Neg. 312). Maimonides also labeled the rabbis the
“transmitters” (rāwīn; 2, 163), “transmitters of the interpretation” (ruwāt al-tafsīr; 244 [Neg. 137], 260
[Neg. 168]), and “transmitters of the transmissions” (rāwī al-rāwiyāt; 1). See the term “the carriers of
tradition” (al-nāqilīn; e.g., 27 [Prin. Eight], 243 [Neg. 157], 325 [Neg. 312]). Less frequently, the verbs b672
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In several places in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides ascribed “details” of
commandments to naql and tafsīr. These remarks suggest that, for Maimonides,
revelation consisted of more than 613 “laws” even if such were to be part of larger
“commandment-units.”675 He wrote, for example, that the commandment not to eat on
Yom Kippur includes prohibitions of washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital
relations on that day; each of the aforementioned are known by tradition (naql), and were
not created by the rabbis. By the same token, the Commentary on the Mishnah refers to
talmudic derivations for these prohibitions (bYom 76a-77b) as “hints and prooftexts”
(ishārāt wa-isnādāt), and the Mishneh Torah refers to these prohibitions as ones that are
known mi-pi ha-shemuʿah, from aural tradition (Hilkhot Shevitat ʿEsor, 1:5).676
According to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, the commandment pertaining to the nullification of vows

y-n (to clarify or explain) and sh-r-ḥ (to interpret) describe Sinaitic material; see there 77 (Pos. 34), 162-63
(b-y-n; Pos. 205), 182 (Neg. 4), 297 (sh-r-ḥ; Neg. 245). Note the phrase “by way of interpretation” (fī
sharḥ) to describe rabbinic exegesis (69 [Pos. 20], 173 [Pos. 334], 299 [Neg.247]), and “interpreters”
(shārihīn) to denote the rabbis (33 [Prin. Nine; twice]). See the designation of Targum Onqelos as “the
interpreter of tradition” (al-shāriḥ lil-naql; 238 [Neg. 128]). On the Targumim in Maimonides’ writings,
see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 58n92; Rafael Binyamin Posen, “Targum Onqelos
be-Khitvei ha-Rambam,” in Sefer Zikaron le-Rav Yosef ben David Kafiḥ, 240-56; and Fixler, “Lashon veSignon be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” 205-209.
675
Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 14, termed the commandments in Sefer ha-Miṣvot “mizvahunits”; see chap. four. Consider the enumeration’s silence about some explicit laws: The commandment to
take palm branches obviously includes all four species listed in Lev. 23:40, though only the palm branches
are mentioned in the enumeration; the Mishneh Torah explains that all four are “one commandment”
(miṣvah aḥat; Hilkhot Shofar, ve-Sukkah, ve-Lulav, 7:5; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 14445 [Pos. 169]. In Principle Eleven, he described this as “miṣvat lulav, which is four species” [ מצות לולב אלתי
 ;ארבעה מיניןed. Kafiḥ, 43].). In the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #169, he also only
mentioned the palm branches; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 28 lines 226-27. See similarly the heading
of Hilkhot Shofar ve-Sukkah ve-Lulav. I would suggest, perhaps, that lulav constitutes what Maimonides
called in Principle Seven “the base commandment” (aṣl al-miṣvah); see below, n946.
676
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 143 (Pos. 164); and idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed.
Kafiḥ, 2:262-63 (mYom 8:1). Compare Maimonides’ deployment of these derivations, there. These
prohibitions do not appear in the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #164; idem, Mishneh Torah,
eds. Cohen et al., 28 line 221. In the Commentary, he originally wrote that violation incurs lashes, but later
explained that these are rabbinic lashes (makat mardut); ed. Kafiḥ, 2:263n10. This may constitute evidence
that non-explicit prohibitions receive different punishments than explicit prohibitions; see Henshke, “Lavin
she-Ein Loqin ʿalehem.”
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(hafarat nedarim) includes a naql-based teaching that a sage may facilitate release from
vows (hatarat nedarim).677 The Commentary refers to this in the same manner, adding,
“there is no evidence for this [tradition] in Scripture” (lā shāhid lahu fī al-naṣṣ),678 and
Maimonides asserted in the Mishneh Torah that “Moses our teacher taught this law mi-pi
ha-qabbalah (from tradition)” (see Hilkhot Shevuʿot, 6:1-2). Along the same lines, he
described the law prohibiting a priest from serving in the Temple without proper clothing
as one that has “arrived by way of (lit., in) the tafsīr” (jāʾ fī al-tafsīr). Pointedly diverging
from talmudic claims, he wrote that this law lacks a substantiating verse (naṣṣ).679
On occasion, Maimonides considered glosses of biblical passages to be Sinaitic
“details” of larger commandments. For example, he cited Deut. 17:15, “You shall set a
king over yourself,” as the basis of the commandment to appoint a king, adding that a
revealed tafsīr glosses the word “yourself” to indicate that subjects should fear the

677

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 110 (Pos. 95).
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:152 (mNed 10:8); similarly 3:180 (mNaz 4:7);
compare 4:173 (mSan 6:7), 5:210 (mḤul 6:7). Joshua ha-Nagid identified anti-Qaraite animus behind these
claims; Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 108. Maimonides’ discussion of “heresy” (minut) regarding hatarat nedarim
supports this; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:152 (mNed 10:8); and Hilkhot Shevuʿot, 12:12. In
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he read the claim that the hatarat nedarim “flies in the air” (porḥin be-avir; i.e., lacks
scriptural support [mḤag 1:8]) to mean that it is based on “the sound tradition” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ; ed. Kafiḥ,
110 [Pos. 95]). I have not found this claim in the Commentary; see esp. his comments on mNed 10:8
(3:151-53) and mḤag 1:8 (2:376). For Qaraite views, see Revel, The Karaite Halakah, 81; and Lewin, Oṣar
ha-Geonim, Masekhet Nedarim, 9-11. Lawrence Schiffman, “The Laws of Vows and Oaths (Num. 30, 116) in the Zadokite Fragments and the Temple Scroll,” Revue de Qumran 15 (1991): 203n17, treated some
of the Maimonidean passages. Note also Abraham Maimonides’ formulations; see below, n781.
679
The Talmud derives this prohibition from Ex. 29:9, “And wind turbans upon them … and so
they shall have priesthood” (bSan 83b; bZev 17b), asserting that without proper clothing, a priest is
equivalent to a non-priest (zar). Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 76 (Pos. 33); see similarly Hilkhot
Kelei ha-Miqdash, 10:4. This rabbinic interpretation appears in Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:194-95
(mSan 9:6); it is a naql there, 5:27 (mZev 2:1); see also Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 5:2; and Hilkhot
Sanhedrin, 19:2. For the prohibition against a zar serving in the Temple, see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ,
220 (Neg. 74). The only other capital punishment in the Positive Commandments that I have found is for
violating the commandment that a priest wash his hands and face before entering the Temple (Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 72 [Pos. 24]); rabbinic literature associates this law with the commandment of priestly
garments; see bZev 19b and Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 5:2. Compare also below, n1091.
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king.680 Regarding the commandment to set apart one who is afflicted with ṣaraʿat
(usually translated as leprosy), Maimonides noted that a supplemental naql obligates
setting apart all impure individuals.681 He also asserted, based on tafsīr and naql, that the
consecration of new months is effective even if the court errs regarding the date of the
new moon’s appearance.682
These examples show that Maimonides understood Sinaitic law as a category that
was broader than the sum of the enumerated commandments. His attempt to identify the
613 commandments, and to organize the law around them, made it necessary for him to
include many details under the rubrics of larger commandment-units. This observation
corroborates Duran’s claim that, for Maimonides, non-explicit biblical “details” often do
not constitute distinct commandments. It also indicates that Principle Two primarily
addresses a limited group of enumerated commandments that lack “clear” scriptural
support and does not primarly focus on the question of whether or not midrash creates
law of biblical or rabbinic status. Finally, it affirms the tension that Blidstein noted, when
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Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 146 (Pos. 173). This appears in Sifrei, ed. Finkelstein,
209 (§157); and bSan 20b. Maimonides labeled it a naql in the Commentary; Tiqun Mishnah, ed. Shailat,
163 (mHor 3:8). He also referred to it as a “principle” (aṣl); Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:269-70
(mSoṭ 7:6). See also Hilkhot Melakhim, 2:1.
681
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 118 (Pos. 112); compare Hilkhot Tumat Ṣaraʿat, 10:8,
and the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #112; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 24 lines
150-52. The source is Sifra, ed. Weiss, 67b (parashat tazriʿa, §12).
682
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 137 (Pos. 153). Maimonides cited different verses for
this; see there, 135 (Pos. 153); the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #153 (Mishneh Torah, eds.
Cohen et al., 27 lines 207-208); and Hilkhot Qiddush ha-Ḥodesh, 1:1, 1:7. Many rabbinic texts state that
sanctification is valid even if the court acted willfully incorrectly, but Qaraite criticisms may have
encouraged self-censorship. See Lieberman, Tosefta ke-Feshutah, 5:1037 line 2; and Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 73n15. See the Qaraite texts in Tirosh-Becker, Ginzei Ḥazal, 2:999, 1001, 1002.
Compare Saul Lieberman, Sheqiʿin: Devarim Aḥadim ʿal Agadot, Minhagim u-Meqorot Sifrutiyim shel haYehudim she-Nishtaqʿu be-Sifrei ha-Qaraʾim veha-Noṣrim (Jerusalem: Wahrman, 1970), 52-72; and
Aharon Shweke, “Luḥot ha-Even, ha-Torah veha-Miṣvah,” Tarbiẓ 81, no. 1-4 (2013): 346-48.
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he juxtaposed Maimonides’ claim that “most rules of the law” (akthar aḥkām al-sharīʿa)
are derived by way of the middot, in Principle Two, with his ubiquitous use of mi-pi hashemuʿah, from aural tradition, in the Mishneh Torah.683 By using the categories of tafsīr
marwī and naql, Maimonides was able to categorize as “Sinaitic” many non-scriptural
laws that appear in halakhic midrash.
In short, the question, “does midrash produce biblical or rabbinic law?” is
misconceived, driven, in part, by readings that flatten or ignore the subtleties of
Maimonides’ terminology. Rather, Maimonides asked each midrash: does this midrash
create law or uphold law?684 I now turn to the difficulties in determining how
Maimonides answered this question.

Identifying Tafsīr Marwī in Midrash Halakhah
Maimonides’ failure to provide guidelines for the identification of Sinaitic
traditions within rabbinic midrash bothered several scholars.685 Neubauer conjectured
that when “peshaṭ is against a particular interpretation, it seems that this interpretation
must be received,” and he suggested that Maimonides used “logic and hermeneutics” in
determining which midrashim contained Sinaitic law.686 Shimshon Ettinger took a

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two); and Blidstein, “Masoret ve-Samkhut
Mosdit,” 17. Examination of the Commentary on the Mishnah would undoubtedly reveal a similar
phenomenon.
684
Some have hinted at this distinction, but it has not received adequate treatment; see Neubauer,
Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 85-87; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 42; Blidstein’s
comments cited above, n641; and Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 132-35.
685
See Zvi Karl, “‘Sefer ha-Miṣvot’ leha-Rambam,” Moznayim 3 (1935): 463; Neubauer, HaRambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 88; and Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 42; see also above,
n437. Maimonides’ tendency to transform rabbinic midrash into tafsīr marwī was perhaps first noted by
Guttman (see above, n541).
686
Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 89.
683
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different view, writing that Sinaitic traditions, for Maimonides, are based on “clear …
logic and common sense” and “the plain meaning of the text.” On the other hand, wrote
Ettinger, if a “teaching appears remote from this simple meaning” it is “an allusion
(asmakhta) only” and merely rabbinic.687 According to Mordechai Cohen, Maimonides
“adhere[d] as closely as possible to the principles of philological-contextual analysis.”688
As is evident from the preceding excursus, none of these general statements adequately
accounts for Maimonides’ perspectives on halakhic midrash.
For Maimonides, the presence or absence of received traditions was marked by
certain features. The existence of a biblical punishment was the most direct evidence of a
biblical commandment.689 In one letter to Samuel ben ʿEli, Maimonides cited the biblical
prescription of flogging as evidence of a biblical prohibition,690 and in the letter to Pinḥas
ha-dayan, he invoked biblically imposed punishments in asserting that marriages
transacted through a legal document (shṭar) are of biblical status. Relying on the rabbinic

Ettinger, “ʿAl Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah,” 19-20; trans. in idem, “On the Place of Logic
(Svara) in Maimonides’ Code,” in Authority, Process and Method: Studies in Jewish Law, eds. Ḥanina
Ben-Menaḥem and Neil S. Hecht (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), 155. See similarly
Meyer S. Feldblum, “Criteria for Designating Laws Traditions, Derivations from Biblical Exegesis, and
Legislative Enactments,” in Maimonides as Codifier of Jewish Law, ed. Nahum Rakover (Jerusalem:
Library of Jewish Law, 1987), 48: “any rabbinic interpretation of a Torah verse that results in a law must be
philologically defensible, even if it is derived by the 13 hermeneutical principles.”
688
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 431. Cohen added that Maimonides used
“halakhic evidence” to isolate received traditions. I am not sure what this term means; see there, 417, 424;
see also 434, and below, n690. Compare ibn Ṣur Sefardi, Megillat Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Hellman, 76 (Prin. Two).
689
See Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 55 (Prin. Two).
690
Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:574 (§310); treated in Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 388-89. The example is flogging for travelling beyond the Sabbath boundaries (see bʿEiruv
17b). Maimonides cited this statement in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 188 (Neg. 10); and in another letter to
Samuel; Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:571 (§309). Elsewhere, Cohen explained that Maimonides considered a law
that “is assumed in the Mishnah to be de-orayta” to be based on a “transmitted interpretation” (425). This
“assumption” is based on the fact that violating this law incurs excision, as noted in Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ,
in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 62 (Prin. Two).
687
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reading of the word “possesses her” (baʿalah; Deut. 24:1) to mean coition (biʾah; bQid
4b, 9b), he asserted that marriages enacted by intercourse are of biblical status. Though it
might have been assumed that marriages contracted through legal documents and the
exchange of money are of rabbinic status (mi-diverehem) because they are derived “from
logic” (min ha-din), Maimonides came to a different conclusion. The Talmud’s
imposition of capital punishment for adultery with a maiden (naʿarah meʾurasah)691
betrothed through a legal document (bQid 9b) indicated to him that such a marriage must
be of biblical status, because capital punishments are only incurred for violation of a
biblical prohibition.692 Sefer ha-Miṣvot also deems laws “biblical” if their violation incurs
biblical punishment, even in cases where the prohibition in question has no supporting
verse.693 Maimonides even cited the inclusion of a particular prohibition on a rabbinic list
of sins whose violation incurs capital punishment to prove that it is an independent
commandment.694 By the same token, when a ritually pure nazirite is exposed to a type of
impurity that would compel him to begin his period of nazirism anew, this impurity must
ipso facto be biblical in nature.695 Maimonides similarly wrote that a specific prohibition

691

Rabbinic law limits this status to a girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half.
Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:454.
693
E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 76 (Pos. 33; see above, n679), 221 (Neg. 76).
See the similar usage there, 243. He cited lists in mKer 1:1, bMak 22b, and bSan 83a. See Allegri, Leiv
Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 70-71 (Prin. Two). Compare also Hilkhot
Sanhedrin, chap. 19. Maimonides’ usage differed from geonic-era usage; see Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot,
16-18, 20-21. De-orayta mandated lashes evince a biblical prohibition; e.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 208 (Neg. 52), 285 (Neg. 215), 286 (Neg. 216).
694
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 337 (Neg. 349). This may be his argument elsewhere;
there, 225 (twice; Neg. 86-87), 324 (Neg. 309). Abraham Maimonides used these lists similarly; see n754.
695
This case and its attendant details are quite complex; see Isaac Bekhor David, Divrei Emet,
84a-85b; Henshke, “ʿAl ha-Meṣiʾut ha-Mishpaṭit,” 236-37; idem, “Sheniyot le-‘Divrei Sofrim’,” 58-63;
idem, “Le-Yesodei,” 114-18; and Ettinger, “Shetei Heʿarot,” 238-42. The details of this rule troubled
Maimonides throughout his life; Abraham Karelitz claimed that Maimonides was “undecided” about
692
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is rabbinic in status because it is neither included in these lists nor learned from the
peshaṭeh di-qera.696
Maimonides often inferred a law’s rabbinic status from the Sages’ explicit use of
the middot.697 Yet the fact that he regarded certain middot-derived laws as biblical in
status698 suggests that he alone ultimately determined – based on the criteria suggested
above and other possible factors – which midrashim created laws, and which upheld
received laws,699 citing accordingly the rabbinic texts that best matched his conclusions.

Conclusion
A number of dichotomies populate Maimonides’ conception of revelation:
Sinaitic and post-Sinaitic law; written and oral revelation; Moses and subsequent leaders;
and the transmission of legal material and its creation. Maimonides drew on Andalusian
depictions of rabbinic legal creativity and he mobilized geonic, Andalusian, and Islamic
thinking about Scripture and revelation in order to decisively reject geonic presentations

several applications of this principle (merafya ha-davar be-yado); Sefer Ḥazon Ish: Toharot (Benei Brak,
1974), 73b (mOha 10:8); noted in Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 118.
696
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 16-17 (Prin. Three). Compare my reading to Cohen,
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 327-28 (see there, n136), 333.
697
For example, on ribbuy, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two); and note
the comparison of ribbuy with qiyās in idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:397 (mʿOrl 1:2), and with
naẓar and qiyās, 4:256 (mShev 3:6). In one place, the principle rubbuy aḥar ribbuy teaches a naql; 2:357
(mMeg 4:3). On gezeirah shavah, see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 243 (Neg. 135); and above n670.
Several appearances of this term in the Commentary denote biblical law, e.g., Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed.
Kafiḥ, 4:242 (mMak 3:5), 6:672 (mZav 3:1). See the equation of middot and naql there, 5:150-51 (mMen
9:7); see similarly 6:53-55 (mKel 2:1). The Commentary may be less careful than Sefer ha-Miṣvot about
these terms; in one passage, Maimonides insisted that he did not intend to fully explicate the middot in the
Commentary (mʿOrl 1:2, noted in Sinai, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” 212-13n52). I hope to treat the
Commentary’s use of the middot in a future study.
698
See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 42-43.
699
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 306, reached a similar conclusion. Compare the
comments in Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin, Haʿamek Sheʾeilah (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1999), 1:6,
regarding the term halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai.
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of the Oral Torah’s origins. An array of Arabic and Hebrew terms helped Maimonides
navigate the realms of revelation, received tradition, and rabbinic law. Nevertheless, the
search for precisely 613 commandments occasionally led Maimonides to blur his own
neat definitions and conceptual boundaries.
Further research could explore how Maimonides applied his system and the extent
to which he worked out his ideas between writing the Commentary on the Mishnah and
Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Integrating these works, along with the Mishneh Torah and
Maimonides’ responsa into studies of Maimonides’ intellectual development may help to
clarify his reformulation of ideas when challenged by new agendas, such as enumerating
the commandments, formulating a legal compendium, or various interlocutors.
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Chapter Three: Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides on the Oral
Torah
Introduction
The early thirteenth-century debate between Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli and
Abraham Maimonides constitutes the first controversy over Maimonides’ approach to the
Oral Torah. Less than three folios in the lone manuscript, Daniel’s challenges to
Principles One and Two of Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot demonstrate that Maimonides’
views were influential, even for those who rejected his conclusions. Daniel’s approach to
the Oral Torah – at least as can be inferred from his criticism of Maimonides – integrated
elements of geonic and Maimonidean thought. Abraham Maimonides, for his part,
staunchly defended his father, and, in his later writings, upheld and expanded upon
Maimonides’ understanding of the Oral Torah in the service of his own pietistic program.
This chapter begins with Daniel and Abraham’s debate in order to underscore the
(continuing) importance of reflections on the Oral Torah among Judeo-Arabic writers. I
then turn to Abraham’s later writings, especially his Kifāyat al-ʿĀbidīn (The Sufficient
Guide for the Servants of God) and responsa. Analysis of these texts, augmented by brief
treatment of Abraham’s biblical commentary, uncovers the ways that Abraham
championed and applied his father’s system.
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Daniel ha-Bavli’s Criticism of Principles One and Two
In his query to Abraham Maimonides, Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli grouped his
criticisms of Principles One and Two into one question,700 implicitly adopting the
assumption of many modern treatments that regard Principles One and Two as intimately
connected.701

The Scope of Revelation and the Enumeration of the Commandments
Daniel began his comments on Principle One, which excludes “rabbinic
commandments” from the enumeration of the commandments, by explaining that
Maimonides only enumerated material based on faṣīḥ al-naṣṣ, an express scriptural
passage.702 Daniel, however, considered all “revealed” material – so identified in rabbinic
literature – to be of equal status for the purpose of enumeration. Therefore, while he
accepted Maimonides’ claim that the description of the 613 commandments as “said to
Moses at Sinai” (bMak 23b) precludes the enumeration of rabbinic enactments,703 he
rejected the idea that the Written Torah is of special importance for the enumeration.

700
This is clear from internal evidence; Daniel transitioned from Principle One to Principle Two
with wa-kadhālika (“and likewise”; MS. Hunt. 185, 128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4; §1). There is no reason to
think that the copyist of this manuscript from the (lost) original combined what were originally two
questions.
701
E.g., the work of Blidstein, Halbertal, Harris, and Kassierer and Glicksburg.
702
Translation follows Blau, Dictionary, 505, s.v. ّّفصيح النص. This phrase does not appear in
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot, nor, as far as I can tell, elsewhere in his writings. For geonic usage, see
Yehuda Raṣhabi, “Seridim mi-Peirush R. Saʿadya le-Megillat Esther,” Sinai 104, no. 1 (1989): 207;
Wechsler, The Book of Conviviality in Exile, 564 line 13; Saʿadya, Kitāb al-Amānāt wal-Iʿtiqādāt, ed.
Kafiḥ, 220; and Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni, 216 (Gen. 44:1). Two Qaraite
biblical commentators use this phrase; see Yevr.-Arab. I 25, 40a, published in Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, Kitvei
ha-Yad be-ʿAravit-Yehudit be-Osfei Firqoviṣ: Yefet ben ʿEli al-Baṣri, Peirush Bereishit, Qatalog leDugmah, Meqorot u-Meḥqarim (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2000), 29; and Yevr.-Arab. I 2131 (from Jeshua
ben Judah).
703
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9 (Prin. One); see above, n190.
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After all, he noted, the Talmud does not state, “Moses wrote for us 613 commandments
in the Torah.” For this reason, asserted Daniel, one may criticize geonic-era enumerations
for counting rabbinic ordinances and decrees (gezeirot and taqqanot), but not for
counting laws based on extra-scriptural Sinaitic traditions.704
Daniel turned to the two scriptural prohibitions pertaining to priests serving in the
Temple found in Ezekiel (44:9, 20).705 According to the Talmud, these prohibitions were
orally transmitted from Moses long before Ezekiel wrote them down (bTan 17b, etc.).706
For Daniel, this talmudic claim demonstrates that extra-scriptural traditions are
equivalent to explicit biblical passages for the purpose of enumeration. Given their
Sinaitic origin, Daniel asserted that Maimonides erred in excluding these laws from the
enumeration.707
Daniel used this line of reasoning to respond to Maimonides’ claim that geonicera enumerators had mistakenly counted commandments to clothe the naked, visit the
sick, and comfort the bereaved. Where Maimonides claimed that these enumerators

MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2. He wrote that bMak 23b includes anything that is a
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai: פקד חוי הד'א אלקול כל מא הו הלכה למשה מסיני ולם יסקט אלא אלתקנות ואלגזרות אלתי
 ;רתבת מת'ל עירובין וידיםMS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2 (§1). I believe that the phrase halakhah leMoshe mi-Sinai here refers to all unwritten, revealed laws, not just laws that receive this designation in
rabbinic literature (see below, nn707, 724), as Daniel contrasted halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai with
“ordinances and decrees.” See also MS. Hunt. 185, 128b-129a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1): ועלי אננא גיר מקיידין
704

 פי עדד תרי"ג מצות בפציח אלנצוץ כמא קד תקדם אלקול לאן אלעדד הו למא קבל משה מסיני אן כאן מכתוב פציח ואן כאן גיר מנצוץ.
705

The prohibitions against an uncircumcised priest serving in the Temple and a priest entering the
Temple with unkempt hair. The latter example is curious, because it appears in surviving texts of Sefer haMiṣvot, as Abraham Maimonides noted; see MS. Hunt. 185, 120a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6 (§1). For the
suggestion that Daniel’s version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot omitted this commandment, see Maimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Heller, 25 (introductory pagination), 118n13; see also below, n1044.
706
For background in rabbinic literature and geonic-era use of these texts, see above, nn200, 202.
707
Daniel assumed that Maimonides accepted the talmudic claim that these laws were transmitted
orally from Sinai; MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2-3 (§1). On Maimonides’ view, see above,
nn613-614. Daniel labeled these laws halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, which the Talmud did not (writing:
 ;לכנהא ליסת נצוץ בל הלכה למשה מסיניMS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2; §1); see above, n704, and
below, n723.
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considered “When you see the naked, clothe him” (Isa. 58:7) to be the source of the
obligation to clothe the naked, but their true source to be the pentateuchal command to
provide for the poor (“Sufficient for what he needs”; Deut. 15:8), Daniel inverted
Maimonides’ argument and likened these laws to those found in Ezekiel. Daniel thus
described the verse in Isaiah as a “transmitted interpretation” (sharḥ manqūl), elaborating
on Deut. 15:8, writing that the later prophet had “stated expressly” (faṣaḥa bihā), i.e., in a
more elaborate form, the Sinaitic charges.708 Similarly, where Maimonides had asserted
that talmudic glosses (bBQ 100a) to each phrase in Ex. 18:20 (“Make known to them the
way they are to go in and the practices they are to follow”) misled earlier enumerators to
count visiting the sick and comforting the bereaved as separate commandments,709 Daniel
labeled each of these glosses a “narrated interpretation (sharḥ marwī) from the messenger
(i.e., Moses).”710

Particular Manifestations of General Scriptural Commands
Daniel ha-Bavli next turned to two other laws excluded by Maimonides, the
requirement to recite the Hallel prayer, which is comprised of Pss. 113-18 and is recited
on festive days, and the celebration of the post-biblical festival of Hanukah. Earlier
enumerators had listed both as commandments, but Maimonides deemed them rabbinic in
status.711 In order to prove the “biblical” status of these requirements, Daniel argued that

MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). For Maimonides’ view, see above, n612. On
faṣaḥa (or faṣṣaḥa) bihā, see Blau, Dictionary, 505, s.v.  فصحI, II.
709
See above, nn625-626; see also above, n198.
710
 ;שרח מרוי ען אלרסולMS. Hunt. 185, 127b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1).
711
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9-10 (Prin. One); and above, n607.
708
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discrete manifestations of general scriptural commands may be counted as distinct
commandments. Turning to Hallel, he claimed that the rabbis had “stated expressly
(faṣīḥ) that [the recitation of Hallel] is biblical in status (de-orayta) on eighteen days.”712
(This is actually an inference from bTaʿan 28a, which lists these eighteen days in order to
prove that the requirement to recite Hallel on the first day of new months – days not
counted among the eighteen – is not biblical in status.713) Daniel next cited a baraita that
addresses the origin of Hallel (bPes 117a):
Who recited this Hallel? R. Yosi says: “My son Eleazar says: ‘Moses and all
Israel said it at the moment that they ascended from the sea.’ But his colleagues
disagree with him, saying ‘David [the presumed author of Psalms] said it.’ His
view appears preferable to theirs: is it possible that Israel slaughtered their paschal
sacrifices and did not recite song?”714
While Daniel accepted the first view, he asserted that, even according to the second view,
“it is not impossible that the command (amr) [ordains] general praise (tasbīḥ stam), not
necessarily with these designated words. Rather, [God] obligated the recitation of songs
and praises during these festivals (mawāsim) – with any words.”715

712

 ;פקד קאלו ז"ל פציח אנהא דאוריתא בי'ח' ימיםi.e., eight days of each of Sukkot and Hanukah and the
first days of Passover and Shavuʿot; bTaʿan 28b, bʿErkh 10a; see also jSuk 54c (4:5).
713
Daniel’s text of bTaʿan 28a accords with most manuscripts, which differ slightly from the
printed edition. See also MS. Hunt. 91b; Birkat Avraham, 51 (§38; the numbering differs in the
manuscript).
714
הלל זה מי אמרו ר' יוסי אומר אלעזר בני אומ' משה וכל ישראל אמרוהו בשעה שעלו מן הים וחלוקין עליו חביריו לומר
. דוד אמרו ונראין דבריו מדבריהם אפשר ישראל שחטו פסחיהן ולא אמרו שירהThis is Daniel’s text; manuscripts, with the

exception of Vatican 109, record few variants. On the texts of Bavli Pesaḥim, see below, n1225. Rashi, s.v.
efshar, explained that R. Yosi’s rhetorical question asks: did Israel not recite Hallel when they slaughtered
their paschal sacrifices between the time of the Exodus and that of King David?
715

'וחתי עלי ראי מן יקול דוד אמרו לא ימתנע אן יכון אלאמר באלתסביח סתם לם ילזם אן יכון בהד'ה אלאלפאט
 ;אלמעינה בל אוג'ב תע' אן יקולו שירות ותושבחות פי הד'ה אלמואסם באי לפט' תהיאMS. Hunt. 185, 127b; Maʿaseh

Nissim, 3 (§1).
200

Daniel suggested that “Sing to the Lord, for He has triumphed gloriously” (Ex.
15:21) constitutes the source for the obligation to recite Hallel.716 “It is clear,” he wrote,
“that all of the festivals commemorate the Exodus from Egypt. It is obligatory from this
that we thank and praise Him every time He makes His power and deliverance manifest
(yuẓhir) to us.”717 Daniel asserted that since God’s power was manifest during the
Maccabean revolt, the recitation of Hallel on Hanukah constitutes a biblical obligation,
even though “the days of Hanukah are not explicitly stated (manṣūṣa) in the Torah.” 718
Claiming that the recitation of Hallel also fulfills the commandment to “publicize a
miracle” (pirsumei nisa; see bSab 23b etc.), he invoked the rabbinic comment “it is
inferred (mi-mashmaʿ) from ‘Do not desecrate’ – sanctify,” describing the obligation to
publicize a miracle as “supported by” (mustanida ilā) the verse “Do not desecrate the
name of your God” (Lev. 18:21).719

716

Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. Hallel, does not list anybody else who cited this verse as the
source for the obligation to recite Hallel.
717

ואלאמר בד'לך הו קול אלרסול ע"ה שירו ליוי כי גאה גאה וקד באן באן אלמועדים כלהא זכר ליציאת מצרים ווג'ב מן
. ד'לך איצ'א אנא נשכרה תע' ונסבחה פי כל וקת יט'הר לנא קדרתה ונצרתהDaniel may have relied on the prayer book for

the claim that all holidays commemorate the exodus; alternatively, Uri Melamed (personal communication)
noted this claim in Saul Lieberman, ed., Midrash Devarim Rabbah (Jerusalem: Shaleim, 1992), 17 (§18).
718
 ;לא אן איאם אלחנוכה מנצוצה פי אלתורהMS. Hunt. 185, 127b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). Standard
commentators on the enumeration in the Halakhot Gedolot have concluded that this enumeration counted
the eighteen days as eighteen, not one, commandments; Shaul ben Musah ha-Kohen, Netiv Miṣvotekha
(Livorno, 1841), 45a-45b; and Mordecai Sluṣqi, Azharot le-Ḥag ha-Shavuʿot: Mevuʾar be-sheim Hidur
Zaqein (Warsaw, 1900), 9-11; see also Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 81. Daniel’s
position on this question is unclear.
719
 ;ממשמע שנא' לא תחלל אמר קדשMS. Hunt. 185, 127b-128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). Daniel quoted
Lev. 18:21; surviving editions of the Sifra link this gloss to Lev. 22:32 (“You shall not desecrate My holy
name”); noted in Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:515; see Sifra, ed. Weiss, 99b (parashat emor, §9).
Daniel described this interpretation as offered “by way of interpretation” (fī sharḥ), perhaps hinting that
such interpretations have the status of biblical law. On the phrase fī sharḥ in Maimonides’ writings, see
above, n674. Daniel also suggested that the recitation of Hallel is not the only possible way to publicize a
miracle.
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This conclusion facilitated Daniel’s response to the Maimonidean claim about the
Talmud’s assertion (bSab 23a) that the requirement to light Hanukah candles has the
same basis as all rabbinic decrees (“In accordance with the instruction given you”; Deut.
17:11).720 Daniel agreed that the requirement to light Hanukah candles is rabbinic in
origin, but saw this as different from the recitation of Hallel, which, he claimed, fulfills
the “biblical” commandment to observe Hanukah. Whereas Maimonides interpreted the
talmudic query, “where were we commanded to light Hanukah candles?” to mean, “what
is the scriptural basis for Hanukah?” Daniel understood it as, “why was Hanukah singled
out with the lighting of candles?”721 Thus, in Daniel’s view, specific manifestations of
general biblical commands – in this case, the recitation of Hallel and the celebration of
Hanukah – may constitute distinct commandments.

Laws Derived Through the Middot
Daniel ha-Bavli began his rebuttal of Principle Two by attacking Maimonides’
insistence that the vast majority of laws derived from the middot (hermeneutical rules)
are neither enumerated nor of biblical status.722 Incredulous, Daniel exclaimed that
Maimonides could not possibly deny that the thirteen middot and that which is “deduced
by means of them” (al-mustafād bi-ṭarīqihā) is of Sinaitic origin; he termed that which

720

See above, n611; see also above, n345.
Daniel asserted that lighting Hanukah candles is “a commandment (miṣvah) to listen to the
sages from ‘You shall not deviate [from the verdict that they announce to you]’ (Deut. 17:11; פכאן אלג'ואב
 ;)לאן מצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים מלא תסורMS. Hunt. 185, 128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). Manuscripts of bSab 23a
only quote Deut. 17:11, not the phrase “a commandment to listen to the sages.” In Principle One,
Maimonides quoted this phrase from bḤul 106a, linking it to Deut. 17:11 (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10).
It is likely that Daniel imputed this phrase due to Maimonides’ comments.
722
See above, n621.
721
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was derived in this manner halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai; i.e., law given to Moses at
Sinai.723 Daniel, for his part, insisted that the label de-orayta (of biblical status) may be
applied to any law derived from the middot, writing: “That which is verified for us [as
having] its basis (isnādahu) in one of the middot, we term it de-orayta.” On the other
hand, he explained, “That which is not verified for us [as having] its basis in one of the
middot, we term it halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, meaning, merely a halakhah (here:
tradition).”724
Because Daniel equated scriptural laws with laws derived through the middot, he
asserted that a law in either category may be the basis of a distinct commandment if it
constitutes not merely “part” (juzʾ) of a commandment, but a “guf miṣvah,” lit., “body of
a commandment”; i.e., a self-contained or discrete commandment.725 He therefore agreed
with Maimonides that geonic-era enumerators had been wrong to count as a distinct

723

 ;מע כונה ז"ל לא ינכר אן שלש עשרה מדות הלכה למשה מסיני וסאיר אלמסתפאד בטריקהא הלכה למשה מסיניothers
have read this sentence not as an expression of astonishment but as Daniel’s attempt to interpret
Maimonides, claiming that Daniel felt that Maimonides held that laws derived by the middot are biblical in
status; Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:19; Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 152; and
Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 209n7. This reading fails to account for the fact that Daniel
also quoted Maimonides’ assertion that if the Talmud did not identify a derived law as de-orayta or guf hatorah, the law in question is rabbinic in status. How could Daniel’s supposed interpretation of Maimonides
contradict the passage that he immediately quoted? Perla and Friedberg even suggested that Daniel
anticipated Simeon ben Ṣemaḥ Duran’s claim that the terms “biblical” and “rabbinic” in Principle Two
distinguish between enumerated and non-enumerated laws.
724

לכן מא יצח לנא אסנאדה באחד אלמדות נסמיה דאוריתא ומא לא יצח לנא אסנאדה באחד אלמדות פנסמיה הלכה
 ;למשה מסיני נעני הלכה פקטMS. Hunt. 185, 128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1). Daniel appears to use the phrase

halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai in two different senses in this passage; see also above, nn704, 707.
725
Daniel used this term twice here, and elsewhere contrasted it with acts done to complete a
commandment (tashlumei miṣvah; MS. Hunt. 185, 173b-174a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 60; §5). I have uncovered
no rabbinic or geonic usage of this phrase. My guess is that it relates to the mishnaic terms kol ha-guf (an
entire principle [mHor 1:3]; see below, n848) and guf torah (essence of the Torah [mḤag 1:8]; see above,
n621). Note Joseph ben Abraham Gikatilla, Kelalei ha-Miṣvot, ed. Barukh Avigdor Ḥeifeṣ (Safed, 1992),
198: ואם הלויה שאינה גוף מצוה מיוחדת מתרי"ג מצות אלא ענף א' מענפי גמילות חסדים אין לה שיעור ק"ו שאר גופי מצות
שבתורה. See also Arieh Goldschmidt, ed., Maḥzor Vitry le-Rabbeinu Simḥah mi-Vitry, Talmid Rashi
(Jerusalem: Oṣar ha-Posqim, 2003), 3:941: והרב ר' חיים כהן בר' חננאל פי' מצות וחוקים ובכור מצות אלה המשפטים שהן
גופי מצות ודיניו.
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commandment the obligation to fear sages. But while Maimonides excluded this on the
grounds that it is derived from a lexical redundancy (ribbuy) and was not explicit in the
Pentateuch, Daniel argued that fear of the sages is a biblical “part” of the commandment
to fear God (both are based on Deut. 6:13).726
Daniel also used his equation of explicit laws with those based on the middot to
reject Maimonides’ claim that derived laws constitute “branches” (furūʿ) of Sinaitic
“roots” (uṣūl);727 he argued that the enumeration should include any “guf miṣvah” that the
rabbis “derived” (istakhrajū) through the middot. For Daniel, such a commandment
would be both “derived” and Sinaitic – and it could not be mapped onto the distinction
between “roots” and “branches.” Daniel exploited this argument to reject Maimonides’
conclusion from the legend that the Israelites forgot seventeen hundred derived laws after
Moses’ death (bTem 16a). Maimonides had cited this tradition in order to exclude most
derived laws from the enumeration; after all, he reasoned, the number of derived laws
clearly exceeds 613 and consistency dictates that either all of them be counted or none of
them.728 Daniel explained that these forgotten derivations are Sinaitic “branches of
commandments (miṣvot), parts, and specifications (fiqh) of explicit commandments

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two); MS. Hunt. 185, 128a-128b; Maʿaseh
Nissim, 4 (§1); see bPes 22b. For similar positions, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. yirat ha-sheim,
25:88nn161-62. Daniel described this law as “supported” (musnad) by Deut. 6:13. Maimonides’ position
may be more complex than Principle Two suggests; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 164-66 (Pos. 209);
Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 5:1; di Trani, Qiryat Sefer, 11b-12a (Hilkhot Talmud Torah, chap. 5); and
Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 315n72, 324-25.
727
See above, nn632-633.
728
See above, n634.
726
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(sharāʾiʿ manṣūṣa); one commandment can entail (taḥtamil) numerous branches.” Hence,
such derivations are not enumerated because they do not constitute a “guf miṣvah.”729
The assertion that all laws that are “derived” through the middot were in fact
given at Sinai730 also led Daniel to challenge another assertion, in which Maimonides
claimed that the talmudic term guf torah (“essence of the Torah”) denotes a select set of
unwritten, Sinaitic laws that constitute distinct commandments. As evidence,
Maimonides had pointed to the Talmud’s (bKer 5a) application of the term guf torah to a
few non-explicit laws, and to its warning about them: “Do not take a gezeirah shavah
(analogy based on verbal congruity) lightly.”731 Daniel, however, rejected Maimonides’
assumption that the term guf torah is relevant for the enumeration of the commandments.
Instead, he inferred a general rule from this passage and claimed that any law learned
from a gezeirah shavah can be considered a guf torah, whether or not the rabbis used this
term.732 However, a law labeled guf torah may only be counted in the enumeration if it
constitutes a “whole” commandment (i.e., what Daniel called a guf miṣvah).
Daniel concluded by claiming that Maimonides had inconsistently applied his
own rules when he counted the prohibition against a priest who has ritually bathed but
will only be fully purified with sunset (ṭevul yom) serving in the Temple, which the
Talmud (bSan 83b, bZev 17a) learns from a scriptural “hint” (remez) in Lev. 21:6. After

729
 ;לאן חאצל הד'ה פרוע מצות ואג'זא ופקה שראיע מנצוצה תחתמל אלשריעה אלואחדה פרוע עדידהMS. Hunt. 185,
128b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1). On the meaning of the term fiqh here, see above, n570, and below, nn921944; see below, nn998-999, for Daniel’s use of this term.
730
See the text cited above, n723.
731
See above, nn651-653, 668. Maimonides, of course, used several criteria to identify such
commandments.
732
MS. Hunt. 185, 128b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1).
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all, he noted, Maimonides had asserted that the only non-scriptural laws that constitute
distinct commandments are those designated de-orayta or guf torah in rabbinic
literature.733 Daniel also drew attention to Maimonides’ comment, elsewhere, that another
law could not constitute a distinct commandment because it is derived from a “hint,” and
not from the peshaṭeh di-qera.734 As rabbinic literature labeled neither law of de-orayta
status or a guf torah, Daniel observed, they should be identical for purposes of the
enumeration.735

Other Maimonidean Claims about the Oral Torah
The comments about revelation and rabbinic tradition that appear throughout
Daniel’s queries demonstrate that he sensed, at least in part, the breadth of Maimonides’
claims about the Oral Torah. One case pertains to a law that the Talmud (bSan 83b)
linked to Ex. 29:9, but that in Maimonides’ opinion, was based on a revealed tafsīr, rather
than an explicit verse (naṣṣ).736 Daniel agreed with Maimonides, writing “there is no
doubt that without the halakhah that arrived from Sinai … it would have been impossible

See the references above, n731. Maimonides identified the tafsīr marwī as the source of this
law. Daniel added that, in his view, the Sifra’s reading of Lev. 21:6 (ed. Weiss, 91a [parashat emor, §1),
constitutes the peshaṭeh di-qera of this verse.
734
I.e., the prohibition against stealing a libation vessel (qisvah); bSan 81b. See Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 16-17 (Prin. Three). On this passage, see above, n696.
735
MS. Hunt. 185, 129a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4-5 (§1); Sifra, ed. Weiss, 94ab (parashat emor, §1).
Elsewhere, Daniel wrote the rabbis considered this “hint” a ribbuy; MS. Hunt. 185, 140a; Maʿaseh Nissim,
19 (§3).
736
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 76 (Pos. 33), concerning the prohibition against an
improperly dressed priest (meḥusar begadim) serving in the Temple. In Hilkhot Kelei ha-Miqdash, 10:4,
Maimonides cited Ex. 29:9, but no extra-scriptural interpretation of this verse (e.g., mi-pi ha-shemuʿah or
mi-pi ha-qabbalah).
733
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to derive it (istakhrājuhu) from this verse.”737 Another comment by Daniel relates to a
debate over the phrase “the seventh day” in the verse “On the seventh day you shall rest;
you shall rest from plowing and harvesting” (Ex. 34:21): does this refer to the Sabbatical
year or to the weekly Sabbath (bMK 3b-4a)?738 Despite the fact that the talmudic sugya
appears to accept the latter view, Daniel noted that Maimonides cited this verse, among
others, as the basis for the commandment to refrain from farming during the Sabbatical
year.739
Daniel was also among the early critics to claim that Maimonides was wrong
when (in Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2, 3:20) he categorized the effectuation of marriage through the
exchange of money as a law of divrei sofrim status (words or matters of the scribes). Was
it possible, asked Daniel, that the obligation to marry, categorized by Maimonides (in
Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2) as a biblical law (shel torah), could be fulfilled through a rabbinicallyordained mechanism? Indeed, asked Daniel, if a woman who is married through the
exchange of money enters into a second marriage through a biblically-ordained
mechanism, does the second marriage override the first? Daniel further wondered what
reason Maimonides had for distinguishing between the effectuation of marriage through
money, which is derived from a gezeirah shavah (bQid 2a), and its effectuation through

737

 למא אמכן אסתכ'ראג'ה מן הד'א אלנץ...  ;ולא שבהה אן לולא אלהלכה אלוארדה מסיניMS. Hunt. 185, 140b;
Maʿaseh Nissim, 19 (§3). On this passage, see also below, n1041.
738
The first view asserts that this verse extends the prohibitions against plowing and harvesting to
a period before and after the Sabbatical year, based on the assumption that there is no reason to single out
plowing and harvesting among the labors prohibited on the Sabbath. The second holds that only optional
plowing and harvesting are forbidden on the Sabbath, but such actions are permitted when fulfilling a
commandment (i.e., for the purposes of the ʿomer sacrifice); for treatment see David Henshke, “‘Be-Ḥarish
uve-Qaṣir Tishbot’ – Eḥad Miqra u-Shenayim Midrash,” Sidra 15 (1999): 13-29.
739
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 127 (Pos. 135); MS. Hunt. 185, 195b-196a; Maʿaseh
Nissim, 88 (§9).
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legal documents, which is derived through a scriptural “analogy” (heqqesh; bQid 5a);
neither mechanism, he wrote, is explicit in Scripture.740

Daniel ha-Bavli’s Use of Sefer ha-Miṣvot
Daniel ha-Bavli’s criticism of Principles One and Two highlights the controversy
over Maimonides’ portrayals of revelation and of laws derived through the middot. In
asserting the divine basis of much of Jewish law (and not only that which is explicit in
the Torah), Daniel occasionally went further than talmudic claims. One such case is his
declaration that laws identified by Isaiah are Sinaitic – in keeping with the talmudic claim
regarding laws mentioned by Ezekiel. Daniel’s description of the middot using Arabic
roots such as kh-r-j, h-ṣ-l, and f-y-d, which denote derivation or deduction, differed from
the Saʿadyanic model, which saw the middot as “matching” Scripture with received
tradition.741 This choice of terminology suggests the influence of Maimonides’ portrayal,
and understanding, of rabbinic activity.742

MS. Hunt. 185, 114b-115b; Birkat Avraham, 61-62 (§44). For Maimonides’ view, see above,
n692. For Daniel’s challenge to a law that Maimonides labeled mi-pi ha-shemuʿah (Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ,
9:3), see MS. Hunt. 185, 28a-28b; Birkat Avraham, 14 (§8).
741
See above, n244.
742
Compare below, n828. Feldblum, Peirushim u-Meḥqarim, 5n9, astutely noted that
Naḥmanides’ position that (some? see above, n636) halakhic midrash creates laws of biblical status
fundamentally accepts Maimonides’ position that halakhic midrash (when not based on tafsīr marwī)
generates law; see also Blidstein, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 21; and idem, “Oral Law as Institution in
Maimonides,” 181n141, writing: “[Naḥmanides] also learns from Maimonides. … His own view of
rabbinic midrash is that it in fact creates law with Scriptural status. This carries beyond Maimonides, but it
may also reflect the permission granted by Maimonides to see the rabbi [sic] as creative” (there, 172-73).
Compare Wolfson, “By Way of Truth,” 128.
740
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The fact that Daniel did not respond to all of the criticisms that Maimonides
leveled against geonic-era enumerators743 suggests that he may have lacked either the
interest or ability to defend them.

Abraham Maimonides’ Responses to Daniel ha-Bavli
The perspectives of Maimonides cast an overwhelming shadow over the
presentations of his son Abraham, not only because Abraham sought to defend his father,
but also because he employed his father’s theories in his later works in order to bolster
his own pietistic reforms. Abraham’s responses to Daniel (which most likely constitute
his first written reflections on the Oral Torah) focus primarily on the taxonomic status of
a distinct commandment. Abraham also offered rejoinders to Daniel’s claims about
specific commandments; these rebuttals shed light on Abraham’s applications and
extensions of his father’s system.

Revelation and the 613 Commandments
The first part of Abraham’s answer challenged Daniel’s claim that the
enumeration may include any revealed law, even laws not found in Scripture. Abraham
asserted that Daniel’s position “does not allow for the ability to differentiate (or, to make
into parts; tabʿīḍ), but necessitates … enumerating every law whose basis is transmission

Of the “commandments” counted by geonic-era enumerators rejected in Principles One and
Two, Daniel did not mention observing the festival of Purim, reciting one hundred blessings a day,
intercalating the calendar, and burying the dead (though this relates to his treatment of Lev. 19:18). He also
accepted Maimonides’ claims that fear of the sages does not constitute a distinct commandment and that
geonic-era enumerators erred by counting rabbinic decrees.
743
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from the master, the messenger (i.e., Moses).”744 He suggested that the talmudic phrase
“613 commandments were said to Moses at Sinai” may refer to: (1) express scriptural
passages (manṣūṣ) and what is “entailed by” (yalḥaq) them; (2) transmitted (manqūl)
material only and not scriptural passages; or (3) express scriptural passages and what is
“entailed by it” as well as to other transmitted material. Abraham declared that nobody
with a “sound ability to conceptualize” (taṣawwur sālim) could accept the second option,
and the third, which he identified as Daniel’s view, necessitates counting more than 613
commandments. Therefore, only the first – in Abraham’s mind, his father’s approach – is
viable.745 In his words, this is “an established argument (qiyās) and conclusive proof.”746
Abraham did not explain the distinction between extra-scriptural traditions that
are “entailed by” Scripture and other revealed material. I am not aware of any relevant
Maimonidean usage of the term “entailed by” (yalḥaq); this term may refer to the “three
[or] four” exceptions to Principle Two747 or to the tafsīr marwī, the interpretation
transmitted from Sinai.
Two of Abraham’s comments imply that he, like his father, accepted that some
rabbinic dicta constitute Sinaitic traditions but do not qualify as distinct commandments.
He explained that an “interpretation” of revelation may not qualify as a distinct
commandment, even though it may be “a verse (naṣṣ) of the Torah, a verse stated (naṣṣ

744
' ;לא יצח אלתבעיץ' בל ילזם עלי הד'א אלפרץ' עדד כל חכם אצלה מנקול ען אלסיד אלרסול על' אלסMS. Hunt.
185, 129b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 5 (§1).
745
MS. Hunt. 185, 129b-130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 5-6 (§1).
746
 ;והד'א קיאס מסתקל ודליל קאטע למן יפהם אלמקאייס וידריהאMS. Hunt. 185, 130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6
(§1). For this meaning of mustaqill, see Blau, Dictionary, 560, s.v.  قللX.
747
While Abraham evinced no knowledge of the letter that mentions these exceptions (see below,
n762), Principle Two does mention them.
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kalām) [by] a prophet, a transmitted interpretation (tafsīr marwī), or derived (mustanbaṭ)
through qiyās.”748 Similarly, he wrote that a particular rabbinic gloss should not be
enumerated as a distinct commandment, even “if it is conceded (idhā sullima) that it is a
verified interpretation (sharḥ muḥaqqaq), and not [a conclusion made merely] on the
basis of its support (isnād).”749

Deflections of Daniel ha-Bavli’s Claims
In the remainder of his response, Abraham focused on two matters raised by
Daniel: the question of whether to include in the enumeration the observance of Hanukah
and the prohibition pertaining to a priest who must wait until sunset to become pure
(ṭevul yom). In Abraham’s view, Daniel’s argument that Hanukah constitutes a
manifestation of a general command to express gratitude for God’s deliverance would
preclude the “ability to differentiate” (tabʿīḍ), and would necessitate the inclusion of
several other post-biblical festivals in the enumeration of the commandments.750

748

 ;פלא ינבגי עדדהא לא פרק כאנת נץ [אל]תורה או נץ כלאם נבי או תפסיר מרוי או מסתנבט בקיאסMS. Hunt. 185,
130b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 7 (§1). Compare the threefold division between laws that are “written, transmitted,
or derived through qiyās” ( ;)מנצוצא או מנקולא או מסתכ'רג'א בקיאסMS. Hunt. 185, 142b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 22
(§3). See also below, nn784-788.
749
 ;אד'א סלם אנה שרח מחקק לא עלי חכם אלאסנאדMS. Hunt. 185, 130b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 7 (§1). These
“verified interpretations” may not be transmitted from Moses, but just philologically sound readings of
Scripture. On the term isnād, see above, n525.
750
MS. Hunt. 185, 130b-131b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 7-8 (§1). He noted that the rabbis annulled the
observance of the festivals listed in Megillat Taʿanit (bRH 19b), an ancient work that listed a number of
victories and other joyous events. How could they do so, he asked, if their observance is biblically
mandated? Abraham also used various textual arguments to dismiss Daniel’s claim that reciting Hallel
constitutes a biblical commandment. On the recitation of Hallel, note Abraham’s comments introducing his
responses to Daniel’s questions about Sefer ha-Miṣvot; MS. Hunt. 185, 126b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 1-2
(introduction).
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Abraham asserted that the law prohibiting a priest from serving in the Temple
prior to sunset on the day of his purification was of biblical status (min ha-torah). Though
he admitted that this prohibition is “derived through a hint (remez) from a verse whose
manifest sense (ẓāhirihi) concerns another matter,” Abraham nonetheless affirmed its
biblical status, because the “transmitters” (nāqilīn) had “expressly” included it among
sins that incur the death penalty (bSan 83a).751 This, he asserted, was equivalent to
rabbinic usage of the term guf torah. Furthermore, he wrote, despite the lack of a “clear
verse” (naṣṣ jalī), the tafsīr marwī, transmitted interpretation, qualifies it as a distinct
commandment.752 Abraham also cautioned that “one must accurately consider
[Maimonides’] statements before hurriedly and loudly raising doubts against him.”753
Had Daniel paid close attention, Abraham wrote, he would have noticed Maimonides’
remarks on another law derived from a “hint,” the prohibition against stealing a libation
vessel. According to Maimonides, this prohibition does not qualify as an enumerated
commandment because its violation does not incur capital punishment and it is not based
on the peshaṭei di-qera.754 This particular defense of Sefer ha-Miṣvot supports the
hypothesis, offered in Chapter Two, that the presence or absence of biblically imposed
punishments helped Maimonides determine if a “derived” law was based on the tafsīr
marwī and a distinct commandment or on a post-Sinaitic extrapolation.

751
 ;לכונה מסתכ'רג' ברמז מן נץ ט'אהרה פי גיר ד'לך תצריח אלנאקלין פיה באנה מן ג'מלה מחוייבי מיתהviolation of
rabbinic law, Abraham wrote, cannot incur capital punishment. For ẓāhir as “manifest sense” in
Maimonides’ writings, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 93-96.
752
On the term naṣṣ jalī, see above, n655. This also supports the suggestion that this prohibition
constituted one of the “three [or] four” exceptions to Principle Two; see above, n661.
753

.תתאמל תחריר אקאוילה ז"ל קבל אלמבאדרה ואלתהאפת ללתשכיך עליה

MS. Hunt. 185, 132a-132b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 8-9 (§1). Abraham used these lists similarly
elsewhere; see MS. Hunt. 143b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 23 (§3).
754
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Abraham also drew on other elements of his father’s system in his responses to
Daniel’s queries. For example, he claimed that the presence of rabbinic debate (ikhtilāf)
concerning the meaning of “You shall rest from plowing and harvesting” (Ex. 34:21)
shows that the meaning of this verse is neither apparent (ẓāhir) nor transmitted
(manqūla).755 He suggested that his father had quoted additional verses as the basis of
this law in Sefer ha-Miṣvot because of the debate over the verse’s meaning; in this case,
he wrote, Maimonides may have relied on the reading of this verse found in the Mekhilta
de-Rashbi.756
Abraham’s use of Principle Two elsewhere in his responses to Daniel is of
particular interest. In one case, he explained that his father omitted certain laws derived
by qiyās from the enumeration of 613 because they are neither “explicit” (mafṣūḥ) nor
labeled by the rabbis as “guf torah.”757 Daniel’s assertion that distinct laws should be
counted in cases where the rabbis used the same verses to teach several laws led
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Compare the similar statement that particular rules (awḍāʿ) pertaining to slaughter are matters
of tradition (naql) that lack any debate (khilāf); MS. Hunt. 185, 203b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 97 (§10). Abraham
claimed elsewhere that a matter of debate cannot be a Mosaic tradition; see Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 96
(§78); and Elazar Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal le-Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-Rambam:
Sarid mi-tokh ha-Maqor ha-ʿAravi she-nitgalah be-genizat Qahir,” in Joshua Finkel Festschrift, eds. Sidney
B. Hoenig and Leon D. Stitskin (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1974), 150; repr. in idem, “Maʾamar
ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal le-Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-Rambam: Sarid min ha-Maqor be-ʿAravit-Yehudit
mi-Genizat Qahir,” in Seridim mi-Toratan shel Geonim ve-Rishonim mi-Genizat Qahir, vol. 2 (New York:
Yeshiva University Press, 1989); references will be to the earlier edition. On this manuscript of the
Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal, see Moritz Steinschneider, Die arabische Literatur der Juden
(Frankfurt, 1902), 221-22; and Cohen, “The Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 35n91.
756
MS. Hunt. 185, 196b-197b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 89-90 (§9). On scriptural repetition, see Chapter
Five. See Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, ed. Epstein, 223 (see there, n11); and Menaḥem Kasher,
Ha-Rambam veha-Mekhilta de-Rashbi (New York, 1980), 86-88. On Maimonides’ view, see his Mishnah
ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:221-22 (mShev 1:1); and Hilkhot Shemiṭah ve-Yovel, 1:1; note the comments of
Joseph Korkos there, cited in above, n435.
757
MS. Hunt. 185, 189a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 80 (§7). This use of Principle Two seems to comport
with Maimonides’ presentation; see below, n1009.
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Abraham to claim that his father’s statements in Principle Two reaffirm the view that “a
biblical verse does not leave the realm of its peshaṭ” (bSab 63a etc.).758
Another important comment by Abraham was occasioned by Daniel’s suggestion
that the requirement to “Slaughter … as I have instructed you” (Deut. 12:21) might imply
that eating improperly slaughtered meat violates a positive commandment, given the rule
that “a prohibition implied from a command constitutes a command (or, positive
commandment)” (lav ha-ba mi-khlal ʿaseh, ʿaseh; bPes 41b etc.).759 Abraham rejected
this suggestion, because the rabbis did not offer such a reading of this verse. At the same
time, Abraham’s admission that reasoning (qiyās) could mandate such a conclusion,760
might be read as rejecting the possibility of deriving laws from Scripture after the
rabbinic period. (This would fly in the face of Maimonidean claims.761)
Lastly, Abraham reported that while his father had originally asserted the rabbinic
status (de-rabbanan) of the exchange of money to effectuate marriage, Maimonides later
reconsidered this. Abraham reported that he possessed a corrected text of Hilkhot Ishut,

MS. Hunt. 185, 163b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 48 (§4). See below, n1245. This may relate to
Abraham’s claim that the enumeration consists primarily of express scriptural passages and what is
“entailed by” them. Maimonides, however, appears to have allowed for the possibility that such rabbinic
teachings may impart distinct commandments; see below, n1086.
759
See MS. Hunt. 185, 200b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 94 (§10). Daniel pointed out that although
Maimonides did not list such a prohibition, he did list similar ones. On this rule, see Encyclopedia
Talmudit, 35:289-314, s.v. lav ha-ba mi-khlal ʿaseh. For Maimonides’ discussion, see Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:237 (mMak 3:1); he termed it a “principle” (aṣl) there, 5:95 (mZev 14:9), 5:204
(mḤul 5:1), and in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 108 (Pos. 92), 226 (Neg. 89), 263 (Neg. 172). Maimonides
mentioned this rule a number of other times in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and the Mishneh Torah.
760
MS. Hunt. 185, 203a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 97 (§10).
761
Namely, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1; see Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 79-91.
758
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1:2, written in his father’s own handwriting (be-khtav yado), which designated this mode
of acquiring a wife as a mechanism of biblical status (din torah).762

Abraham Maimonides’ Later Writings
Studies of Abraham Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah have largely
focused on his Commentary on Genesis and Exodus; less attention has been paid to his
responsa and Kifāya. This section summarizes the conclusions of these earlier studies and
seeks to fill this lacuna.
Abraham’s Commentary contains no methodological discussion of the role that
oral traditions play in biblical interpretation.763 Seeking to induce principles from this
work, scholars have noted the author’s “predilection for plain and simple exegesis” and
his “thrust towards the plain sense of the text.”764 Abraham also frequently evaluated

762
MS. Hunt. 185, 115b-116b; Birkat Avraham, 62 (§44). Twersky, incorrectly, wrote that
Abraham “maintained that a careless scribe was at fault here … and his father never upheld such a view”;
Rabad of Posquières, 136n16. Abraham evinced no knowledge of the relevant letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan; as
noted in Maimonides, Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. A.H. Freimann (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1934),
162n17; see also idem, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:633n21. He was apparently ignorant of other responsa penned
by his father; see Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Maḥloqet le-Sheim Shamayim,” 261n69; and idem,
“ʿAsarah Baṭlanim shebe-Veit ha-Keneset be-Mishnat ha-Rambam veha-Raʾavam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe,
2:813n129. Daniel and Abraham also debated the status of the prohibition against travelling on the
Sabbath; see MS. Hunt. 185, 38a-40b, 206a-206b; Birkat Avraham, 19-21 (§12); Maʿaseh Nissim, 100-101
(§112). On Abraham’s view, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 390, citing Abraham
Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 289 (Ex. 16:29). Maimonides and Samuel ben ʿEli, Daniel’s
teacher, debated this issue as well; see above, n387.
763
Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot,” 58.
764
Abraham Maimonides, The High Ways to Perfection of Abraham Maimonides, vol. 1, ed. and
trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), 1:115; and Paul Fenton, “The
Post-Maimonidean Schools of Exegesis in the East: Abraham Maimonides, the Pietists, Tanḥûm haYərušalmi and the Yemenite school,” in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation,
vol. 1, part 2: The Middle Ages, ed. Magne Saebø (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 436. See
similarly S.D. Goitein, “Abraham Maimonides and His Pietist Circle,” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance
Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 148-49: “[Abraham’s]
explications of the Bible and the Talmud are so graceful, so lucid, so persuasive that one is almost
convinced that his derāsh is peshāṭ, that his moralistic and pietist interpretation constitutes the literal
meaning of the text.” See also Yehoshafat Navo, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam la-Torah,”
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midrashim, both halakhic and aggadic, rejecting those that, in his words, reflect “neither
the intent (qaṣd) of Scripture nor its purpose (gharaḍahu).”765 On the other hand, he was
willing to accept those traditions that he deemed “authentic.” Regarding one midrash
that, in his estimation, lacked “scriptural proof” (dalīl naṣṣī), Abraham cited the mishnaic
statement: “if it is a tradition, we accept it, but if it is an inference, there is a rebuttal”
(mYeb 8:3, mKer 3:9).766
Abraham, of course, professed allegiance to received tradition; in one case, he
clarified the “ẓāhir” of “Do not follow the majority to do wrong” (Ex. 23:2), but
proceeded to write that “the explanation of the tradition (sharḥ al-naql) [explains]
otherwise – on it we depend (wuqūfunā) and rely.”767 Abraham also felt comfortable

Sinai 113 (1994): 233-35; Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot,” 58-64; and Ezra Labaton, “A Comprehensive
Analysis of Rabenu Abraham Maimuni’s Biblical Commentary,” (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2012),
244-55. Abraham, of course, was not averse to reading anthropomorphic verses against their apparent
(ẓāhir) meaning; see, e.g., Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 5 (Gen. 1:26); and Labaton, “A Comprehensive
Analysis,” 251, 252n670. On Abraham’s use of earlier commentators, particularly Abraham Ibn Ezra, see
Navo, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham,” 252; and Fenton, “The Post-Maimonidean Schools,” 436.
765
 ;ואן לא [יכן] קצד אלנץ ולא גרצ'הAbraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 89 (Gen. 28:22);
mentioned in Eppenstein, Abraham Maimuni, 39n2. For treatment, see there, 39-40, 70; Abraham
Maimonides, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 1:115-19; Navo, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham,” 234-35; Amnon
Bazak, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam la-Torah,” in Teshurah le-ʿAmos: Asupat Meḥqarim
be-Farshanut ha-Miqra mugeshet le-ʿAmos Ḥakham, eds. Moshe Bar-Asher et al. (Alon Shvut: Tevunot,
2007), 117-18; and Labaton, “A Comprehensive Analysis,” 255-60. The terms qaṣd and gharaḍ in this
sense appear throughout the Commentary. For a similar claim, see Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed.
Freimann, 44-45 (§39). Compare the phrase “among the best explanations” (min ghurrar al-tafāsīr) used to
describe rabbinic interpretations; idem, The High Ways to Perfection of Abraham Maimonides, vol. 2, ed.
and trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), 2:348. This phrase appears in
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:404 (intro. to mSan, chap. 8).
766
 ;אם הלכה נקבל ואם לדין יש תשובהAbraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 223-25 (Ex.
2:1; see similarly there, 179 [Gen. 46:27]), concerning the midrash that Yokheved was born at the precise
moment Jacob’s family entered Egypt; mentioned in Bazak, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham,” 118. Abraham
also cited this phrase in Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 557 (Ex. 32:27), concerning the midrash that certain
letters that were carved in the stone tablets of the Ten Commandments were miraculously supported
(writing:  ;)ואלנקאלון ז"ל אכברand Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 299: ואן כאן פשאטיה דקרא אן ד'לך מת'ל קולה בין אב
 ;לבתו פאלאמור מנקולהֿ מקבולהֿ אם הלכה נקבלsee also below, n782.
767
 ;לכן שרח אלנקל גיר ד'לך ומעה וקופנא ואליה אנתהאינאAbraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg,
359 (Ex. 23:2); see Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot,” 64-65. On Ex. 23:2, see above, n576. He also wrote that
the translation of Targum Onqelos is based on manqūl, transmitted material; see below, n792. Note the
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contrasting Scripture’s peshaṭ or ẓāhir (literal or “plain” meaning) with the interpretation
suggested by “tradition” (naql). Regarding “You shall not steal” (Ex. 20:13), for example,
he explained, “the transmitters restrict (yukhaṣṣiṣūn) this prohibition to the kidnapping of
a Jew (see bSan 86a) … but, nevertheless, a biblical verse does not leave the realm of its
peshaṭ.”768 Similar comments led two contemporary scholars to conclude that Abraham
allowed for a “dual hermeneutic” of Scripture, accepting both a philological-contextual
reading and a reading guided by received tradition.769

Scripture and Tradition in Abraham Maimonides’ Kifāya and Responsa
Neither the responsa of Abraham Maimonides nor his Kifāya are preserved in
their totality, and though the Kifāya predominantly treats ethical and pietistic subjects and
only a fraction of its halakhic discussions are extant,770 what remains of these writings
comment that “the explanation of the translator (i.e., Onqelos) in this … is built on derived interpretation or
transmitted [material]; so too the interpretations of the Sages regarding it” ( ושרח אלמתרג'ם פי ד'לך ופי אכת'ר
 ;)הד'ה אלברכות מבני עלי תאויל [מסתנבט] או מנקול וכד'לך שרוח אלחכמים ז'ל' פיהאAbraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed.
Wiesenberg, 195 [Gen. 49:3]; see there, n16; noted in Labaton, “A Comprehensive Analysis,” 248.
768

 ומע ד'לך אין מקרא יוצא מידי...  ואלנאקלון ז'ל' יכ'צצון אלנהי בגונב נפש מישראל... פשטיה דקרא נהי ען כל סרקה
 ;פשוטוAbraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 219-21 (Ex. 20:13); noted in Labaton, “A

Comprehensive Analysis,” 250.
769
Harris, How do We Know This, 292n51; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation,
380n93, 390, 433n4, 445n3, 446n34, 467n29. According to both Harris and Cohen, this is closer to geonic
and earlier Andalusian approaches than to Maimonides’ approach. Both also focus on legal traditions;
Abraham in fact accepted received tradition in non-halakhic areas as well (see, e.g., above, n766). See also
Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 200-201n75. Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 390n39 (see also
401n48), argued that the fact that Abraham did not define peshaṭ as the ẓāhir sense of Scripture as rendered
by the halakhic tradition (i.e., Cohen’s understanding of Maimonides’ use of the term peshaṭ) led Abraham
to use the words peshaṭ and ẓāhir interchangeably; see above, n444.
770
Goitein, “Abraham Maimonides and His Pietist Circle,” 147, estimated the size of the Kifāya at
2500 pages of Judeo-Arabic text, a claim repeated in Daniel Frank, “Review of Nissim Dana, Rabbi
Abraham Ben Moshe Ben Maimon: Sefer ha-Maspik le-ʿOvdey ha-Shem,” JJS 40, no. 2 (1989): 254; and
Paul Fenton, “En marge du Kitâb Kifâyat al-ʿÂbidîn «La provision suffisante des serviteurs» de rabbi
Abraham ben Moïse Maïmonide,” REJ 150, no. 3-4 (1991): 386. Large parts of two of the original ten
sections of this work survive, published by Rosenblatt and Dana; Paul Fenton, “Dana’s Edition of Abraham
Maimuni’s Kifāyat al-ʿĀbidīn,” JQR 82, no. 1-2 (1991): 194. Several pieces of other sections survive, the
best known is a translation of the so-called Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal; on this section, see Cohen,
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include numerous discussions of the Oral Torah. Surviving texts provide at least a
tentative picture of Abraham’s views of revelation and the development of Jewish law.
In these texts, Abraham repeated conventional Rabbanite statements affirming
that extra-scriptural traditions determines the meaning of scriptural passages. Clear
statements to this effect appear in two responsa, written to the same correspondent,
regarding his father’s Sefer ha-Miṣvot.771 The first concerns the charge “Walk in His
ways” (Deut. 28:9), which Maimonides had counted as a distinct commandment. The
correspondent had suggested that this should have been excluded from the enumeration
by Maimonides’ own Principle Four, which precludes broad (ʿāmm; or, unrestricted)
verses from the count of 613.772 In his programmatic response, Abraham invoked what he
called the:
Great principle of the law (sharīʿa), through which we distinguish ourselves, the
community of the Rabbanites, from the position (or, school; madhhab) of the
Qaraites.773 This principle is that we do not rely on what the verse alone

“The Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 35-36; Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 139-40;
and Yaʿakov Elbaum, Le-Havin Divrei Ḥakhamim: Mivḥar Divrei Mavo la-Aggadah vela-Midrash, mi-shel
Ḥakhmei Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2000), 146-48. I also utilize Avraham Harkavy,
Ḥadashim Gam Yeshanim (Jerusalem: Karmiel, 1970), 202-203; Yeḥezkel David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim miSefer ‘ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem’ le-R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam,” Sinai 132 (2003): 3-38; Ḥayim
Sabbato, “Qeṭaʿ Ḥadash mi-Sefer ‘ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem’ le-R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam,”
Maʿaliyot 25 (2005): 22-30; idem, “Qeṭaʿ be-ʿInyanei Hashavat Aveidah mi-Sefer ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei haShem shel Rabbi Avraham ben ha-Rambam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 1:3-11; and Paul Fenton, “Torat haDevequt be-Mishnato shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam: Qeṭaʿim mi-tokh ha-Heleq ha-Avud shel haMaspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem,” Daʿat 50-52 (2003): 107-119 (which only includes a translation). Friedman
estimated that the Genizah contains over 60 unpublished responsa from Abraham’s pen; “Responsa of R.
Abraham Maimonides,” 31; and idem, “ʿAl Shut ha-Raʿavam u-Vnei Doro she-min ha-Genizah,” Bar Ilan
Annual 26-27 (1995): 260.
771
Abraham praised the author of these questions; see Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, xiv, 72.
772
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 18-19 (Prin. Four), 62-63 (Pos. 8); and Abraham
Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 65-66 (§63). On Principle Four, see above, n649.
773
This reference to Qaraites appears incongruous, as there is no evidence that his interlocutor had
Qaraite inclinations.
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(mujarrad al-naṣṣ) indicates, but on what the verse and tradition, together,
indicate.774
Abraham explained that even if the “apparent meaning” (ẓāhirihi) of “Walk in His ways”
were an exhortation that pertains to the entire law, “it would then be incumbent upon us
to believe” that it is a “restricted command” (amr khāṣṣ), because the “tradition clarified”
that the verse ordains specific deeds, i.e., the imitation of God’s traits.775 In the other
responsum, Abraham repeated the claim that Rabbanites do not “draw inferences” (lā
nastadill) solely from the “unaccompanied verse,” but from both Scripture and tradition
together. Abraham described this rule as “the sound principle … in legal matters” and a
“pillar upon which everything depends and a peg upon which everything hangs.”776
Like his father, Abraham maintained that hints to unwritten tradition could be
found in Scripture.777 He asserted, for example, that the singular word ot (sign) for the
arm phylactery and the plural ṭoṭafot (“frontlets”)778 for the head phylactery (Ex. 13:16)
shows that the former contains one compartment and the latter, multiple compartments,

774

אצל עט'ים פי אלשריעה ובה ננפצל נחן ג'מאעה אלרבאנין מן מד'הב אלקראיין וד'לך אלאצל הו אננא לא נתעמד עלי
 ;מא ידל עליה מג'רד אלנץ בל עלי מא ידל עליה אלנץ ואלנקל ג'מיעאon the term mujarrad, see below, n1142.
775
פלו אן הד'א אלנץ ידל ט'אהרה קטעא עלי אן אלקצד בה אמתת'אל ג'מלהֿ אלשריעהֿ ללזמנא אן נעתקד פיה אנה אמר
' ;כ'אץ למא בין אלנקל פיה מה הוא ניקרא חנון וכוAbraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 66-67 (§63). He

clarified that this verse ordains imitating God in “matters that pertain to character, as the tradition made
clear” ()אשיא מתעלקה באכ'לאק כמא צרח אלנקל. On the midrash cited here, see there, 67n13; and Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 37n18. This responsum is treated briefly in Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 343n168; and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 155n137; see also there, 294n36.
There is extensive literature on Maimonides’ understanding of this verse, see Howard Kreisel, “Imitatio
Dei in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 19, no. 2 (1994): 169-211; and the literature
cited there. On ʿāmm and khāṣṣ in Islamic legal literature, see above, n221; for use in geonic-era literature,
see above, nn280, 282, 289; see also above, n649.
776
אנא לא נסתדל במא ידל עליה מג'רד אלנץ בל [ב]מא ידל אלנץ ואלנקל ג'מיעא פאן הד'א אלאצל אלצחיח הו אלד'י
( תרתפע בה ג'ל אלשכוך בל כלהא אלטאריהֿ פי אלנצוץ פלא תנסאה לאנה פי אלפקה עמוד שהכל נשען עליו ויתד שהכל תלוי בוthe
printed text reads  ;)כמאAbraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 72 (§65). On the place of tradition,

note also David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 19 (discussing the signs of kosher and non-kosher animals).
777
For Maimonides’ approach, see above, nn538, 544, 633.
778
The meaning of this word is uncertain; see Yehudah B. Cohn, Tangled Up in Text: Tefillin and
the Ancient World (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2008), 38 esp. nn34-37.
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“as the tradition explained” (ka-mā bayyana al-naql).779 Yet in the Kifāya, as in the
Commentary, Abraham recognized that some traditions contradict Scripture’s ẓāhir or
peshaṭ.780 For this reason, like his father, Abraham wrote that a sage’s ability to release
vows is based solely on “the sound tradition” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ); he described the
scriptural support (asmakhta) for this law as “very weak” (ḍaʿīf bi-marra).781
In one noteworthy passage, Abraham asserted that a law may follow Scripture’s
“literal” meaning, notwithstanding received tradition. Noting that the “ẓāhir” meaning of
the prohibition against overcharging (onaʾah; Lev.25:14) is not limited to one type of
property, he observed that “the tradition explained and restricted” this prohibition (alnaql sharaḥahu wa-khaṣṣaṣahu) to moveable property (see mBM 4:9). In this case, he
cautioned his readers not to rely solely on the rabbinic reading (drash), but to consider
Scripture’s ẓāhir meaning and avoid any sort of overcharging. He wrote, “if it is a
tradition, we accept it,”782 but also cited the adage “a biblical verse does not leave the
realm of its peshaṭ,” arguing that one cannot overlook a verse’s ẓāhir meaning, despite
the “transmitted or derived interpretations” (tafāsīr manqūla aw mustakhraja).783

779
780

Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 261; see also, e.g., 260, 269, 273, 297, 299.
Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 262, 299, 302; see above, nn768-767.

781

והד'א אמר מנקול ואסנאדה ללנץ צ'עיף במרהֿ אעני לא יחל דברו הוא אינו מוחל אבל אחרים מוחלין לו הד'ה אסמכתא
 ;צ'עיפהֿ וחקיקהֿ אלאמר מא נצתה אלמשנה התר נדרים ושבועות פורחין באויר ואין להם על מה שיסמכוAbraham Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 303. See Blau, Dictionary, 655, s.v.  َمرّة. For similar usage of the term

asmakhta; see there, 299; idem, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 1:176 (describing an aggadic tradition); and
idem, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 347 (Ex. 22:4). At least one usage of this term may denote a matter that is
not received tradition; there, 263 (Ex. 12:17). For Maimonides’ view, see above, n674.
782
Compare above, n766.
783
Harkavy, Ḥadashim Gam Yeshanim, 202-203. Harkavy (204) inferred from this claim that
Abraham felt that the law should follow Scripture’s peshaṭ, irrespective of the Oral Torah. Rejecting this
interpretation, Carmiel Cohen, “ʿAl Odot Sefer ‘ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem’,” Maʿaliyot 25 (2005):
33n11, noted Abraham’s frequent deference to rabbinic tradition. While this is certainly correct, Cohen did
not fully account for this passage. On the term derashot, see below, n793.
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The Scope of Revelation and the Role of the Rabbis
Abraham’s understanding of the scope of revelation and of the role of rabbinic
legal activity must be inferred from passing comments in unrelated discussions. Several
times in the Kifāya, Abraham listed the elements that, in his view, constitute authoritative
legal sources.784 He occasionally cited the familiar division between written Scripture and
its transmitted interpretation;785 elsewhere, he was more expansive, writing, twice, that
“the text of the Pentateuch, the texts of the prophets, … and the statements of the sages
… prove” a particular argument,786 and referring in another place to “what the Pentateuch
commanded and [what] the practices (siyar) of the prophets and traditions of the
transmitters (āthār al-naqala) prove.”787 In another passage, Abraham added another
element, writing, “there is no controversy regarding this matter because qiyās (here:
reasoning) demands it, the express passages (nuṣūṣ) of the sages obligate it, and the
express passages of the prophets – nay, the express passages of the Pentateuch – prove
it.”788 Proofs from post-Mosaic prophets constitute the most unusual component in these

This paragraph benefits from the argument in Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī Have a Theory of ‘Four
Sources’ of Law?” 31-33. Compare the statements quoted above, n748.
785
E.g.,  ;ואד'א תאמל שריעהֿ בן סורר ומורה ומא ורד פי נצהא ומא תצ'מנה אלתפסיר פי נקלהאAbraham
Maimonides, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 2:218.
786
 ;פידל עלי ד'לך איצ'א נץ אלתורה ונצוץ אלאנביא ע' אלס' ואקאויל אלחכמים ז"לAbraham Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 139, 141.
787
' ;ומא אמרת בה אלתורה ודלת עליה סיר אלאנביא ואת'אר אלנקלהֿ על' אלסAbraham Maimonides, Sefer haMaspiq, ed. Dana, 155. Similarly: פי נץ הד'ה אלבריתא בל פי נץ אלאנביא אלד'י בינאה בל פי נץ אלתורה אלד'י עליה בנית
 ;הד'ה אלבריתאthere, 99 (Joseph Lowry suggested that  בינאהhere should perhaps be )בינהא. Abraham appears
– at least rhetorically – to distinguish between āthār and naql (tradition); הד'ה ברכת כהנים אלמאמור בהא וקתהא
 ;עלי מא שהד בה אלנקל ותצ'מנה אלאת'ר ודל עליה אלנץthere, 211. For the equation of prophetic and rabbinic āthār,
see there, 104.
788
 ;לא נזאע פיה לאן אלקיאס יקצ'יה ונצוץ אלחכמים ז"ל תוג'בה ונצוץ אלאנביא בל נצוץ אלתורה תדל עליהAbraham
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 168. I discuss Abraham’s use of the term qiyās below. Similarly:
( פמא ד'לך ממא יסתשהד עליה בנץ ולא בקיאסthere, 133); and ( פלאנה מכ'אלף לנץ אלאנביא ונץ אלחכמיםthere, 94).
784
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lists, as Rabbanites did not usually derive law from the Prophets or Writings.789 One
recent study has argued that Abraham turned to prophetic dictates because they – more
than the Pentateuch or rabbinic literature – corroborated his innovative, pietistic
practices.790
Passages from surviving texts of the Kifāya do not define the scope of Sinaitic,
extra-scriptural tradition. The Kifāya uses terms like naql (tradition) and tafsīr
(interpretation) to mark what the author regarded as Sinaitic traditions.791 Of particular
interest is Abraham’s reliance on Targum Onqelos, which in his view, and in that of his
father, contains numerous Sinaitic traditions.792
Abraham offered several tools to interpret rabbinic traditions that he labeled
“derashot” in the so-called Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal (Statement Concerning

789
For talmudic and Rabbanite views, see Urbach, “Halakhah u-Nevuʾah,” 12-21 (compare,
however, there, 8n65, with Shweke, “Luḥot ha-Even,” 350-51); and Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “Lo ba-Shamayim Hi,”
in Yad le-Gilat: Asupat Maʾamarim shel Yiṣḥaq Dov Gilat, eds. Israel Ta-Shma and Israel Gilat (Jerusalem:
Bialik, 2002), 140-44. For Maimonides’ view, see above, nn455, 506, 533, 538, 567, 577, 596, 612. For
Qaraite views, see Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim, 303-304; Aharon Dotan, “Ha-Omnam haya Ben-Asher
Qaraʾi?” Sinai 41 (1957): 287-88; Assaf, Tequfat ha-Geonim ve-Sifrutah, 121; Lasker “Maimonides’
Influence on Karaite Theories of Prophecy and Law,” 100n4, 106-113; idem, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal haRambam,” 155n53; and Yoram Erder and Meira Polliack, “Ha-Qanon ha-Qaraʾi be-Meʾot ha-teshiʿit ʿad
ha-aḥat ʿesreh le-Sefirat ha-Noṣrim,” Teʿudah 23 (2009): 197-210.
790
Elisha Russ-Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt: A Study of
Abraham Maimonides and His Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79.
791
See e.g., David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14 lines 7-8 (based on bRH 17a, cited in Maimonides’
Hilkhot Teshuvah, 3:6), 15 lines 14-15 (based on bSan 59b); and Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq,
ed. Dana, 218 (based on bSoṭ 38a), 274 (based on bRH 17b?). See also idem, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 41
(§34). Abraham even reported that the geonim transmit a tradition (yanqulūn), which may or may not be
Sinaitic, about the status of a particular food; David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 19 lines 7-8. Maimonides’
Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 1:19, was undoubtedly the source for this claim ()אמרו הגאונים שמסורת בידיהם.
792
See, e.g., Abraham Maimonides, ed. Rosenblatt, High Ways, 2:52, 2:390. Abraham relied on
Targum Onqelos extensively in his Commentary; see above, n767. On Maimonides’ use of Onqelos, see
above, n674. He appears to use the phrase “by way of interpretation” (fī sharḥ), like his father, to denote
Sinaitic tradition; see Abraham Maimonides, ed. Rosenblatt, High Ways, 1:174, 1:176, 2:42, 2:348; idem,
Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 174; idem, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 131 (§85), 139 (§95); Sabbato, “Qeṭaʿ
Ḥadash,” 5; idem, “Qeṭaʿ be-ʿInyanei Hashavat Aveidah,” 28; and David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 12 line 13.
This phrase also appears throughout his Commentary.
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Midrash of the Rabbis).793 Abraham described many derashot as “poetical conceits”
(nawādir al-shiʿrīya),794 and asserted that the authors of such midrashim would admit
that their creations did not relay the “true” meaning of Scripture. As evidence, he cited
the adage “Scripture stands alone and midrash stands alone” (miqra le-ḥud u-midrash leḥud). (Though he ascribed this to the rabbis, this saying does not appear in surviving
rabbinic literature.795) Abraham also warned readers not to assume that all of “the
interpretation of the verses” (sharḥ al-nuṣūṣ) are matters of tradition (naql); this would be
akin to the error of those who assume that “just as the principles of the law and the
traditions are transmitted, so too all of their [i.e., the rabbis] statements are transmitted.”
He explained that the comments made by rabbinic interpretations, both legal and nonlegal, addressed Scripture from many subtle perspectives: “[Regarding] their
interpretations of verses that are not connected (mutaʿalliqa) to the law (fiqh) and the
rules (aḥkām) – some of them are in the form of deduction (istinbāṭ) and weighing
alternatives (tarjīḥ), and some of them are in the form of rhetorical flourish (tanaddur)
and juristic preference (istiḥsān).”796

793

This text is primarily preserved in a medieval Hebrew translation, which the anonymous
translator reported was part of the Kifāya. A large part of the Judeo-Arabic original survives; see above,
n755. The term derashot has a narrow denotation in Maimonides’ writings, see above, n624.
794
In Guide, III:43, upon which Abraham based these comments, Maimonides explained that
some people consider midrashim to have the status of “poetical conceits” ( ;)עלי צורהֿ אלנואדר אלשעריהDalālat
al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Munk and Joel, 419; translation follows The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Pines, 573.
795
Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 149 lines 67-70. Hurvitz, 159n70, cited a similar
phrase in bḤul 137b and bʿAZ 45b; see however Shraga Abramson, Mi-pi Baʿalei Leshonot (Jerusalem:
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1988), 238. The text Abramson cited now appears in Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 127.
796
ולא תט'ן אן כל קול יקולה ז"ל פי שרח אלנצוץ הו נקל באידיהם כמא יט'ן ג'מאעה לא יצלוא לאלתחריר אן כמא אצול
אלפקה ואלרואיאת מנקולה כד'לך כל אקאוילהם ז"ל מנקולה בל אעלם אן שרוחהם ללנצוץ אלגיר מתעלקה באלפקה ואלאחכאם
 ;בעצ'הא עלי חכם אלאסתנבאט ואלתרג'יח ובעצ'הא עלי חכם אלתנדר ואלאסתחסאןHurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot

Ḥazal,” 149-50 lines 76-83. It is difficult to know how far to take this implied affirmation of the divine
basis of all extra-scriptural legal traditions.
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Singling out a prototypical example of a non-revealed interpretation, the rabbinic
debate concerning the content of what “Jethro heard” (Ex. 18:1), Abraham asserted that
the very existence of disagreement demonstrates that the rabbis’ suggestions could not
have been received tradition (naql).797
Passing remarks in the Kifāya also affirm Abraham’s conviction that humans
possess the authority to interpret revelation. In using words like qiyās (reasoning) and
istidlāl (drawing inferences) to characterize rabbinic activity, Abraham implied that the
rabbis had derived law by means of their intellects.798 His equation of a gezeirah shavah
with qiyās in one non-legal passage suggests that he may have regarded some, or all, such
derivations as post-Sinaitic.799 Abraham also unabashedly described the rabbis as the
source of particular laws,800 and he used the phrase (mi-)divrei sofrim (words or matters
of the scribes) to describe rabbinic enactments.801

Post-Talmudic Legal Development
Abraham frequently considered post-talmudic legal development in his responsa
and in the Kifāya. In several responsa, he utilized the terms uṣūl, principles or roots, and

Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 150 lines 86-94; for rabbinic sources, see there,
161n86. The last claim builds on Maimonidean arguments; see above, nn414, 417, 537.
798
For qiyās, see e.g., Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 92, 190; for istidlāl,
there, 65, 118, 318; for istimdād, there, 110, 317 (for geonic istimdād, there, 137); for istinbāṭ, there, 190.
799
Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 149 lines 51-52. Compare above, n697.
800
E.g., Abraham Maimonides, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 2:116, 2:162, 2:352.
801
E.g., Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 83, 227, 234, 271; idem, High Ways,
ed. Rosenblatt, 2:358; and idem, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 4, 8. Like his father, Abraham argued that despite
the fact that the Talmud identifies a scriptural source for the requirement to recite one hundred blessings a
day, this is a rabbinic obligation; Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 247; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 9 (Prin. One); Hilkhot Tefillah, 7:14.
797
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furūʿ, details or branches, to describe the relationship of texts and their interpretation.802
Thus, he wrote:
The judge (ḥākim) who only follows what is written (masṭūr) and explicit
(manṣūṣ) in his rulings is deficient and weak. [Acting] accordingly, he abolishes
their [i.e., the rabbis’] statement “a judge (dayan) only has what his eyes see”
(bSan 6b inter alia.). The matter is not like this. Rather, the written matters are the
principle (aṣl), and it behooves the judge (ḥākim) or jurisconsult (muftī) [treating]
them to exercise discretion (yataṣarraf), in accordance with each and every case,
and to compare (yaqīs) the law to its equivalent, and to bring forth details (yuntij
furūʿ) from these principles.803
In another context, Abraham described rabbinic statements as “the principle from which
all later [jurists] derive (istamadd) after them.”804
What may be Abraham’s most important remarks on post-talmudic legal
development appear in his attempts to preempt challenges to one of his pietistic reforms,
the increased use of prostration in prayer.805 Given the staunch opposition to Abraham’s

802

On these terms, see below, n899.

803

אלחאכם מתי כאן לא יתבע פי אחכאמה אלא אלמסטור ואלמנצוץ פקט עג'ז וכל ובחסב ד'לך יסקט קולהם אין לדיין
ֿאלא מה שעיניו רואות וליס אלאמר כד'לך בל אלאמור אלמסטורהֿ הי אלאצל וינבגי ללחאכם או אלמפתי אן יתצרף פיהא בחסב ואקעה
 ;ואקעהֿ ויקיס אלחכם לנט'ירה וינתג' פרוע מן תלך אלאצולAbraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 96 (§78);

see the lengthy deployment of uṣūl and furūʿ in that responsum, 98-101. Maimonides cited this adage in
Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 23:9; and Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 1:1 (§1), 2:640 (§365); see also Hilkhot Sheʾeilah uFiqadon, 6:4 ()ואין לו לדיין אלא מה שדעתו סומכת עליו.
804
 ;ויקצד אלשואהד מן קול רבותינו ז"ל אלתי הי אלאצל אלד'י אסתמד מנה כל מתאכ'ר בעדהםAbraham
Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 115 (§82); similar statements appear there, 96 (§78), 172 (§104;
though the editors noted that the text of the relevant manuscript is unclear). On the first of these responsa,
see Friedman, “Responsa of R. Abraham Maimonides,” 35-40; idem, “ʿAl Shut ha-Raʿavam,” 261-62; and
idem, “Masa u-Matan bein Ḥakham mi-Teiman le-R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam ʿal Kesef ha-Ketubah veʿal Samkhut ha-Masoret,” Teʿudah 14 (2008): 139-65.
805
On Abraham Maimonides’ prayer reforms, see Naphtali Wieder, Hashpaʿot Islamiyot ʿal haPulḥan ha-Yehudi (Oxford: Sifriyat Mizraḥ u-Maʿarav, 1947), passim; Goitein, “Abraham Maimonides and
His Pietist Circle,” 162-64; Friedman, “Abraham Maimuni’s Prayer Reforms,” 139-54; idem, “Maḥloqet
le-Sheim Shamayim,” 245-98; Elisha Russ-Fishbane, “The Maimonidean Legacy in the East: A Study of
Father and Son,” JQR 102, no. 2 (2012): 190-223; and idem, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval
Egypt, 158-84. On bowing specifically, see also Y. Tzvi Langermann, “From Private Devotion to
Communal Prayer New Light on Abraham Maimonides’ Synagogue Reforms,” Ginzei Qedem 1 (2005):
31-49.
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pietistic program, it is unlikely that this was a theoretical exercise.806 Abraham claimed
that he was simply restoring biblical and rabbinic practice, but his opponents charged him
with imitating contemporary Muslims, in violation of the prohibition against imitating
gentiles (Lev. 20:23).807
The first charge that Abraham anticipated was that his proposed innovations
violated the mishnaic (mPes 4:1) exhortation to refrain from observing customs808 that
are at variance with local practice lest disputes arise. The obligation to maintain accepted
practice, he suggested, might be particularly acute because earlier scholars had tacitly
endorsed the status quo by not opposing it.809 Abraham sought to pre-empt such a charge
in two ways. In the first (echoed in the [lost] Introduction to the Kifāya), he argued that
there is no obligation to uphold accepted practice in the face of evidence proving its
deficiency, even if the practice is widespread or ancient. He explained that later scholars,
In addition to the sources in the previous and next notes, see S.D. Goitein, “A Treatise in
Defence of the Pietists by Abraham Maimonides,” JJS 16, no. 3-4 (1965): 108-114; idem, “New
Documents from the Cairo Geniza,” in Homenaje a Millas-Vallicrosa, ed. Roberto Almagià (Barcelona:
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1954), 1:707-713; Cohen, “The Soteriology of R.
Abraham Maimuni,” 76-78; Obadiah ben Abraham Maimonides, The Treatise of the Pool (al-Maqāla alḤawḍiyya), ed. Paul Fenton (London: Octagon Press, 1981), 12-19; Paul Fenton, Deux traités de mystique
juive (Paris: Lagrasse, 1987), 81-89; idem, “Tefillah baʿad ha-Rashut u-Reshut baʿad ha-Tefillah: Zuṭot
min ha-Genizah,” Mi-Mizraḥ umi-Maʿarav: Qoveṣ Meḥqarim be-Toldot ha-Yehudim be-Mizraḥ uveMaghreb 4 (1984): 17-21; Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah ule-Minhagei Tefillah EreṣYisraeliyim be-Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot she-min ha-Genizah,” in Keneset Ezra: Sifrut ve-Ḥayim be-Veit haKeneset, Asupat Maʾamarim Mugeshet le-Ezra Fleischer, eds. Shulamit Elizur et al. (Jerusalem: Yad BenẒvi, 1994), 71-85; and idem, “Abraham Maimonides on His Leadership,” 500-510. See also below, n809.
807
On Abraham’s response to this charge, see Wieder, Hashpaʿot Islamiyot, 55-57; Cohen “The
Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 85-86; Paul Fenton, “Deux écoles piétistes: les hasidei Ashkenaz et
les soufis juifs d’Égypte,” in La société juive à travers l'histoire, ed. Shmuel Trigano (Paris: Fayard,
1992), 221; idem, “Abraham Maimonides (1186-1237): Founding a Mystical Dynasty,” in Jewish Mystical
Leaders and Leadership in the 13th Century, ed. Moshe Idel (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1998), 151;
and Russ-Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt, 76-85.
808
He used the Hebrew minhag and the Arabic ʿāda (and their plurals) interchangeably to denote
“custom.”
809
Both of these claims also appear in R. Joseph rosh ha-seder’s responsum regarding the attempt
on the part of Babylonian Rabbanites to alter the practices of the Palestinian Rabbanite community in
Fusṭāṭ; see Friedman, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah,” 88 line 9, 89 line 2.
806
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at times, clarified matters that were opaque to earlier ones by “improving what had not
been improved and deriving (yastanbiṭ) what had not been derived, because the earlier
ones were engaged in other matters.”810 In Abraham’s view, this explains why all accept
the post-talmudic principle that the law follows later authorities (hilkheta ke-batrai),
notwithstanding the talmudic statement (bYom 9b) “the fingernails of the earlier ones are
larger than the stomachs of the later ones.”811 This, he wrote, is not due to the perfection
(kamāl) of later ones but due to the fact that later authorities “examine (yanẓuru fī) the
statements of the earlier ones, build upon them, take from them, and bring forth (yuntij)
conclusions according to the rules of reasoning (qawānīn al-qiyās).”812 Abraham made a
similar point in the first of his seven preambles to the Kifāya (now lost), which addressed
the development of Jewish law. He argued, there, that later generations may be superior
to earlier ones in certain respects and, for this reason, might be qualified to alter
particular religious practices.813
Abraham thus argued that it would be illogical to reject a novel legal opinion
solely because it was not held by earlier generations. Indeed, he noted, the history of
post-talmudic legal discourse proves this: Later geonim challenged earlier geonim, Alfasi
challenged his predecessors Hayya Gaon and Nissim of Qayrawān, and Ibn Migash

810
811

.ויתפרג לתנקיח מא לם ינקחה ויסתנבט מא לם יסתנבטה ד'אך אלמתקדם לאשתגאלה בסואה
 ;גדול צפרנן שלראשונים יתר מכריסן שלאחרוניםAbraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 177.

Most manuscripts of bYom 9b have “better” (ṭovah) rather than larger (gadol); MS. Vatican 134 has
gedolah. On this post-talmudic principle, see Stampfer, “‘Hilkheta ke-Batrai’,” 417-25; compare above,
n265.
812
' ;אלמתאכ'ר ינט'ר פי אקאויל אלמתקדמין ויבני עליהא ויאכ'ד' מנהא וינתג' פיהא בקואנין אלקיאס נתאיגAbraham
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 176-77.
813
See Abraham’s discussion of this preamble in Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 177, 183. For an
outline of the contents of the Kifāya, see Cohen, “The Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 89-96, 33-40;
and Fenton, “Dana’s Edition,” 197-99.
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challenged his teacher Alfasi. And though Maimonides called these figures (Alfasi and
Ibn Migash?814) “my teachers” (rabbotai) in the Mishneh Torah, he disagreed with them
in a number of places.815 Abraham insisted that scholars, unlike ignoramuses, recognize
that such disagreements do not constitute censure (intiqād), but are the expected outcome
of intellectual discourse.816
The other way in which Abraham sought to pre-empt criticisms of his innovations
was by narrowing the scope of practices covered by the mishnaic injunction cited above.
According to Abraham, the exhortation to uphold local custom applies exclusively to
customs that lack either a textual or logical basis, to customs that qiyās ([textual]
reasoning) neither supports nor rejects, and to customs that are based on local business
practice.817 In such cases, he explained, “custom overrides (lit., abolishes) law” (minhag
mevaṭel halakhah; jYeb 12:1 [12c]; jBM 7:1 [11b]). Abraham asserted, however, that
accepted practice has no say regarding matters that are “religiously mandated” (wājiba fī
al-dīn). He did not offer a detailed definition of this last category, but implied that either
text (naṣṣ) or reasoning (qiyās) might impose obligations that would result in the
overturning of custom by law.818

The referent of the phrase “these figures” is not entirely clear.
For disagreements with “rabbotai,” see Hilkhot Geirushin, 9:31; Hilkhot Mekhirah, 29:17;
Hilkhot Zekhiyah u-Matanah, 3:8; Hilkhot Shluḥin ve-Shutafin, 6:4-5; Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh, 27:1; and
Hilkhot Ṭoʿen ve-Niṭʿan, 3:2, 3:7. Abraham added that Maimonides even disagreed with his own father; see
Hilkhot Sheḥitah, 11:10.
816
Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 177-78.
817
In the first category, he offered the example in mPes 4:1 of not performing labor before noon
on the eve of Passover; in the second, lighting candles for the Day of Atonement; and in the third, quoted
the statement that “everything follows local practice” (ha-kol ke-minhag ha-medinah) in financial matters
(mKet 6:4; mBB 1:1).
818
Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 178-79; see similarly there, 98. In the
remainder of this section, he vociferously criticized the appointment of prayer leaders who, in his view, are
unfit and, citing his father, certain customs observed in the Palestinian synagogue in Fusṭāṭ (179-81). See
814
815
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Abraham was also concerned to forestall the charge that additional prostrations
during prayer cannot be required, even if the need for them is derived using qiyās,
because the practice lacks explicit rabbinic support. Abraham offered both a “general”
(kullī) and “particular” (juzʾī) answer in anticipation of this challenge. The general
answer (which he reportedly discussed, as well, in the [lost] Introduction to the Kifāya)
divided rabbinic law regarding acts of divine worship (ʿibādāt) into three classes:
explicitly forbidden acts, explicitly mandated acts, and acts neither forbidden nor
required.819 In his words, those in the last category are:
Left to the form of that which reasoning establishes (ʿalā mā yuʿṭīhi al-qiyās)820
and to that which the verses of [holy] writings (nuṣūṣ al-kutub), the traditions of
the transmitters (āthār al-nāqilīn), and rules of reasoning (qawānīn al-qiyās)
indicate (yadullu) regarding their obligation or rejection. Therefore, we have
discussed them using speculative reason and evidence.821
Abraham acknowledged that strong evidence from rabbinic literature might lead his
conclusions to be overturned. Short of that, he would rebuff unpersuasive arguments with
reasoning and evidence.822

Friedman, “Maḥloqet le-Sheim Shamayim,” 256-76 (for earlier scholarship, see there, 259nn61-62); idem,
“Abraham Maimuni’s Prayer Reforms,” 144-48; idem, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah,” 74-76; Ezra Fleischer,
Tefillah u-Minhagei Tefillah Ereṣ-Yisraeliyim bi-Tequfat ha-Genizah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), 215-29;
and Russ-Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt, 16. For Maimonides’ position on
piyuṭ, which formed part of this controversy, see below, n856. On the place of custom, see also Abraham
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 92: וליס אלמנהג הו אלאצל אלד'י יג'ב אן יעתמד עליה בל אלנץ או אלקיאס או
מג'מועהא פאן וג'ד אלמנהג מבניא עלי אלואג'ב אסתמר עליה ואן וג'ד עלי גיר אלואג'ב רג'ע ענה אלי אלואג'ב.
819
Examples in the first category include reciting an unnecessary blessing and changing the text
(maṭbeiʿa) of blessings; the second, praying three times a day and reciting the blessings surrounding the
shmaʿ. For the third, see what follows.
820
See Blau, Dictionary, 443, s.v.  عطوIV.
821
פהי באקיהֿ עלי צורהֿ מא יעטיה אלקיאס וידל עליהא נצוץ אלכתב ואת'אר אלנאקלין וקואנין אלקיאס מן איג'אבהא או
.אנכארהא ולד'לך תנאולנאהא באלנט'ר ואלדליל
822

Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 181-82. For R. Joseph rosh ha-seder’s
similar claim, also made in the context of pietistic prayer reform, see Friedman, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah,” 91
lines 17-18.
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In the more “particular” answer, Abraham pointed readers to his detailed
discussion of prostration.823 He added that other prayer practices, like the reading of Ps.
92 on the Sabbath and of 1 Chron. 16:8-36 and selections from Psalms each morning,
similarly lack any basis in rabbinic literature, but no “gaon, sage (ḥakham), or
jurisconsult (muftī)” ever criticized their recitation. The fact that the blessings of barukh
she-amar and yishtabaḥ (recited before and after these passages) do not appear in the
Talmud, wrote Abraham, constitutes even more compelling proof for the permissibility of
adding to divine worship.824 (This endorsement of these two post-talmudic blessings
appears to be in tension with the Kifāya’s criticism, elsewhere, of the “blessing of
virginity.” There, Abraham noted that this blessing lacks talmudic support and asserted
that post-talmudic authorities may not institute a new blessing that uses the standard
blessing formula.825)
Abraham’s conviction that jurists in the post-talmudic period must use reasoning
and textual arguments to reach legal conclusions is expressed in the Kifāya and in his
responsa, but is most elaborately presented in his defense of pietistic prayer reforms.

823

See Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 117-47.
Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 182-83.
825
I.e., be-sheim u-malkhut, mentioning God’s name and sovereignty; Abraham Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 232. See the similar tension discussed in Robert Brody, “Saadya Gaon on the
Limits of Liturgical Flexibility,” in Genizah Research after Ninety Years, 41-43. On this blessing and
Maimonides’ opposition to it, see A. Marmorstein, “The Jewish ‘Blessing of Virginity’,” JJS 1 (1948): 3334; Israel Ta-Shma, “Teshuvat ha-Rambam be-ʿInyan Birkat Betulim,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1992): 915; repr. in idem, Ha-Tefillah ha-Ashkenazit ha-Qedumah: Peraqim be-Ofyah uve-Toldoteha (Jerusalem:
Magnes, 2003), 181-87; idem, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-Qadmon, 44n90; Gerald Blidstein, Ha-Tefillah beMishnato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1994), 126, 132, 135; Ruth Langer, “The Birkat
Betulim: A Study of the Jewish Celebration of Bridal Virginity,” PAAJR 61 (1995): 53-94; idem, To
Worship God Properly: Tensions Between Liturgical Custom and Halakhah in Judaism (Cincinnati:
Hebrew Union College Press, 1998), 60-73; and Anat Kutner, “Birkat Asher Ṣag: Gilgulei Berakhah sheNeʿelamah,” Granot 3 (2003): 179-87.
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Abraham’s remarks on this topic rely heavily upon perspectives expressed by his father;
namely, Maimonides’ cognizance of the inherent ambiguities of textual interpretation and
his valorization of human reasoning in the evolution of law.826

Conclusion
Maimonides’ revolutionary attempt to limit the scope of revelation and to broaden
the purview of post-Sinaitic contributions to Jewish law evoked considerable anxiety; an
early testimony to this is the criticisms that Daniel ha-Bavli leveled against Principles
One and Two in Maimonides’ Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot. The tone of Daniel’s
comments and his assertion that all middot-based laws were, in fact, revealed at Sinai,
suggest that Maimonides’ claims offended Daniel’s “religious sensibility;”827 Daniel
simply could not countenance the idea that the vast preponderance of Jewish law is manmade. The above analysis shows, however, that Maimonides influenced Daniel’s
understanding of the geonim, and, at least terminologically, his description of rabbinic
activity.828 While Daniel understood that Maimonides had successfully demolished the
geonic-era approach to revelation, he rejected the Maimonidean system, as it unduly
minimized God’s role in the creation of Jewish law.

On Maimonides’ view, in addition to the discussion in Chapter Two, see Cohen, “Ha-Biṭuy
‘Bāb/Abwāb al-Taʾwīl’,” 174-75.
827
In seeking to explain the bitterness of Naḥmanides reaction to Principle Two in Sefer haMiṣvot, Blidstein asked if Naḥmanides was concerned that Maimonides’ system fails to account for the
“academic dialectics of the Talmud” or if Maimonides’ approach offended Naḥmanides’ “religious
sensibility”; “Oral Law as Institution,” 172. In the English version of this article, he left this as an open
question, but in the Hebrew version (“Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 21), he preferred the first option.
828
As Harry Wolfson noted, “beliefs and ideas ride on the back of terms”; The Philosophy of the
Kalam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 70-71; see Lobel, Between Mysticism and
Philosophy, 6, 183n14.
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In defending his father’s understanding of the Oral Torah, Abraham Maimonides
forcefully rebuffed all of Daniel’s criticisms. By contrast, Abraham’s reactions to
Daniel’s critique of other Principles were often more measured. (These will be treated in
Chapters Four and Five of this dissertation.) Abraham’s assertions are frequently difficult
to parse, however; the polemical nature of his exchange with Daniel may have led him to
make sweeping or ambiguous statements in order to vindicate Maimonides. He may also
have recognized problems with his father’s depiction of revelation and of the rabbis, but
preferred not to acknowledge them.
Abraham’s later writings evince sustained interest in the mechanics of the Oral
Torah and a strong commitment to his father’s understanding of the scope of revelation
and rabbinic tradition. He employed Maimonides’ arguments to great effect in many of
his writings, particularly when justifying his own pietistic reforms.
Subsequent research may explore the ways in which Abraham used rabbinic
traditions, in both legal and non-legal discussions, in the Commentary and in the Kifāya.
Further analysis might also clarify how differences of emphasis and framing between
Maimonides and Abraham reflect the commonalities and divergences in their respective
corpora.
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Chapter Four: Creating Commandment-Units
Introduction
The challenge of selecting those laws that comprise the list of the 613
commandments was one of the most enduring problems of enumeration. Those who
attempted to list 613 commandments encountered numerous difficulties, for there is
apparent arbitrariness to the number 613, rabbinic literature offers no guidance,829 and the
Talmud seems to assume that innumerable laws are biblical in status.830 These and other
challenges motivated one Rabbanite to suggest that 613 is “an approximation” (ʿala sabīl
al-taqrīb),831 and another to write that “the number is roughly (naḥwa) 613
commandments (sharīʿa).”832 Such a perspective is implicit in lists that contain fewer
than 613 entries,833 among them, perhaps, the earliest attempt at enumeration.834 This
chapter, however, focuses on the methodologies of those who attempted to identify

829

As Naḥmanides noted at length; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel 1-7 (Prin. One); see
similarly Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 225 (concluding remarks). See also below, n907. Blidstein, “Where Do
We Stand,” 25: “the Talmud, needless to say, does not really consider the problem of what a mizvah is for
[the purpose of enumeration].”
830
The importance of this problem for Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot is noted in Peritz, “Das Buch
der Gesetze,” 1:440-42; and Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 461-62. Bloch, “Les 613 Lois,” 198200, noted the general challenges of enumeration.
831
Fuchs, Studien über Abu Zakaria Jachja, xxiii; and Perez, “Commentary on Numbers &
Deuteronomy,” 63. See also Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 225 (concluding remarks).
832
 ;אלעדד נחו תרי"ג שריעהBaḥya, Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ, 23 (introduction); note Kafiḥ’s
attempt to reread this, there, 23n12. Elsewhere, Baḥya did not qualify this number; 137 (2:3), 427 (10:7).
See similarly Gersonides, Peirushei ha-Torah le-Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom, ed. Yaʿaqov Leib Levi
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1992-1998), 2:76 (Ex. 12).
833
Avraham Oḥayon, “Ha-Omnam Taryag Miṣvot?” Shaʾanan: Shenaton ha-Mikhlalah ha-Datit
le-Ḥinukh 14 (2009): 94, pointed out that Eliezar ben Samuel of Metz’s Sefer Yireʾim counts 417
commandments, and that it is difficult to imagine that Isaac of Corbeil, who listed 320 commandments for
the post-Temple era in his Sefer Miṣvot Qatan, could have found 293 Temple-era commandments.
834
The piyuṭ titled Atah hinḥalta; see Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 36 (introductory pagination).
Saʿadya already noticed this; see above, n60. Ephraim of Bonn (1132-97) made a similar complaint; see
Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 42n150. Compare Maimonides’ statement that “nobody who
enumerated the commandments ever doubted the number 613” ( והד'א מא לא יג'הלה אחד מן כל מן עד אלמצות אעני
 ;אנהא הד'א עדדהאSefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 7 [introduction]; emphasis added).
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exactly 613 commandments. While central to any enumeration project, this problem is
irrelevant to applied law.
Enumerators faced the problem of identifying what constitutes a
“commandment.” To take two examples (treated below), the Pentateuch (Num. 9:4-13)
provides an opportunity for those unable to offer the paschal sacrifice at its designated
time to do so one month later. Is this law, known in rabbinic literature as pesaḥ sheini, the
second paschal sacrifice (see mPes chaps. 8-9), a distinct commandment, or is it part of
the commandment to offer the paschal sacrifice in its time (Ex. 12:6)? Are the head and
arm phylacteries to be counted as one or as two commandments? According to Moses
ben Joseph di Trani (Salonika, Safed; 1505-85), the “vast majority” (rov kol) of the
debates between Maimonides and Naḥmanides over the enumeration of the
commandments turn on the question of when a specific “law” constitutes a distinct
commandment.835 Gerald Blidstein termed the groups of laws listed as “commandments”
in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot “mizvah-units”836 (“commandment-units”), and I use
this term throughout this chapter.
Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem pointed to a similarity between the challenge of reducing
Jewish law to 613 commandments and a concept in legal theory known as
“individuation,” which divides a legal system into distinct laws.837 The philosopher and
jurist, Jeremy Bentham (England; 1748-1832), was the first to reflect on the individuation

835

di Trani, Qiryat Sefer, 9a (introduction, §6).
Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 14.
837
See Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel Ḥuqqim,” 95-97; idem, “Maimonides’
Fourteen Roots,” 3-7; and idem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora,” 179-80, 188. Friedberg drew on this concept
in his study of Sefer ha-Miṣvot; Crafting the 613 Commandments, 50-52. See also Michael Abraham,
“Kelalav shel ha-Rambam le-Minyan ha-Miṣvot,” 1:146-49.
836
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of laws. Bentham had a longstanding interest in the determination of what constitutes a
“whole law.”838 In his earliest work, he attacked the compiler of English Common Law,
William Blackstone (1723-80), for having failed to distinguish between “one law” and its
constituent parts.839 Bentham sought to replace Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws
of England with a more progressive code, called the “Pannomion.”840 This nevercompleted work was to be organized around distinct laws, so that “the precise number …
might be counted, were it to answer any purpose.”841 Bentham struggled at length to
identify “a compleat law,”842 but, as one prominent modern reader noted, never presented
a clear way to do so.843 Still, in broad terms, Bentham’s search for a “whole law” may be
analogous to the problem of identifying distinct commandment-units.844

838

Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. Philip Schofield
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 168.
839
Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, eds. J.H.
Burns and H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 72 (emphasis in original). On Bentham’s attack
on Blackstone, see Richard A. Posner, “Blackstone and Bentham,” Journal of Law and Economics 19, no.
3 (1976): 569-71; and David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in
Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 257-62.
840
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, eds. J.H. Burns
and H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 305; see David Lieberman, “From Bentham to
Benthamism,” The Historical Journal 28, no. 1 (1985): 205. On Bentham’s penchant for neologisms, see
H.F. Pitkin, “Slippery Bentham: Some Neglected Cracks in the Foundation of Utilitarianism,” Political
Theory 18, no. 1 (1990): 105.
841
Bentham, Limits, 269. Bentham similarly wrote that “the number and description, then, of the
several laws of which the system is composed being once given, the whole code will be given likewise: the
parts or contents of it will be an object of arithmetic” (Limits, 222). David Lieberman argued that Bentham
was interested in what constitutes a “whole law” in order to provide “the proper means for comprehending
the nature of the legal system as a whole and for evaluating the merits of its parts” (The Province of
Legislation Determined, 277). For alternative interpretations, see M.H. James, “Bentham on the
Individuation of Laws,” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 24, no. 3 (1973): 357-70; and A.M. Honoré,
“Real Laws,” in Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart, eds. P.M.S. Hacker and
Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 102-103; and below, n844.
842
See Bentham, Limits, 168-97, 268-70.
843
H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1982), 107, 125; and idem, “Bentham on Legal Powers,” The Yale Law Journal 81, no. 5
(1972): 814n44, 815, 819.
844
Joseph Raz used the concept of individuation to solve problems in legal philosophy, arguing
that the perennial question “what is law?” is unintelligible without first understanding what comprises a
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This chapter begins with a brief review of passages and terms in rabbinic
literature that are germane to the question of what constitutes a “complete law,” although
there is little discussion of these texts in medieval reflections on the enumeration of the
commandments. I then turn to the surviving pre-Maimonidean discussions of what
constitutes a “commandment.” Next, I analyze Maimonides’ system for the identification
of the 613 commandment-units through philological examination of Principles Seven,
Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen in the Introduction to his Sefer ha-Miṣvot. I
conclude with the relevant discussions from the exchange between Daniel ha-Bavli and
Abraham Maimonides.
Throughout this chapter, I use words like “law” and “rule” to denote part of a
“commandment-unit.” I am aware that this leaves open the question of what constitutes a
distinct “law,” but am unable, at present, to find better terms for conveying this concept.

Background in Rabbinic Literature
Though the idea that God gave 613 commandments appears in the Talmud (bMak
23b), nowhere does the Talmud discuss how these commandments are to be identified.845
Several talmudic concepts pertain to the division of laws into distinct units, however.
Ben-Menaḥem drew attention to mHor 1:3, where the Mishnah discusses cases in which

complete law; “Legal Principles and the Limits of the Law,” The Yale Law Journal 81, no. 5 (1972): 82332; and idem, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of a Legal System, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 70-91, 141-46. See the criticism in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 71-80. In applying individuation to
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Ben-Menaḥem followed Raz and claimed that individuation is a “purely
theoretical” endeavor that “proffers a mode of dividing the totality of material constituting a legal system
into separate units”; “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 3-4.
845
See above, n829.
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the court erroneously rules against laws that the rabbis considered to be biblical in
status.846 It reads:
If the [members of the] court gave a decision uprooting an entire principle (kol
ha-guf): if they said, “There is nothing in the Pentateuch concerning the
menstruant,” [or] “There is nothing in the Pentateuch concerning the Sabbath,”
[or] “There is nothing in the Pentateuch concerning idolatry,” they are not
culpable. If they gave a decision that in part annulled and in part sustained [a
biblical law], they are culpable. How? If they said, “Laws concerning the
menstruant are in the Pentateuch, but if a man has intercourse with a woman who
awaits day against day (shomeret yom ke-neged yom)847 he is not culpable”; [or if
they said,] “Laws concerning the Sabbath are in the Pentateuch, but if a man
carries from a private domain to a public domain he is not culpable;” [or if they
said,] “Laws concerning idolatry are in the Pentateuch, but if a man bows [before
an idol], he is not culpable,” they [i.e., members of the court] are culpable, for it is
written “if something is hidden” (Lev. 4:13) [offer an atoning sacrifice] –
“something,” but not an entire principle.848
This Mishnah assumes that an “entire principle” can be distinguished from its parts. As
Ben-Menaḥem noted, the broad themes of menstruation, the Sabbath, and idolatry contain
many discrete rules. He added that the Tosefta and Jerusalem Talmud seem to define “an
entire principle” differently than the Mishnah.849
A second relevant concept in rabbinic literature is the idea that laws can be part of
one topic (sheim eḥad).850 In two debates (mKer 3:6, 4:4), one view holds that two sin
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Note that not all of the examples in this Mishnah are explicit in the Pentateuch; see
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:472-73 (mHor 1:3).
847
A woman who has the status of shomeret yom ke-neged yom has experienced flow during the
eleven days that follow her seven prescribed days of uncleanness (Lev. 15:19), and awaits a complete day
of cleanness.
848
הורו בית דין לעקור את כל הגוף אמרו אין נדה בתורה אין שבת בתורה אין עבודה זרה בתורה הרי אלו פטורין הורו
לבטל מקצת ולקיים מקצת הרי אלו חייבין כיצד אמרו יש נדה בתורה אבל הבא על שומרת יום כנגד יום פטור יש שבת בתורה אבל
המוציא מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים פטור יש עבודה זרה בתורה אבל המשתחוה פטור הרי אלו חייבין שנאמר ונעלם דבר דבר ולא כל
 ;הגוףtranslation based on Danby, The Mishnah, 462, with slight changes.
849
See tHor 1:7 and jHor 1:3 (45d). Ben-Menaḥem, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel Ḥuqqim,” 101-103; and
idem, “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 11-13. One could divide the laws of the Sabbath according to the 39
labors and the laws of idolatry according to methods of worship (see bSab 71a-72a and bSan 82a).
850
The concept of sheim eḥad appears to be related to the rabbinic division between avot and
toladot (principle and derivative categories); see Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, 107-108. On sheim eḥad,
see there, 103-107, 144-59. Compare the general comments about tractate Keritot in Federico Dal Bo,
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offerings are incurred for the simultaneous violation of two laws, but another view posits
that the inadvertent sinner needs to bring only one sacrifice because the laws fall into the
same category. The second view relies on some method to include discrete laws in one
category.
An Amoraic question of whether multiple prohibitions may come together in a
single situation (isur ḥal ʿal isur)851 presupposes that discrete laws can be included in one
category. According to some interpretations, this problem concerns the number of
punishments incurred for violating multiple prohibitions in a single act. For example, the
Talmud (bQid 77a) wonders if a High Priest who marries a woman who is both a
divorcée and a widow (see Lev. 21:14) is punished once or twice.852 This issue turns, in
part, on the classification of prohibitions and the identification of distinct laws.
In setting forth his enumeration of the commandments, Maimonides was
concerned with the multivalent term miṣvah (lit., commandment). This term has many
meanings in rabbinic literature, but it does not seem to mean “discrete commandment.”853

“‘Women to Think With’: Sexual Transgressions as Heuristics in bKeritot 17a-20a,” in A Feminist
Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud V: Introduction to Seder Qodashim, eds. Tal Ilan et al. (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 241. See also below, n1107.
851
For treatment, see de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 60-68; and Encyclopedia
Talmudit, s.v. ein isur ḥal ʿal isur, 1:581-91.
852
See Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. ein isur ḥal ʿal isur, 1:581-82.
853
In fact, I have found no evidence of this usage. On this term, see Zvi Hirsch Chajes comments
to bBer 4b s.v. af ʿal pi; Zvi Pereṣ Chayes, “Hagahot le-Masekhet Berakhot,” in Festschrift zu Israel
Lewy’s siebzigstem Geburtstag, eds. M. Brann and J. Elbogen (Breslau, 1911), 174 (Hebrew section); Saul
Lieberman, “Tiqunei Yerushalmi,” 6, no. 1 (1934): 97-99; Gedaliah Alon, “Shevut, Reshut, Miṣvah,”
Tarbiẓ 7, no. 3 (1936): 135-42; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 50-59; Simon Greenberg, “The
Multiplication of the Mitzvot,” in Mordecai Kaplan Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his Seventieth
Birthday, ed. Moshe Davis (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1953), 384-89 (esp. Louis
Ginzberg’s comments cited there, 388n37); Urbach, Ḥazal, 297-301, esp. 297n77; Marc Hirschman,
“Miṣvah u-Sekharah be-Mishnah uve-Tosefta: le-Darkhah shel Maḥshevet Ḥazal,” Proceedings of the
World Congress of Jewish Studies, 10, Division C Vol. 1: Jewish Thought and Literature (1989): 54-60;
Robert Goldenberg, “Law and Spirit in Talmudic Religion,” in Jewish Spirituality from the Bible through
the Middle Ages, ed. Arthur Green (New York: Crossroad, 1986-1987), 1:236; Aharon Shemesh, “Le238

In his Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides frequently argued that a specific law constitutes a
distinct commandment because the rabbis termed it a “miṣvah” (see below). However,
this claim is difficult to maintain, as many have pointed out.854

Pre-Maimonidean Attempts to Create Commandment-Units
Early Liturgical Enumerations
The authors of azharot (“warnings”), liturgical poems that enumerate the
commandments, appear to have been the first to list the 613 commandments.855 In the
introduction to his Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides described these authors as “poets, not
jurists,”856 even though at least two, Saʿadya ben Joseph Gaon and Isaac ben Reuben alBargeloni (c. 1043 - c. 1113), were certainly “jurists.”857 Many traditional commentators
have struggled to identify 613 commandments in these poems,858 and because the
Toldot Mashmaʿam shel ha-Musagim Miṣvot ʿAseh u-Miṣvot lo Taʿaseh,” Tarbiẓ 72, no. 1-2 (2003): 13350; Novick, What is Good and What God Demands, 26-34, 39-60, 89-107; and idem, “Blessings over
Miṣvot: The Origins of a Category,” HUCA 79 (2008): 76-78. Compare Sherira Gaon’s definition
(mentioned by Urbach) in Joel Müller, Teshuvot Geonei Mizraḥ u-Maʿarav (Berlin, 1888), 34 (§141):
דמצות תרין אנפי הויאן מנהון חובה דמאן דלא עביד לה קאים בעון ומנהון רשות דמאן דעבי(ר)[ד] לה אית ליה שכר.
854
See Daniel ha-Bavli’s comments treated below; Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam,
ed. Chavel, 128-30 (Prin. Eleven); and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 36-46, 61-64.
855
On this genre, see above, n44.
856
 ;שערא ולא פקהאMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 5 (introduction). See Twersky,
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 250-51n29. On Maimonides’ objections to piyuṭ, see Jacob I.
Dienstag, “The Prayer Book of Maimonides,” in The Leo Jung Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his
Seventieth Birthday, eds. Menaḥem M. Kasher et al. (New York: The Jewish Center, 1962), 62-63;
Blidstein, Ha-Tefillah be-Mishnato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 134-39; idem, “Maimonides’ Taqqanah
Concerning Public Prayer,” Maimonidean Studies 3 (1995): 24-25; Yosef Yahalom, “Ha-Rambam vehaMeliṣah ha-ʿIvrit,” Peʿamim 81 (1999): 4-18; Edwin Seroussi, “More on Maimonides on Music,” Zutot 2
(2002): 126-135; and Hopkins, “The Languages of Maimonides,” 95n42.
857
Contrast Moses Ibn Ezra’s description of al-Bargeloni as “among the master jurisprudents and
its teachers” ( ;)מן צדור אלפקהא ואעלאמהםSefer ha-ʿIyunim veha-Diyunim, ed. Halkin, 75 line 88.
858
On the enumeration in Halakhot Gedolot, see Avraham Shimon Ṭraub, Sefer Halakhot
Gedolot: Meḥubar u-Meyusad le-Halakhot ke-fi Seder Shata Sidrei Talmud ha-Bavli (Warsaw, 1874); and
Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot.” On one of Saʿadya’s enumerations, see Perla, Sefer haMiṣvot le-Rasag; and Shimon Halperin, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag: ʿim beiʾur Qaṣar u-Maspiq (Jerusalem,
1930). On Isaac ben Reuben al-Bargeloni’s azharot, see Shaul ben Musah, Netiv Miṣvotekha. On Solomon
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authors, with one exception, did not number the commandments, it is almost impossible
to do so with certainty.859 The liturgical setting for these works leads one to wonder if
commentators committed a category error by relating to them as juridical texts. It may be
fruitful, however, to contrast these poems with later, more jurisprudentially inclined
enumerations in order to consider how later enumerators “thought with” earlier liturgical
lists.
Several of these enumerations contain terms used for grouping numerous laws
under one heading. For example, the author of the piyuṭ titled Atah hinḥalta, which may
be the earliest surviving enumeration, used the synonyms “din” and “mishpaṭ” (law) to
collect groups of laws.860 Saʿadya followed this style, using the words “datei” and
“ḥuqqei” for the same purpose, and al-Bargeloni used the word “torat,”861 all of which
are nouns in the construct state that mean “laws of.” In addition, several lists count the

Ibn Gabirol’s azharot, see Abraham Israel, “Peirush Rabbi Moshe Ibn Tibbon le-Azharot she-Ḥiber R.
Shlomo Ibn Gabirol” (MA thesis, Ben Gurion University, 2007); Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa; and Shaul ben
Musah, Netiv Miṣvotekha; Neubauer published parts of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s commentary in “Miscellanea
Liturgica,” 699-703. On Elijah ha-Zaqein’s azharot, see Mordecai Sluṣqi, Azharot le-Ḥag ha-Shavuʿot;
Israel Issar Shapiro, Azharot Eliyahu ha-Zaqein: Kolel Taryag Miṣvot ʿim beiʾur raḥav ṣefunot yigaleh
niqra be-sheim Meteq Azharot (Jerusalem, 1972); Ephraim Kupfer, “Peirush Azharot de-Rabbana Eliyahu
ha-Zaqein bar Menaḥem mi-Mans me-et Ḥakham eḥad mi-ḥug shel Rabbeinu Ḥayim bar Ḥananel haKohen,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 11, no. 2 (23) (1989): 109-207; and Abraham Grossman, Ḥakhmei Ṣarfat haRishonim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1995), 98-99.
859
See Hildesheimer’s comments in “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 15-18 (introductory
pagination); add Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot, 15-17.
860
Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 622 line 48.
861
Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 163 line 74, 164 line 80;
and Isaac ben Reuben al-Bargeloni, Azharot (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ben Yissakhar, 1992), 17a.
240

collected rites of the Day of Atonement as one unit.862 These authors, however, were far
from consistent when grouping laws.863

The Term Parshiyot & Punishments as Commandments
Though the Talmud divides the 613 commandments into 248 positive and 365
negative commandments, many early enumerators divided the commandments into four
categories, positive and negative commandments, and two categories that do not appear
in the Talmud, parshiyot (sing., parasha) and punishments (ʿonashim). Though the
author of Atah hinḥalta864 did not use these latter groupings in his enumeration, they
appear in the list in Halakhot Gedolot and several other enumerations.865 Both of these
post-talmudic classifications may be relevant to the discussion of how to create
commandment-units.

862
E.g., Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 623 line 55; and Isaac ben Reuben, Azharot, 8b; see the
comments in Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 37. Note also the general commandments in the list in Halakhot
Gedolot, e.g., to bring a sin-offering and seek forgiveness ()וחטא להתכפר בתחחנונים ובקרבן, and the grouping
of valuations (ʿeirekhin) as one commandment (Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 90,
101).
863
Kafiḥ guessed that Maimonides had Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ in mind when he criticized an
anonymous enumerator for counting as distinct commandments eleven laws of one afflicted by ṣaraʿat;
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25n17. These laws do not appear in surviving fragments of Ḥefeṣ’s work;
Maimonides may (also?) have been referring to Atah hinḥalta (Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 624-25 lines 6579), or even to a list by Saʿadya (though this is unclear; see Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:805-806).
See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 79.
864
This piyuṭ does use the phrases parashat soṭah, parashat ʿeglah ʿarufah, and parashat hamelekh, all of which appear in mSot 7:1-2; Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 617 line 17 and 629 line 98. The
author did not use this term to group laws that do not appear in this Mishnah.
865
For Saʿadya’s usage, see below, nn869-872. See Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot
Gedolot,” 12, 25-26 (introductory pagination), for discussion of those who included these four classes of
laws; add Zulai, “Azharot R. Yiṣḥaq Ibn Gikatilla,” 174 lines 314 (parshiyot), 173 line 195 (punishments);
Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 35-37, 43-44; and Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 41-42 (introductory
pagination). Solomon Ibn Gabirol’s lists are another exception, see Dov Yarden, Shirei ha-Qodesh le-Rabbi
Shlomo Ibn Gabirol (Jerusalem, 1972), 414; and Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 26
(introductory pagination). Enumerations based on the Ten Commandments obviously did not use this
system; see Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 13n42.
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The meaning of the word parshiyot is subject to dispute. The simplest
interpretation is that parshiyot are units of laws grouped together for the purpose of the
enumeration, e.g., the parashah of oaths or the parashah of inheritance laws. This is how
the term was understood by Abraham Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, Naḥmanides, and Simeon
ben Ṣemaḥ Duran; this view may find support in a rabbinic text adduced by Michael
Guttman.866 However, several medieval readers noticed that the enumeration in Halakhot
Gedolot is inconsistent in its use of this term: some commandments listed as parshiyot
appear elsewhere in that count, while certain laws listed as distinct commandments seem
as if they should be grouped together.867
Several researchers have attempted to explain why these enumerators labeled
some laws parshiyot, while listing others as positive or negative commandments. The
most widespread interpretation is that parshiyot are rules that obligate the community,
and not the individual. This view, adopted by Guttman and Yeruḥam Fischel Perla,
appears in one manuscript of Halakhot Gedolot and in Baḥya ibn Paqudah’s Duties of the
Heart; a number of liturgical enumerations also hint at it.868

866
ואחת יש בה מששים ששים מצות דמר ר' יוחנן בשם ר' שמע' בן יוחי שלש פרשיות כתב לנו משה בתורה וכל אחת
ואילו הן פרש' פסחים ופרשת נזיקים ופרשת קדושים ר' לוי בשם ר' שילה דכפר תמרתה משבעים שבעים א"ר תנחומה ולא פליגין מן
דעבד פסחים שבעים כלול עימה פרש' תפילין מן דעבד פרשת נזיקין שבעים כלול עמה פרשת שמיטה מן דעבד פרשת קדושים שבעים
 ;כלול עמה פרש' ערלהPesiqta de-Rav Kahana: ʿal pi ketav yad Oqsford (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-

Rabbanim sheba-America, 1987), ed. Bernard Mandelbaum, 1:99 lines 2-8 (pisqa 5 s.v. ha-ḥodesh ha-zeh,
§10). See Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot, 22. It is not clear that parshiyot here means a group of laws. As the
editor pointed out, the idea that the parashah of phylacteries includes 10 commandments may be based on
the fact that that one of the relevant sections of the Pentateuch contains ten verses (Ex. 13:1-10). See also
Novick, What is Good and What God Demands, 95-96n14.
867
Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, eds. Cohen and Simon, 102 (2:1); Maimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25 (Prin. Seven), 43 (Prin. Eleven; note his use of this term, 52 [Prin. Fourteen]);
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 62 (Prin. Three), 127 (Prin. Ten); Duran, Zohar
ha-Raqiʿa, 18 (introductory pagination; Prin. Seven). See ibn Zimra, Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, 6:22 (§2111).
868
Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot: ʿal pi Ketav-yad Romi, 14 ( ואילו הן פרשיות חקים ומשפטים
 ;)המסורים לציבורBaḥya, Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ, 427 (;)פראיץ' תלזם אלג'מהור לא תלזם אלאפראד והי ס"ה שריעה
Zulai, “Azharot R. Yiṣḥak Ibn Gikatilla,” 174 line 314 ( ;) ִש ִשים וְ ָחמֵּ ש פָ ָר ִשיות הַ ְמסּורות לַעֲ ָד ִתיand Elijah ha242

It is possible that Saʿadya offered this interpretation too, though Moshe Zucker
felt that his position was more complex. At the outset of one of his liturgical
enumerations, Saʿadya described the parshiyot as “65 laws established for cases that
occur.”869 In the introduction to his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the Commandments), he
added a few important words, defining the parshiyot as “65 laws established for cases
that occur concerning the community” (fī ḥukm al-jamāʿa [fī]ha). Zucker, however,
transcribed the last phrase “fa-yaḥkum al-jamāʿa [fī]ha,” meaning that the community is
to rule on these laws (i.e., they are laws entrusted to the courts). Zucker based his
interpretation on a division in one of Saʿadya’s liturgical enumerations, between the first
forty parshiyot and the remaining twenty-five,870 claiming that Saʿadya distinguished
between commandments entrusted to the court and commandments that obligate the
community. However, Zucker incorrectly transcribed the manuscript of the introduction
to Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ;871 moreover, the second group of parshiyot in Saʿadya’s liturgical
enumeration contains laws other than those enforced by the courts.872 It seems more

Zaqein’s azharot in Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 669 line 136 (וקי ִצבּור ְדבֵּ ֶקיָך
ֵּ ֻ) ַתּמּו פָ ָר ִשיות ח. Benjamin ben
Samuel’s enumeration seems to hint at this as well, though it is unclear because the entire text is not
preserved; see Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 47 lines 50-51 ( מצוות עֳ ֵּשה
ְ ישים \ עֵּ ֶרְך
ִ הֲ ֵּרי ָכאן ָחמֵּ ש וְ ִש
ּומ ְשפטֵּ י עֵּ ָדה
ִ ). Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot, 23, 38; and Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:10, 3:205-208.
Compare the distinction in Islamic law between individual and communal obligations (farḍ al-ʿayn and
farḍ al-kifāya).
869
 ;ואחכאם מוצ'ועה לחואדת' תחדת' סהSaʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 156 lines
22-23.
870
Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 182 line 244 (ַארבָ ִעים ִמ ְצות
ְ ) ְסכּום.
871
The fragment is ENA 2674.10, which reads: כמסה וסתין חכם מוצ'ועה לחואדת' תחדת' פי חכם אלגמאעה
[פי]הא. See the transcription in David Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,” 2:192 lines 3-5.
872
See Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 11; see also idem, “Miluʾim,” 386, quoting oral
communication with Saul Lieberman. Neither Perla (Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:205-208) nor the editors
of Saʿadya’s Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt (eds. Davidson et al., 179) agreed with Zucker’s interpretation.
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likely, then, that Saʿadya viewed the parshiyot as laws that obligate the community as a
whole.
Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ may have claimed that earlier writers distinguished between
parshiyot that contain laws entrusted to the courts and parshiyot that do not. In the
Introduction to his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ, he wrote that some writers distinguished between
commandments that do not depend on the discretion of the judge (laysa muʿallaq binaẓar al-ḥākim), and those that do. Zucker suggested that this refers to the parshiyot.873
Ezriel Hildesheimer, the most recent editor of Halakhot Gedolot, proposed a third
interpretation; he suggested that the term parshiyot is based on the verb f-r-sh (to
interpret or explain), and refers not to “units” of laws but to “interpreted laws.” The
primary evidence for this theory is a passage in the homiletical introduction to the
enumeration in Halakhot Gedolot:
The sages taught 65 parshiyot, which are the essence of the Torah (gufah shel
Torah). Each and every parashah was explained by the sages of Israel.874
Based on this passage, Hildesheimer contended that the term “parshiyot” designates
commandments that the sages explicated, and not commandments that obligate the
community or involve the court.875 In the end, however, no single explanation has been
able to account for all of the laws termed parshiyot in enumerations of the 613
commandments.876

873

Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 11-12, 14.

874

 ;ושנו חכמים חמשה וששים פרשיות גופה שלתורה וכל פרשה ופרשה פירשוה חכמי ישראלHildesheimer, ed.,
“Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 19 lines 32-33.
875
Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 94n421.
876
Compare Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:196-200. The exception may be one of Saʿadya’s
enumerations, see there, 3:205-206, and Tobi, “Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” 1:95.
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The label “punishments” may also reflect thinking about the ways that laws can
be grouped into commandment-units.877 Maimonides vociferously attacked enumerators
who counted “punishments” as a category distinct from negative commandments; he
described this as “confusion that requires no rebuttal.”878 One apologist suggested that
enumerators who included “punishments” did so in lieu of listing these prohibitions
among the negative commandments,879 but the overlap between the punishments and the
negative commandments undercuts this explanation.880 Perla suggested that the negative
commandments are prohibitions, and that punishments designate the court’s penal
obligations. Such a reading suggests that some enumerators divided laws according to
their respective performers. 881 According to Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ, the inclusion of excision
(karet) among the punishments that make up the count of 613 serves as a reminder of the
role that God plays in the Jewish legal system.882

877

For background, see Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 12-14 (introductory

pagination).
878

 ;תכ'ליט לא אחתאג' עליה רדMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 52 (Prin. Fourteen).

Ṭraub, Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, 14 (§31). Compare Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot lehaRambam, ed. Chavel, 140-42 (Prin. Fourteen).
880
As Maimonides noticed; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 52-53 (Prin. Fourteen).
881
Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:4. Compare Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, 72:
“In the directory part [the law] bids, in the sanctional part it prophecies. In the remedial part … it bids other
men than him whom it bade and prophesied to before, to fulfill such a prophecy … upon the first man in
case of his disobedience”; and idem, An Introduction to the Principles, 302: “A law confining itself to the
creation of an offence, and a law commanding a punishment to be administered … are two distinct laws;
not parts … of one and the same law. The acts they command are altogether different; the persons they are
addressed to are altogether different.” On azharah and ʿonesh, see above, n663.
882
This is not preserved in the surviving fragments of Ḥefeṣ’s work, but Maimonides quoted it;
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 53 (Prin. Fourteen); see Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 54, 107-108.
Note Saʿadya’s inclusion of excision among the seven methods of punishment; Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt,
eds. Davidson et al., 174 line 180. Compare Abraham Ibn Ezra’s comment to Lev. 18:29 that excision is
preformed either by the court or God ( ;)"ונכרתו הנפשות העשת" בפרהסיא שתמיתום ואם בסתר אני אכריתםPeirushei
ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 3:59; treated in Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah,” 191. On
this issue, see also Mubashshir ha-Levi’s discussion in Kitāb Istidrāk, ed. Zucker, 57-58.
879
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Pre-Maimonidean Reflections on Creating Commandment-Units
As mentioned in the Introduction, Saʿadya counted the commandments numerous
times, in several liturgical poems and in his more juristic Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the
Commandments), which is only partially preserved.883 (Nevertheless, he asserted that he
did not regard enumeration itself as particularly important.884) Like others, Saʿadya
recognized that commandment-units contain numerous laws; in one poem, he wrote:
Many acts are found in one commandment /
Like flaying and cutting burnt offerings.885
Saʿadya surmised that the obligations to flay and cut a burnt offering (ʿolah; Lev. 1:6)
constitute one commandment, not two.886 Likewise, he wrote:
An illustration of no negative [commandment] in it /
Upon consideration they are one commandment /
Like “give his [wage] in the day” (Lev. 19:13), without “[his] leaving” (Deut.
24:15) /
This and that are one commandment.887
Saʿadya combined Leviticus’ prohibition against withholding a day laborer’s wages until
the day following his work with Deuteronomy’s directive to pay him before sunset; he
chose not to count them as separate positive and negative commandments.888

883
884

See above, n61-62.
See above, n60.

885

יתּוח ְבעֵּ ֶרך עולות
ַ
ִמצוָ ה ַאחַ ת ַרבות ְפעֻ וּלות \ כְ הֶ ְפ ֵּשט וְ נ
ְ  ; ָמצּוי ְבTobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 244

lines 49-50.
According to Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 244n, Saʿadya hinted to this in his
azharot; see Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 161 line 49, 174 line 113.
887
 ; ִציּור ִאם אֵּ ין בָ מו ְביִּשּוב \ ְש ֵּתיהֶ ם ִפיקּוד אֶ ָחד חָ שּוב \ כִ ְביומו ִת ֵּתן ְבלִ י לְֵּך וָ שּוב \ אֲ ֶשר זֶה וָ זֶה אֶ ָחד ָקשּובTobi,
“Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 247 lines 69-72 (see Prov. 3:28). In the next few lines (247-48 lines 7376), Saʿadya grouped another two acts as one commandment.
888
On overlapping positive and negative commandments, see Neubauer, “Miscellanea Liturgica,”
707; Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 22-23, 86-87; Baneth, “Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav
Saʿadya,” 380-81; and Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 247 lines 73-76. Compare Sklare, Samuel
ben Ḥofni Gaon, 167-68n7, 197, 238, 285-86, 290; Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 60-73; and Hallaq,
A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 48-56. I hope to expand on this parallel elsewhere.
886
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Another effort by Saʿadya to combine various biblically-prescribed acts as
commandment-units is mentioned in Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Arabic translation of Saʿadya’s
introduction (reshut) to one liturgical enumeration.889 Samuel mentioned various
divisions that Saʿadya proposed for the commandments, including:
Section Sixteen: Commandments that depend on a group of actions (afʿāl jamāʿa)
but comprise a single commandment. This is like the flaying and the cutting (Lev.
1:6), and breaking the neck of the heifer (Deut. 21:1-9).890
This section also apparently discussed the combination of rules as commandment-units.
Sa’adya often grouped together acts as commandment-units in his enumerations.891 It is
difficult, however, to identify any principles underlying his methodology. At the outset of
his voluminous commentary on one of Saʿadya’s liturgical enumerations, Perla compared
it, anachronistically, to Maimonides’ Fourteen Principles in the Introduction to Sefer haMiṣvot, and considered the extent to which Saʿadya “agreed” with them. While Perla’s
arguments are often compelling, it is hard to know which of his speculative
reconstructions are correct.892
As discussed in the Introduction, Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book
on the Commandments) placed commandments in overlapping categories; Samuel was

On the authorship of this text, see Baneth, “Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,” 371n33,
citing earlier scholarship; Assaf, “Mi-Shiyarei,” 27; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 30. For the impact
of this commentary on Samuel’s division of the commandments, see there, 184n43.
889

890

ואלקסם אליו אלמצות אלתי תתעלק בלואחדה מנהא אפעאל ג'מאעה והי מצוה ואחדה והד'ה כאלהפשט ואלניתוח
 ;ואלערף פי אלעגלותNeubauer, “Miscellanea Liturgica,” 706. A parallel fragment appears in Schechter,

Saadyana, 43. See Baneth’s attempt to reorganize this text; “Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,”
379-80nn18-19. Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 244n, suggested that “breaking the neck of the
heifer” (al-ʿeref fī al-ʿagalot) should read “setting the burnt offerings” (al-ʿeirekh fī al-ʿolot).
891
For example, see the selections of Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ in Sklare, “The Religious and
Legal Thought,” 2:197 lines 1-3, 2:199 lines 1-5, 2:201 lines 1-8.
892
See Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:22-24, 1:31-33, 1:40-46. Compare Halperin, Sefer haMiṣvot le-Rasag, 6-15; see Abraham Hirsch Rabinowitz, Ha-Miṣvah veha-Miqra: ʿim beiʾur Binah beMiṣvah (Jerusalem: ʿAtir, 1988), 29-30.
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therefore less interested in classifying laws as single commandment-units.893
Nevertheless, there are instances in which Samuel implicitly addressed the problem of
identifying such units.894 He noted, for example, that there are two kinds (ḍarbayn) of
prohibitions that forbid priests to touch dead bodies: the first categorically prohibits the
High Priest from any contact with the dead, while the second prohibits regular priests
from such contact with certain exceptions.895 Samuel apparently regarded these as two
manifestations of one commandment; elsewhere, he referred to commandments
regulating the conduct of the High Priest and of regular priests as two expressions of a
single commandment.896 In situations where the Pentateuch indicates that one can choose
one of two acts – e.g., entrance into a levirate marriage, or refusal to do so (Deut. 25:510), or redeeming a firstborn donkey, or breaking its neck (Ex. 13:13, 34:20) – Samuel
seems to have counted both of the acts as a single commandment.897 If so, this would
have been in sharp contrast to the adamantly-held position taken, later, by Maimonides
(this is detailed below).
Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ explicitly addressed the problem of distinguishing between a
commandment and its parts. In the Introduction to his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ, he noted that his
predecessors had enumerated the commandments in different ways. He criticized some of

893

See above, n73.
All of the following examples come from the fragments of Part Two of Samuel’s Kitāb fī alSharāʾiʿ; Sklare did not translate this part of the text; see Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 176-77.
895
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 20 lines 609-620 (Hebrew pagination); 21, lines 673-74. See
similarly 21 lines 666-67. Maimonides counted this as two; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 259 (Neg. 166,
168).
896
See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 20 lines 620-23, 22 lines 679-821 (Hebrew pagination).
Similar examples appear elsewhere, such as the meal offerings brought by the High Priest in the morning
and evening (Lev. 6:13) constitute one commandment, and there are ten commandments (sharāʾiʿ) related
to the Temple and its vessels; idem, 21 lines 671-72, 25-26 lines 820-30 (Hebrew pagination).
897
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 34 lines 1125-31 (Hebrew pagination).
894
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them for confusing commandments (which he termed uṣūl; i.e., roots or principles) with
details (here furūʿ; i.e., branches or details).898 The distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ is
widespread in Islamic law.899 Ḥefeṣ wrote that in order to arrive at an accurate count, this
confusion was in need of resolution:
With thorough scrutiny you find more than a thousand commandments (sharīʿa).
However, those among them that exceed [the count of] 613 have the status of
branches (furūʿ) that extend900 from the roots (uṣūl), which are 613; they are not
[true] roots (lā li-annahā uṣūlan [sic] kal-uṣūl). For example, the components
(fuṣūl) of making [the] Tabernacle: each one of them is a single commandment
(sharīʿa wāḥida), from which stem branches and regulations (qawānīn).
Similarly, the components of the sacrifices and components of other[ law]s.901
While Ḥefeṣ highlighted the alleged errors of his predecessors, none of the
published fragments of his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ sets forth a methodology for distinguishing
commandments from details. Not unlike Perla, in his study of Saʿadya, Benzion Halper,
the first compiler of Ḥefeṣ’s work, attempted to deduce the author’s system by comparing
the lists of commandments drawn up by Ḥefeṣ and Maimonides. Of course, this referral
to a later scholar is anachronistic; moreover, Halper was mistaken to assume that because
Ḥefeṣ included a commandment that Maimonides excluded on the basis of a particular

 ;ומנהם מן יג'על בעץ' אלאצול פרועא [ובעץ'] אלפרוע אצולאZucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14. See Cohen,
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 284-85, 302, 438.
899
Islamic legal theorists used the distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ to illustrate the link between
sources of the law and its branches or applications; furūʿ can also mean substantive laws; see above, n480.
900
Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14, read inbaṣaṭat, following a correction of a later scribe (the
manuscript is T.-S. Ar. 18(1).22). The first scribe wrote inḍabaṭat, a less common word, which would mean
“established” by the 613 uṣūl (on this meaning, see Dozy, Dictionnaires Arabes, 2:2; and Blau, Dictionary,
382, s.v. )ضبط. I thank Marina Rustow for her help with this manuscript.
898

901
וענד תצפח אל מסתקצא פתג'ד זאיד עלי אלף שריעה לכן אלתי מנהא הו זיאדה עלי תרי"ג מנזלתהא מנזלת פרוע
אנבצטת מן אלאצול אלתי הי תרי"ג לא לאנהא אצולא כאלאצול מן ד'לך פצול מעשה משכן פאד' כל ואחד מנהא יתחוי עלי שריעה
; ואחדה ואסעה אלקול יתפרע מנהא פרועא וקואנין וכד'אך פצול אלקראבין ופצול אכ'ר איצ'א גיר הד'א כמא סנד'כרהא פי מואצ'עהא

Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14-15. Translation based on Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation,
302, with changes.
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Principle, Ḥefeṣ necessarily rejected the relevant Principle.902 Yet some of Halper’s
conclusions are quite suggestive. As the underappreciated Ḥefeṣ certainly influenced
Maimonides,903 it is likely that Maimonides had the earlier work in mind when shaping
some of his Principles.
Halper collected thirty commandments that appear in both Maimonides’ Sefer haMiṣvot, and in the fragments of Ḥefeṣ’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ to which he had access, and he
contrasted these with twenty-one commandments on Ḥefeṣ’s list that were omitted by
Maimonides. Of the twenty-one commandments that are not on Maimonides’ list, sixteen
are excluded on the basis of Principle Seven, four on the basis of Principle Twelve, and
one on the basis of Principle Nine.904 Halper therefore asserted that Maimonides’
Principle Seven, which eliminates instantiations (see below) of a commandment from the
enumeration even when they are explicit in the Pentateuch, was “chiefly directed” against
Ḥefeṣ.905
Abraham Ibn Ezra dedicated the second chapter of his Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah
(The Foundation of Reverence and the Secret of the Torah) to the difficulties of

902

See Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 61-88, see below, n905.
In one responsum, Maimonides ascribed what he later considered to be an error to reliance on
Ḥefeṣ; Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:383 (§217); Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:295. For treatment of Maimonides’
relationship to Ḥefeṣ, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 16, 247-48, 253.
904
Ḥefeṣ counted the prohibition against using money of a prostitute or dog for the altar (Deut.
23:18) as two commandments; Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 85, ascribed Maimonides’
counting them as one to his “inconsistency”; see also there, 70. On Maimonides’ view, see below, n1184.
905
Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 86. To my mind, Halper was premature to imply that
Ḥefeṣ thought about the problems Principle Seven poses in Maimonidean terms when he concluded that
Ḥefeṣ followed scriptural formulations but that Maimonides was “guided by logical principles in the
system of enumerating the commandments”; A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 87-88; see also 57-58. See
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 247; and Baron, SRHJ2, 6:95-96. On this issue, note
Eliezer of Metz’s statement that he did not follow the organization of the Pentateuch in arranging the
commandments ( ;ולא בסדר המקראות כי כל מצוות הנכללות בדמיון אחד אייחד לבד בכלל אחדSefer Yireiʿim, 7a,
mentioned by Twersky).
903
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enumerating the commandments.906 Unlike the above authors, he argued that the search
for an accurate enumeration is futile.907 Like Ḥefeṣ, he noted that earlier enumerators
employed different schemes to list the commandments. And echoing Ḥefeṣ’s complaint
about the confusion of uṣūl and furūʿ, Ibn Ezra wrote that some counted general
principles (kelalim) and details (peraṭim) separately, but others mixed them together.908
He added that the problem of determining which general principles consititute distinct
commandments is compounded by the fact that an “overarching principle” (kelal
gavohah) may impose numerous obligations.909
Abraham Ibn Ezra offered an example that would highlight the arbitrary nature of
enumerations. According to the rabbis, the three verses prohibiting the cooking of a kid in
its mother’s milk (Ex. 23:19, 34:26, and Deut. 14:21) teach three separate prohibitions:
benefiting from, eating, and cooking mixtures of milk and meat.910 Abraham Ibn Ezra
noted that some enumerators listed this prohibition once, and others, three times.911

906

According to some manuscripts, this work was originally called Sefer ha-Miṣvot; M.
Friedländer, “Ibn Ezra in England,” Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England 2 (18941895): 48n3; and Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora,” 179n12.
907
“In truth, the number of commandments is endless” (  ;)ועל דרך מחקר האמת אין קץ למספר המצותIbn
Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 92 (2:4); see the treatment there, 28-29, 88.
908
 ;ויש מי שיספור הכללים והפרטים ויש שסופרים פעם הכללים לבדם ופעם הפרטים לבדםIbn Ezra, Yesod Mora
ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 92 (2:3).
909

יש כלל גבוה כמו לשמור את כל מצות ה' כולל עשה ולא תעשה ומלת ועבדתם את ה' אלהיכם כוללות כל מצוה עשה
 ;שהם בלב ובפה ובמעשה שהם עקרי' או ֵּז ֶכר להם ומלת ליראה את ה' כוללת כל מצות לא תעשה והיא יצאה במלת עשהIbn Ezra,

Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 93 (2:6). Compare idem, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Solomon
Zalman Ḥayim Halberstam (Lyck, 1874), 11b, where he categorized commandments as principles (ʿiqarim)
and remembrances thereto (zekher la-hem).
910
See Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. basar be-ḥalav, 4:694-95.
911
 ;יש מהם שספר בשול גדי פעם אחת ויש שספרו בשלש מצוות כנגד שנכתב שלש פעמי' וחכמינו דרשום ורבות ככהIbn
Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 91-92 (2:3); see the notes for earlier positions. Ibn
Ezra reiterated this problem throughout this chapter; see 94 (2:6), 98 (2:9), 99 (2:9), 106 (2:15). Some of
his methodological comments are treated in Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah,” 18688. For a proposed parallel between Ibn Ezra’s statement and Maimonides’ Principle Seven, see Avraham
I. Bromberg, “Haqbalot be-Rabaʿ uve-Rambam,” Sinai 55 (1963): 44.
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Creating Commandment-Units in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot
Like his predecessors, Maimonides recognized the challenge of separating
commandments from details of commandments; he declared Principle Eleven, which
asserts that parts of a commandment are not distinct commandments, “extremely difficult
to understand” (ʿawīṣ al-fahm jiddan).912 Maimonides’ system for distinguishing
commandments from details has not been subject to thorough investigation.913 Jacob
Levinger suggested that when Maimonides described certain laws in the Mishneh Torah
as “included” in (be-khlal) others, he may have referred to the activity of grouping laws
under larger headings.914 However, Levinger mostly focused on a few examples in the
Mishneh Torah while examining the creation of commandment-units, though this work is

Though beyond the scope of this chapter, note Moses Ibn Tibbon’s statement that some made
principles (shorashim; the same word he used to translate Maimonides’ term aṣl) into branches (porot;
Ezek. 17:10), while others, branches into roots ( יש רבים מונים במספר המצוות פרטים אחרים ועושים מן השורשים
 ;פארות ומן הפארות שרשיםIsrael, “Peirush Rabbi Moshe Ibn Tibbon,” 32). Porot clearly relates to the term
furūʿ.
912
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 44 (Prin. Seven). See also the end of Principle Seven:
“understand this Principle; it is the central pillar (ʿamud ha-tavekh) for our topic” ( פאפהם הד'א אלאצל אנה
 ;עמוד התוך פי מא נחן בסבילהthere, 26). As Bloch and Joshua ha-Nagid noted, this could refer to the fact that
this Principle is in the middle of the Principles or to the importance of its subject matter; Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 26n4; and Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 100; I prefer the second option.
913
Duran (Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 6-32, introductory pagination) may have been the first to comment on
all of the Principles. More recently, Perla (Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:17-46) penned the most systematic
examination.
914
See, e.g., Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 5:11: “there are other matters included in the prohibition
against desecrating God” ( ;)יש דברים אחרים בכלל חילול השםLevinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit
shel ha-Rambam, 78-80. The author of Sefer ha-Ḥinukh used the phrase “included in this commandment”
( )בכלל מצוה זוfor a similar purpose. On the term be-khlal in the Mishneh Torah, see Shoḥetman, “LeSheʾelat ha-Yaḥas,” 37n19; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 309, 310n86, noting that bekhlal may refer to rabbinic laws that are “included” in a larger commandment-unit.
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of secondary importance to this problem. He did not explore the relevant Principles in
Sefer ha-Miṣvot at length, and in one instance, he failed to distinguish between laws
excluded by Principle Seven and those excluded by Principle Eleven.915
In his attempt to determine which of Maimonides’ Principles addressed the
challenge of reducing Jewish law to 613 units, Ben-Menaḥem divided the Fourteen
Principles into “exclusionary rules” and “rules of individuation.” Ben-Menaḥem further
subdivided the “exclusionary rules” into “rules of identification” (Principles One, Two,
and Three) and “rules of interpretation” (Principles Five, Eight, and Ten), and the “rules
of individuation” into “analytical rules” (Principles Seven, Eleven, and Twelve) and
“rules of individuation proper” (Principles Four, Six, Nine, Thirteen, and Fourteen). BenMenaḥem claimed that the “analytical rules” and the “rules of individuation proper” were
those that address “individuation.”916

915

See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 81n39, treating Hilkhot
Shabbat, 29:1, and Positive Commandment #145. On the apparent contradiction between these passages,
see also Binyamin Zeʾev Benedikt, Ha-Rambam le-lo Sṭiyah min ha-Talmud (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav
Kook, 1985), 112-16.
916
Ben-Menaḥem, “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 17-29; see ibid, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel
Ḥuqqim,” 103-106, for an earlier presentation; see above, n844. This analysis is helpful, but ignores the
order of the Principles. (I cannot entirely explain the order of the Principles, but there appears to be some
logical arrangement; see n918.) Another problem is that Ben-Menaḥem described the “rules of
individuation proper” as “rules that stipulate how the laws are actually to be individuated.” I do not see why
this covers Principles Four (not to count instructions that cover the entire law) and Six (to count
overlapping positive and negative commandments as two commandments), but excludes Principle Eleven
(not to count parts of a law). Why is Principle Six in the same category as Principle Four? How is Principle
Eleven not a “rule of individuation proper”? On Ben-Menaḥem’s proposal, see also Friedberg, Crafting the
613 Commandments, 52. Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 461n8, claimed that Principles Nine to
Fourteen deal with the details of the law; and Feintuch, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei
Yisharim, 1:69, considered Principles Seven, Ten, Eleven, and Twelve to address the question of when
scriptural laws are grouped together under the heading of one commandment.
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In my view, five Principles in the Introduction to Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot
address the distinction between commandments and details of commandments.917
Principle Seven asserts that the fiqh (here: instantiations) of a commandment are not to be
counted in the enumeration; Principle Eleven asserts that parts of a commandment are not
to be counted; Principle Twelve asserts that parts used to assemble a commandment are
not to be counted; and, Principle Thirteen asserts that if an act is required over a number
of days, it is only counted once. In short, Principles Seven, Eleven, Twelve and Thirteen
deal with two types of acts that form one commandment-unit: Principle Seven addresses
different ways a single commandment is manifest, while Principles Eleven, Twelve, and
Thirteen focus on parts of a commandment-unit that must (or should) come together or
appear in a series.918 Lastly, Principle Fourteen considers the extent to which the
requirement to impose punishments (iqāmat al-ḥudūd) results in the creation of distinct
commandments. Maimonides also addressed the creation of “commandment-units” in his
enumeration, raising potential objections and dismissing them.919

See Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 26: “the massive issue handled by Maimonides
piecemeal in Principles 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, and in a sense, 8 as well: how to identify single norms, norms that
are composed of many aspects or components or actions.” I understand Principle Eight to be concerned
with linguistic matters.
918
If Principles Seven, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen deal with creating commandmentunits, why is Principle Seven separated from the others? This relates to the larger question of whether there
is an order to the Principles. Maimonides likely did not group Principle Seven with the other relevant
Principles because Principle Seven deals with unique manifestations of one law, but the others treat parts of
one law that are (usually) present simultaneously. (Compare Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 139 [Prin. Seven]; Allegri’s claims are largely compelling, but because he read
Sefer ha-Miṣvot in translation, he occasionally asked questions that the Arabic shows are unnecessary.)
919
E.g., “a skeptic could be skeptical and say” ()והנא ינבגי ללמשכך אן ישכך עליי ויקול, and “one could
challenge me and say” ( ;)וללמעתרץ' אן יעתרצ'ני ויקולMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 88 (Pos. 57),
102 (Pos. 83).
917
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Principles Nine and Ten, which relate to the creation of commandment-units but
do not deal with it directly, are excluded from this analysis. Principle Nine focuses on the
relationship between the Pentateuch and the enumeration of the commandments (see
Chapter Five). And according to Principle Ten, a commandment’s preliminary steps
(tauṭiʾāt) are not to be counted as separate commandments.920 Technically speaking,
these prefatory steps are not details but preliminary actions needed for a commandment’s
performance. An example would be the need to “take choice flour” (Lev. 24:5) in order
to prepare the showbread.

Principle Seven
In Principle Seven, Maimonides claimed that an instantiation (fiqh) of a
commandment is not a distinct commandment. Use of the word fiqh in this sense is
decidedly uncommon.921 In the early Islamic period, the term fiqh referred to theology in
general or to theological conclusions that were not the product of revelation.922 By the
ninth century, fiqh came to refer solely to jurisprudence,923 and not only for Muslim
writers. Judeo-Arabic writers, Maimonides among them, also used the term fiqh to denote
law or jurisprudence. But what did Maimonides mean in the heading of Principle Seven

See Blau, Dictionary, 770, s.v. وطأ. Kafiḥ and Ibn Tibbon translated this word as haqdamot
(preliminaries [?]).
921
First noticed, as far as I know, in Ignaz Goldziher, “Das arabische Original von Maimuni’s
Sêfer Hammiṣewôt,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morganlandes 3 (1889): 81-82. See also Israel
Friedlaender, Arabisch-deutsches Lexikon zum Sprachgebrauch des Maimonides: Ein Nachtrag zu den
arabischen Lexicis (Frankfurt: J. Kauffmann, 1902), 88, s.v.  ;فقهGoldberg’s comments in Maʿaseh Nissim,
16 (§3); and Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 78.
922
van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 1:209; and A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis
and Historical Development (London: Frank Cass, 1965), 110-11.
923
Baber Johansen, Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh
(Leiden: Brill, 1999), 2-3.
920
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when he wrote, “it is inappropriate to count the fiqh of a commandment”?924 In his
Hebrew translation of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Moses Ibn Tibbon rendered fiqh al-sharīʿa (the
fiqh of a commandment) as diqduqei ha-miṣvah (the specifics of a commandment),925 and
in his, Kafiḥ suggested peraṭei hilkhot ha-miṣvah (the details of the laws of a
commandment) and mishpaṭei ha-miṣvah (the rules of a commandment).926 These
translations are not particularly helpful in understanding the term fiqh. Jon Bloomberg
suggested that Maimonides may have used the word fiqh as a calque of the Hebrew word
halakhah in Principle Seven.927 How, then, did he distinguish the fiqh of a commandment
from its parts (ajzāʾ, sing., juzʾ)?928 (These parts were excluded from the enumeration by
Principle Eleven.)
At the outset of Principle Seven, Maimonides wrote: “Know that a single
commandment (al-sharīʿa al-wāḥida) is an accepted proposition (qaḍīya mā musallama),
and this premise (muqaddima) necessitates (yalzam) many commands and prohibitions
(awāmir wa-nawāhī) that are the fiqh of a commandment.”929 This sentence is full of

924

 ;אנה לא ינבגי אן יעד פקה אלשריעהMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 21 (Prin. Seven).

925

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 13 (Prin. Seven). Compare the phrase diqduqei
nezirut (from mNaz 1:2; Hilkhot Nezirut, 1:9, 2:14, 2:22, 4:12, 6:2), which denotes distinct commandments.
926
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 21 (Prin. Seven); see also there, 2n13. Note the term
mishpaṭei miṣvah in the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 14 line 171.
See also below, n934.
927
“This use of fiqh would appear to be a calque, inasmuch as the Hebrew hălakhah has a twofold
connotation, referring to Jewish law in general on the one hand, and to a specific norm of Jewish law on the
other”; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 8.
928
Both Ibn Tibbon (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 24) and Kafiḥ (ed. Kafiḥ, 43; Prin.
Eleven) translated ajzāʾ al-sharīʿa (the parts of a commandment) as ḥelqei ha-miṣvah. See below, n961,
and Allegri’s explanation of the difference between Principles Seven and Eleven mentioned above, n918.
929
;אלשריעה אלואחדה הי קצ'יה' מא מסלמה וילזם ען תלך אלמדקמה אואמר ונואהי כת'ירה פי פקה אלשריעה
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 21 (Prin. Seven). My translation is based on Michael Schwarz,
“‘Al-Fiqh’, A Term Borrowed from Islam used by Maimonides for a Jewish Concept in His Sefer haMitzwoth and in His Guide of the Perplexed,” in Adaptations and Innovations: Studies on the Interaction
between Jewish and Islamic Thought and Literature from the Early Middle Ages to the Late Twentieth
Century, eds. Y. Tzvi Langermann and Josef Stern (Paris: Peeters, 2007), 352, with some changes.
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terms borrowed from the science of logic;930 these are not captured by the Hebrew
translations of Ibn Tibbon or Kafiḥ.931

930
As far as I know, Joshua ha-Nagid was the only pre-modern reader to notice this; see Teshuvot,
ed. Raṣhabi, 99. Schwarz’s translation shows that he was aware of the parallels, though he did not explicate
them. Kafiḥ translated the sentence as: “One commandment is a totally complete unit, and that introduction
obligates many commands and prohibitions in the laws (halakhot) of the commandment” ( המצוה האחת היא
 ומתחייבים מאותה ההקדמה צווים ואזהרות רבים בהלכות המצוה,)יחידה מסויימת שלמה. Both Ibn Tibbon (Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 13) and Kafiḥ (idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 21; Prin. Seven) translated
“muqaddima” as “haqdamah” (introduction); compare above, n920. Kafiḥ’s explanation shows the
difficultly of this translation ( כלומר השם הכללי המוגדר והמגובש של המצוה שאנו מציגים אותו בפתח דברינו כל פעם שאנו
 ;באים לדבר על מצוה מסויימתthere, 21n87). In the logical sciences, muqaddima refers to each of the first two
parts of a syllogism. For Maimonides’ use, see Efros, “Maimonides’ Arabic Treatise on Logic,” 16 line 19
(Hebrew pagination). Similarly, the word qaḍīya means premise or proposition. Maimonides’ use of the
root l-z-m also hints at the logical sciences. In formal logic, the verb l-z-m means “necessitates,” as in a
proof or deduction, and in legal contexts it means “obligates.” On Solomon ibn Ayyub’s translation of the
verb l-z-m, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 6 (introductory pagination). On this verb in
Avicenna’s logical writings, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003), 217.
Scholars have adduced further examples of the relationship of the Treatise on Logic and Sefer haMiṣvot. See Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 471, 475n32; and Daniel Sinclair, “Ḥashivah
Mishpaṭit be-Mishnatam shel ha-Rambam veha-Ramban,” in Sefer ha-Yovel Minḥah le-Ish: Qoveṣ
Maʾamarim Mugash be-Hoqarah leha-Rav Avraham Yishayahu Dolgin be-Melot lo Shivʿim ve-Ḥameish
Shanah, ed. Itamar Warhaftig (Jerusalem: Beit Kenesset Beit Yaʿaqov, 1991), 350. Principle Eight also
relies on concepts from Greek logic; see also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 24n81. Note
Abraham Ibn Ezra’s call for the use of logic in the enumeration; Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and
Simon, 88-91 (2:1-2; see Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora,” 183-84; and Cohen, Opening the
Gates of Interpretation, 302n69); and Abraham Maimonides’ censure of Daniel ha-Bavli for the latter’s
alleged ignorance of logic treated below.
Herbert Davidson rejected the ascription of the Treatise on Logic to Maimonides, but several
scholars have challenged this; see his “The Authenticity of Works Attributed to Maimonides,” in Meiʾah
Sheʿarim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life, in Memory of Isadore Twersky, eds. Ezra Fleischer et
al. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2001), 118-25; idem, Maimonides, 313-22; idem, “Ibn al-Qifṭī’s Statement
Regarding Maimonides’ Early Study of Science,” Aleph 14, no. 1 (2014): 245-58; Ahmad Hasnawi,
“Réflexions sur la terminologie logique de Maïmonide et son contexte farabien: Le Guide des perplexes et
le Traité de logique,” in Maïmonide: Philosophe et Savant (1138-1204), eds. Tony Lévy and Rushdī
Rāshid (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 69-78; Mordechai Cohen, “Dimyon ve-Higayon, Emet ve-Sheqer:
Gishotehem shel Rambaʿ ve-Rambam le-Meṭaforah ha-Miqraʾit le-Or ha-Poʾetiqah veha-Filosofyahh haʿIvrit,” Tarbiẓ 73, no. 3 (2004): 420-21; Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Igeret shel ha-Rambam le-R. Ḥisdai: ʿEd
Ḥadash le-Nusaḥ ve-Hagigim Nosafim ʿal Yeḥuso le-Rambam,” in Ta Shma, 2:536; and Sarah Stroumsa,
“On Maimonides and Logic,” Aleph 14, no. 1 (2014): 259-63. See also Joseph A. Buijs, “Maimonides’ Use
of Logic in The Guide of the Perplexed,” in Judaic Logic, ed. Andrew Schumann (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias
Press, 2010), 47-76.
931
Wael Hallaq ascribed the introduction of Greek syllogisms into uṣūl al-fiqh to al-Ghazālī and
described some of the ramifications and receptions of formal logic in Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh; see his “The
Development of Logical Structure in Sunnī Legal Theory,” Der Islam 64 (1987): 58-65; idem, “NonAnalogical Arguments,” 300-306; idem, “Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in
Sunnī Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37, no. 3 (1990): 315-21; and idem; A History of Islamic Legal Theories,
137-42. This engendered a sharp response from Ibn Taymiyya; see idem, Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek
Logicians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), xiv-xxiv. See also Felicitas Meta Maria Opwis, Maṣlaḥah and
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Several times in Principle Seven, Maimonides connected the word fiqh with the
word “stipulation” (sharṭ or ishtirāṭ), for example: “Scripture completed the fiqh of the
law of this punishment (qiṣāṣ) and provided several stipulations (ishtirāṭāt).”932 He also
contrasted the fiqh of a commandment with its overarching principle (aṣl).933 I think that
the best translation of the term fiqh in this and similar contexts is “instantiation,”
“manifestation,” or “application.”934 This accounts for many appearances elsewhere in
Sefer ha-Miṣvot and for the examples in Principle Seven of its Introduction.935 In
addition, Maimonides used the fifth form of the root f-q-h to denote “detailing of the
law.” For instance, in the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he wrote, “it is not my
intention in this treatise to detail any of the commandments (al-tafaqquh fī miṣvah min al-

the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4th/10th to the 8th/14th Century
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 90-96. Sobhi Rayan argued that while Ibn Taymiyya rejected Aristotelian syllogisms,
he used Aristotelian logic more generally; “Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of the Syllogism,” Der Islam 86, no.
1 (2001): 93-121.
932
 ;ת'ם תמם אלכתאב פקה חכם הד'א אלקצאץ ואשתרט פיה אשתראטאתMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 23
(Prin. Seven). Note also the rare plural fiqhīyāt; there, 26; adduced by Blau, Dictionary, 512, s.v. فقهيّات.
933
 ;לאן כל מא יוג'ד מכתוב יעד מן גיר תאמל לאצל אלמצוה ולא לפקההא או שרוטהאMaimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 22 (Prin. Seven).
934
Halper wrote that Principle Seven addresses “the various ramifications and hypothetical cases
of a certain group of laws,”; A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 85. Peritz wrote that Principle Seven is
concerned with “Rechtsverfahren” (legal procedures) or “verschieden Bestimmungen” (various regulations
or provisions); “Das Buch der Gesetze,” 1:451n3. Schwarz, “Al-Fiqh,” 351-53, offered “detailed rules
pertaining to the law” for fiqh. I prefer “instantiations” because it accounts for the fact that the
commandment manifests itself differently in different circumstances. See Bloch’s comment in Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, xxviii, that the translation that Naḥmanides used consistently translated fiqh as
diqduqim (compare above, n925), but that Ibn Tibbon chose din or mishpaṭ for fiqh and ḥukm (rule).
935
See below. Schwarz, “Al-Fiqh,” 351-53, wrote that there are 29 appearances fiqh and its
derivatives in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 28 with this usage. A search on the Friedberg Judeo-Arabic Project returns
over 50 appearances of the words (al-)fiqh and (al-)tafaqquh. Among Muslim jurists, tafaqquh denoted
studying or applying oneself to the study of law; Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges, 99-100, 103, 114, 172-73.
Jonathan Owens’ definition of a technical term is useful here: “When a term is consistently used to
represent a constant extensional class or a fixed process it can be taken as a technical term. Very often such
terms are represented as a derivational set”; Early Arabic Grammatical Theory, 11. See also Versteegh,
Arabic Grammar, 1-2.
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miṣvot); rather, solely to count them.”936 In the course of identifying the location of the
primary talmudic discussion of each law, he often mentioned the fiqh or aḥkām (rules) of
a commandment. At times, he seems to have chosen the word fiqh because of the broad
nature of the commandment in question. However, I cannot explain every case.937
In Maimonides’ other writings, the word fiqh can refer either to jurisprudence in
general or to the details or instantiations of a law. Michael Schwarz showed that in the
Guide of the Perplexed, fiqh usually means jurisprudence but can occasionally mean
specific rules.938 In the Treatise on Resurrection, Maimonides described the Mishneh
Torah as “compilations of the law (tawālīf fiqh al-sharīʿa) and exposition of its statutes
(aḥkāmuhā);”939 he elsewhere categorized the Mishnah as a “book of law” (kitāb fiqh).940
In one responsum, he distinguished between the fiqh and the uṣūl (roots) of a law.941
Abraham Maimonides frequently said that the fiqh of a given subject is detailed in a

936

 ;וליס גרצ'י פי הד'ה אלמקאלה אלתפקה פי מצוה מן אלמצות בל עדדהא פקטMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 6 (introduction). See Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 8-9; Blau, Dictionary,
512, s.v.  ;فقهand Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 266n88, 469. Compare the formulation in one
letter to Samuel ben ʿEli, that the intent of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is not to discuss the fiqh of the commandments
(sharāʾiʿ), only the basic contours thereof (];)ליס גרץ' ד'לך אלכתאב ד'כר פקה תלך אלש[ראיע] בל מערפה מענאהא [פקט
Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:378. On this line in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see also Abraham Maimonides’
comments in MS. Hunt. 185, 213a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 106-107 (§13).
937
For example, “din shor” (“the law of oxen”) is one commandment and the “fiqh of this law”
(fiqh hādhā din) appear in the third chapter of Bava Qamma (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 174;
Pos. 337). See the description of the commandment to redeem a Jewish slavegirl, which contains “rules and
stipulations, and there are many fiqh therein” ( ;והד'ה אלפדיה להא אחכאם ושרוט ופיהא פקה כת'ירibid, 173).
938
See Schwarz, “Al-fiqh,” 351.
939
 ;אלתואליף פי פקה אלשריעה ותביין אחכאמהאMaimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:319 lines 21-22.
Translation based on David Hartman, Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, trans. Abraham S.
Halkin (Philadelphia: JPS, 1985), 211. Some manuscripts have the singular taʾalīf. On this line, see
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 45, 257.
940
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:122 (mMen 4:1). See Twersky, Introduction to
the Code of Maimonides, 168n203, 235-36.
941
 ;וד'לך כלה אנמא הו פקה עלי אצול אלאחכאםMaimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 1:237 (§129).
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particular section of the Mishneh Torah.942 Tanḥum ben Joseph ha-Yerushalmi (d. 1291),
a supporter of Maimonides who wrote al-Murshid al-Kāfī (The Sufficient Guide), a
Judeo-Arabic dictionary of difficult words in the Mishneh Torah, occasionally used the
word fiqh in ways that are found in Principle Seven.943
Maimonides’ use of the word fiqh is all the more striking when compared with the
use of the word furūʿ (branches) and its Hebrew synonyms by others who reflected on the
enumeration of the commandments. Maimonides did use the word furūʿ in Principle Two,
but there it describes rabbinic law, not the (biblical) instantiations considered in
Principles Seven, or the parts of commandments discussed in other Principles.944

Collecting Fiqh al-Miṣvah into Commandment-Units
The primary goal of Principle Seven, like the other Principles of Maimonides’
Sefer ha-Miṣvot treated in this chapter, is to group several laws into one commandmentunit. According to Maimonides, the author of the count in the Halakhot Gedolot was
aware of the need to do this and therefore listed parshiyot that collected vows, oaths, and
inheritance laws. But, in Maimonides’ opinion, this earlier enumerator had failed to fully
grasp this problem, listing many laws as individual commandments solely because they

942

See Abraham Maimonides, Peirush Rabbeinu Avraham, ed. Wiesenberg, 345 (see also 341);
idem, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 123, 131; on the word fiqh in this work, see there, 51. See also idem,
Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 68, 97, 132.
943
See Tanḥum ben Joseph ha-Yerushalmi, Al-Murshid al-Kāfī: Milono shel Tanḥum haYerushalmi le-Mishneh Torah le-Rambam, ed. Hadassa Shy (Jerusalem: ha-Aqademyah ha-Leʾumit haYisraelit le-Madaʿim, 2005), 2, 6. The fifteenth-century Qaraite Samuel ben Moses al-Maghrebī also used
fiqh this way in his Kitāb al-Murshid; see Joshua Blau, Ha-Sifrut ha-ʿArvit ha-Yehudit: Peraqim Nivḥarim
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1980), 266n94.
944
On the term furūʿ in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and the Commentary on the Mishnah, see above, n632. On
the root f-q-h in the latter work, see above, nn415, 569-570. As far as I can tell, this root invariably denotes
laws of biblical status in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, but can refer to laws of rabbinic status in the Commentary.
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are mentioned in the Pentateuch.945 According to Maimonides, the enumeration of the
commandments should only list the “principle” or “base” commandment (aṣl al-miṣvah),
and not “its instantiations or stipulations” (fiqhihā ʾaw shurūtihā), even if these are
explicitly set forth in the Pentateuch.946
Determining the aṣl al-miṣvah was not a simple task, however, and in Principle
Seven, Maimonides did not offer a clear way to identify it. Most of Principle Seven
consists of criticism of his predecessors, and of examples. Four of the five examples are
laws that are collected as one commandment, though they vary considerably in
application. For example: the permissibility of entering a levirate marriage depends on
the widow’s relationships to the family of her deceased husband; the nature of a
particular sin-offering varies according to the wealth of the sinner (Lev. 5:6-11); and the
personal status of an adulteress determines her punishment.947
In his fifth example, Maimonides stated that the rules pertaining to accidental
homicide comprise one commandment: the “law” (din) of unintentional homicide.948 He
used the term fiqh here to refer to the ways that unintentional homicide may occur. Even
though these details are set forth in the Pentateuch (Num. 35:16-23), they are not distinct
commandments. However, some laws that Maimonides called fiqh are better rendered
“details” or “provisions”; one example is the requirement that the unintentional killer flee

945

לכנה לם יתלכ'ץ לה הד'א אלמעני עלי אלכמאל ולא תחצל לה ולד'לך עד פי תלך אלפרשיות מא קד תקדם לה עדדה והו
 ;לא ישערMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25 (Prin. Seven). See above, n867.
946
פאן פקה אלמצוה איצ'א אד'א כאן נץ אלתורה לא ינבגי עדדה לאן ליס בכון אלכתאב ביין פקה תלך אלמצוה או
אלאשתראטאת אלתי פיהא נעד נחן כל שרט או כל פרצ'ה פקהייה במצוה וקד גלט פי הד'א כת'יר לאן כל מא יוג'ד מכתוב יעד מן גיר
 ;תאמל לאצל אלמצוה ולא לפקההא או שרוטהאMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 22 (Prin. Seven).
947
I.e., whether she is the daughter of a priest, a betrothed girl between the age of twelve and
twelve and a half (naʿarah ha-meʾurasah), or lacks either of these statuses; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v.
eshet ish, 2:291.
948
 ;אלמצוה אלמעדודה פהו דין מכה נפש בשגגהMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 24 (Prin. Seven).
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to a city of refuge (Num. 35:15). Maimonides was clearly aware that this case differs
from the others in Principle Seven, for he wrote only that examples one to four are “of the
same type” (wa-min hādhā al-qabīl), but did not use this phrase to introduce the fifth
example. Maimonides added that the fact that the Pentateuch calls these rules mishpaṭim
(ordinances; Num. 35:24), and not miṣvot, is further evidence that they are not distinct
commandments.949
From the examples in Principle Seven, it seems that Maimonides primarily looked
for conceptual connections when searching for the aṣl al-miṣvah, which he occasionally
called “the enumerated commandment” (al-miṣvah al-maʿdūda) or just the “miṣvah.” In
the enumeration itself, he identified different types of evidence to distinguish between the
fiqh and the enumerated commandment. According to Maimonides, the fact that the
Mishnah (mBek 1:7) uses the word miṣvah to describe both levirate marriage and the
levir’s release of the widow (ḥaliṣah) shows that these are distinct commandments.950
And although qiyās (here: analogy or logic) dictates that redeeming a firstborn calf or
breaking its neck should be treated as fiqh of a commandment, the same Mishnah terms
each of these acts a miṣvah, which indicates that they are two commandments.951 Albert
Friedberg showed that Maimonides was inconsistent in citing the phrase “commandment-

949

Note the various words that Maimonides used to classify these commandments in the
enumeration. He referred to the components of levirate marriage, variable sin offerings, and unintentional
homicide as aḥkām (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 95 [Pos. 72], 169 [317], 171 [Pos. 226], 319 [Neg. 295]),
used the root f-q-h to describe vows and sacrifices for unintentional sins (the other example in this
Principle; 93 [Pos. 70], 110 [Pos. 95]), classified the statuses of an adulteress as tafṣīl (detail or component,
see below; 23 [Prin. Seven], 336 [Neg. 347]), and called the inheritance laws “dinei naḥalot” (177 [Pos.
248]). Note the same phrase in the Short Enumeration in the Mishneh Torah; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds.
Cohen et al., 34 line 317.
950
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 102 (Pos. 82), 168-69 (Pos. 216-17).
951
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 102 (Pos. 82), and above, n897.
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x” (miṣvat-x) as evidence for a distinct commandment and that there are many examples
in rabbinic literature that Maimonides ignored.952 Unstated evidence and conceptual
factors appear to have led Maimonides to rely only selectively on this phrase.
In Principle Seven, Maimonides also used the root f-ṣ-l (to divide or separate) and
the verbal noun tafṣīl (making divisions or dividing) to denote part of a commandmentunit.953 In one instance, he associated the tafṣīl of a commandment with its “stipulations,”
(ishtirāṭ),954 and in four places in the enumeration, he used this root in relationship to
punishments imposed for similar acts.955 In Principle Nine, Maimonides employed this
root to tease apart individual prohibitions that are part of overarching negative
commandments (lav shebe-khlalot).956 Maimonides also used the word tafṣīl to denote a
component of the Temple, similar to Ḥefeṣ’s description of the Tabernacle.957
Another kind of evidence appears in Maimonides’ discussion of pesaḥ sheini (the
second paschal sacrifice), an arrangement which makes it possible for those unable to
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Above, n854. One problematic example (cited by Friedberg) is mSuk 4:3, which describes
taking the willow-branch as a miṣvah, but Maimonides, following the Talmud (bSuk 44a), called this a
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, both in the Commentary on the Mishnah (Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ,
2:182) and Hilkhot Lulav, 7:20-21. Note Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 108 (Pos. 93), where Maimonides
cited a passage from the Sifra (Parashat Meṣoraʿ, §2:6, ed. Weiss, 71b) that designated three instructions
to shave a miṣvah. Maimonides counted two of these (Pos. 93 and 111), but the third is a temporary
commandment excluded from the enumeration by Principle Three.
Modern readers of the Mishneh Torah have argued that Maimonides used the term miṣvah in that
work differently than he did in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. See Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 173-206,
271-326, and the literature cited there. See also Michael Chernick, “Ha-Hevdel bein Miṣvah ve-Halakhah
be-Torato shel ha-Rambam,” CCAR Journal (Special issue, 1997) 113-17.
953
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 23, 25 (Prin. Seven).
954
 ; אמא תפציל אלאשיא אלתי יכון בהא טמא או טהור פלא ינבגי עדהא לאנהא אשתראטאתMaimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25 (Prin. Seven).
955
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 186 (Neg. 9), 208 (Neg. 52), 219 (Neg. 73), 336 (Neg.
347).
956
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 33, 37 (Prin. Nine).
957
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 70 (Pos. 21); see also there, 99 (Pos. 77). For Ḥefeṣ’s
use, see above, n901; compare above, n896.
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bring the paschal sacrifice in its time to do so one month later. According to Maimonides,
one could have thought that this second occasion for a paschal sacrifice is a fiqh of the
commandment to bring the paschal sacrifice at the first opportunity. He claimed that this
question is at issue in a talmudic debate (bPes 93a) about the number of punishments
incurred for failing to offer the paschal sacrifice. Maimonides cited the view of R. Judah
the Prince, who had claimed that one who fails to bring the paschal sacrifice at either
time incurs two punishments because pesaḥ sheini is an “independent festival” (regel befnei ʿaṣmo). This shows, in Maimonides’ view, that the second paschal sacrifice does not
constitute a fiqh but is a distinct commandment.958
Maimonides also struggled to determine when acts in a series comprise one
commandment-unit. Two examples of this problem appear in Sefer ha-Miṣvot: the acts
that mark the end of one’s status as a nazirite (Num. 6:13-21), namely sacrifices and
shaving, and these same acts when used to purify one afflicted by ṣaraʿat (Lev. 14:9-10).
He wrote that the acts marking the end of one’s status as a nazirite are fiqh of a single
commandment because both are required to permit the former nazirite to drink wine.959
But in the case of one afflicted by ṣaraʿat, the acts of shaving and of sacrifice have
different goals (ghāya). After bringing the sacrifices, this individual is in an intermediate
state of purification (known as meḥusar kaparah; see, e.g., bNaz 45a); he is only
completely pure after shaving.960 Therefore, argued Maimonides, the acts of shaving and
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Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 88 (Pos. 57); see below, n1001.
Maimonides described these acts as the fiqh of this miṣvah twice in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and one
time used the fifth form verb f-q-h to describe them; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 108-109 (Pos. 93), 117
(Pos. 111). Note the careful use of the terms fiqh and juzʾ (part) there, 117 (Pos. 111); on the latter term, see
below.
960
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 116-17 (Pos. 111).
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of sacrifice comprise a single commandment for the former nazirite, but two
commandments for one who had been afflicted by ṣaraʿat.

Principles Eleven and Twelve
In Principles Eleven and Twelve, Maimonides argued that “parts” of a
commandment form a single commandment-unit. In both Principles, he used the same
Arabic word for “part” (juzʾ, pl., ajzāʾ). Indeed, the terminological similarity suggests
that Maimonides could have combined Principles Eleven and Twelve.961 While these
Principles are very similar, they differ in that Principle Eleven groups different objects or
acts and Principle Twelve is concerned with different components that comprise a larger,
manufactured object.
Principle Eleven states that parts of a commandment-unit can be combined in two
ways. The first requires the presence of a number of objects or acts. In the case of the
commandment to take the four species (Lev. 23:20), several objects must come together.
In order to set apart the individual afflicted by ṣaraʿat (ʿamāzat al-meṣoraʿ; Lev. 13-14),
a series of actions must be performed. Maimonides wrote that the latter case consists of
six “characteristics” (ṣifāt); each act (fiʿl) cannot possibly be a distinct commandment
(miṣvah be-fnei ʿaṣmah). Using words from the root j-m-ʿ (to combine) to describe the

Note Kafiḥ’s recognition of this and his decision to use the Hebrew words ḥeileq in Principle
Eleven and peraṭ in Principle Twelve; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45n84.
961
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relationship of the parts, he wrote that the desired outcome cannot be attained (al-ghāya
al-maṭluba lam tuḥaṣṣal) with only one “part.”962
Maimonides claimed that the second way that parts of a commandment-unit can
be combined is “extremely difficult to understand.”963 The difficulty arises when the
absence of one of the needed components does not inhibit fulfillment of the
commandment (einan meʿaqvin zeh et zeh). He cited the blue (tekheilet) and white fringes
of a four-cornered garment (Num. 15:38) to illustrate the complexity of this problem.
Lest “one imagine” (yasbiq lil-khāṭir)964 that the two colors refer to two commandments,
Maimonides cited a halakhic midrash:
Perhaps they are two commandments (miṣvot), the commandment of blue and the
commandment of white? Therefore it says “it will be for you as fringes” (Num.
15:39); “it” is one commandment and not two commandments.965
Maimonides drew a general rule from this midrash:
This clarifies for you that even if the absence of the parts of a commandment does
not inhibit its fulfillment, [the parts] may nevertheless constitute one
commandment (miṣvah aḥat) if they are one concept (or, meaning; al-maʿnā
wāḥid). Since the purpose (qaṣd) of the fringes is “to remember [all of the
commandments]” (Num. 15:40), and all of the prescribed matter (al-shayʾ almūjab) is to remember, it is counted as one commandment. [Consequently,] for
the enumeration of the commandments we ignore their [i.e., the rabbis’]
statements about parts of a commandment whose absence inhibit the fulfillment
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Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 43-44 (Prin. Eleven); see also 117-18 (Pos. 112), 14445 (Pos. 169).
963
See above, n912.
964
This phrase is exclusively a pejorative; Blau, Dictionary, 286, s.v. سبق.
965
 ; יכול שהן שתי מצות מצות תכלת ומצות לבן תלמוד לומר והיה לכם לציצית מצוה אחת היא ואינן שתי מצותhe
cited this midrash here as the Mekihlta but elsewhere as the Sifrei (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 [Prin.
Eleven], 66 [Pos. 14]). Naḥmanides cited this as the Mekhilta. Heller noted that this midrash is known
today as Sifrei Zuta; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 26n10; and Sifrei Zuṭa, ed. Zeʾev
Joskowicz (Lodz, 1929), 2:367. See Louis Finkelstein, “Maimonides and the Tannaitic Midrashim,” JQR
25, no. 4 (1935): 475-76, 477n15; and Jacob Dienstag, “The Relationship of Maimonides to his
Predecessors: Part I, Midrashic Literature,” Jewish Law Annual 1 (1978): 57-58.
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of other parts. Rather, [we consider] only the concept: Is it one concept or many
concepts?966
Maimonides here identified an additional way to bring acts into the framework of a single
commandment-unit. Apart from the relationship of the acts, the enumeration may depend
on the meaning or goal of the commandment, as in the case of fringes, whose goal –
remembrance – is stated in the Pentateuch. It is unclear how Maimonides would have
identified the maʿnā (concept or meaning) of the vast majority of commandments whose
intentions are not specified. His use of the term maʿnā may resemble its use in some
kalām texts.967
Many readers of Sefer ha-Miṣvot have noticed that Maimonides’ approach to the
(single) commandment of fringes seems to be in tension with his enumeration of the head
and arm phylacteries as two distinct commandments.968 The Talmud (bMen 44a) rejects

966
פקד באן לך אן ולו אלאג'זא אלתי אינן מעכבין זה את זה קד תכון מצוה אחת אד'א כאן אלמעני ואחד לאן אלקצד
באלציצית למען תזכרו פג'מלהֿ אלשי אלמוג'ב ללד'כר מצוה אחת ינעד פלם יבקי אד'א אן נלתפת פי עדד אלמצות לקולהם מעכבין ואינן
 ;מעכבין בל ללמעני פקט הל הו מעני ואחד או מעאני כת'ירהMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 (Prin.

Eleven). Apparently based on this discussion, Maimonides added a similar passage to the Commentary on
the Mishnah, writing: “the commandment of fringes includes two precepts” (miṣvat ṣiṣit mushtamil ʿala
farīḍatayn; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:121n7 [mMen 4:1]; note that miṣvah and farīḍ are often
synonyms in Judeo-Arabic. Here the term miṣvah denotes one of the 613 commandments. For some reason,
Joshua ha-Nagid was unaware that this was a correction to the Commentary on the Mishnah; see Teshuvot,
ed. Raṣhabi, 95. See also Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 16n21; and Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 28-31 [Prin. Eight].) Maimonides formulated this somewhat differently in Hilkhot Ṣiṣit, 1:4:
והתכלת אינו מעכב את הלבן והלבן אינו מעכב את התכלת כיצד הרי שאין לו תכלת עושה לבן לבדו וכן אם עשה לבן ותכלת ונפסק
הלבן ונתמעט עד הכנף ונשאר התכלת לבדו כשר. See Fixler, “Ha-Biṭuy ‘Ḥakhamim/Ḥasidim Rishonim’,” 60-61.

On the term maʿnā in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Chapter Five, esp. nn1108-1115. In the enumeration
of the commandments, I think that it is unlikely that Maimonides had in mind the medieval project of
identifying reasons for the commandments. In some works on Islamic legal theory, the term maʿnā is
interchangeable with ʿilla (ratio legis), the basis for juridical qiyās. See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty,
160n3, 193; Shehaby, “ʿIlla and Qiyās in Early Islamic Legal Theory,” 27-46; and Hallaq, A History of
Islamic Legal Theories, 23. On early use of this term, see Versteegh, Arabic Grammar, 96-99. See also
Richard Frank, “Al-Maʿnà: Some Reflections on the Technical Meanings of the Term in the Kalâm and its
Use in the Physics of Muʿammar,” JAOS 87, no. 3 (1967): 250-52.
968
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 65-66 (Pos. 12-13). See Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot
leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 129-30 (Prin. Eleven); Isaac ben Sheshet, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ha-Rivash
(Jerusalem: Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1993), 1:145-46 (§137); Duran, Teshuvot ha-Tashbeṣ, 3:146-47
967

267

the position that one should avoid wearing only one phylactery,969 asking: “Should one
who lacks two commandments (miṣvot) not perform one?”970 Based on the Talmud’s use
of the word miṣvah, Maimonides saw in this passage evidence (dalīl) that these are two
commandments.971
One exception to Maimonides’ understanding of rabbinic use of the term miṣvah
is the biblical requirement to count the days from Passover to Pentecost (Lev. 23:15).
While the Talmud (bMen 66a and parallels) says, “it is a commandment (miṣvah) to
count the days and a commandment to count the weeks,”972 Maimonides claimed that the
counting of days and the counting of weeks are two parts (ajzāʾ) of a single
commandment. Reading the rabbinic phrase, he wrote, “if one says ‘you must (yalzam)
do such-and-such,’ this statement does not mean that the act (al-fiʿl) must be an
independent commandment.”973 He further argued that use of a lone blessing indicates
that the counting of days and of weeks constitutes a single commandment.974

(§137); Jacob ben Joseph Reisher, Shevut Yaʿaqov (Metz, 1789), 3:2a (§3:4); and Daniel ha-Bavli’s claims,
treated below. See also Faur, ʿIyunim ba-Mishneh Torah, 142-43.
969
Maimonides originally accepted this position; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:121n7
(mMen 4:1); and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 65-66n60. Compare Abraham Maimonides, Sefer haMaspiq, ed. Dana, 261-62.
970
 ;מאן דלית ליה שתי מצות חדא לא לעבידthis version differs from some manuscripts.
971
See above, n952. As mentioned, he did not cite this term consistently; in two places the
Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael uses the phrase miṣvat tefillin (the commandment of phylacteries) to describe
both phylacteries; see Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horovitz and Rabin, 67 line 13 (masekhta de-fasḥa
§17), 74 line 8 (masekhta de-fasḥa §18).
972
973

.מצוה לממני יומי ומצוה לממני שבועי
 ;אד'א קלת ילזם אן יפעל כ'דא וכ'דא פליס ילזם מן הד'א אלקול אן ד'לך אלפעל מצוה בפני עצמהMaimonides,

Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 142 (Pos. 161).
974
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 142 (Pos. 161). See Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 61
(Neg. §53). Note that the prohibitions against shaving the corners of a man’s face and beard contain
numerous parts (ajzāʾ; the four corners of a face and the five prohibited parts of a beard); Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 202-203 (Neg. 43-44).
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Principle Twelve considers material parts used to manufacture (ajzāʾ ṣināʿa) a
single object.975 Maimonides explained that occasionally:
It is known that a particular act is legislated for us, then the scriptural (or, explicit;
naṣṣ) text confirms the explanation of how to perform that act and explains the
term (ism, lit., noun) which it had mentioned and states what it encompasses.976
But what, for Maimonides, constitutes an ism (which I have translated as “term”)?977 This
word appears two more times in Principle Twelve, where it refers to the commandmentunit of offering a meal offering (Lev. 2; Maimonides also called this “torat haminḥah”).978 Though the word “ism” in Sefer ha-Miṣvot frequently means “name,” it
sometimes appears to have a more technical meaning. For example, Maimonides twice
stated that the goal of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is only to “explain the ism” (sharḥ al-ism) of the
commandments.979
Maimonides’ Principle Twelve frames the vessels and other objects in the Temple
as one commandment-unit; the collection of the parts is termed (yatasammā; from the
same root as ism) the Temple (miqdash).980 Each sacrifice is also a single procedure,

975

 ;אלאצל אלת'אני עשר אנה לא ינבגי אן תעד אג'זא צנעהֿ מא מאמור בעמלהא כל ג'ז עלי אנפראדהMaimonides,

Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 (Prin. Twelve).
976

מעלום אנא קד נשרע בעמל מא מן אלאעמל ת'ם יאכ'ד אלנץ פי תביין כיפיה ד'לך אלעמל וישרח אלאסם אלד'י ד'כר
 ;ויקול עלי מא ישתמלthis is Bloch’s text, which I have followed for ease of translation; see Maimonides, Sefer

ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 47 (Prin. Twelve); and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45n24.
977
Following Israel Efros’ translation of the Treatise on Logic; “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,”
47 (English pagination). On the range of meanings of this word, see Almog Kasher, “The Term Ism in
Medieval Arabic Grammatical Tradition: A Hyponym of Itself,” JSS 54, no. 2 (2009): 459-74.
978
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 48 (Prin. Thirteen).
979
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 7 (introduction), 55 (supplemental introduction). On
this phrase, see Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch, Mishneh Torah ʿim Peirush Yad Peshuṭah: Zemanim 1
(Maʿaliyot: Maʿaleh Adumim, 2007), 687 (intro. to Hilkhot Shabbat, chap. 27). Compare the statement in
his letter to Samuel ben ʿEli, cited above, n936. See below, n1107.
980
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45-46 (Prin. Twelve), 69 (Pos. 20). See also
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 168-69 (Neg. 33).
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involving numerous steps.981 By the same token, the separation of each of the tithes and
their transferences constitute single commandments.982

Principle Thirteen
Maimonides’ Principle Thirteen is “the straightforward rule” (al-qānūn almustaqīm), according to which acts that repeat over time, whether over the course of a
year, or continuously (muttaṣila), constitute a single commandment-unit. For example,
the tamid sacrifice offered each morning and night (Num. 28:3-8) is counted once, as are
sacrifices of new months (Num. 28:11-15). In language reminiscent of Principle Eleven,
Maimonides claimed that the count depends on “al-maʿnā al-maʾamūr” (“the
commanded concept”). Maimonides further asserted that this Principle should be
obvious, except for the “enormous and repulsive mistake” (ghalṭa ʿaẓīma wa-shanīʿa)
made by earlier enumerators who counted all of the additional sacrifices of festivals
(mussafin) once, rather than counting the sacrifices of each holiday independently.983
How does one discern and identify cases that have one, as opposed to two,
“concepts”? Maimonides’ division between commandments and parts, while far from

981

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 46-47 (Prin. Twelve). Maimonides stated that general
requirements for all sacrifices are exceptions and are counted as distinct commandments (Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 48). Note that in one instance, he described commandment-units of this type as a “ritual” (rutba;
see Blau, Dictionary, 238, s.v. )رتبة. Kafiḥ noticed that the word ṣināʿa impacted the title of the relevant
section in the Mishneh Torah (i.e., Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot); Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 46n90. This
makes sense in light of Maimonides’ emphasis of the importance of Principle Twelve for the enumeration
of sacrifices.
982
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 47 (Prin. Twelve). See Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot
leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 134-37 (Prin. Twelve); and Isaac de Leon’s suggestion that Maimonides
changed his mind about some of the applications of this argument (Megillat Esther, in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Hellman, 190; Prin. Twelve).
983
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 48-49 (Prin. Thirteen).
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capricious, is certainly subject to debate.984 Noting some arbitrariness in the applications
of Principle Thirteen, Avraham Feintuch observed that Maimonides counted the
additional sacrifices of the seven days of Passover as a single commandment, while he
regarded the injunction to rest on the first and seventh days of Passover as separate
commandments.985

Principle Fourteen
In Principle Fourteen, Maimonides turned to the question of whether or not
punishments constitute distinct commandments. In his view, his predecessors had
inconsistently counted punishments as distinct commandments.986 By contrast,
Maimonides argued that the requirement to enact each type of punishment constitutes a
distinct commandment, but that the same punishment meted out for different sins only
constitutes a single commandment. As evidence, he cited the rabbinic designation of each
of the four types of capital punishment as “commandment-x” (miṣvat-x), and analogized
from these designations to the other types of punishment (e.g., lashes and each sacrifice
offered to atone for a sin). If the punishment for each sin was counted as a distinct
commandment, he argued, the number of positive commandments would exceed four
hundred!987 Maimonides does not seem to have considered the other extreme, that

984

See, e.g., below, n1092.
Avraham Feintuch, “Minyan ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Rambam u-Qedushat ha-Moʿadim,” Sinai 116
(1995): 218-19. Regarding Principle Thirteen, Friedberg wrote: “we see here that the individuating criteria
are not firmly set and can vary almost whimsically” (Crafting the 613 Commandments, 58; see also 78-80,
88-90).
986
See above, n878.
987
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 51-52 (Prin. Fourteen); on this number, see there, n33.
985

271

imposition of all of the punishments might constitute a single commandment;988 it may be
that the rabbinic phrase miṣvat-x precluded this option.

The Root t-b-ʿ to Describe a Component of a Commandment-Unit
In Sefer ha-Miṣvot, words derived from the root t-b-ʿ (to follow or be subordinate)
describe a subordinate element of a commandment-unit. Maimonides used this root to
categorize the requirement to eat bitter herbs with the paschal sacrifice. It is not clear
which Principle – if any – relates to this situation; perhaps the closest analogue is
Principle Eleven, which stipulates that parts of a commandment are not counted
separately. Maimonides, however, did not depict bitter herbs as “part” of the
commandment to eat the paschal sacrifice, but as an auxiliary to it. The root t-b-ʿ does not
appear frequently in Sefer ha-Miṣvot to describe the relationship of two laws, so it is hard
to clarify how Maimonides used this term. In Principle Four, which stipulates that
commands (awāmir) that include (taʿumm) all of the commandments (sharāʿiʾ) are not
counted, Maimonides cited “you shall be a holy people to Me” (Ex. 22:30) and referred to
the Mekhilta’s comment: “When God establishes (meḥadesh) a commandment for Israel,
He adds sanctity to them.”989 From Maimonides’ perspective, this broad understanding of
“you shall be holy” indicates that this phrase does not constitute an independent
commandment, but that Ex. 22:30 is “subordinate (tābiʿ) to the commandment that is

This is Naḥmanides’ view; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 142 (Prin. Fourteen).
The version in Sefer ha-Miṣvot reads:  ;כשהקב"ה מחדש מצוה לישראל הוא מוסיף להן קדושהpreserved
with slight variants in Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horovitz and Rabin, 320 lines 11-12.
988
989
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instructed.”990 (In at least two places in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides
stated that some rituals are appurtenances of others.991)
In one place, the Pentateuch (Num. 9:11) instructs that the paschal sacrifice be
eaten with unleavened bread and bitter herbs, yet elsewhere (Ex. 12:18) it mentions the
requirement to eat unleavened bread independently.992 Maimonides cited this latter verse
as the source for an independent commandment to eat unleavened bread.993 In his view,
the consumption of bitter herbs constitutes a “subordinate” (tābiʿ) act, or an
“appurtenance”994 (tābiʿa) of the paschal sacrifice; it is thus part of the commandmentunit to consume the paschal sacrifice. Citing a Mekhilta passage stating that neither
unleavened bread nor bitter herbs are considered a “miṣvah” independent of the paschal
sacrifice,995 and a talmudic statement (bPes 120a) describing the consumption of bitter
herbs on Passover as rabbinically ordained (de-rabbanan) in post-Temple times (bezeman ha-zeh), Maimonides claimed that the requirement to consume bitter herbs is
secondary to the paschal sacrifice.996

990

 ;תאבע ללמצוה אלמאמור ביהאMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 18-19 (Prin. Four). Note
throughout Principle Four the words that Maimonides used to avoid the word miṣvah.
991
One of which may have ramifications for the enumeration; see Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:97 (intro. to mMen), 5:109 (mMen 2:3); and compare idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 82 (Pos. 46).
992
The rabbinic reading is a decontextualized interpretation of this verse: “In the first of the
month, from the fourteenth of the month at evening, you shall eat unleavened bread until the twenty-first of
the month, at evening.”
993
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 140 (Pos. 158). Maimonides further cited the talmudic
description of this as an “obligation” (ha-katuv qevaʿo ḥova; bPes 120a and parallels).
994
Translation in Blau, Dictionary, 61-62, s.v.  ;تابعةsee also Friedlaender, Arabisch-deutsches
Lexikon, 13, s.v. تابعة. Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86-87 (Pos. 56).
995
Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horovitz and Rabin, 19-20. Horovitz preferred an alternative
version of this text (see below, n1014); see his notes and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 51n6.
996
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86-87 (Pos. 56).
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Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides on Creating Commandment-Units
Given the centrality of creating commandment-units in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and the
occasional inconsistencies in Maimonides’ arguments, it is not surprising that many of
Daniel ha-Bavli’s queries focused on the identification of parts of commandments and of
whole commandments. Five of Daniel’s thirteen questions on Sefer ha-Miṣvot tackled
this problem, two addressed Principles Seven and Eleven, and three pertained to the
enumeration itself. Several of the difficulties noted by Daniel coincided with passages in
which Maimonides himself had struggled to clarify his views.997 Whatever their source,
Daniel’s queries demonstrate his careful consideration of Maimonides’ grounds for
enumeration.
In at least two places, Daniel borrowed Maimonides’ use of the root f-q-h to
describe the relationship of various laws. He rejected Maimonides’ claim that despite the
different punishments imposed for committing adultery with women of different statuses,
there is nevertheless only one Negative Commandment prohibiting adultery. Daniel
wrote that the enumeration of the commandments should actually include every instance
in which Scripture “details the fiqh” (tafaqqahat al-naṣṣ) of a commandment.998 Daniel

997
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86 (Pos. 56), 88 (Pos. 57), 116-17 (Pos. 111).
Similarly, Maimonides mentioned the difficulties that Daniel raised against Principle Three; Maimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 153-54; MS. Hunt. 138a-140b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 9-12 (§2). Daniel’s insistence
that the enumeration should reflect Scriptural statements may also also build on Maimonides’ presentation
of his predecessors’ views.
998
MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3); Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 23-24
(Prin. Seven); see above, n947.
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also labeled the second paschal sacrifice one of the “commandments of restitution”
(miṣvot hashlamah) that are “fiqh” of another commandment, and therefore excluded it
from the enumeration.999 In both cases, Daniel used the word fiqh in the way that
Maimonides had stipulated, but came to different conclusions.

Abraham Maimonides’ Rejoinders to Daniel ha-Bavli
Daniel’s questions elicited strong reactions from Maimonides’ son Abraham,
which ranged from harsh critique to warm compliment.1000 Three themes deserve
attention. (1) In some cases, Abraham claimed that Maimonides had already considered
the arguments made by Daniel, and had adjusted later works accordingly. (2) In others,
Abraham explained Sefer ha-Miṣvot by resorting to arguments that do not appear in that
work. (3) In yet other cases, Abraham affirmed his own reliance on the claims of
logicians and dialectians, or as he put it, on one who is “a proponent of speculative
reasoning” (dhū al-naẓar).
Twice in these five responsa to Daniel, Abraham claimed that his father had
already considered Daniel’s arguments, integrated them into the Mishneh Torah, and
(silently) disclaimed his earlier assertions in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Describing the Mishneh
Torah as ṣaḥīḥ (reliable or authentic) and the repository of his father’s authoritative
statements, Abraham claimed that his father had disavowed the position set forth in Sefer
ha-Miṣvot regarding pesaḥ sheini (the second paschal sacrifice; Abraham labeled the

999

MS. Hunt. 185, 187b-188a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 78 (§7).
See above, n108.
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earlier view “objectionable” [muʿtariḍ]).1001 In response to Daniel’s claim that shaving is
not required to remove the nazirite prohibitions, Abraham similarly explained that his
father had, in fact, ruled accordingly in the Mishneh Torah (against Sefer ha-Miṣvot).1002
In insisting that the Mishneh Torah reflects his father’s final views and in calling that
work ṣaḥīḥ, Abraham echoed Maimonides’ claim that the Mishneh Torah is ṣaḥīḥ
relative to his Commentary on the Mishnah.1003

MS. Hunt. 185, 190a-190b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 81-82 (§7). For the earlier view, see above, n958.
In Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 5:2, Maimonides did not explicitly contradict his earlier position, but did imply
as much; see Korkos there (ed. Frankel, 7.2:39); and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 52n3. In the
Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides seems to have concurred with the ruling in the Mishneh Torah;
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 2:197 (mPes 9:1). Maimonides’ descendant Joshua ha-Nagid was unaware
of any change in Maimonides’ view; Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 106. The language in Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ,
1:2, seems to echo Sefer ha-Miṣvot. For the suggestion that different goals of the Mishneh Torah and Sefer
ha-Miṣvot explains contradictions, see Benedikt, Ha-Rambam le-lo Sṭiyah min ha-Talmud, 26, 127; and
idem, Asupat Maʾamarim, 135n14; based on the passage in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 378 lines 16-17.
See also Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 86, and below, n1003.
1002
For the earlier view, see above, n959. In the later work, Maimonides wrote that shaving the
nazirite is “meritorious, but does not preclude” drinking wine (le-miṣvah ve-lo le-ʿaqev; Hilkhot Nezirut,
8:5); see also Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot, 14:17. Maimonides changed the Commentary to agree with
the Mishneh Torah; see Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:189n35 (mNez 6:8). Abraham
repeated this elsewhere; see MS. Hunt. 185, 205b-206a, 206a-206b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 99-100 (§11), 100101 (§12); and below.
1003
See Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:383 (§217), and the notes there. Abraham also wrote
that the Mishneh Torah is “more careful” (ha-meduqdaq) than the Commentary; Teshuvot, ed. Freimann,
106-107 (§81). Compare there, 69-70 (§64): אלד'י פי ספר מצות סהו פי חאל אלכתאבהֿ וקד אצלחתה אלאן בהד'א אלנץ.
Maimonides edited the Mishneh Torah and Commentary on the Mishnah throughout his life, but Sefer haMiṣvot appears not to have been finalized, at least in surviving copies. For background, see Twersky,
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 16-17nn21-22; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 11-14
(introductory pagination); Hopkins, Peirush ha-Rambam le-Masekhet Shabbat, xxi-xxiii; and idem,
“Tiqunei Lashon ve-Hagbahat Signon be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” in Ḥiqrei ʿEver va-ʿArav, 25455. On edits to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 23-25 (introductory
pagination), 23n78, 24n6, 118n13; David Henshke, “Seridei Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rambam be-Mishneh
Torah,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies 1, div.10, division C, no. 1 (1989): 180-86;
idem, “Le-Gilguleha shel Shiṭat ha-Rambam ʿal Sheviʿit be-Zeman ha-Zeh,” Asufot 8 (1994): 182, 184;
idem, “Le-Yesodei,” 145-46; idem, “Le-Ḥashivato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam,” 1:144-45n90; and idem,
“Ke-Maʿayan ha-Mitgaber: ‘Sefer ha-Miṣvot’ le-Rambam ke-Biṭuy le-Hitpatḥut Ḥashivato ha-Hilkhatit,” in
ʿAl Pi ha-Beʾer: Meḥqarim be-Hagut Yehudit uve-Maḥshevet Yisrael mugashim le-Yaʿaqov Blidstein, eds.
Uri Ehrlich et al. (Beʾer-Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University Press, 2008), 151-82, esp. 152n7. To the
premodern testimonies there, add Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 410
(“forgotten” negative commandments); and Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 231-33 (concluding remarks). See
also Yuval Sinai, “Setirot Penimiyot,” 1:179-81; below, nn1044-1045; and the discussions in Chapter Five.
1001
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In other cases, Abraham explained Maimonides’ positions by invoking criteria
absent from Sefer ha-Miṣvot. For example, Abraham admitted that his father’s attempt to
combine blue and white fringes into a single commandment because they share a concept
(maʿnā) may “be misleading” (muwahhim); he acknowledged that hesitation
(mutawaqqif) regarding this claim was appropriate.1004 Yet he regarded Daniel’s claim
that all of the commandments connected with remembrance of the Exodus should be
counted as one (see below) as excessive. According to Abraham, Daniel’s reasoning
could be used to argue that all forbidden foods are subsumed under the commandment to
be holy (Lev. 11:44-45; this statement appears at the end of a list of prohibited foods), or
that all religious law could be subsumed under two overarching commandments, to love
God and to fear God (Deut. 28:48, 11:22). As this could not possibly have been
Maimonides’ intent, Abraham introduced new terms to distinguish phylacteries, which
constitute two commandments, from fringes, which constitute one. The two phylacteries,
he wrote, are “distinct” (mutabāyin), but blue and white fringes are “mutually entailing”
(mutalāzima).1005
Abraham also twice described a subsidiary law of a larger commandment-unit as
an “appendage” (iḍāfa) in cases where Maimonides had not used this term.1006 In one
instance, he contrasted this “appendage” with the “essence” (nafs) of a

MS. Hunt. 177a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 64 (§5).
MS. Hunt. 177a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 64-65 (§5).
1006
I have only found one instance of this term in Maimonides’ enumeration of the
commandments and two in the Principles; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two), 19 (Prin. Four), 91
(Pos. 66).
1004
1005
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commandment.1007 He did admit that Maimonides may not have intended a particular
“interpretation” (taʾwīl) of Sefer ha-Miṣvot that Abraham offered, and that there may be
“room to disagree” (wajh lil-muʿāraḍa) with some of his father’s proofs.1008 Appealing to
Principle Two, Abraham also explained decisions that his father had made by
emphasizing that Maimonides had enumerated only explicit (mafṣūḥ) laws, and not laws
derived from qiyās that are not guf ha-torah (essence of the Torah).1009
Finally, Abraham repeatedly cited terms and concepts from logic and dialectics to
dismiss Daniel’s arguments. He referred to “a proponent of speculative reasoning” (dhū
al-naẓar) twice, apparently somebody trained in logic or dialectics, and to a dialectician’s
postulate: If one of two contradictory views is disproved, then the other must remain.
Applying this to the circumstances at hand, Abraham declared that if Daniel was refuted,
Maimonides must emerge victorious.1010 Elsewhere, Abraham conceded that even a dhū
al-naẓar might fail to grasp the difference between phylacteries and the four species, or
the talmudic claim (bMen 44a) that the wearing of one phylactery in the absence of the
other fulfills a commandment, while the taking of three species in the absence of the
fourth is not. Abraham accepted that one might also be confused by another teaching of

MS. Hunt. 185, 181a, 193b-194a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70 (§6), 85-86 (§8). Nafs can also mean
independent; see Blau, Dictionary, 708, s.v. نفس.
1008
MS. Hunt. 185, 194b-195b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 86-88 (§8). On Abraham’s disagreements with
his father in halakhic matters, see Carmiel Cohen, “Moreshet Av be-Khtivato ha-Hilkhatit shel Rabbi
Avraham ben ha-Rambam,” Meʿaliyot 25 (2005): 188-98.
1009
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12-13 (Prin. Two); MS. Hunt. 185, 188a-189b;
Maʿaseh Nissim, 78-80 (§7). I have not found any evidence that Maimonides applied Principle Two to the
case at hand.
1010
MS. Hunt. 141b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 21 (§3). This argument is reminiscent of qiyās al-khulf; see
below n1012. Formal dialectics remains an understudied field; see Larry Benjamin Miller, “Islamic
Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth
Centuries,” (PhD. Diss, Princeton University, 1985).
1007
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Maimonides: the claim that if the absence of one act precludes the fulfillment of another,
then the two acts constitute one commandment, but when one act does not preclude the
fulfillment of another, these two acts are not necessarily two commandments. He insisted
that this “subtle” (daqīq) distinction requires careful consideration.1011
Abraham even argued that only a person who is not trained in qiyās could read a
Mekhilta passage as Daniel did. Abraham claimed that his own interpretation follows
what “the masters of the art of comparison” (arbāb ṣināʿat al-maqāyīs) term an
“apagogic syllogism” (qiyās al-khulf).1012 Any possessor1013 of “comprehension” (afhām)
who regarded this a weak argument was, in his opinion, similar to a “proponent of the
kalām” whose incomplete knowledge leads him to dismiss “definitive apodictic
demonstrations” (al-barāhīn al-qaṭʿīya).1014

MS. Hunt. 176a-176b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 63-64 (§5).
Goldberg (Maʿaseh Nissim, 71; §6) translated maqāyīs as higayon (logic), probably what
Abraham had in mind. Translation of qiyās al-khulf follows Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 45-46
(English pagination); see Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and
Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 73. On this term (which could be
vocalized qiyās al-khalf), see also Kwame Gyekye, “Al-Farabi on the Logic of the Arguments of the
Muslim Philosophical Theologians,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27, no. 1 (1989): 136-37; and
Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics, 74. For use in legal contexts, see Wael Hallaq, “Logic of
Legal Reasoning in Religious and Non-Religious Cultures: The Case of Islamic Law and the Common
Law,” Cleveland State Law Review 34 (1985-1986): 84. Qiyās al-khulf also appears in James Robinson,
Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2007), 218.
1013
MS. Hunt. 185, 182b, does not include the word dhū, but Goldberg (Maʿaseh Nissim, 71; §6)
plausibly suggested that it should be there.
1014
MS. Hunt. 185, 181b-182b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70-71 (§6). The text at hand reads: הרי אתה דן
( הואיל והפסח מצות עשה ומרור מצות עשהMekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horowitz and Rabin, 20 lines 3-4
(see the notes there); Maʾagarim does not preserve any alternative readings). Abraham argued that the
phrase miṣvat ʿaseh indicates that unleavened bread and bitter herbs are one commandment because this
phrase is singular and the Mekhilta always mentions unleavened bread before the bitter herbs. Neither
claim is particularly convincing; the word miṣvat could be vocalized as miṣvot, and it is hard to make much
of the order of unleavened bread and bitter herbs in this text.
1011
1012
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Abraham also claimed that Daniel’s comparison between the second opportunity
to bring the paschal sacrifice and the opportunity to bring a sacrifice on the intermediate
days of a festival (see below) violates basic logic. Similar deductions (natāʾij), wrote
Abraham, may result from different premises (muqaddimāt). Though both the second
opportunity to bring the paschal sacrifice and the opportunity to bring a sacrifice on the
intermediate days of a festival are opportunities to remedy failure, they are dissimilar for
the purpose of the enumeration.1015

Substantive Disagreements about the Creation of Commandment-Units
Throughout the responsa that address the creation of commandment-units, both
Abraham and Daniel focused on terminological and conceptual themes that were central
to Maimonides’ attempts to identify 613 distinct commandments. It is clear from their
discussions of five issues that both scholars were aware of problems with Maimonides’
methodological postulates, and recognized that these could not yield an unassailable
enumeration of the commandments.
(1) Daniel ha-Bavli called attention to Maimonides’ reliance on rabbinic use of
the term miṣvah. Citing two appearances of this word, Daniel asserted that acts that
Maimonides had combined into a single commandment-unit were actually distinct
commandments. First, Daniel claimed that in the Mekhilta passage cited by Maimonides,
bitter herbs and unleavened bread both share the same status; each is described as a
“miṣvah.”1016 Therefore, bitter herbs are a distinct commandment, asserted Daniel, and

1015
1016

MS. Hunt. 185, 189a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 80 (§7).
MS. Hunt. 185, 178b-179a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 66 (§6). For the Mekhilta text, see above n1014.
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not merely subordinate to the paschal sacrifice. Moreover, wrote Daniel, the talmudic
phrase the “commandment of shaving” (miṣvat giluaḥ, e.g., bNed 4a) indicates that
shaving is a distinct commandment for the nazirite, against the view of Maimonides, who
counted shaving and sacrifice as one commandment.1017
Elsewhere, Daniel asserted that the term miṣvah cannot possibly denote a distinct
commandment. Though the Talmud (bSuk 37b) described the four species (Lev. 23:40)
as four “miṣvot,” he noted, nobody counts these as constituting four commandments. This
alone would undermine Maimonides’ claim that the phylacteries count as two
commandments since the term miṣvah applies to each phylactery.1018 Daniel suggested
that the rabbis may have used the term miṣvah for each phylactery in the way that they
had referred to the four species, with each miṣvah denoting part of the commandment.1019
Daniel’s understanding of the Mekhilta elicited Abraham’s above-cited sharp
comments about his interlocutor’s ignorance of the ways of qiyās. In order to defend his
father’s reading, Abraham wrote that, as Daniel recognized that the rabbinic term miṣvah
could refer to parts (ajzāʾ) of a commandment, Daniel should acknowledge that the
“miṣvah” of consuming bitter herbs need hardly be a distinct commandment.1020 Abraham
made the same claim to deflect Daniel’s argument about concluding a period of

MS. Hunt. 185, 192b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 83 (§8); see above, n959.
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 144-45 (Pos. 169). Perla repeatedly insisted that
nobody could possibly think that the four species constitute four commandments (Sefer ha-Miṣvot leRasag, 1:13, 1:160, 1:468, 1:582). Benjamin bar Samuel indicated that the four species are four
commandments; see Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 46 (see there, 37); and Frankel, Maḥzor
Shavuʿot, 698 line 27.
1019
MS. Hunt. 185, 174b-175a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 61-62 (§5). See similarly Daniel’s criticism of
Maimonides’ use of the word miṣvah in MS. Hunt. 185, 198a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 91 (§10).
1020
MS. Hunt. 185, 184b-185a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 74 (§6). The transcription should read אללולב
( ארבעה מצותnot )מצוי.
1017
1018
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naziriteship.1021 In neither case did Abraham attempt to reconcile his own position with
his father’s claims.
(2) Daniel also challenged Maimonides’ search for conceptual links that would
result in the creation of commandment-units. Were this line of reasoning correct, Daniel
claimed, laws pertaining to tithes, or firstborn sons and firstborn animals would constitute
a single commandment, because each shares a name or appears to be based on similar
concepts.1022 Maimonides had argued that blue and white fringes share a common
meaning (maʿnā) because the Pentateuch states that they are affixed to garments “in
order (le-maʿan) to remember all of the commandments” (Num. 15:40), but he had
suggested that the head and arm phylacteries do not share a common goal. Daniel
asserted that if so, all of the commandments which are linked to the requirement to
remember the Exodus would have needed to be counted as one. He concluded that the
singular word “it shall be” (ve-haya; Ex. 13:9, Num. 15:39) indicates that phylacteries
and fringes are each a single commandment.1023 Noting that the Pentateuch uses the word
“le-maʿan” (“in order to”; Ex. 13:9, Num. 15:40) with respect to both fringes and
phylacteries, Daniel further claimed that they share a single goal (gharaḍ). This was the
contention that led Abraham to admit that the arguments of his father may have been
“misleading” – though Abraham attempted to defend him.

MS. Hunt. 185, 193b-194a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 85-86 (§7).
I.e., tithes are maʿaser rishon, maʿaser sheini, etc., and require a portion of produce be given
away, and both firstborn sons and first born animals, known as bekhor adam and bekhor beheimah, grant a
priest the firstborn (though the former is subsequently “redeemed”); MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim,
18 (§3).
1023
MS. Hunt. 185, 174b-175b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 61-62 (§5).
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The Role of Scripture in Identifying Distinct Commandments
(3) Daniel disagreed with Maimonides’ claims about the role of Scripture in the
enumeration of the commandments. He did recognize that the “umbrella” of a larger
commandment-unit frequently subsumes numerous laws. A commandment might contain
numerous sub-commandments (farḍāt)1024 whose rules (aḥkām) differ,1025 wrote Daniel;
although the divisions (aqsām) of one commandment (sharīʿa) may vary, they are
nevertheless one unit. This is a “truth about which there is no disagreement,”1026 he
wrote. Daniel also accepted that scriptural divisions, parts (ajzāʾ), or aspects (wujūh) of a
commandment are not always enumerated separately.1027 Nonetheless, he argued that the
enumeration should hew more closely to scriptural divisions than to conceptual
classifications. In Daniel’s view, this perspective helps explain several claims made by
“the ancients” (al-qudman) whose enumerations Maimonides had dismissed.1028
In setting forth his theory, Daniel invoked a talmudic passage (bSab 73b-74a) that
asks why the Mishnah (mSab chap. 7) lists prohibited Sabbath labors that are similar to
one another, such as threshing and winnowing: Could one prohibition not be derived
from the other? The answer offered in the Talmud is that the list of prohibited labors
accords with the acts performed in the Tabernacle: “everything that was in the
Tabernacle: even though there is [something] similar to it, it counts.”1029 Mirroring this

1024
This word is related to farīḍa (pl., farāʾiḍ), a common Judeo-Arabic term for miṣvah, but is
uncommon; see Blau, Dictionary, 497, s.v. فرضة.
1025
 ;קד תפקה אלחכמים ז"ל פיהמא ואפרצ'ו פיהא פרצ'את עדידה תכתלף אלאחכאם פיהא באכתלאפהאMS. Hunt.
185, 138a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 16 (§3).
1026
 ;חק לא כלאף פיהMS. Hunt. 185, 138a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 16 (§1).
1027
MS. Hunt. 185, 138a-138b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 16 (§1).
1028
MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3).
1029
 ;כל מילתא דהוי במשכן אע"ג דאיכא דדמיא לה חשיב להthis is Daniel’s text; others vary slightly.
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language, Daniel wrote, “everything that is written in the Pentateuch: even if there is
[something] similar to it, it counts as a commandment.”1030 According to Daniel, this
explains why earlier enumerations had counted the three punishments for adultery as
three commandments, despite the fact that they are all “fiqh” of a single prohibition.1031
Daniel highlighted an incongruity in Principle Seven in order to demonstrate his
approach. Maimonides had claimed that the sacrifice offered by an inadvertent sinner
constitutes a single miṣvah, even though the sacrifice varies according to the status of the
sinner (e.g., head of the court [nasi], High Priest, or neither). He compared this to the
single commandment obligating an atonement sacrifice for the sin of entering the Temple
while impure, for here, too, the sacrifice was related to one’s status. While the rich sinner
might bring a lamb or goat (Lev. 5:6), noted Maimonides, these, and the sacrifices of
poorer sinners, constitute “without doubt a [single] positive commandment” and its
fiqh.1032 Daniel claimed that Maimonides was wrong to equate these laws, for there is
great disparity in the sacrificial rites demanded of inadvertent sinners of different
statuses;1033 they are quite unlike the option of the wealthy man to bring a lamb or a goat
to atone for having entered the Temple in a state of impurity.
Daniel compared the option to sacrifice a lamb or a goat to another situation that
involved choice. Maimonides had written that, were it not for the fact that the Mishnah

1030
 ;כל מלתא דכתיב באורייתא אע"ג דאיכא דדמיא לה מצוה קא חשיב להsee the strikingly similar argument in
di Trani, Qiryat Sefer, 9a (introduction, §6).
1031
MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3).
1032
 ;מצות עשה בלא שךMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 22; see there, 22-23 (Prin. Seven);
and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 81-83.
1033
I.e., their blood is sprinkled in different places and they are offered on different altars; MS.
Hunt. 185, 138b-139a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 17-18 (§3).

284

described as “commandments” both the redemption of a firstborn donkey and the
breaking of its neck, qiyās would dictate that each is a fiqh of a single commandment.1034
This disturbed Daniel: “We cannot say,” he exclaimed, “that they [i.e., the rabbis …]
were ignorant of the ways of qiyās!”1035 Rather, he wrote, the enumeration must follow
rabbinic “qiyās”; in cases where the Pentateuch offers a choice, both options constitute
distinct commandments.1036 Daniel wrote that “whenever Scripture (or, the explicit text;
naṣṣ) rules that something be divided, and distinguishes … between those aspects of it
that are subject to division, it is [to be considered] distinct in regard to the
enumeration.”1037
Abraham Maimonides responded by pointing out an ambiguity in Daniel’s
argument regarding the atoning sacrifices for inadvertent sinners. According to Abraham,
choice is irrelevant to the enumeration; the count of commandments only increases when
laws differ depending on their performers (he ignored the role that choice apparently
plays in the commandments of the firstborn donkey and levirate marriage).1038 Daniel’s
indignation at Maimonides’ dismissal of rabbinic “qiyās” also irritated Abraham. The
rabbis knew on the basis of a divine tradition (naql) that redeeming a firstborn donkey

1034

See above, n951.

1035

 ;ולא ימכננא אנא נקול אנהם עלאל"ס כאנוא ג'אהלין בטרק אלקיאסMS. Hunt. 185, 139a; Maʿaseh Nissim,

18 (§3).
1036
Daniel wrote that the choice to enter a levirate marriage is similar. In his view, the choice of
lamb or goat is one commandment, however, apparently because only the animal varies, but levirate
marriages and firstborn donkeys entail different actions. Compare Perla’s comment that “nobody could
possibly think that the [choice of] lamb or goat is two commandments” ( ולא עלה על דעת שום אדם שיאמר דכשבה
 ;)ושעירה שתי מצוותSefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:584.
1037
 ;כל מא תחכם אלנץ פי תקסימה ופרק פי חכמה בין וגוה אלתקסים פהו מפתרק פי אלעדדMS. Hunt. 185, 138a138b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3).
1038
MS. Hunt. 140b-141a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 19-20 (§3). See however above, n1036.
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and breaking its neck are distinct commandments, he wrote, but general principles of
enumeration of the commandments cannot be extracted from such statements.1039
(4) When Daniel claimed that Maimonides had focused inconsistently on explicit
and non-explicit laws, he argued that Maimonides had included certain details (here:
furūʿ) of a single commandment (here: aṣl) in his enumeration, despite the fact that these
details are not explicit in the Pentateuch (ghayr mafṣūḥ; ghayr manṣūṣa) and that their
laws do not differ fundamentally (laysat mukhālif fī al-ḥukm) from one another. In one
such case, claimed Daniel, Maimonides had misclassified the commandment which
prohibits an improperly dressed priest from serving in the Temple, for he included this
within the positive commandment of donning priestly garments.1040 From Daniel’s
perspective, this prohibition should be seen as one offshoot (farʿ min furūʿ) of the
commandment that prohibits a non-priest (zar) from serving in the Temple.1041 Daniel set
forth similar perspectives with regard to three negative commandments that prohibit an
impure priest from serving in the Temple: the general prohibition; the case of a priest
who has taken a ritual bath but remains unclean until sunset (ṭevul yom); and that of the
priest who has not completed the rituals of atonement and remains in an intermediate
state of impurity (meḥusar kaparah).1042

MS. Hunt. 142b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 22 (§3).
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 75-76 (Pos. 33). See also above, nn736-737.
1041
MS. Hunt. 185, 140a-140b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 19 (§3). Daniel’s assumption is not entirely fair,
as Maimonides listed this law as part of the commandment that priests wear specific clothing. See Sayid,
Ner Miṣvah, 1:48a; and Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 2:424-25, 3:60-62; see also Duran, Zohar haRaqiʿa, 232 (concluding remarks). Note Abraham Maimonides’ reformulation of this prohibition; MS.
Hunt. 185, 143b-144a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 23 (§3).
1042
MS. Hunt. 185, 140a-140b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18-19 (§3).
1039
1040

286

There is reason to conjecture that this particular challenge is one to which
Maimonides himself was sensitive because, curiously, Daniel’s third example does not
appear in surviving manuscripts of Sefer ha-Miṣvot. In his rebuttal, Abraham
Maimonides did not claim that Daniel possessed an erroneous text of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, as
he did when Daniel cited another passage that is absent from surviving versions of Sefer
ha-Miṣvot.1043 Ḥayim Heller, however, surmised that Daniel had an earlier version of
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, and suggested that Naḥmanides’ version of this work also included this
prohibition.1044 (There are also indications in the Mishneh Torah that Maimonides
rethought aspects of this prohibition.1045) Whatever the state of Daniel’s text of Sefer haMiṣvot, he regarded these prohibitions as furūʿ of a single umbrella commandment
prohibiting impure priests from serving in the Temple. Rejecting Maimonides’ claims,
Daniel argued that if the three prohibitions pertaining to impure priests constitute three
commandments, despite the fact that they are not explicit in Scripture, then the existence
of three different punishments for adultery, which are based on express scriptural
passages (faṣīḥ al-naṣṣ), should definitely evince the presence of three
commandments.1046

See MS. Hunt. 185, 130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6 (§1).
See above, n705.
1045
See the sources in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 45n8; and Hilkhot Biʾat haMiqdash, 3:9, 4:4, 9:11; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:194 (mSan 9:6); Menaḥem haMeiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah ʿal Masekhet Sanhedrin, ed. Abraham Sofer (Jerusalem: Qedem, 1971), 301 (bSan
83b); Sayid, Ner Miṣvah, 1:36a; and Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:57.
1046
MS. Hunt. 185, 140a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 19 (§3). Regarding these commandments, see also MS.
Hunt. 185, 126b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2 (introduction). On the term faṣīḥ al-naṣṣ, see above, n702.
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The Relationship between “Parts” and “Umbrella” Commandments
(5) Daniel ha-Bavli also challenged a number of Maimonides’ decisions that
aggregated individual laws into larger commandment-units. Daniel began his critique of
Principle Eleven with one of his favorite tactics, by claiming that Maimonides had
contradicted himself. The first part of Principle Eleven posits that if the absence of any
component of a ritual prevents its fulfillment, then all components collectively comprise
one commandment.1047 According to Daniel, Maimonides had contradicted this by
counting, as separate commandments, the injunctions to slaughter the paschal sacrifice
and to eat it.1048 Daniel pointed to a talmudic debate (bPes 78b-79a) about the
relationship of these laws, in which the minority does not regard failure to eat the paschal
sacrifice as a barrier to fulfillment of the commandment of sacrifice (akhila lo meʿaqva).
Though the Talmud does not say as much, Daniel inferred that the majority position was
that failure to eat the paschal sacrifice does render the sacrifice invalid. If Maimonides, in
fact, followed the majority position, argued Daniel, why had he counted the slaughtering
and eating of the paschal sacrifice as two commandments?1049 Daniel posited that these
acts constitute a single commandment. In his view, eating the paschal sacrifice completes

1047

See above, n962.
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86 (Pos. 56).
1049
See Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 2:14, 4:2. The Talmud does not actually say that the majority hold
that failure to eat the paschal sacrifice renders it invalid; see Korkos to Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 4:2 (ed.
Frankel, 7.2:32); and Avraham Teʾomim, Ḥesed le-Avraham, Mahadurah Tinyana (Lvov, 1898), 2:26
(Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 8:1). Maimonides therefore need not have accepted Daniel’s inference; see Perla,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:423-25.
1048
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the sacrifice (he termed it tashlumei miṣvah) and is not, by itself, a distinct commandment
(guf miṣvah).1050
In his responses, Abraham Maimonides asserted that there is an “enormous
difference” (farq kabīr) between saying that two objects are indispensible to one another
(meʿaqvin zeh et zeh), and saying that the absence of one object precludes the fulfillment
of the other (davar ploni meʿaqev davar ploni).1051 Therefore, the majority position that
failure to eat the paschal sacrifice precludes fulfillment of the sacrifice need not mean
that slaughtering and eating the paschal sacrifice constitute a single commandment.
Abraham also added a more convincing argument: These acts are two commandments
because slaughtering the paschal sacrifice and eating it are done at different times;
excision is only incurred by failure to do the latter.1052
In his challenges to Maimonides’ claim that bitter herbs are merely an
“appurtenance” to the paschal sacrifice and not an independent commandment, Daniel
attacked the evidence from the Mekhilta,1053 and proposed an interesting interpretation of
bPes 120a. In this passage, Rava claims that since the destruction of the Temple (bezeman ha-zeh), the injunction to consume unleavened bread on Passover would have the
force of biblical law, but the injunction to consume bitter herbs, only that of rabbinic law.
The Talmud explains that the verse “they shall eat it with unleavened bread and bitter
herbs” (Num. 9:11) obligates eating bitter herbs and unleavened bread only when the

MS. Hunt. 173a-174a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 59-60 (§4). As evidence, Daniel cited the Talmud’s
statement that eating the paschal sacrifice is of secondary importance (le-miṣvah be-ʿalma). On the term guf
miṣvah, see above, n725.
1051
As Perla noted, Abraham’s “enormous difference” is certainly debatable and does not account
for similar passages; Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:426.
1052
MS. Hunt. 175b-176a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 62-63 (§5).
1053
Above, n1016.
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paschal sacrifice is offered (be-zeman de-ika pesaḥ). Rava claimed that a verse that does
not mention bitter herbs, “at evening you shall eat unleavened bread” (Ex. 12:18),
obligates eating unleavened bread even when the paschal sacrifice is not offered (bezeman de-leika pesaḥ). An opposing view cited in the Talmud describes the consumption
of both bitter herbs and unleavened bread as rabbinically mandated laws in the absence of
the Temple.1054 Rava responded by arguing from the case of an uncircumcised person
who cannot bring a paschal sacrifice: “No uncircumcised person may eat of it” (Ex.
12:48) – “it” (i.e., the paschal sacrifice) he may not consume, but he must consume
unleavened bread and bitter herbs. Daniel adduced this passage to argue that the
consumption of bitter herbs on Passover is a biblical obligation that is independent of the
paschal sacrifice, and consequently (?), an independent commandment.1055

1054

This position holds that Ex. 12:18 obligates one who does not offer the paschal sacrifice
during the Temple period to eat unleavened bread and bitter herbs. Although Ex. 12:18 only mentions
unleavened bread, the Talmud twice says that this verse imposes an obligation to eat bitter herbs as well
(bPes 28b and 120a). All of the manuscripts on the Lieberman Institute website share this reading. Some
commentators viewed the appearance of bitter herbs in this statement as “imprecise”; see, e.g., David of
Bonafed, Ḥidushei Rabbeinu David, ed. Zevulun Shoshanah (Jerusalem: Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1997),
150-51 (bPes 28b); and Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona, Ḥidushei ha-Ran, Masekhet Pesaḥim, ed. Eliyahu
Lichtenstein (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1991), 166 (bPes 28b). See also Rashi, bPes 28b, s.v. leṭamei; and Menaḥem ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah ʿal Masekhet Pesaḥim, ed. Joseph Klein (Jerusalem:
Mekhon ha-Talmud ha-Yisraeli ha-Shaleim, 1966), 84 (bPes 28b).
1055
MS. Hunt. 185, 178a-180b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 66-69 (§6). See similarly Tosafot, bYeb 71a, s.v.
bo. Maimonides apparently agreed with Daniel’s reading (see Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 9:8) but not about the
impact on the enumeration. See Korkos there (ed. Frankel, 7.2:61); Menaḥem ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah ʿal
Masekhet Yevamot, ed. Shmuel Dickman (Jerusalem: Mekhon ha-Talmud ha-Yisraeli ha-Shaleim,
1962), 262 (bYeb 71a); Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:434-35; and Babad, Minḥat Ḥinukh, 1:96. By
distinguishing between those who do not offer the sacrifice when the Temple stood (be-zeman de-leika
pesaḥ) and the post-Temple period (be-zeman ha-zeh). Daniel appears to have read the word zeman in this
passage to denote both “situation” and “period.” In Daniel’s view, Ex. 12:48 mandates that the former eat
both bitter herbs and unleavened bread but Ex. 12:18 mandates that the latter eat only unleavened bread.
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This argument elicited a strident response from Abraham, who insisted that bitter
herbs are merely an “appendage” (iḍāfa) to the paschal sacrifice.1056 He nevertheless
concurred with Daniel’s distinction between the obligations after the Temple period and
those that were in force while it stood. According to Abraham, the Talmud needed to
clarify that those who did not bring the paschal sacrifice while the Temple stood were
nevertheless obligated to eat bitter herbs precisely because they are merely an
“appurtenance” (tābiʿa, as his father had written), and one might have thought that there
was no requirement to eat them.
Abraham suggested that Daniel misunderstood this for one of two reasons: Either
the entire Talmud was a “sealed document” (Isa. 29:11) for Daniel, or due to the bias (alhawī)1057 that Daniel felt against Maimonides. Otherwise, wrote Abraham, Daniel would
surely not have interpreted bPes 120a as he did.1058 These remarks also appear to subtly
evoke Maimonides’ battles with Daniel’s teacher, Samuel ben ʿEli.1059 Abraham further
cautioned Daniel that scholars (ʿulamāʾ) do not needlessly quote clear texts, as it is
beneath their honor.1060

1056
MS. Hunt. 185, 181a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70 (§6). This is a reformulation of Maimonides’ claim,
as Maimonides did not use this word to describe the relationship of bitter herbs and the paschal sacrifice.
For use of the passive participle muḍāf(a) in this sense, see above, n1007.
1057
Goldberg has  אלהאbut the manuscript reads  ;אלהויMS. Hunt. 185, 184b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 74
(§6).
1058
MS. Hunt. 185, 184a-185a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 73-74 (§6).
1059
Abraham sardonically asked Daniel, “Is it a great thing to read verses?” (;רבותא למיקרי פסוקי
MS. Hunt. 185, 181a-181b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70; §6). In one letter, Maimonides similarly castigated
Samuel for quoting texts that Samuel allegedly misunderstood, adding this remark. Though this expression
sounds like a quote from rabbinic literature, I have not found a source for this line, and neither have the
most recent editors of Maimonides’ letter to Samuel. See Maimonides, Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. Blau,
2:573 (§310); and Igrot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 1:378, 1:383n36. This phrase also appears in a responsum
of R. Isaac ben R. Mordecai Qimḥi (Provence, late 13th c.); see Abraham Schreiber, ed., Teshuvot Ḥakhmei
Provanṣiya (Jerusalem, 1967), 374 (dinei shutafut, §20).
1060
MS. Hunt. 185, 181a-181b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70 (§6).
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In another passage, Daniel disagreed with Maimonides’ claim that the designation
of the second paschal sacrifice as “regel bi-fnei ʿaṣmo” (“independent festival”) indicates
that it is a discrete commandment. Daniel compared the second paschal sacrifice to the
compensatory sacrifice brought throughout the festival’s duration when one is unable to
bring the ḥagigah sacrifice (Ex. 23:14) on the first day (see bḤag 9a-9b). This, noted
Daniel, is not a distinct commandment.1061 (This argument is slightly problematic
because the Talmud labels compensatory festival offerings a restitution [tashlumin] and
Maimonides had rejected the notion that the second paschal sacrifice was an opportunity
for restitution.) Daniel also described Maimonides surprising claim – that because it is an
“independent festival,” one who willfully ignores the first opportunity to offer the paschal
sacrifice but offered it in the second incurrs the punishment of excision1062 – as “very
difficult” (ṣaʿb jiddan).1063 Maimonides had written that This view is indeed surprising,
as one would have thought that the Pentateuch had provided the supplementary
opportunity in order to avoid punishment! Daniel concluded that “commandments of
restitution” (miṣvot hashlamah) are “fiqh” of a commandment and they should be
excluded from the count.1064
Lastly, Daniel challenged the distinction that Maimonides had drawn between the
rites performed at the end of one’s nazirite period and the rites of purification for one
afflicted by ṣaraʿat. In the latter case, Maimonides had counted the two-step purification

MS. Hunt. 185, 185a-186b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 75-76 (§7).
See above, n958.
1063
MS. Hunt. 185, 186b-187a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 75-78 (§7).
1064
MS. Hunt. 185, 187b-188a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 78 (§7). Daniel also addressed the second
paschal sacrifice in one of his queries about the Mishneh Torah; see MS. Hunt. 185, 18b-19a; Birkat
Avraham, 9 (§4).
1061
1062
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process (sacrifices and shaving) as two commandments, noting that each act achieves a
separate goal (ghāya). Though concluding nazirite status involves the same requirements,
Maimonides declared these acts “connected” (murtabiṭ), and thus, one commandment.1065
Yet Daniel pointed to the majority position in the relevant talmudic discussion (bNaz
46a), which stated that the nazirite prohibitions are revoked once the nazirite offers the
requisite sacrifices. This being the case, he wrote, the sacrifices achieve “the desired
goal” (al-ghāya al-maṭlūba), and the requirement to shave is unrelated to the
sacrifices.1066
Abraham commended Daniel on both points, but insisted that his father had
changed his mind. He also asked whether Daniel would not consider the Eighth Day of
Assembly (Lev. 23:36) a distinct commandment, given the Talmud’s (bSuk 47a and
parallels) reference to it as an “independent festival”?1067 Abraham further argued that
shaving is the “essence” (nafs) of the commandment to conclude nazirite status, while the
sacrifices are merely an “appendage” (iḍāfa) to the commandment.1068 In the end,
however, wrote Abraham, Maimonides had already noticed these challenges. Although
he failed to amend Sefer ha-Miṣvot, his new conclusions appear in the Mishneh Torah.1069
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See above, nn959-960.
MS. Hunt. 185, 191a-193b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 82-85 (§8).
1067
MS. Hunt. 185, 189b-190a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 80-81 (§7). Maimonides relied on this statement
as a evidence (dalīl) that the sacrifices for the Eighth Day of Assembly are a distinct commandment; Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 83-84 (Pos. 51). At the end of this section (MS. Hunt. 185, 189a; Maʿaseh Nissim,
80; §7), Abraham claimed that his father’s furūʿ “flow” (muṭṭarid) from his uṣūl. Abraham did not use the
term furūʿ in the way that it is used in Sefer ha-Miṣvot (see above, n632), but rather to refer to the
enumeration as a whole. See similarly MS. Hunt. 185, 130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6 (§1), where Abraham
wrote: ומן הד'א אלאצל תסתמד בטלאן כל או אכת'ר מא אעתרצ'ת בה עלי תלך אלאצול ופרועהא.
1068
See above, n1007.
1069
See above, nn1001-1003.
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Conclusion
Grouping laws as commandment-units was one of the central difficulties that any
enumerator of the commandments faced. While many individual decisions can be
justified, exceptions to programmatic postulates are inevitable. This project may have
been doomed from the outset by the arbitrary nature of the number 613, but as medieval
enumerators struggled to identify exactly 613 commandments, they crafted nuanced
arguments that integrated the Bible, rabbinic literature, and occasionally, ideas from
beyond the standard rabbinic corpus (such as dialectics, logic, and uṣūl al-fiqh). In this
way, the enumeration of the commandments was “good to think with” and gave
Rabbanite jurists a vehicle to reflect on the law as a whole.1070
Maimonides appears to have been the first to outline a systematic methodology
for the enumeration of the commandments, and he used his scheme to criticize unnamed
predecessors who, in his estimation, had violated these “rules.” These enumerators were
bound to fail the test that he devised, as the Principles in the Introduction to Sefer haMiṣvot were, on occasion, shaped by the “blunders” of predecessors.
Shortly after Maimonides’ death, Daniel ha-Bavli engaged in a careful and
reasoned criticism of Maimonides’ methodology. While Daniel learned much from
Maimonides, he ultimately demonstrated the frailty of Maimonides’ system and the
problems endemic to his (and perhaps any) attempt to identify precisely 613
commandments. Daniel was the first reader – and the only reader of the Judeo-Arabic
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Compare A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 3-4, arguing that Muslims engaged theoretical
problems as an entry point into “delicate” or “sensitive” topics that were “too disturbing or unnerving” to
address directly. I believe that the jurists who engaged the material treated in this chapter (and the next), in
part, did have larger concerns in mind, such as portraying Jewish law as well-organized and coherent.
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text of Sefer ha-Miṣvot – to demonstrate that Sefer ha-Miṣvot is occasionally arbitrary
and always vulnerable to criticism.
Daniel’s queries were so piercing that Abraham Maimonides’ responses
frequently seem flimsy by comparison. In fact, Abraham admitted that his father had
silently disclaimed positions in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, as could be discerned in his later work,
the Mishneh Torah. Some of Abraham’s disagreements with Daniel were due to genuine
differences in interpretation, and there is little doubt that Daniel was motivated by the
“bias” that Abraham identified. Nevertheless, many of Abraham’s retorts seem to have
been driven by the impulse to defend his father against a robust, studied evaluation.
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Chapter Five: The Pentateuch and the Enumeration of the Commandments
Introduction
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot asserts that there is an intimate relationship
between the Pentateuch and the 613 commandments. It hardly needs to be stated that
there is no inkling of the notion of 613 commandments in the Pentateuch itself; likewise,
rabbinic literature and, apparently, earlier enumerators of the commandments, did not
consider the relationship between the Pentateuch and the enumeration in any substantive
way. Maimonides’ attempt to connect the enumeration with the Pentateuch has received
scant scholarly attention, but is one of the most ambitious and creative elements of Sefer
ha-Miṣvot. It exhibits his careful readings of Scripture and rabbinic literature, his reliance
on Rabbanite lexicographic works, and his innovative suggestions for classification.
Scrutiny of his ideas also uncovers an important chapter in the development of
Maimonidean halakhah and in the writing process that produced Sefer ha-Miṣvot.
Maimonides presented his theory regarding the connection between Scripture and
the 613 commandments in Principle Nine of his Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot. This
Principle presented Maimonides with a monumental challenge, and he rethought several
related claims throughout his life. Principle Nine may also have been, for him, the most
important, as he cited it more than any other,1071 writing at its conclusion, “Place this

1071

Maimonides cited Principle Nine ten times in his enumeration, and it is the only Principle
mentioned in another Principle; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 (Principle Eleven), 211 (Neg. 60), 229-30
(Neg. 94), 231 (Neg. 98), 238 (Neg. 125), 275 (Neg. 191), 277 (Neg. 195), 292 (Neg. 235), 309 (Neg. 272),
325 (Neg. 311), 338 (Neg. 350). Principle Twelve also references Principle Nine, though not by name;
there, 49. For references to Principle Two, see there, 260 (Neg. 168; treated in above, n670); Principle
Four, 60 (Pos. 5), 193 (Neg. 26); Principle Seven, 88 (Pos. 57), 102 (Pos. 82; and the “supplemental
introduction” appended to Principle Fourteen, 193 (Neg. 26), 211 (twice; Neg. 60), 227 (Neg. 90), 242
(Neg. 133), 277 (Neg. 195). He did not refer to any other Principle in the enumeration.
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Principle in its entirety opposite your eyes at all times; it is a very important key for the
verification of (li-taḥqīq) the enumeration of the commandments.”1072
Principle Nine seeks to link every scriptural do and do not with a distinct
commandment. Maimonides used the Hebrew words ʿaseh and lav1073 and the Arabic
amr and nahy to denote “do” and “do not,” verbs in the imperative and prohibitive (or
“vetitive”) moods, respectively. Accordingly, “do X” constitutes an ʿaseh or amr, and
“do not do X,” a lav or nahy. (In this chapter, I frequently use “command” and
“prohibition” to denote scriptural dos and do nots in order to avoid the bulky translation
“verb in the imperative/prohibitive mood.”1074)
The first part of Principle Nine argues that each commandment is a stand-alone
“concept” (usually maʿnā, sometimes shayʾ, “thing”) and that repeated scriptural
commands (Heb. ʿaseh;1075 Ar. awāmir) and prohibitions (Heb. lavin; Ar. nawāhī) that
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 ;ואג'על הד'א אלאצל בג'מלתה חד'א עיניך דאימא פאנה מפתאח כביר ג'דא לתחקיק עדד אלמצותMaimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 42 (Prin. Nine). Some texts read faṣl (section) instead of aṣl (Principle) in this
statement; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 44; ed. Kafiḥ, 42 (Prin. Nine); see also ed. Heller,
24n108. While faṣl may be preferable according to the principle of lectio difficilior, Maimonides referred to
this unit “in its entirety,” in contrast with the previous sentence, which only discusses the second part of
Principle Nine. The term faṣl may also refer to the entirety of Principle Nine. Compare Naḥmanides’
comment that in this Principle, Maimonides “decrees many decrees, … and they are a large key for him in
the enumeration of the commandments” ( ;)יגזור בו הרב ז"ל גזירות רבות והם לו מפתח גדול במנין המצותSefer haMiṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 97 (Prin. Nine). See also ibn Abi Zimra, Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, 5:4a
(leshonot ha-Rambam, §15): ועיין באותו שורש כי הוא רב התועלת וזכרהו תמיד.
1073
According to Yoḥanan Breuer, “Ḥidushim Miloniyim be-Lashon ha-Amoraʾim,” Lĕšonénu 69,
no. 1-2 (2007): 56, the singular lav denoting “a negative commandment” is a Babylonian innovation, and
Tannaitic literature uses the term lo taʿaseh to denote “a single negative commandment.”
1074
Note that the scope of a command or prohibition does not correspond to the division of
Scripture into verses; one verse may contain several dos and one do may extend over several verses.
Maimonides treated the definition of nahy in Principle Eight at length; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 2632. The ideas developed in Principle Eight and elsewhere are obviously crucial to understanding
Maimonides’ approach to the terms amr and nahy, which were discussed at length by Jewish and Muslim
grammarians and legal theorists, but are not central to Principle Nine.
1075
As far as I can tell, Maimonides never used the plural ʿasin, which appears in some medieval
texts.
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address one “concept” do not constitute evidence of multiple commandments.
Maimonides therefore needed to define what constitutes “repetition,” as the Pentateuch
frequently repeats itself, using different formulations. The second part of Principle Nine,
which he described as “appended to” (yanḍāf ilā)1076 the first, asserts that each “concept”
must be based on “an exclusive verb in the prohibitive1077 mood” (lav mujarrad).1078
Yeruḥam Fischel Perla noted tension between the first part, which constructs “concepts”
that transcend scriptural formulations, and the second, which relies solely on Scripture in
grouping distinct laws as a single commandment.1079 I would suggest that the division
within Principle Nine may preserve an earlier conceptualization which treated only
repeated commands and prohibitions; the second part may have been appended later.
As Maimonides was almost certainly the first enumerator of the commandments
to deal in a systematic way with the problems posed by Principle Nine,1080 I only treat
earlier literature in cases where it has bearing on his claims. This chapter is organized
around the two theses of Principle Nine; it considers their impact on the “verification” of

1076

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 37 (Prin. Nine). See the (nearly?) identical language
in the supplemental introduction after Principle Fourteen; ed. Bloch, 56, reads tanḍāf ilā (note the variants
recorded there), and ed. Kafiḥ, 54, yanḍāf ilā. See also ed. Heller, 31n58.
1077
On the Positive Commandments; see below, n1142.
1078
He termed the opposite a lav shebe-khlalot, perhaps “a verb in the prohibitive mood that
covers several laws”; on both terms, see below.
1079
Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:34-37.
1080
Sefer ha-Miṣvot itself is the best indication of this: although Maimonides claimed that an
unnamed predecessor erred regarding one ramification of this Principle (see below, n1193; see also below,
n1128), he was far less concerned with “errors” of earlier enumerators in Principle Nine than he was in
other Principles. Compare Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9, 12 (Prin. One), 13-14 (Prin. Two),
16-17 (Prin. Three), 41-42 (Prin. Nine), 52-53 (Prin. Fourteen). For other criticisms, see there, 18 (Prin.
Four), 20 (Prin. Five), 25-26 (Prin. Seven), 27-28 (Prin. Eight), 43 (Prin. Ten), 48 (Prin. Twelve); see also
4-5 (introduction). Note the comment that he could not “remember for the moment” (fī mā adhkuruhu alān) anyone who erred concerning the topic of Principle Six (there, 20); compare the text in Baneth,
“Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,” 381.
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the commandments, and it closes with the exchange of Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham
Maimonides’ regarding this Principle.

Overlapping Pentateuchal Commands and Prohibitions
It may be of significance that the heading of Principle Nine focuses only on its
first argument: “It is inappropriate to count the do nots (al-lavin) or the dos (al-ʿaseh),
but [only] the forbidden or commanded things (al-ashyāʾ al-manhī ʿanhā wal-maʾmūr
bihā) [should be counted].”1081 Or, as Maimonides summarized at the end of this part of
Principle Nine: “It is inappropriate to count every do not (lav) found in the Torah or
every do (ʿaseh), for it [i.e., these] may be repeated. Rather, it is appropriate to count the
commanded or forbidden concepts (al-maʿānī al-maʾmūr bihā aw al-manhī ʿanhā).”1082
Maimonides asserted that these “concepts” (a term used interchangeably with “things”)
fit into four categories: opinions (ārāʾ),1083 actions, character traits, and utterances.1084 He

1081

 ;אלאצל אלתאסע אנה לא ינבגי אן יעד אללאוין ואלעשה בל אלאשיא אלמנהי ענהא ואלמאמור בהאMaimonides,

Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8, 32 (Prin. Nine).
1082

אנה לא ינבגי אן יעד כל לאו יוג'ד פי אלתורה ולא כל עשה לאנה קד יכון מכרר ואנמא ינבגי אן תעד אלמעאני
 ;אלמאמור בהא או אלמנהי ענהאMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36 (Prin. Nine). Compare Isaac ben
Sheshet, Teshuvot ha-Rivash, 2:556 (§387): שבהתרבות הלאוין לא תתרבינה המצות.
1083
Or, one line later, “belief” (iʿtiqād). Kafiḥ repeatedly insisted that iʿtiqād denotes
“knowledge,” not “belief”; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 32n90, and the references there.
Many have rejected this; see Avraham Nuriel, “Remarks on Maimonides’ Epistemology,” in Maimonides
and Philosophy: Papers Presented at the Sixth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, eds. Shlomo Pines and
Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986), 40-50; Simon Rawidowicz, “On Maimonides’ ‘Sefer HaMadda’,” in Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J.H. Hertz, 333-39; repr. in idem, Studies in Jewish
Thought (Philadelphia: JPS, 1974), 319-23; Herbert Davidson, “The First Two Positive Commandments,”
in Creation and Re-Creation, 129n61; repr. in idem, Maimonides the Rationalist, 35n72; and Blau,
Dictionary, 444, s.v.  عقدVIII.
1084
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 32-33 (Prin. Nine). Kafiḥ (32n88) noted that Guide
III:28 speaks of a similar division. Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:16, added that Abraham Ibn Ezra
divided the law similarly: (1) “faith of the heart” (emunat ha-leiv), (2) commandments of the mouth, and
(3) commandments of action; see Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon,
131 line 11 (7:2). The editors of that work noted a similar division in Ibn Ezra’s “Long Commentary” to
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claimed that the rabbis, as “the commentators who transmit the tradition” (al-shāriḥīn alrāwīn), relay reports regarding the “division of concepts” (tafṣīl al-maʿānī) that
occasionally override the presumption that the “ẓāhir” (apparent or literal) meaning of
Scripture reflects the divine intent. In some such cases, the rabbis may clarify that a
seemingly repetitive do or do not actually “includes” (yataḍammanu),1085 or “adds,” a
novel concept (li-ziyāda maʿnā).1086
The imposition of punishments offers the most important evidence regarding the
“division of concepts.” Maimonides posited a one-to-one correspondence between the
number of “concepts” that a sinner violates, the number of punishments that he incurs,
and the number of commandments that he contravenes. However, when the rabbis state
that a given act violates two (or more) prohibitions (i.e., laʿavor ʿalav be-shnei lavin),1087
the prohibitions are deemed repetitions and do not qualify as distinct commandments.1088
Citing several rabbinic statements to support this claim, Maimonides noted that failure to
wear phylacteries “violates eight positive commandments” (ʿover be-shmonah ʿaseh;

Ex. 20:1; see Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 2:131. Compare Twersky, Introduction to the Code of
Maimonides, 275.
1085
In the enumeration, the root ḍ-m-n occasionally denotes cases that the sages explain that a
commandment includes multiple acts; see, e.g., Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 59 (Pos. 3), 182 (Neg. 4). In
one instance, Maimonides contrasted gufei di-qera (“the verse itself”) with acts that the sages explained are
included in a given prohibition (there, 204; [Neg. 45]).
1086
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 33-34 (Prin. Nine); see Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 120-21. Similarly: ולא ימכן מערפהֿ אללאו ואלעשה אלמתכרר אנה ג'א לזיאדהֿ מעני אלא במוקף יוקף עלי
( ד'לך והם רואת אלתפסיר ע"סed. Kafiḥ, 36; Prin. Nine). Throughout Principle Nine, Maimonides stressed the
rabbis’ role as transmitters, most likely because this Principle addresses rules of divine origin and
Maimonides held that non-revealed interpretations yield laws rabbinic in status.
1087
On this phrase, see the brief comment in Yaakov Elman, “Le-Toldot ha-Ribbuy be-Talmud haBavli,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies Division C: Thought and Literature, Volume
I: Rabbinic And Talmudic Literature (1993): 91.
1088
He also understood the statement that a verse is “superfluous” (yetar) to mean that it is
repeated.
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bMen 44a), and that the Pentateuch warned against wronging a convert (ger; “stranger”
in biblical Hebrew) thirty-six times (bBM 59b). In neither case, he claimed, can each
scriptural mention possibly correspond to a distinct commandment.1089 (In both Sefer haMiṣvot and the Mishneh Torah, however, Maimonides often used the phrase ʿover beshnei lavin to denote two commandments.1090) Maimonides therefore had an easier time
identifying a Negative Commandment than a Positive one, for, with two exceptions,
punishment is only incurred for violation of the former.1091 Futhermore, Maimonides’
decisions about what constitutes a Positive “concept” tend to be more subjective.1092
According to Principle Nine, repetitions, even “in different formulations” (bialfāẓ mukhtalifa),1093 may be for “emphasis” (taʾkīd) – in which case a designated sin is

1089

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 34, 35-36 (Prin. Nine). On the latter, see ed. Heller,
20n36. Compare Hilkhot Tefillah u-Nesiʾat Kapayim, 15:12, and Hilkhot Tefilin, 4:26. In at least one
instance, he asserted the inverse, that the lack of lashes for violating a specific rule shows that this rule
merely completes (tatmīm) the law; ed. Kafiḥ, 262 (Neg. 170). On tension between “received traditional
interpretation” and philological readings of Scritpure in qurʾānic tafsīr, see Walid Saleh, The Formation of
Classical Tafsīr Tradition: The Qurʾān Commentary of al-Thaʿlabī (d. 427/1035) (Leiden: Brill, 2004),
134-37.
1090
See, e.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 280 (Neg. 201), 297-98 (Neg. 246), 311
(Neg. 280), 328 (Neg. 317); note that there, 229 (Neg. 94), he implied that some sages used the term ʿover
differently than proposed in Principle Nine. For the Mishneh Torah, see, e.g., Hilkhot Sekhirut, 11:2;
Hilkhot Roṣeaḥ u-Shemirat ha-Nefesh, 1:15; and Hilkhot Gezeilah ve-Aveidah, 1:12. Note the careful use of
the terms ʿover and loqeh in Hilkhot Kilaʾim, 10:31, and the comments in Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh,
there (Mishneh Torah, ed. Frankel, 6:72). I have not found this phrase in the Commentary.
1091
Compare Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 34-35. The exceptions are circumcision
and offering the paschal sacrifice; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 54 (supplemental
introduction), 86 (Pos. 45), 277-78 (Neg. 196). See also above, n679.
1092
For example, Perla (Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 2:48) argued that one of Saʿadya’s
enumerations considers “You shall love the convert (ger)” (Deut. 10:19) part of the commandment to “Love
your fellow as yourself” (Lev. 19:18) because the convert is just an example of a fellow Jew. Maimonides
marshaled several arguments in order to show that these verses ordain two commandments (Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 163-64 [Pos. 207]; see also Hilkhot Deiʿot, 6:3-4), and reported that no enumerator
counted them as one. For Perla’s claim about the Saʿadya’s approach to the Negative Commandments, see
there, 1:37-40; compare however Tobi, “Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” 1:100; and Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod
Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 98 lines 57-60 (2:9).
1093
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36 (Prin. Nine); see Cohen, Opening the Gates of
Interpretation, 121n114. Maimonides’ example appears to overlook an explicit mishnah. He claimed that
the verses “You shall not pick your vineyard bare (teʿolel), or gather the fallen fruit of your vineyard” (Lev.
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“very significant” (ʿaẓīm jiddan); alternatively, the repetition may “complete” (tatmīm or
takmīl) the rules of a commandment, in which case it is immaterial to the
enumeration.1094 Maimonides was not the first Andalusian Rabbanite to reflect on the
concept of “emphasis.” Jonah Ibn Janāḥ (11th c.) dedicated a lengthy chapter of his Kitāb
al-Lumaʿ (The Book of Variegated Flower Beds) to scriptural taʾkīd; following Muslim
grammarians, Ibn Janāḥ used taʾkīd to explain superfluous letters and words.1095 In the

19:10), “When … you overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it” (Deut. 24:19), and “When
you beat down (tefaʾer) the fruit of your olive trees, do not go over them again” (Deut. 24:20) all command
a single “concept,” namely, that one may not return to collect forgotten fruits, and that grapes and olives are
just two examples of this concept (mithlayn; ed. Kafiḥ, 36-37 [Prin. Nine]; see similarly, 121 [Pos. 123],
283 [Neg. 212]). Based on the editio princeps, Bloch included an explicit statement that leftover grapes are
ʿolelot and olives peʾarot ( ;וסמי אלבקיה מן אלענבים עוללות ואלבקיה מן הזתים פארותsee ed. Bloch, 37n3). Such a
statement also appears in Ibn Tibbon’s translation, and Naḥmanides quoted it as well, indicating that it is
original; see ed. Heller, 20 (Prin. Nine) and n42; and Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed.
Chavel, 149 (supplemental introduction). Solomon ibn Ayyub’s translation, in David ben Kokhavi, Sefer
ha-Batim, 2:240 (Pos. 180), 2:399 (Neg. 212), repeats the position in standard versions of Sefer ha-Miṣvot.
However, mPea 7:4 defines ʿolelot (from Lev. 19:10) as a grape that lacks “shoulder (kateif) and pendant
(nateif)” (trans. in Danby, The Mishnah, 18), not as forgotten grapes. Naḥmanides (there) noted that
Maimonides followed the mishnaic definition of ʿolelot in Hilkhot Matanot ʿAniyim, 4:17-18 (see also 1:5),
and not the definition in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. The editio princeps of Sefer ha-Miṣvot includes the following
interpolation: הגה' נראה כי דעת הרב כי בקדשים נזכר פאה ולקט ועוללות ופרט ולא נזכר בו שכחה ובכי תבא נזכרים זיתך לא
'תפאר אחריך ובענבים כרמך לא תעולל אחריך וה"ה לשאר אילנות ואין זה ממין וכרמך לא תעולל הכתו' בקדשים כי הוא אפי' לפני
'אסו' ואפי' כל הכרם עוללות כלה לעניים ואין דין פרט ועוללות אלא בכרם לבד ע'כ. See Dror Fixler, “ʿOlelot – Halakhah u-

Maʿaseh,” Teḥumin 28 (2008): 355-56, 365-67. Kafiḥ struggled mightily with Maimonides’ deviance from
the Mishnah; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36-37nn22, 25, 121n88, 283n32, 283-84n35. Kafiḥ suggested
that the text in Ibn Tibbon’s translation reflects an early version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot and that Maimonides
eventually removed it. (Kafiḥ’s text appears to have been altered to accord with mPea 7:4 and the Mishneh
Torah.) There is no hint to the understanding of ʿolelot found in Sefer ha-Miṣvot in the Commentary on the
Mishnah to mPea 7:4 (Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:122). In fact, Sefer ha-Miṣvot follows the
definition of ʿolelot as khuṣāṣ (sing., khāṣaṣa) in Ibn Janāḥ’s Kitāb al-Uṣūl; see The Book of Hebrew Roots,
ed. Adolf Neubauer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875), 521. Ibn Janāḥ derived his definition from
“lexicographic books of the Arabs” (kutub lugha al-ʿarab).
1094
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 33-34 (Prin. Nine).
1095
Jonah Ibn Janāḥ, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, ed. Joseph Derenbourg (Paris, 1886), 278-90. For the claim
that several words can simply be for emphasis, see there, 288. See the brief treatment in Cohen, Opening
the Gates of Interpretation, 58-59; see also there, 121 and n113. At least one claim of this chapter copies
from a Muslim grammarian; see Dan Becker, “Linguistic Rules and Definitions in Ibn Janāḥ’s Kitāb alLumaʿ (Sefer ha-Riqmah) Copied from the Arab Grammarians,” JQR 86, nos. 3-4 (1996): 278; and idem,
Meqorot ʿAraviyim le-Diqduqo shel R. Yonah Ibn Janāḥ (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1998), 34244. On Judah Ibn Tibbon’s translation of the term taʾkīd, see Jonah Ibn Janāḥ, Sefer ha-Riqmah be-Tirgumo
ha-ʿIvri shel R. Yehuda Ibn Tibbon, ed. Michael Wilensky (Jerusalem: Ha-Aqademiyah le-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit,
1964), 1:52n5. On taʾkīd among Muslim grammarians, see Owens, Early Arabic Grammatical Theory, 5657, 62-63, 74-76, 99-100; idem, “The Historical Linguistics of the Intrusive *-n in Arabic and West
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Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides invoked taʾkīd to explain superfluities in
Scripture and in the Mishnah itself.1096 Citing “one of the principles of language usage”
(aṣl min uṣūl al-lugha) in one discussion, Maimonides argued that repeated letters in the
quinquiradicals (words with five root letters) yeraqraq and adamdam (Lev. 13:49) are
added for “emphasis”; they respectively denote the deepest green and the deepest red.1097
According to the Guide, scriptural instances of taʾkīd emphasize the evil of idolatry or the
importance of love of God.1098 However, in one place in the Commentary on the
Mishnah, Maimonides wrote that, according to tradition (naql), the five scriptural
prohibitions against offering blemished animals as sacrifices are not simply repeated for
“emphasis”; rather, each covers a distinct “concept” (maʿnā). One might refer to the

Semitic,” JAOS 133, no. 2 (2013): 217-48; and Tamar Zewi, “Energicus,” in Encyclopedia of Arabic
Linguistics, 2:22-25. For use in tafsīr, see Wansbrough, “Majāz al-Qurʾān,” 251, 258; and idem, Quranic
Studies, 230-31. I have not found extensive discussions of taʾkīd among Rabbanites who predate Ibn Janāḥ.
In another context, Éric Chaumont translated the title Kitāb al-Lumaʿ as Le livre des rais
illuminant; see his Le livre des rais illuminant les fondements de la compréhension de la loi: traité de
théorie légale musulmane (Berkeley: Robbins, 1999).
1096
For the application to Scripture, see Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:397
(mʿOrl 1:2); for the application to the Mishnah, 2:376 (mḤag 1:8; explaining the phrase hen hen gufei
torah).
1097
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:388 (mNeg 11:4); see Hilkhot Tumat Ṣaraʿat,
12:2. This follows the rabbinic understanding, and was adopted by Ibn Janāḥ, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, 120, and Ibn
Ghiyāth, in Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 173. Others argued that quinquiradicals denote the weakest shades of
these colors; see Dunash ben Labrat, Sefer Teshuvot Dunash ha-Levi ben Labraṭ ʿal Rabbi Saʿadya Gaon,
ed. Robert Schröter (Breslau: Schletter’sche Buchhandlung, 1866), 11-12 (§35); Abraham Ibn Ezra,
Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 3:41 (Lev. 13:49); idem, Yesod Diqduq hu Sefat Yeter, ed. Neḥemyah
Allony (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1984), 155 and n379; see also idem, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah,
eds. Cohen and Simon, 174 lines 8-9 (11:2). Rashi cited Dunash’s position in his commentary to Ps. 68:14
(a verse that seems to indicate that yeraqraq means “yellow”). On these roots, see Igal Yannai, “Peʿalim
Merubei-ʿIṣurim be-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit,” Lĕšonénu 38, 1-2 (1974): 118-30, no. 3: 183-94; and idem,
“Augmented Verbs in Biblical Hebrew,” HUCA 45 (1974): 71-95. On the ascription of this treatise to
Dunash, see David Herzog, “The Polemic Treatise Against Saadya Ascribed to Dunash ben Labrat,” in
Saadya Studies, 26-46.
1098
E.g., Maimonides, Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Munk and Joel, 373 (III:28), 400 (III:37), 411
(III:41), 423 (III:45).
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blemished animal’s sanctity, and another to the sprinkling of its blood.1099 The distinction
between repetitions for the sake of taʾkīd and repetitions to denote separate “concepts” is
central in Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1100
Principle Nine offers two simple examples of taʾkīd: the Pentateuch’s twelve-fold
repetition of the command to rest on the Sabbath, and its seven-fold repetition of the
prohibition against eating blood; nobody, insisted Maimonides, would count each more
than once in an enumeration of the commandments.1101 Maimonides usually used the fifth
form of the Arabic root k-r-r (to be repeated or reiterated) to denote repetitions, and
frequently wrote that Scripture repeats a law “in another formulation” (bi-lafẓ ākhar).1102
However, this claim that the Pentateuch may, sometimes, add new information in order to
“complete the particular ruling of the commandment” (takmīl ḥukm al-miṣvah)1103 elides
the neat delineation between emphasis and the teaching of a new commandment.
Maimonides argued, for example, that several prohibitions addressed to both regular
priests and the High Priest do not teach distinct commandments; rather, they are repeated

Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:144-45 (mMen 8:7). He revisited this
conclusion, however; see below, n1189.
1100
As far as I can tell, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 250 (Neg. 152), is the only discussion of taʾkīd
in this work that is not connected with the problem of repeated verses.
1101
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 34-35 (Prin. Nine); see there, nn6-7, for the verses.
1102
E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 221 (Neg. 77), 231 (Neg. 98), 342 (Neg. 355);
see above, n1093.
1103
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 34 (Prin. Nine). For example, the various types of
capital punishment for different classes of women “complete (tatmīm) the law of the punishment for
adultery” ( ;תתמים חכם קצאץ אשת אישsee above, n947), and the examples of improper weights and measures
(Lev. 19:36; Deut. 25:13-15) “come to complete the laws (li-tatmīm aḥkām) of the miṣvah” ( ולא תט'ן אן קולה
 ;)לא יהיה לך איפה ואיפה ולא יהיה לך אבן ואבן שתי מצות לאן [אל]שני לאוין אנמא ג'את לתתמים אחכאם אלמצוהthere, 23
(Prin. Seven), 309 (Neg. 272).
1099
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in order “to clarify a given matter”1104 or in order to rule out an otherwise logical
conclusion (see below).1105
Maimonides also asserted that acts which incur multiple punishments violate
multiple sheimot (sing., sheim). In rabbinic literature, the term sheim (and the related
term, mi-shum) denotes a legal category, i.e., a heading that covers disparate
institutions.1106 Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s novel argument is that each sheim constitutes a
“concept,” and a discrete, enumerated commandment.1107

Identifying Distinct “Concepts”
Principle Nine asserts, rather than defends, the claim that the enumeration of the
commandments consists of 613 “concepts.” Maimonides did not clarify the notion of a
“concept,” and its parameters appear somewhat subjective. Maimonides, however, was
not the first to equate “enumerated commandment” with the word maʿnā, i.e., concept; in

1104

 ;תכררת פי כהן גדול לתביין מעני מאMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 258.

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 256 (Neg. 163). He repeated this in Hilkhot Biʾat haMiqdash, 2:6. Two rules derived from the same prohibition do not constitute distinct commandments (for
example, the prohibitions against shaving various parts of the face or beard); Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ,
202-204 (Neg. 43-44).
1106
See Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, 105-107, 148-50, 156-59. See also, Shlomo Naʾeh, “ʿAl
Gevul ha-Diqduq veha-Milon,” Meḥqarim be-Lashon 5-6 (1992): 302-303; and Shamma Friedman, “Shum
Davar,” in ʿIyunim be-Leshon Ḥakhmaim, ed. Moshe Bar Asher (Jerusalem: ha-Mekhon le-Limudim
Mitqadmim, 1996), 79-84.
1107
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 35 (Prin. Nine); see also there, 229 (Neg. 94). The
term sheim denotes distinct commandments in Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh, 3:5. However, Maimonides also
connected the term sheim with two rules created by the same prohibition; compare Hilkhot Shegagot, 4:1
(see also 4:4), with Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 338 (Neg. 350). On the term sheim, see Joshua ha-Nagid,
Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 101; see further above, n979, and below, n1207.
1105
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a passage quoted by Maimonides, Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ used this word to denote a distinct
commandment.1108
In the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides announced that the Mishneh
Torah would group together laws that share one “maʿnā” (i.e., meaning or intent).1109
This terminology suggests that the classificatory project of the Mishneh Torah
overlapped with that of determining the parameters of a “concept” (maʿnā) in Sefer haMiṣvot.1110 Principle Six appears to blur maʿnā’s two senses – as “meaning” and as
“concept,” arguing that commands and prohibitions that pertain to a single topic (e.g.,
“keep the Sabbath” and “do not violate the Sabbath”) constitute distinct commandments,
because “the maʿnā of the command (amr) is unlike the maʿnā of the prohibition (nahy) –
they are two distinct maʿnās.”1111 In Principle Nine, he contrasted the enumerated maʿnā
with repeated “prohibitions” (lavin), and in Principle Eleven, insisted that laws that share
a single goal are combined as one “enumerated concept” (al-maʿnā al-maʿdūd).1112
Elsewhere, Maimonides cited other evidence from rabbinic literature to identify distinct

1108

 ; ומנה את'נין ות'לאת'ין מעני אכ'ברנא באנה תבארך ותעאלי יתולא פעלהא לא נחן ג'מיעהא מצ'מוןMaimonides,
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 53 (Prin. Fourteen).
1109
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 4 (introduction). Note that “Do not curse a leader
(nasi) in your people” (Ex. 22:27) applies both to one who holds the title nasi and a king, because the
“meaning” (maʿnā) of this prohibition relates to anyone in a position of power; there, 326 (Neg. 316).
1110
On this project, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 238-323; Haym
Soloveitchik, “Hirhurim ʿal Miyuno shel ha-Rambam be-Mishneh Torah: Baʿayot Amitiyot u-Medumot,”
Maimonidean Studies 4 (2000): 107-115; trans. in idem, “Classification of Mishneh Torah: Problems Real
and Imaginary,” in Collected Essays, 2:367-77; Kaplan, “Further Reflections on Classification of Mishneh
Torah,” 29-70; and the literature cited there, 30n2
1111
 ;מעני אלאמר פיהא גיר מעני אלנהי והמא מעניין מתבאיניןMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 20
(Prin. Six).
1112
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 44, 45; see also there, 49 (Principle Twelve); treated
above, nn966-967.
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“concepts”;1113 these included distinct punishments or sacrifices,1114 and statements that
one is culpable (ḥayav) for multiple prohibitions.1115
One notable discussion pertains to the three-fold repetition of the pentateuchal
prohibition against cooking a kid in its mother’s milk (Ex. 23:19, 34:26, Deut. 14:21).
The rabbis had understood this as prohibiting the cooking, eating, and benefiting from
mixtures of milk and meat, but unlike others,1116 Maimonides only counted the first two
of these as commandments. Explaining his calculus in detail, he cited talmudic assertions
(bMak 21b; bḤul 114a) that the cooking and the eating of milk and meat together make
one liable for punishment. Missing from these sugyot, he implied, is any claim of a
penalty for benefiting from such mixtures. Maimonides went added what he called an
“important principle” (aṣl kabīr): despite the three-fold repetition of this prohibition, and
despite the fact that “the transmitters of the interpretation” (ruwāt al-tasfir) explain that

1113

For example, the requirement to count years and seven-year cycles for the jubilee derives from
“two scriptural statements” (shenei ketuvim, lit., two verses; both statements are in Lev. 25:8), showing that
“this concept (maʿnā) … must be one commandment” ( ומנד' קאל אן הד'א אלמעני לם יחצל אלא משני כתובים דל עלי
 ;אנהא מצוה אחת צ'רורהMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 130 [Pos. 140]; see however there, n80). See
similarly, there, 141-42 (Pos. 161), 161 (Pos. 201); compare there, 305 (Neg. 264). Likewise, leavened
bread and leaven are equivalent, based on the statement that Ex. 13:7 “opened with leavened bread and
closed with leaven” (pataḥ ha-katuv be-ḥameiṣ ve-siyem be-seʾor; see bBeṣ 7b); therefore, the prohibitions
“No leavened bread shall be found with you and no leaven shall be found in all your territory” ordain a
single commandment; there, 279 (Neg. 200) and see n2. Elsewhere, neshekh and marbit, two terms for
prohibited interest, constitute a single commandment because the Talmud (bBM 60b) equates them; there,
291 (Neg. 235).
1114
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 35 (Prin. Nine), 38 (Prin. Nine), 98-99 (Pos. 77). See
the challenges to this cited below, n1180.
1115
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 232 (Neg. 103), 253 (Neg. 157), 254 (Neg. 161), 260
(Neg. 168), 275 (Neg. 191), 306 (Neg. 266; see Hilkhot Gezeilah ve-Aveidah, 7:11). He reinterpreted this
term there, 296 (Neg. 242). In Guide II:46 (eds. Munk and Joel, 288-89), Maimonides used the term ḥayav
for two laws that are not distinct commandments. See Levinger, Ha-Rambam ke-Filosof ukhe-Foseq, 177;
and Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim, trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1972), 26768n16.
1116
See above, nn910-911.
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each prohibition (lav) covers a distinct “concept,” these prohibitions constitute only two
commandments, because eating is a type of benefiting.1117

Applications in the Enumeration of the Commandments
The idea that repetitions “emphasize” or “complete” a commandment appears
throughout Sefer ha-Miṣvot, and Maimonides frequently grouped similar verses under the
heading of one commandment. Thus, he claimed, the prohibition against priests
wounding their heads (Lev. 21:5) repeats (karrara) and completes (tatmīm) a related
prohibition warning all Jews not to wound the front of the head when mourning the dead
(Deut. 14:1). Following the rabbis, he explained that certain aspects of each verse are
legally operative.1118 In reference to two prohibitions addressed to both priests and
Levites, Maimonides formulated a general rule: “any case of the general and particular
(al-ʿumūm wal-khuṣūṣ) similar to this is only repeated for emphasis or in order to
complete (li-tatmīm) the law, because the law cannot be completely deduced (lam
yuḥaṣṣal al-ḥukm kāmil) from one prohibition (nahy).”1119 This is why each prohibition

1117

He further argued that if benefiting from mixtures of milk and meat constitute a distinct
commandment, then all prohibitions against benefiting from an object that is forbidden to eat would be
counted separately (even though other prohibitions against benefiting are not based on repeated verses). He
concluded by explaining why the Pentateuch repeated this prohibition three times; Maimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 272-74 (Neg. 187); compare Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 9:2, treated briefly in above,
n652. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, he referred to this “important principle” as a “wondrous point,
… a key to many other matters” ( ;)נכתה עג'יבה ננבה עליהא אד' הי מפתאח לאשיא אכ'רMishnah ʿim Peirush, ed.
Kafiḥ, 5:360 (mKer 3:4).
1118
The prohibition applies to any part of the head but only to wounds inflicted due to mourning;
see bMak 20a; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 262-63 (Neg. 171); see similarly Hilkhot ʿAvodat
Kokhavim, 12:12, 15. Likewise, two prohibitions forbidding Jew and a priest from shaving (Lev. 19:27;
21:5) are stated “only in order to complete the law” (li-takmīl al-ḥukm fa-qaṭ); there, 262 (Neg. 170); see
also, 263 (Neg. 171).
1119

כל מא ישבה הד'א מן אלעמום ואלכ'צוץ אנמא יכרר ללתאכיד או לתתמים אלחכם אד' לם יחצל אלחכם כאמל מן
 ;אלנהי אלואחדMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 261 (Neg. 170). He repeated this, writing: אלנהי אלד'י
עלי אלעמום פקט הו אלד'י ינעד ואן אלד'י יג'י פי ד'לך אלמעני בעינה נהי אכ'ר עלי אלכ'צוץ אנמא הו לתעלם חכם מא או לתתמים
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against marrying certain classes of women, repeated for both regular priests and the High
Priest (Lev. 21:7, 14), constitute only a single commandment.1120 Maimonides rarely
attempted to explain why the Pentateuch could not state the laws for different populations
at the same time.1121
Maimonides’ comments on the recurring pentateuchal prohibitions against
oppressing a convert (ger) suggest that he continued to think about the phenomenon of
literary repetition. Principle Nine asserts that the talmudic statement (bBM 59b) that one
who wrongs a convert (i.e., transgresses the prohibition of onaʾah, lit., oppression; in
financial contexts, overcharging) violates (ʿover be-) three prohibitions actually refers to
a thrice-repeated prohibition; the number of commandments involved, however, is only
two.1122 In his discussion of these commandments in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides listed
four relevant negative commandments: (1) financial onaʾah of a Jew; (2) verbal onaʾah
of a Jew (onaʾat devarim); (3) verbal onaʾah of a convert; and (4) financial onaʾah of a
convert. In other words, wronging a convert violates the relevant commandments
pertaining to the Jew as well as to the convert.1123 However, in the Mishneh Torah,
Maimonides’ perspective was closer to that of the talmudic statement. He explained that,
because the Pentateuch uses the same words for financial and verbal onaʾah of a Jew (lo

אלקצ'ייה. Maimonides insisted that the reader “understand this principle (aṣl) and obtain it” ( פאפהם הד'א
 ;)אלאצל וחצלהibid, 262 (Neg. 170). Curiously, the first of these commandments was omitted in the editio

princeps; see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 1n1 (introductory pagination). See also Allegri, Leiv
Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 328 (Neg. 98).
1120
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 261 (Neg. 170). See below, n1193
1121
E.g., above, n1118.
1122
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36 (Prin. Nine): “this is clear, there is no doubt
regarding it” ()והד'א בין לא אשכאל פיה. See above, n1089.
1123
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 300-301 (Neg. 250-53); the reading in Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Bloch, 288, is preferable to the one in ed. Kafiḥ, 301n41.
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tonu; Lev. 25:15, 25:17), but “explicitly” (be-feirush) repeats the prohibitions against
financial and verbal onaʾah of a convert, formulating each in different words,1124 the
financial or verbal onaʾah of a convert violates one prohibition pertaining to a convert,
but it violates both prohibitions pertaining to a Jew (Hilkhot Mekhirah, 14:16-17).1125
A dense subject related to this part of Principle Nine (though not discussed in this
Principle) pertains to a talmudic statement (bPes 24a-24b etc.) that one who eats a puṭita
(eel-like fish?1126) receives four sets of lashes; a nemalah (ant), five; and a ṣirʿah (hornet
or wasp), six. Given his insistence that multiple punishments are only incurred for the
violation of distinct commandments, Maimonides was forced1127 to conclude that the
eating of these creatures entailed the violation of four, five, and six unique
commandments respectively. He noted that his conclusion disagreed with “all” earlier
interpreters of this sugya, who had explained that, in this case, repeated verses prescribe
multiple punishments.1128

I.e., “Do not wrong the convert (lo toneh) and do not oppress him (lo tilḥaṣenu)” (Ex. 22:20).
He cited the Mekhilta’s reading that the former refers to verbal onaʾah and the latter to financial onaʾah.
1124

1125

ומפני מה עובר בגר על לאו של הוניית דברים אף בהוניית ממון ועל לא של הוניית ממון אף בהוניית דברים מפני
 ;שהוציא הכתוב את שניהן בלשון הונייה סתם וכפל הלאוין בגר בשני הדברים בפירוש לא תונו ולא תלחץcompare above,

n1107. The exemption from lashes (Hilkhot Mekhirah, 12:1) means that punishments cannot be used to
determine the number of violations. My reading follows that of Solomon ben Moses of Chelm, Merkevet
ha-Mishneh (Jerusalem, 2000), 1:84b-85a; see also Feintuch, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush
Piqudei Yisharim, 2:879-80. Yom Tov ben Moses Ṣahalon, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot Maharitaṣ (Venice, 1694),
123a (§190), remarked that this passage “bothered me my entire life” ()כל ימי נצטערתי על דברי הרמב"ם.
1126
So Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic and Geonic
Periods (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002), 888-89, s.v.  ;פוטיתאfollowing a responsum ascribed
to Amram bar Sheshna Gaon in Ginzberg, Geonica, 1:340; see below.
1127
See Aharon ha-Levi of Barcelona [?], Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, ed. Charles Baer Chavel (Jerusalem:
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 2002), 237 (§164):  הרבה...  ;ומצד השורש הזה הקבוע אליו היה לו לדחוק בפירוש אותה שמועהand
Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 22 (introductory pagination; Prin. Nine): שהוא דחק עצמו הרבה.
1128
He wrote that “all (jamīʿ) those whose statement I have heard or view I have seen” ( אלתפסיר
 )אלד'י פסר ג'מיע מן סמעת קולה או ראית כלאמהoffered this interpretation; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 266 (Neg.
179). See Mirsky, Sheʾiltot de-Rav Aḥai Gaon, 3:87-89; Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot, 3:195;
Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel la-Talmud, ʿEiruvin, eds. David Meṣger
and Elijah Dickman, 62 (Jerusalem: Leiv Sameaḥ, 1992) (bʿEiruv 28a); idem, Pesaḥim, ed. David Meṣger
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Maimonides argued that the nemalah and ṣirʿah are not generic ants or hornets1129
but, rather, specific types of these insects, and because of their characteristics, one who
eats them incurs five or six sets of lashes. (It is more compelling to offer such a definition
of the puṭita, which is not mentioned elsewhere in rabbinic literature). He listed four
relevant commandments: Negative Commandment #174: not to eat non-kosher birds;
Negative Commandment #175: not to eat flying insects (shereṣ ha-ʿof / dabīb al-ṭayr);
Negative Commandment #176: not to eat crawling insects (shereṣ ha-areṣ / dabīb alarḍ); and Negative Commandment #179: not to eat water insects (shereṣ ha-mayim).1130
He also identified two other prohibitions that pertain to the eating of these insects in their
spontaneously-generated forms, namely: Negative Commandment #177: not to eat insects
spontaneously generated in putrid matter (al-mutakawwin min al-ʿufūnāt);1131 and

(Jerusalem: Leiv Sameaḥ, 1991) 51 (bPes 24a-24b); and Alfasi, Halakhot, Ḥullin 25a (though
commentators noted problems with the text of this passage). See also Alexander Kohut, ʿArukh ha-Shaleim
(Vienna: Menorah, 1926), 6:322-32 s.v.  ;פטתאand Kasher, Torah Shleimah, 28:86. Post-Maimonidean
jurists also rejected Maimonides’ view; see Daniel ha-Bavli’s comments below, Naḥmanides, Sefer haMiṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 100-113 (Prin. Nine); Aharon ha-Levi [?], Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, ed. Chavel,
236-38 (§164); Yom Tov Asevilli, Ḥidushei ha-Ritva, Masekhet ʿEiruvin, ed. Moshe Goldstein (Jerusalem:
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 2008), 262-63 (bʿEiruv 28a); and Menaḥem ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah, Masekhet
Makkot, ed. Shimon Sṭarliṣ (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav Herzog, 1965), 90-93 (bMak 16b). Duran, Zohar haRaqiʿa, 22 (introductory pagination; Prin. Nine), described Naḥmanides’ position as “the explanation of the
early and the late ones” ()פירוש הראשונים והאחרונים.
1129
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 251 (Neg. 175), offered the zunbūr as an example of
non-kosher creeping birds (dabīb al-ṭayr; ed. Kafiḥ, 264, has dabīb al-ṭāʾir (translated as ha-sheraṣim hameʿufafim; see n70), but Ibn Tibbon, who translated shereṣ ha-ʿof, clearly had Bloch’s text; ed. Heller,
142). Both Ibn Tibbon and Kafiḥ translated zunbūr as ṣirʿah (hornet or wasp). Later, however, Maimonides
wrote that eating a ṣirʿah incurs six sets of lashes, so he must have understood the ṣirʿah to be a different
animal, not the zunbūr; see ed. Kafiḥ, 264n71, 269n100; and ed. Heller, 142n2. The difficulties in
Maimonides’ view are evident in Aryeh Leib Horowitz, Marganita Ṭava, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Hellman, 514 (Prin. Nine). Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:5, categorizes these prohibitions as shereṣ ha-ʿof,
and offers the ṣirʿah as an example; see also idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 50 lines 250. Note
that in the Kifāya, Abraham Maimonides wrote that the zunbūr qualifies as a dabīb al-ṭāʾir; David,
“Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 19 line 13.
1130
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 264-69 (Neg. 174-79). Maimonides did not offer a
concise Arabic term in Negative Commandment #179.
1131
He cited the Sifra’s reading of “You shall not make yourself unclean through any swarming
thing that moves [ha-romes] upon the earth” (Lev. 11:44) as the source of this prohibition. His text read:
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Negative Commandment #178: not to eat animals generated (al-mutawallida)1132 in food
once they have crawled outside the food.1133
Maimonides based the prohibition against eating water insects on the sweeping
phraseology of the verse, “You shall not draw abomination upon yourselves through
anything that swarms” (Lev. 11:43). In so doing, he differed from earlier jurists who, he
reported, held that “anything that swarms” merely replicates other prohibitions against
eating insects. In this sense, he wrote, they saw this verse as being “similar to a

 ;הרומש על הארץ אף על פי שאינו פ[ו]רה ור[ו]בהSefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 265 (Neg. 177). This comment is absent

from standard editions of the Sifra.
1132
It appears that Maimonides treated mutakawwin and mutawallida as synonyms; note אלנמל
 ;אלטיאר אלמתולד מן עפונהֿ אלפואכה אלתי אינו פורה ורובהand  ולא ימתנע תולד אלצרעה או... ואלצרעה אלמתולדה מן אלעפונה
 מן אלעפונאת ופי דאכ'ל אלפואכה...  ;אלנמלה אוSefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 268-69; Neg. 179.
1133
He reformulated this in Hilkhot Maʾakhlot Asurot, 2:16; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ,
265n79, 268n99; see also Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 115-16. Spontaneous generation was
widely accepted in this period. Maimonides testified to his belief in it in many places; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 269 (Neg. 179); idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:220 (mḤul 9:6; calling it
“confounding” [mudhish]); Hilkhot Shabbat, 11:2-3; Hilkhot Tumat Meit, 3:10; Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot,
2:13-14; Guide, I:72 (eds. Munk and Joel, 130); and his Medical Aphorisms, 24:11, in idem, Pirqei Moshe
bi-Refuʾah: be-Tirgumo shel R. Natan ha-Meʾati, ed. Sussmann Muntner (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook,
1959), 304; treated in Fred Rosner, Medicine in the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides (New York: Ktav, 1984)
294-95; and Davidson, Maimonides, 160n155. Kafiḥ was troubled by this; see Maimonides, Mishneh
Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:231-32 (Hilkhot Shabbat, 11:2); and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 269n2. Note his
inconsistent translations of Maimonides’ terms for spontaneous generation; there, 265n78, 267n96. On
Aristotelian discussion of spontaneous generation, see James G. Lennox, “Teleology, Chance, and
Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982): 219-38;
and Allan Gotthelf, “Teleology and Spontaneous Generation in Aristotle: A Discussion,” in Nature,
Knowledge, and Virtue: Essays in Memory of Joan Kung, eds. Terry Penner and Richard Kraut (Edmonton:
Academic Print. and Pub., 1989), 181-95. For medieval Jewish views of spontaneous generation, see Harry
Austryn Wolfson, “Hallevi and Maimonides on Design, Chance and Necessity,” PAAJR 11 (1941): 146-48;
and Ahuva Gaziel, “Spontaneous Generation in Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Theology,” History of
Philosophy and Life Sciences 32 (2012): 461-80. For medieval Muslim views, see Remke Kruk, “A Frothy
Bubble: Spontaneous Generation in Medieval Islamic Thought,” JSS 35 (1990): 265-82; idem, “Ibn Ḥazm’s
Tadpoles: A Ẓāhirite Reads the Book of Nature,” in Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the
Mediterranean Sea, eds. R. Arnzen and J. Thielmann (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 401-409; idem, “Ibn Sīnā on
Animals: Between the First Teacher and the Physician,” in Avicenna and His Heritage, eds. Jules Janssens
and Daniel de Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 334-39; and Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi,
Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of
Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 233-35.
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prohibition that includes additional acts” (shibh isur kolel).1134 Since Maimonides was
adamant that repeated prohibitions could only incur a single punishment (as set forth in
Principle Nine, a conclusion which he termed “the true, demonstrated principles of the
text of the Talmud”), he regarded earlier interpretations of “anything that swarms” as
misguided.1135 Instead, without citing any evidence in rabbinic literature, Maimonides
asserted that “anything that swarms” refers specifically to swimming insects. He
recognized that “anything that swarms” could conceivably cover flying, crawling, and
swimming insects1136 – unlike the prohibitions against consuming flying and crawling
insects, whose prohibitions “are made clear” (alladhī tabayyana fīhi al-lav) – yet he
nevertheless contended that this phrase must address creatures not yet mentioned,

1134
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 265 (Neg. 179); see n83. Though he rejected this, he
appears to echo it in Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:12 ( ;)הרי כלל בלאו זה שרץ הארץ ושרץ העוף ושרץ המיםsee
Horowitz, Marganita Ṭava, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 519 (Prin. Nine). R. Moses ben Jacob of
Coucy, who did not have access to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, read this line in the Mishneh Torah to adopt the view
of Alfasi and others; see Sefer Miṣvot ha-Gadol, 43b-44a. On Moses of Coucy’s lack of access to
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Ephraim E. Urbach, Baʿalei ha-Tosafot: Toldoteihem, Ḥibureihem, Shit
̣atam (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1986), 1:472; and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 2
(introductory pagination). Joseph ben Meir Teomim, Shoshant ʿAmaqim (Frankfurt, 1782), 120b-121a, also
wondered about this phrase. Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 115, asserted that shibh isur kolel
accords only with the rejected view; he did not explain the similar line in the Mishneh Torah. For
Maimonides’ definition of isur kolel, see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:359-60 (mKer 3:4); see also
there, 5:84 (mZev 3:2).
1135
;והו תפסיר גיר צחיח לא יטרד ולא יתם אלא עלי כ'לאף אלאצול אלצחיחה אלמתברהנה פי נץ אלתלמוד
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 266-67 (Neg. 179).
1136

אל תשקצו את נפשותיכם אלד'י יחרם שרץ המים איצ'א בכלל כל שרץ והו קולה אל תשקצו את נפשותיכם בכל השרץ
 ;השורץMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 267; or הד'א אלנץ אלד'י הו אל תשקצו את נפשותיכם אנמא אסתפדנא
( מנה תחרים שרץ המים כ'אצה אלד'י לם יג'י פיה לאו מג'רד גיר הד'א פאפהם ד'לך268; Neg. 179). Compare the definition
in Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:12: האוכל כזית משרץ המים לוקה מן התורה שנאמר אל תשקצו את נפשותיכם בכל השרץ
השורץ ולא תטמאו בהם הרי כלל בלאו זה שרץ הארץ ושרץ העוף ושרץ המים. It is not clear why he did not offer Lev.

11:11 (“Anything … that has no fins and scales, among all the swarming things of the water and among all
the other living creatures that are in the water, they are an abomination for you”) as the source. Perhaps he
understood “swarming things of the water” to refer to fish; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 264 (Neg. 173).
He may also have accepted Lev. 11:43 as the source for this prohibition before offering this interpretation;
see the next note. See also Vidal of Tolosa, Magid Mishneh, to Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:12, in idem,
Mishneh Torah, ed. Frankel, 4:133; and Kafiḥ’s comments in Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 8:63-64. On
Maimonides’ interpretation of Lev. 11:43, compare Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 19; first noted in Horowitz,
Marganita Ṭava, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 514 (Prin. Nine).
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namely, swimming insects, because one cannot receive two punishments for overlapping
verses.1137
Armed with these claims, Maimonides identified the commandments violated by
eating the puṭita, nemalah, and ṣirʿah, respectively. In his view, consumption of the
puṭita violates the prohibitions against eating (1) a non-kosher bird, (2) a flying insect, (3)
a crawling insect, and (4) a water insect;1138 consumption of the nemalah violates the
prohibitions against consuming (1) an insect born in fruit, (2) a crawling insect, (3) a
spontaneously generated insect, (4) a flying insect, and (5) a water insect. All of these
prohibitions would also be violated by consumption of the ṣirʿah, along with the

Kafiḥ (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 266n88) suggested that Maimonides’ first
draft of Sefer ha-Miṣvot adopted the earlier view, arguing that when Maimonides usually cites views that he
opposed, he would first outline his own position. If so, Maimonides could have originally held Lev. 11:43
to be different from other repetitions because it covers multiple distinct commandments and does not repeat
the same commandment. For the suggestion that harsh language indicates that Maimonides first held a
rejected position, see Fixler, “Lashon Taqifah,” 161-88. It may also be significant that Negative
Commandment #179, which may have, at one point, covered all types of insects, appears at the end of this
list. If it is merely a prohibition against consuming water insects, why is it not Negative Commandment
#177? Compare the order of these prohibitions in Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:23: הרי שהיתה הבריה משרץ
( העוף ומשרץ המים ומשרץ הארץsee below, n1139). (The verses listed in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 268 [Neg. 179], are clearly corrupt; the text in ed. Bloch, 254-55 [Neg. 179], is much more
coherent.)
1138
This is the conclusion in published editions (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 255; ed.
Heller, 144; and ed. Kafiḥ, 268 [Neg. 179]). Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 22 (introductory pagination; Prin.
Nine), claimed that this is “the first edition” (ha-haʿataqah ha-rishonah), but that he found “the final
edition” (ha-haʿataqah ha-aḥaronah) that described the puṭita as (1) born in fruit, (2) a crawling insect, (3)
spontaneously generated, and (4) a flying insect. Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides had this latter
text; see ibid, ed. Heller, 9 (introductory pagination), 144n6; and MS. Hunt. 185, 147a, 160a; Maʿaseh
Nissim, 27, 42-43 (§4). It appears more likely that Daniel and Abraham worked with an earlier version, as
in other cases (e.g., those treated below, nn1153, 1197). This factor and the fact that Bloch, Kafiḥ, and Ibn
Tibbon have what Duran considered to be the “first edition,” lead me to conclude that Duran’s “final
edition” was actually the earlier edition. The approach in this earlier version had the advantage of adding
one commandment to each of the nemalah (a water insect) and ṣirʿah (a water insect and non-kosher bird),
while the other version assumes that the puṭita is not spontaneously generated. Naḥmanides’ text agreed
with published editions; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 106 (Prin. Nine). Solomon ibn
Ayyub’s translation, in Kokhavi, Sefer ha-Batim, ed. Hershler, 2:383 (Neg. 179), includes an incomplete
list.
1137
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prohibition against eating (6) a non-kosher bird.1139 Maimonides defended the claim that
the ṣirʿah is both a bird and an insect, writing that it has conditions (ḥālāt) and performs
actions (afʿālahu) of each.1140

Verbs in the Prohibitive Mood that Cover Many Acts (Lav shebe-Khlalot)
The lengthy section “appended” to Principle Nine – “the important principle” (alaṣl al-kabīr),1141 in Maimonides’ words – further complicates the relationship between
the Pentateuch and the enumerated “concepts” and underscores the role of punishments in
the enumeration. Maimonides argued that every “concept” must either be based on a lav
mujarrad, “a verb in the prohibitive mood with a single attached object” (which I will
term “exclusive verb”),1142 or be identified as a discrete commandment by “the
transmitters” (al-nāqilīn). However, he wrote, if a single do not “includes many
concepts” (yashtamil ʿala maʿānī kathīra), then all associated “concepts” count as a

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 268-69 (Neg. 179). In Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot,
2:23, he did not mention these creatures and listed the prohibitions in a different order: (1) flying insects,
(2) water insects, (3) crawling insects, (4) creatures created (nivraʾu) in fruit, (5) spontaneously generated
creatures, and (6) non-kosher birds. This change is noted and discussed in Berlin, Haʿamek Sheʾelah, 2:95.
Standard editions of Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:23, are corrupt; recent editions fix the error. Abraham
Maimonides’ version agrees with the correct text; see MS. Hunt. 185, 158b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 41 (§4);
noted in Maʿaseh Nissim, ed. Kahana, 9-10n63.
1140
After all, he noted, others described the puṭita as both a fish and water insect; Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 268 (Neg. 179).
1141
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 42 (Prin. Nine).
1142
Blau, Dictionary, 84, s.v. مُجَ رَّ د, offered: simple, uncomplicated, unaccompanied by proofs, and
explicit. Among other possibilities, E.W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (Beirut, 1968), 407, s.v. مُجَ ًّّرد,
has divested of every accessory. Ibn Tibbon used lav be-yiḥud (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller,
20; Prin. Nine); and Kafiḥ, lav meyuḥad (ed. Kafiḥ, 37; Prin. Nine). In two places, Maimonides appears to
use the phrase lav mujarrad to denote a verse that repeats a commanded “concept” but is more specific or
focused; there, 307 (Neg. 269), 308 (Neg. 270). Two other appearances of this phrase conform better to the
usage in Principle Nine; there, 269 (Neg. 179), 337 (Neg. 349). Though he mentioned positive commands
(al-maʿānī al-maʾmūr), I have found no evidence that this section impacts the Positive Commandments.
1139
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single commandment.1143 In other words, “don’t do X and don’t do Y” constitutes two
commandments, but “don’t do X and Y” only constitutes one.
Maimonides used the Aramaic term lav shebe-khlalot in order to describe the
opposite of a lav mujarrad. Medieval talmudists noted the complexity of this term,1144
which may be provisionally translated “a prohibition that covers multiple laws.” The
Babylonian Talmud applies this term to eleven verses.1145 A brief overview of some of
this term’s talmudic appearances will provide background for Maimonides’ deployment
of lav shebe-khlalot. Two sugyot use the term lav shebe-khlalot to designate a verse
understood by the rabbis to mandate numerous unrelated and non-explicit prohibitions.
One such example is, “Do not eat upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26); violation of laws derived
from this type of lav shebe-khlalot incurs no punishment.1146 Other sugyot consider a do
not with several explicit prohibitions a lav shebe-khlalot, such as “Eat no fat of ox nor

1143

' ;או דליל יקולונה אלנאקלין אנה פצל אלמעאני [כלהא] בעצ'הא מן בעץMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 37 (Prin. Nine).
1144
See Judah ben Kalonymus ben Meir, ʿErkhei Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim, ed. Moses Blau (New
York, 1994), ed. Moses Blau, 1:101:  ;וכל אלו שכתבתי אע"פ שהן כלולין בלאו חילוק גדול [יש] בחילוקיהםIsaiah di
Trani the Elder, Tosafot ha-Rid (Lemberg, 1869), 16a (bPes 41a): עכשיו דלאו שבכללות המוזכר בהרבה מקומות אין
 ;פתרונם שוה ואין דינם שוהSolomon ben Abraham Ibn Adret, Teshuvot, 1:74 (§141): ענין לאו שבכללות בגמרא אין
 ;כולו על צד אחדAharon ha-Levi [?], Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, ed. Chavel, 136 (§79): פירוש ענין זה כבר בארוהו בספר
 והרחיבו שם פירושיהם וראיותיהם בזה לברר הדבר יפה ויאריך הענין...  ;המצוות בעיקר התשיעי שני גדולי הדורand Menaḥem
ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah, Masekhet Bava Qamma, ed. Kalman Shlessinger (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei
Nirdamim, 1959), 423 (bBQ 115a-115b): ( מבולבל הרבה ביד המפרשיםsee there, 428). See Babad, Minḥat
Ḥinukh, 1:48: לבאר הכל על נכון צריך קונטרס מיוחד.
1145
The most organized presentation of the talmudic sources is Judah ben Kalonymus, ʿErkhei
Tanaʾim, 1:98-101. For full discussion, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. lav shebe-khlalot, 35:617-70. The
phrase lav shebe-khlalot is apparently Babylonian in origin (Breuer, “Ḥidushim Miloniyim,” 56-57);
tannaitic literature seems unaware of this concept; see Rabad to Hilkhot ʿAvodah Zarah, 3:9 (citing tMak
5:7, Moses Samuel Zuckermandel, Tosefta ʿal pi kitvei yad Erfurṭ u-Vienna [Jerusalem, 1937], 444 lines
15-16). The Babylonian Talmud does impute lav shebe-khlalot into a tannaitic debate (bKer 4a). Note also
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 118 (Prin. Nine), treating yNaz 6:1 (54d), and
Teomim, Shoshanot ʿAmaqim, 122b-123b.
1146
See bSan 63a; see also bPes 24a citing Ex. 29:34
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sheep nor goat” (Lev. 7:23).1147 Two other types of verses classified as lav shebe-khlalot
that are central to Maimonides’ treatment are less clear: “Do not eat of it [i.e., the paschal
sacrifice] raw or cooked, but roasted over fire” (Ex. 12:9),1148 and “Throughout his term
as a nazirite, anything obtained from the grapevine, even seeds or skin, he shall not eat”
(Num. 6:4).1149 Is each a lav shebe-khlalot because it contains a single “do not”? Or was
it included in this designation because the prohibitions against eating a non-roasted
paschal sacrifice and against consuming “anything obtained from the grapevine” cover
many items? The Talmud also notes that “superfluous” words (miyater[ei] qera) serve “to
divide” (le-ḥaleq) a lav shebe-khlalot verse and to impose multiple punishments (bKer
4a-5a).
In a recurring talmudic debate (e.g., bPes 41a, bNaz 38b), Abaye and Rava debate
whether violation of the prohibitions pertaining to the paschal sacrifice and the nazirite
results in punishment for each explicit prohibition1150 or in no punishment (manuscripts
disagree about who adopted which view 1151). In several discussions of this debate, the
Talmud offers two interpretations (ika de-amrei) of the statement that violation of these
prohibitions incurs “no punishment”: either violating all of the explicit prohibitions

1147

See bKer 4a.
See bPes 41a.
1149
See bNaz 38b. “Seeds” (ḥarṣanim) and “skin” (zag) are hapax legomena; translation follows
rabbinic interpretation.
1150
I.e., eating a cooked paschal sacrifice violates “cooked” and “not … roasted,” and eating grape
seeds, “anything obtained from the grapevine” and “even seeds”
1151
As noted by medieval commentators; see, e.g., Tosafot, bMen 58b, s.v. ve-ika; Judah ben
Kalonymus, ʿErkhei Tanaʾim, 1:99; Rabad to Hilkhot Nezirut, 5:8; Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot lehaRambam, ed. Chavel, 125-26 (Prin. Nine); Ibn Adret, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot, 1:74 (§141); and Daniel haBavli and Abraham Maimonides’ statements, treated below. See also Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Heller, 21-22n68; ed. Kafiḥ 39n38, 229n66; and Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. lav shebe-khlalot, 35:66162nn457-58, 461.
1148
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incurs one punishment (miha ḥada laqi) or none at all.1152 Maimonides ruled that
violation of a lav shebe-khlalot with several discrete prohibitions incurs only one
punishment. He seems to have initially ascribed this position to Abaye, but later to
Rava.1153 (Notably, both Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel – whose approach to lav shebe-khlalot
prefigures, and may have influenced, Maimonides’ views1154 – and Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ
attributed this view to Abaye.1155)
The Commentary on the Mishnah contains two definitions of lav shebe-khlalot,
and it appears that they were written at different times.1156 The first defines lav shebekhlalot as a prohibition that “is not stated (lam yaʾtī, lit., does not arrive) with a clarifying

1152

Different manuscripts record this in different sugyot.
Daniel ha-Bavli reported that Principle Nine and Negative Commandment #94 cite Abaye, but
some copies (baʿḍ al-nusakh) of Principle Nine cite Rava. Abraham Maimonides instructed Daniel to
change all texts to Rava; MS. Hunt., 149a-149b, 164b-165a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30, 49 (§4). Bloch has Rava
in Principle Nine and Abaye in Negative Commandment #94; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 40
(Prin. Nine), 216 (Neg. 94); see there, nn1-2; and the version cited in Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed.
Raṣhabi, 102; see there, 41n62. The translation of Negative Commandment #94, in Kokhavi, Sefer haBatim, ed. Hershler, 2:348, has Abaye. Kafiḥ and Ibn Tibbon have Rava in both places; Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Heller, 21-22n68, 122n21; ed. Kafiḥ, 39 (Prin. Nine), 229 (Neg. 94).
1154
See below, n1167.
1155
At least in contemporary editions; Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel,
Pesaḥim, ed. Meṣger, 93 (bPes 41b); and Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 176 lines 4-5.
1156
The first definition appears in the body of the text at the bottom of a page and continues
midsentence in the first four lines of an eight-line marginal note, and the second appears in the remainder of
the note (the next page begins a new topic.) The first part of the note is written in what Solomon Sassoon
called “Slow Cursive,” but the second in a tighter script. Most likely, an earlier draft included the entire
first definition and Maimonides later added the second. (I find it less likely that the entire note was added
from an earlier draft, in part because the second definition starts at the beginning of a new line.) Sassoon
thought that the whole note was added at one time, writing: “It may be remarked that in trying to conjecture
the period of an alteration, not only the form of the writing but its subject matter also may help in the
determination. For instance, the long addendum in Tractate Makkoth (II.314) on the subject of לאו שבכללות
may well be contemporary with the writing of  ספר המצותwhere this subject is also discussed at some length.
Furthermore, it is in a condensed Slow Cursive, and would therefore fit in with the very early alterations
mentioned above”; Maimonidis Commentarius in Mischnam (Hafniae [Copenhagen]: Ejnar Munksgaard,
1956), 1:33. This overlooks the different scripts and the fact that the first four lines pick up the discussion
midsentence. Kafiḥ wrote that the first four lines were added first and the second later; Maimonides,
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238n45 (mMak 3:1). I thank Robert Brody for helping me work through
some of these issues.
1153
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[statement] (bi-bayān) but is derived (yustakhraj) from another statement;”1157
Maimonides related this definition of lav shebe-khlalot to the talmudic phrase “implicitly
stated” (mi-khlala itmar). He offered two simple examples: (1) “You shall eat no bread
or parched grain or fresh ears … until you have brought the offering” (Lev. 23:14; see
bKer 5a) implies a prohibition against consuming any part of the new crop (ḥadash)
before offering its sacrifice; and (2) “Do not eat of it raw or cooked,” implies “do not eat
it other than roasted.” He explained that “implied” prohibitions incur no punishment, but
each explicit prohibition (i.e., “bread or parched grain or fresh ears” or “raw or
cooked”) does.1158
In Maimonides’ third example, the case of the nazirite, who is forbidden to
consume “anything obtained from the grapevine, even seeds or skin” (Num. 6:4), he
understood the words “anything obtained” to imply other grape products. While the
Talmud (bNaz 38b) reports that the Amoraim, Abaye and Rava, debated the number of
punishments a nazirite would incur (if any) for consuming combinations of grape seeds
and skins – whether this incurs “no punishment,” or one for grape seeds, one for skins,
and one for “anything obtained,” Maimonides assumed (based on other sugyot) that “no
punishment” in fact means one punishment.1159 He also claimed that this talmudic debate
was applicable to all five prohibitions in Num. 6:3-4 (“[1] Vinegar of wine or of any
other intoxicant he shall not drink, anything in which grapes have been steeped he shall

1157

 ;לאו לם יאתי בביאן לכנה יסתכ'רג' מן כלאם אכ'רMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:237

(mMak 3:1).
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:237-38 (mMak 3:1); see however there, n48.
See Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 179 (Prin. Nine). He revised this in Sefer
ha-Miṣvot; see below.
1159
It is conceivable that this appeared in Maimonides’ text of bNaz 38b.
1158
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not drink, grapes [2] fresh or [3] dried he shall not eat. Throughout his term as a nazirite,
anything obtained from the grapevine, even [4] seeds or [5] skin, he shall not eat”).1160
According to Maimonides, had the Pentateuch stated, “anything obtained from the
grapevine he shall not eat, even seeds or skin he shall not eat,” the consumption of seeds
would have resulted in two punishments, one for each “he shall not eat” (i.e., each do
not). However, since “anything obtained from the grapevine” lacks an independent do
not, it qualifies as a lav shebe-khlalot; for this reason, the eating of seeds or of skin
violates “only [one] prohibition” (ghayr lav).1161
Maimonides’ early understanding of lav shebe-khlalot formulations as statements
that “imply” prohibitions might conceivably account for all talmudic uses of this term,
and his later definition of lav shebe-khlalot in the Commentary on the Mishnah may have
been added when he was writing Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1162 In the later definition, he wrote that
a lav shebe-khlalot may also be “one verb in the prohibitive mood (lav eḥad) that
encompasses (yaʿumm) two [or] three prohibitions (isurei),”1163 and he labeled this

The Mishnah (mNaz 6:2) omits the distinction between “fresh” and “dried” grapes; it is added
in bNaz 38b (both cited in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 281; [Neg. 206]). In Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 280 (Neg. 202), he insisted that the prohibition “vinegar of wine or of any other intoxicant he
shall not drink” is one commandment because the verse does not read “he shall not drink wine, he shall not
drink vinegar of wine.” “Anything … steeped” prohibits the taste of wine (ṭaʿam ke-ʿiqar; lit., taste is like
the essence); see also Hilkhot Nezirut, 5:5, 9.
1161
 ;לא ילזמה עלי כל ואחד מן אלמד'כורה גיר לאוMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238
(mMak 3:1). Two medieval translations (Naples, 1492, and the text in Meiri’s Beit ha-Beḥirah) read: “only
one prohibition” (ele lav eḥad). On these translations, see Hopkins, Peirush ha-Rambam le-Masekhet
Shabbat, xx-xxiii, and the literature cited there. The phrase lav shebe-khlalot appears nowhere else in the
Commentary. Kafiḥ explained Maimonides’ claim that a certain prohibition imposes no punishment
because “it is not clearly forbidden” (laysat bi-bayyanat al-taḥrīm; i.e., not explicit) to be based on the
concept of lav shebe-khlalot; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:185 and n6 (mSan 7:6).
1162
As suggested by Sassoon, though I disagree with Sassoon’s treatment; see above, n1156.
1163
 ;אן יאתי לאו אחד יעם תרי תלתה אסוריMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238 (mMak
3:1). The similar statement in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 38 (Prin. Nine), includes “or”: לאו שבכללות
הוא דאתו תרי או תלתא איסורי מחד לאו.
1160
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meaning “clearer and easier to understand” than the first.1164 The sole example he cited is
“Do not eat upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26), describing this as a phrase that “included
(kalal) many prohibitions, none of which was made clear (lam yatabayyan) so that we
[must] impose (lit., say) one [additional] set of lashes over that which was made
clear.”1165 This definition distinguishes between a lav shebe-khlalot that implies
additional prohibitions beyond what is explicit, and a lav shebe-khlalot that lacks any
explicit prohibitions.
Maimonides offered two definitions of lav shebe-khlalot in Principle Nine of his
Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Reiterating the point made in the passage that was added
to the Commentary on the Mishnah, he gave the example of prohibitions like, “Do not eat
upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26), which creates five1166 prohibitions. The “concepts” that are
“included under” (mushtamila taḥta) such statements constitute a single commandment,
and their violation incurs no punishment. The second definition in Principle Nine, offered
by earlier talmudists1167 but not explicitly discussed by Maimonides in the Commentary
on the Mishnah, is that a do not with several “attached” (maʿṭūfa)1168 objects (ashyaʾ

1164

 ;אבין ואסהל פהם מן אלמת'אלאת אלמתקדמהMaimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:239

(mMak 3:1).
1165

 ;אנה כלל אסורין הרבה ולם יתבין מנהא ואחד מן חית' נקול לוקין עלי אלד'י תבין מלקות אחדMaimonides,
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238-39 (mMak 3:1).
1166
Ibn Tibbon has six; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 21 (Prin. Nine) and n54. See
also idem, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 22:170 (Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 18:1). On Ibn Janāḥ and Ibn Balʿam’s
interpretations of Lev. 19:26, which are relevant here, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 62,
65, 69; see also there, 168-70, 396.
1167
Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel, Pesaḥim, ed. Meṣger, 93 (bPes 41b): לאו
שבכללות כלומר לאו אחד כולל הואכל נא והאוכל מבושל. See also the so-called Mainz commentary to bMen 58b: על
לאו שבכללות דחד לאו הוא לא תקטירו וכולל בו שאור ודבש ועירוביו. For others, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. lav
shebe-khlalot, 35:647n329. Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 101, explained lav shebe-khlalot as a
“compound term, meaning, a prohibition that includes many goals” ( 'לפצ'ה מרכבה יעני לאו שבו כללות אגראץ
 ;)כת'ירהsee there, 40n57.
1168
On this term, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38n35.
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kathīra, lit., many things) constitutes a single commandment (e.g., “Do not eat of it raw
or cooked”; Ex. 12:9).1169 This claim echoes the assertion in the Commentary about the
hypothetical verse, “anything obtained from the grapevine he shall not eat, even seeds or
skin he shall not eat.” Such a formulation, Maimonides had asserted, would not constitute
a lav shebe-khlalot, but would, instead, impose punishment for each “shall not eat.”1170
Integrating talmudic evidence, Maimonides explained that each “attached” object
may impose a distinct punishment if it is based on Sinaitic tradition (i.e., the tafsīr marwī)
or if one “thing” appears in a separate verse. In such cases, he wrote, each “thing” is a
distinct sheim (category) and a discrete commandment. However, without such evidence,
the prohibition constitutes a single commandment and the violation of any or all of the
“things” incurs only one punishment.1171 He summarized his entire presentation in
Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 18:3, citing examples crucial to Principle Nine:
What is meant by a lav shebe-khlalot? It is a do not (lav) that includes several
matters (she-kolel ʿinyanyim harbeh), such as the injunction “Do not eat upon the
blood” (Lev. 19:26). Moreover, it comprises such cases as Scripture’s saying, “do
not do this and that.” Since there is no unique do not prohibiting (lo yiḥed lo lav)
each act, violation does not incur the penalty of flogging, unless [Scripture]
divided it [the matter] with other do nots (ḥalaq otah be-lavin aḥeirim), or there is
an aural tradition (neʾemar mi-pi ha-shemuʿah) that each be treated separately.
How so? For example, Scripture says, “Do not eat of it raw or cooked” (Ex. 12:9).
If one eats of it raw and cooked, he is flogged not twice but once. Concerning new
produce (ḥadash) it says, “You shall eat no bread or parched grain or fresh ears”
(Lev. 23:14), and if one ate all three, he is liable for three floggings, for we
learned by way of aural tradition that this [i.e., extra words] serves to divide (leḥaleq). It is said, “Let none be found among you who passes his son or daughter
through the fire, or who is an augur” (Deut. 18:10). Although these matters are
covered by a single prohibition, they are divided by other prohibitions, saying,
1169

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 37-38 (Prin. Nine).
“Implied” prohibitions appear tangentially in Principle Nine; see below.
1171
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38, 41-42 (Prin. Nine); the latter conclusion helped
Maimonides reduce the number of enumerated commandments.
1170
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“You shall not practice divination and you shall not practice soothsaying” (Lev.
19:26). This teaches (melammed) that each one is affected by its own do not (belav bifnei ʿaṣmo). So, too, all similar cases.1172
Single Prohibitions that Cover Multiple Non-Explicit Acts
Principle Nine cites two other prohibitions that cover several non-explicit laws:
“You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Lev. 19:14) and “You shall not
carry false reports” (Ex. 23:1). In the enumeration, Maimonides wrote that although the
peshaṭeh di-qera of Lev. 19:14 refers to giving improper advice, the rabbis said that this
verse encompasses (yaʿumm) many “things,” such as helping another sin, or lending with
interest; it is, therefore, a lav shebe-khlalot.1173 The rabbis also understood Ex. 23:1 as
including a number of prohibitions.1174
“Do not eat upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26) serves as the archetype of this kind of
lav shebe-khlalot, but Maimonides’ enumeration privileges one talmudic interpretation
(bSan 63a), which sees this verse as a “warning” (azharah) for the rebellious son (Deut.

1172
אי זהו לאו שבכללות זה לאו אחד שכולל ענינים הרבה כגון לא תאכלו על הדם וכן אם נאמר לא תעשה דבר פלוני
ופלוני הואיל ולא יחד לו לאו לכל אחד ואחד מהן אין לוקין על כל אחד ואחד אלא אם כן חלק אותה בלאוין אחרים או נאמר מפי
השמועה שנחלקו כיצד כגון זה שנאמר אל תאכלו ממנו נא ובשל מבושל אינו לוקה על הנא והמבושל שתים אלא אחת ובחדש הוא
אומר ולחם וקלי וכרמל לא תאכלו וחייב על שלשתן שלש מלקיות מפי השמועה למדו שזה לחלק הרי נאמר לא ימצא בך מעביר בנו
ובתו באש קוסם קסמים ואף על פי שכלל כל הענינים בלאו אחד הרי חלק אותם בלאוין אחרים ואמר לא תנחשו ולא תעוננו מלמד
 ;שכל אחד מהן בלאו בפני עצמו וכן כל כיוצא בזהtranslation based on Maimonides, The Code of Maimonides, Book

Fourteen: The Book of Judges, trans. Abraham M. Hershman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949),
51, with changes.
1173
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38 (Prin. Nine), 320-21 (Neg. 299). My interpretation
disagrees with Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 318-20, esp. 320n111, who argued that
Maimonides considered only the peshaṭ reading biblical in status and other readings, rabbinic (he called the
latter furūʿ, a term that Maimonides did not use). As Cohen noted, in his other works, Maimonides
considered other readings biblical in status, consistent with his comment in Principle Nine. Similarly, I am
hesitant to accept Cohen’s treatment of Maimonides’ understanding of Deut. 23:24; see Maimonides, Sefer
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 109 (Pos. 94); and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 325-27; compare
there, 301n67. This case is less clear; I treat Cohen’s larger argument above, n445.
1174
Such as a judge may not hear claims of one litigant in the absence of the other, one may not
speak or accept evil speech, nor bear false witness; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38 (Prin.
Nine), 312 (Neg. 281). See Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 21:7. See similarly Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 246 (Neg.
163), for a lav that prohibits distinct but related acts.
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21:20), a glutton and drunkard. Characterizing the verse in question as a “prohibition
against desiring much (istikthār)1175 food and drink as a youth,”1176 Maimonides
explained that, because the punishment is explicit (Deut. 21:21), “it remains for us to
seek the warning according to our principles (uṣūlinā) ‘Scripture did not punish unless
[first] it warned’.”1177 Maimonides elsewhere emphasized that an explicit punishment
may supersede the lack of “particularized (mukhtaṣṣa) warning.”1178 “It is not
impossible,” he wrote, “for one prohibition (al-nahy al-wāḥid) to prohibit many things,
and its rule not be that of lav shebe-khlalot, if the punishment is made clear for each and
every concept (maʿnā).”1179 In each case, Scripture’s statement indicating a punishment
constitutes Maimonides’ preferred source for the prohibition.1180

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 264 (Neg. 195); ed. Kafiḥ has istihtār, excessively
following desires; see ed. Kafiḥ, 276n28, 276-77n74-75. Ibn Ayyub had Bloch’s text; Ibn Tibbon’s is not
clear; see ed. Heller, 148 and n16.
1176
 ;אלנהי אלד'י נהינא ען אלאסתכת'אר פי אלטעם ואלשראב פי סן אלצגרMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Bloch, 264 (Neg. 195).
1177
 ;ובאן אלעונש ובקי אן נבחת' ען אלאזהרה עלי אצולנא לא ענש הכתוב אלא אם כן הזהירMaimonides, Sefer haMiṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 276-77 (Neg. 195). This also appears in Principle Nine (there, 37), but not in the
Commentary. See also Hilkhot Mamrim, 7:4, Hilkhot Sheḥita, 1:2, and Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 13:4, 18:3.
1178
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 211 (Neg. 60). On this rule, see above, n663.
1175

1179

ולא ימתנע כון אלנהי אלואחד ינהי ען אשיא כת'ירה ולא יכון חכמה חכם לאו שבכללות אד'א תביין אלעונש פי כל
 ;מעני ומעניMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 193-94 (Neg. 26).

I have found four examples: (1) “You shall not curse elohim” (Ex. 22:27) constitutes the
warning against cursing God and a judge (elohim can denote both in biblical Hebrew). The punishment for
the former is Lev. 24:16; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 210-11 (Neg. 60), 326 (Neg. 316). (2)
“You shall not curse the deaf” (Lev. 19:14) constitutes the warning against cursing any Jew and one’s
parents. The punishment for the latter is Ex. 21:17; there, 326-29 (Neg. 317-18); see also Hilkhot Mamrim,
5:4. (3) “He may be given up to forty lashes, but no more” (Deut. 25:2-3) constitutes the warning against
hitting any Jew and one’s parents. The punishment for the latter is Ex. 21:15; there, 322 (Neg. 300), 329
(Neg. 319). (4) “Make no mention of the names of other gods” (Ex. 23:13) constitutes the warning against
taking an oath and prophesying in the name of a false god. The punishment for the latter is Deut. 18:20;
there, 189 (Neg. 14), 193-94 (Neg. 26). In each case, the Short Enumeration quotes the “punishment”
verse; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 35 line 19, 36 line 35, 39 lines 83-86, 60 line 416, 61 lines
435, 437-40. The Short Enumeration reads “Do not eat upon the blood” to prohibit “eating and drinking the
way of a glutton and drunkard, as it says ‘This son of ours … is a glutton and drunkard’,” and omits “Do
not eat upon the blood” ( ;)שלא לאכול ולשתות דרך זולל וסובא שנאמר בננו זה זולל וסובאthere, 51 line 274. See
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 337-38 (Neg. 195); Aharon ha-Levi [?], Sefer haḤinukh, ed. Chavel, 331-32 (§252); and Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 109-110 (Neg. §15), 136 (Neg. §58),
1180
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Prohibitions with Several “Attached” Laws
Maimonides declared that, “in order that the intended matter be clarified with the
utmost clarity,” he would list “many, … or perhaps all” of the lav shebe-khlalot
prohibitions with “attached” laws.1181 His first example was eating the paschal sacrifice
“raw or cooked” (Ex. 12:9). The Commentary on the Mishnah asserts that this verse
“implies” a prohibition against eating a non-roasted paschal sacrifice (from “Do not eat
of it … but roasted”; Ex. 12:9), and it asserts that the words raw and cooked each impose
a punishment.1182 Principle Nine, however, claims that since the prohibition (lav) is not
“isolated” (yafrud) for each “concept” (i.e., the “concepts” of raw and cooked), this
prohibition constitutes a single commandment. For this reason, the violation of both raw
and cooked incurs just one punishment. Although Maimonides also mentioned the
“implied” prohibition of non-roasted paschal sacrifices, no other “implied” prohibitions
appear in Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1183 The six final examples that Maimonides offered are mostly

207-208 (Neg. §131). Similarly, the “warning” “Do not turn to spirits and necromancers” (Lev. 19:31),
should constitute a lav shebe-khlalot, but Maimonides explained that separate punishments in Lev. 20:27
lead to the enumeration of two commandments; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 186 (Neg. 9). The Short
Enumeration lists the “warning”; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 35 lines 14-15.
1181

ואנא אד'כר אלמת'אלאת אלכת'ירה מן קסמי הד'א אלנוע אלת'אני וקד רבמא ד'כרת תלך אללאוין כלהא אלתי מן
 ;הד'א אלנוע אלת'אני חתי יתביין אלמעני אלמקצוד גאיהֿ אלביאןMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38 (Prin.

Nine).
1182

Above, n1158.
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38-39 (Prin. Nine), 238 (Neg. 125). The second
example, “anything obtained from the grapevine,” appears out of place; see below. The third, “No meal
offering … shall be made of leaven, for no leaven or honey may be offered” (Lev. 2:11), is significant
because Maimonides did not consider the first clause to institute a unique commandment, unlike some
claims treated below; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 39-40 (Prin. Nine).
1183
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formulated, “don’t do X or Y,” and, significantly, they do not appear in rabbinic
literature.1184
Two cases not discussed in Principle Nine reveal difficulties that Maimonides had
with this type of lav shebe-khlalot. The first treats the “extraneous” word “of them”
(meihem) in “Anything blind, or injured, or maimed … you shall not put any of them on
the altar” (Lev. 22:22). The Talmud (bTem 7b) considers the word meihem a lav shebekhlalot that prohibits the sacrifice of parts of blemished animals, but ultimately concludes
by noting that the position that exempts this (every?)1185 lav shebe-khlalot from
punishment is “refuted” (teyuvta de-X).1186 Accepting the conclusion that violation of the
prohibition to sacrifice parts of blemished animals incurs punishment in the Commentary
on the Mishnah, Maimonides described this prohibition as a distinct “concept” (maʿnā);
in other words, it imposes punishment.1187 Sefer ha-Miṣvot, however, accepts the view
that the Talmud had refuted, ascribes it to Rava,1188 and terms it “the sound principle”
(al-aṣl al-ṣaḥīḥ).1189 In the second case, “A handmill or a millstone shall not be taken in

1184

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 40 (Prin. Nine). Notably, entering the Temple and
giving a legal ruling while drunk, which share a single do not (Lev. 10:10-11), incur different punishments;
there, 219-20 (Neg. 73). Somebody wrote to Maimonides asking why another example, “You shall not
bring the fee of a harlot or the pay of a dog into the house of the Lord” (Deut. 23:18), appears as two
commandments in the Short Enumeration. Maimonides replied that his correspondent’s text was corrupt;
Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:724-25 (§447); see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 231 (Neg. 100). I see no reason
to doubt this; note that Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ counted these as two commandments; Halper, A Volume of the
Book of Precepts, 70, 85, 156 line 7. See above, n904.
1185
The Talmud simply renders the statement that one is not punished for violation of a lav shebekhlalot “refuted”; whether this applies only to the specific lav shebe-khlalot at issue or all such prohibitions
is unclear; Daniel ha-Bavli took the latter view (see below, n1223).
1186
This is Maimonides’ version. Other texts read “teyuvta de-X teyuvta”; see also below, n1262.
1187
See above, n1099.
1188
At least in what appears to be the final draft; see above n1153.
1189
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 229-30 (Neg. 94); see Hilkhot Isurei Mizbeaḥ, chap.
1.
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pawn” (Deut. 24:6), Maimonides attempted to limit the consequences of the Talmud’s
characterization of the verse as a lav shebe-khlalot (bBM 115a-116a).1190
While most cases of “attached” laws constitute a single commandment in his
enumeration, Maimonides explained that Sinaitic tradition, as preserved in rabbinic
literature, may identify such laws as multiple commandments. Principle Nine cites the
two talmudic examples in which “superfluous” words (according to the rabbis) in specific
verses qualify them as this type of lav shebe-khlalot (Lev. 23:14 and Deut. 12:17; see
bKer 4a-5a).1191 Based on the idea that “attached” laws may, in some cases, constitute
distinct commandments, Maimonides asserted that nine idolatrous practices joined by one
do not in Deut. 18:10-11 constitute nine discrete commandments because two are
separated in Lev. 19:26 (“You shall not practice divination and you shall not practice
soothsaying”).1192 An unnamed enumerator, who had counted as a single commandment
the prohibitions in Lev. 21:7 (“They [i.e., the priests] shall not marry a [1] harlot, [2] a
defiled woman [ḥalalah], [3] nor shall they marry one divorced from her husband”), in
Maimonides’ view, failed to understand this. Though Maimonides “excused” this
enumerator for grouping together the first two cases, which share a single do not, he

1190

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 295-96 (Neg. 242). The Mishnah (mBM 9:3) renders
one “guilty” (ḥayav) for each; bBM 115a-116a records a debate as to whether Deut. 24:6 is a lav shebekhlalot. Maimonides claimed that this asks whether the taking of two interdependent utensils receives two
punishments. Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 155 (Prin. Nine), argued
that this shows that Maimonides ignored the presence of punishments when counting commandments; I
think that this just shows the challenge of applying talmudic evidence to Maimonides’ system.
1191
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 40-41 (Prin. Nine); see also there, 246 (Neg. 143).
On the text of this passage, see ed. Heller, 23n91. Maimonides cited the statement that burning was singled
out to impose separate liability for each Sabbath labor (havʿarah le-ḥeileq yaṣat; bSab 70a), but not to
count distinct commandments; ed. Kafiḥ, 330 (Neg. 322). Note that the Commentary considers the first a
lav shebe-khlalot due to an “implied” prohibition; see above, n1158.
1192
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 41 (Prin. Nine). Note that rabbinic literature does not
designate Deut. 18:10-11 or Lev. 21:7 as lav shebe-khlalot verses.
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ultimately rejected this, inasmuch as the Talmud says that one is “guilty” (ḥayav; i.e., for
Maimonides, worthy of punishment) for each (bQid 77a). The unnamed enumerator’s
inclusion of the third case with the others, was, for Maimonides, “absolutely inexcusable”
(lā ʿudhr fīhi al-batta), as it has a “clarifying, stand-alone prohibiting verb” (be-lav bifnei ʿaṣmo mubayyin).1193

Grape Products Prohibited to the Nazirite
A window onto the process of the editing of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is offered by textual
alterations that Maimonides appears to have made regarding the scriptural prohibition of
grape products to the nazirite. Two talmudic claims regarding these grape products are in
tension in Maimonides’ system: One is that “anything obtained from the grapevine, even
seeds or skin, he shall not eat” (Num. 6:4) constitutes a lav shebe-khlalot; the second is
the assertion that consumption of each of grape seeds and skin incurs a distinct
punishment (bNaz 38b). The first claim should have led Maimonides, according to the
rules put forward in Principle Nine, to count just one commandment, but the second, five

1193

Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 41-42 (Prin. Nine). I have not identified the
“offending” enumerator. Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 66n296, and others cited there,
argued that the enumeration in Halakhot Gedolot did not adopt the opposing view, though Maimonides
may have had a different version of this count. Maimonides applied this rule to four prohibitions pertaining
to the High Priest that appear to be a lav shebe-khlalot (“[1] A widow, [2] or a divorcée, [3] or a defiled
woman, [4] or a harlot [ḥalalah zonah] – such he may not marry”; Lev. 21:14). He explained that the latter
three prohibitions are repeated (karrara) for the High Priest in order to teach that their rules are identical
for all priests, and cited the fact that the prohibition against marrying a divorcée is “isolated” (ʾafrada) by
Lev. 21:7 and bQid 77a in order to show that all four are distinct commandments; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Kafiḥ, 255 (Neg. 161); see also 256 (Neg. 162), 262 (Neg. 170), and above, n1120. He offered a similar
argument about Num. 18:20 and Deut. 18:2; there, 260-62 (Neg. 170), and Hilkhot Shemiṭah ve-Yovel,
13:10. I translate Lev. 21:7, 14 according to the rabbinic understanding; ḥalalah zonah could be “one who
is degraded by harlotry,” as NJPS has (on zonah, see bYeb 61b).
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(as consumption of each of the five grape products incurs punishment1194). In the earlier
Commentary on the Mishnah, he integrated both statements by explaining that the lack of
a do not means that “anything obtained from the grapevine” imposes no punishment and
that eating each grape product incurs a distinct punishment.1195 Sefer ha-Miṣvot (as we
know it) also counts these prohibitions as five distinct commandments.1196 However, two
thirteenth-century witnesses to Sefer ha-Miṣvot suggest that Maimonides’ view shifted
over time. Daniel ha-Bavli wrote that in Principle Nine, Maimonides had cited Abaye’s
(!) view that one who eats grape seeds and skins incurs just one punishment (even
though, according to Daniel’s text, Maimonides had listed five commandments in his
enumeration).1197 According to Naḥmanides, his text of Sefer ha-Miṣvot counted the five
grape products as one commandment, while his text of the Mishneh Torah counted them
as five!1198
There is no reason to doubt the veracity of these claims, which come from
opposite ends of the Jewish world. Counting these prohibitions as one commandment is
eminently reasonable; it accords with the enumeration of Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ,1199 and it
would have entailed silent rejection of the Commentary on the Mishnah, which

1194

See above, n1160.
See above, nn1160-1161.
1196
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 280-82 (Neg. 202-206).
1197
MS. Hunt. 185, 149a-149b, 151a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 29-30, 32 (§4).
1198
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 123-24 (Prin. Nine); this apparently
refers to the Short Enumeration, see the notes there. See Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 29 (Heb. pagination),
148 (Neg. §63), 231 (concluding remarks); Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed.
Hellman, 181 (Prin. Nine); and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 8, 24 (introductory pagination).
On Naḥmanides’ text of Principle Nine, see below.
1199
Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 173-76; see there, 75-76.
1195
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Maimonides frequently did.1200 Assuming that these reports are correct, at an earlier stage
of Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s composition, when Maimonides considered these prohibitions to
constitute a single commandment, Principle Nine would have mentioned the verse that
prohibits grape products to a nazirite as one that exemplifies the first type of “attached”
prohibitions (i.e., those that constitute just one commandment). However, once
Maimonides came to see these prohibitions as constituting five distinct commandments,
he would have considered them an example of the second type of “attached” prohibitions.
There are several incongruities in Principle Nine’s treatment of these prohibitions.
Maimonides included “anything obtained from the grapevine” within his listing of the
three archetypal “attached” prohibitions that do not constitute distinct commandments,
but in summarizing this section, he only mentioned the other two.1201 Moreover, Principle
Nine does not include this verse when mentioning the “attached” prohibitions that incur
distinct punishments.1202 And lastly, the editio princeps of Sefer ha-Miṣvot
(Constantinople, 1510) includes the following text: “So too, all of the do nots (lavin)
incumbent on the nazirite that are included in the prohibition (be-isur) ‘anything obtained
from the grapevine’ are a single commandment because they are all a detail (peraṭ), as
explained in the gemara.”1203 In light of the testimony of Daniel ha-Bavli and

See Guttmann, “The Decisions of Maimonides,” 230-31 and passim; Saul Lieberman, Hilkhot
ha-Yerushalmi le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-Rabbanim shebe-America,
1948), 6-13; and, systematically, Aaron Adler, “Ha-ʿEqronot he-Shiṭatiyim ke-Yesod le-‘Ḥazarotav’ shel
ha-Rambam mi-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Mishneh Torah,” (PhD diss., Bar Ilan University, 1986).
1201
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 39-40 (Prin. Nine).
1202
In fact, these are the only “attached” prohibitions treated in the Talmud that go unmentioned.
1203
 ;וכן כל לאוין שבאו באיסור כל היוצא מגפן על הנזיר מצוה אחת מפני שהם כלם פרט כמו שהתבאר בגמראcited in
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 23n78.
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Naḥmanides, it is highly likely that this sentence reflects the original Arabic of an early
version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot.
Maimonides’ discussion of “attached” prohibitions that constitute a single
commandment also includes the following:
And there it is also stated: “Abaye said: ‘one who eats grape seeds is punished
twice, skins twice, seeds and skin thrice.’ And Rava said: ‘violating a lav shebekhlalot does not incur punishment’” (bNaz 38b) – meaning, [God’s] statement
“anything obtained from the grapevine,” which, Abaye claimed, imposes
punishment.1204
Daniel ha-Bavli’s comments show that this text originally reversed the views of Abaye
and Rava, not an unexpected finding, given similar inconsistencies between Sefer haMiṣvot manuscripts.1205 I would suggest that Maimonides added the explanation of this
talmudic quotation (beginning with the word “meaning”) after he had concluded that the
verse pertaining to forbidden grape products contains five commandments. (Without this
claim, this text would mean that these prohibitions constitute a single commandment,
fitting more smoothly with this type of “attached” prohibitions.1206) Imagining the text
without this later addition would make Principle Nine compatible with the view that these
prohibitions constitute a single commandment and would account for the problems

1204
והנאך קיל איצ'א אמר אביי אכל זג לוקה שתים חרצן לוקה שתים זג וחרצן לוקה שלש ורבא אמר אין לוקין על לאו
 ;שבכללות יעני קולה מכל אשר יצא מגפן היין אלד'י יזעם אביי אנה לוקין עליוMaimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 39;

ed. Bloch, 40-41 (Prin. Nine). I would further hypothesize that Maimonides removed this example from his
summary of this discussion.
1205
See above, n1153.
1206
Naḥmanides appears to have quoted such a claim: והאמת שהוא לוקה אחת בין שאכל נא או מבושל או
 ;נא ומבושל אחת בלבד לוקה וכן בנזיר בזג וחרצןSefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 114 (Prin. Nine).
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outlined above.1207 In any event, reevaluating these five prohibitions required
Maimonides to adjust his count to reach the number 613.1208

*

*

*

Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides on Principle Nine
Daniel ha-Bavli attempted to dismantle Principle Nine by pointing out difficulties
in Maimonides’ system and by rereading key talmudic passages. His comments on this
Principle, more copious than on any other, demonstrate that its foundations in rabbinic
literature were fragile. Taken as a whole, they underscore the complexity of Maimonides’
assertion that the Pentateuch and the enumeration of the 613 commandments are directly
linked.
While Maimonides’ presentation influenced Daniel’s thinking,1209 two of Daniel’s
comments suggest that he placed more emphasis on rabbinic literature than did

1207

In the enumeration, Maimonides explained that the fact that these prohibitions incur distinct
punishments signal that they constitute five distinct commandments; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 281-82
(Neg. 206); he cited this factor as determinative in Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:724-25 (§447). In Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
he added: “what you must know is that these nazirite prohibitions combine to create an olive’s bulk [to
incur culpability for consumption]” ( ;וממא יג'ב אן תעלמה אן הד'ה אסורי נזיר מצטרפין כולן לכזיתed. Kafiḥ, 282; see
mNaz 6:1). This somewhat out of place comment may reflect his earlier view that these prohibitions
constitute one commandment, because, elsewhere, he argued that two objects only combine if they
constitute a single category (sheim), and if not, they are two; as mentioned (see above, n1107), sheim and
independent commandment are equivalent in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Compare the following: (1) Sefer ha-Miṣvot,
ed. Kafiḥ, 240 (Neg. 131), claims that meat sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its proper time
(piggul) and meat left over after its proscribed period for eating (notar) do not combine because they are
two sheimot. (2) Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 14:6, claims that all untithed produce (ṭevel), whether the
priestly (terumah) or the levitical tithes (maʿaser) have not been separated, combines because it is one
sheim.
1208
For earlier treatment of the editing of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see above, n1003.
1209
In addition to examples in this paragraph, note the use of k-r-r and taʾkīd; MS. Hunt. 185,
146a, 148a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 25, 28 (§4).
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Maimonides. The first pertains to verses that prohibit farming during the sabbatical year;
according to Maimonides, these contained four commandments: “[1] You shall not sow
your field [2] and you shall not prune your vineyard; [3] you shall not reap … your
harvest [4] and you shall not gather grapes of your vines” (Lev. 25:4-5).1210 In
challenging Maimonides’ enumeration, Daniel cited a rabbinic comment that describes
pruning as “included under” (be-khlal) the act of sowing (insofar as both benefit growth),
and the gathering of grapes as “included under” the act of harvesting (bMQ 3a). In short,
argued Daniel, each pair of actions comprises one “concept” (maʿnā). He claimed that
this talmudic assertion overrides what appears to have been Maimonides’ chief
consideration, the four do nots in these verses.1211 Daniel also challenged Maimonides’
assertion in Principle Nine that nobody would consider the seven-fold repetition of the
prohibition against eating blood to constitute more than one commandment.1212 Citing the
Talmud’s claim that five of these verses ordain five different rules (bKer 4a),1213 Daniel
claimed that since the rabbis “divided” (faṣṣalū) these “repeated” verses into different
“concepts,” they constitute five commandments.1214

1210

See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 287-88 (Neg. 220-23).
MS. Hunt. 185, 148a-148b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 28-29 (§4). He added that Maimonides elsewhere
ignored the distinction between trees and bushes; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 121 (Pos.
120), 284-85 (Neg. 214).
1212
See above, n1101.
1213
E.g., the prohibition against consumption of the blood of non-consecrated animals and the
requirement to cover blood from slaughter with dirt.
1214
MS. Hunt. 185, 148b-149a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 29 (§4). Compare Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leRasag, 2:120. Daniel here also used the root ḍ-m-n as Maimonides did (see above, n1085). See also MS.
Hunt. 185, 154b-155a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 36 (§4).
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Daniel ha-Bavli’s Critique of Principle Nine
Daniel’s criticism of Principle Nine focused primarily on three topics. The first
was the relationship between punishments, enumerated commandments, and legal
categories (sheimot). The second was the meaning of the term lav shebe-khlalot, and its
connection to the enumeration. The third was Maimonides’ portrayals of the puṭita,
nemalah, and ṣirʿah, and his method of explaining the number of commandments
implicitly contained in the prohibitions against their consumption.
(1) Daniel cited talmudic evidence to reject Maimonides’ link between
punishments and the enumeration. In order to refute his claim that the term ʿover
(violates) only denotes repeated verses, Daniel identified instances in which the Talmud
equates the phrase “violates (ʿover) two prohibitions” with the imposition of two
punishments.1215 He also rejected Maimonides’ understanding of the term sheim
(category). Quoting the mishnaic statement that two distinct prohibitions – one forbidding
a priest’s marriage with a divorcée, and the second forbidding his marriage to a woman
released from the obligation to perform levirate marriage (ḥaluṣah) – constitute a single
“sheim” (mMak 3:1), Daniel argued that sheim denotes a “lav,” and that such a sheim
may include multiple distinct prohibitions.1216 Daniel also concluded that violation of a

MS. Hunt. 185, 144a-145b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 24-25 (§4); e.g., bPes 25a; bTem 7b. He cited the
conclusion that although R. Ishmael holds that eating forbidden fats of three different species incurs three
punishments, inadvertent consumption of all three only incurs the obligation to bring a single sacrifice
(bKer 4a) in order to argue that this prohibition constitutes a single commandment, regardless of the
number of punishments; MS. Hunt. 185, 153b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 35 (§4); see also MS. Hunt. 185, 154a;
Maʿaseh Nissim, 36 (§4). Maimonides did not address this because he rejected R. Ishmael’s position; see
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 272 (Neg. 185).
1216
Because the rabbis derive the latter prohibition from the superfluous “from her husband” in
“nor shall they [i.e., the priests] marry one divorced from her husband (Lev. 21:7; see bYeb 24a, bQid
78a); MS. Hunt. 185, 147b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 28 (§4); citing bKer 3a (on this text, see below, n1262).
1215
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lav shebe-khlalot incurs multiple punishments; in so doing, he dismissed one of
Maimonides’ primary strategies for reducing the number of punishments, and,
consequently, the number of commandments.1217 Lastly, Daniel adduced examples that
undercut the punishment-commandment-category matrix established in Principle Nine;
Maimonides’ claim that “the separation commandments follows punishments” was, for
Daniel, “very dubious.”1218
At the end of his comments, Daniel expressed frustration that Maimonides had
highlighted the role of punishments yet failed to “take advantage of ‘categories’
(sheimot).”1219 The rabbinic determination of punishments, he claimed, is similar to the
division of prohibited labors on the Sabbath. Though inadvertent performance of two
prohibited labors incurs two sacrifices (bSab 70a), nobody, wrote Daniel, would count
each labor as a distinct commandment!1220 Reiterating his claim that prohibitions related
to different types of blood constitute unique “concepts,” Daniel asserted that the
enumeration should follow conceptual units rather than punishments.1221
(2) Turning to Maimonides’ understanding of lav shebe-khlalot, Daniel
maintained – against Maimonides’ final view – that Abaye, not Rava, held that the
violation of a lav shebe-khlalot incurs one or no punishment.1222 Noting that Rava is
generally followed over Abaye and that the Talmud (bTem 7b) rejects Abaye’s

MS. Hunt. 185, 149b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30 (§4).
 ;תמיז אלמצות תאבע ללמלקות פהו משכל גדאMS. Hunt. 185, 149a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30 (§4).
1219
 ;ולם יהתבל בשמותMS. Hunt. 185, 154a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 36 (§4). Goldberg transcribed יהתכל.
1220
He argued that one view imposes multiple sets of flagellation for multiple labors (see bSab
154a, bMak 13b), but would not dream of counting each labor as a distinct commandment.
1221
MS. Hunt. 185, 154b-155a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 36-37 (§4). See above, n1214. For the verses, see
above, n1101.
1222
See above, nn1151-1153.
1217
1218
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position,1223 Daniel concluded that Maimonides should have ruled that a lav shebe-khlalot
imposes multiple punishments. Daniel also rejected Maimonides’ claim, found in his
(early) text of Principle Nine, that a nazirite incurs one punishment for eating several
forbidden grape products, on the grounds that it contradicts an explicit mishnah.1224 By
citing a passage – present in one family of manuscripts of bPes 41b1225 – that equates the
punishments for nazirite consumption of grape products with eating the paschal sacrifice,
raw or cooked,1226 Daniel also showed the “error” of claiming that the verses prohibiting
grape products to a nazirite contain many commandments, while the prohibition
pertaining to the paschal sacrifice contains just one.1227
Daniel instead offered an interpretation of lav shebe-khlalot that was similar to
Maimonides’ earlier presentation in the Commentary on the Mishnah; he argued that this
term denotes “non-explicit” (ghayr maṣfūḥ) prohibitions, or those “derived from general
statements.”1228 Daniel denied that the formula “don’t do X or Y” qualifies as a lav

1223

Daniel’s text read teyuvta de-Abaye teyuvta; on this passage, see above, n1186, and below,

1224

This is probably what motivated Maimonides to change his mind; see above, nn1160, 1197,

n1262.
1207.
1225

Despite recent reevaluations of Bavli Pesaḥim manuscripts, all agree on the connections
between those containing this passage; see E.S. Rosenthal, Talmud Bavli Masekhet Pesaḥim: Ketav-Yad
Sason-Lunzer u-Meqomo be-Masoret-ha-Nusaḥ (London: Valmadonna Trust Library, 1984), 5-6, 55-59;
idem, “Toldot ha-Nusaḥ u-Vaʿayot-ʿArikhah be-Ḥeiqer ha-Talmud ha-Bavli,” Tarbiẓ 57, no. 1 (1987): 10;
Stephen G. Wald, Pereq Elu ʿOvrin: Bavli Pesaḥim, Pereq Shlishi, Mahadurah Biqortit ʿim beiʾur maqif
(New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2000), 269-72, 276-83; and Aaron Amit, “Kitvei haYad ha-Teimaniyim be-Mesoret ha-Nusaḥ shel Bavli Pesaḥim,” HUCA 73 (2002): 31-77 (Heb. pagination);
see also idem, “ʿAl Girsat Rabbeinu Ḥananel be-Bavli Pesaḥim 8b,” Sidra 21 (2006): 133-44.
1226
Daniel cited only a few words of his version. MS Munich 6 reads: 'וצריכא דאי תנא פסח התם אמ
רבא לוקה שלש אבל בנזיר דלא קדמיה לאו לכללות אימא מודה ליה לאביי ואי תנא נזיר התם אמ' אביי אין לוקין על לאו שבכללות
דלא קדים לאו לכללות אבל הכא אימא מודה ליה לרבא צריכא. Lunzer-Sassoon preserves a similar reading. Daniel had
 דאי אשמעניןinstead of דאי תנא, like MS Columbia X893 and JTS Rab. 1623/2 (EMC 271).

MS. Hunt. 185, 148a-150b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30-31 (§4).
 ;לא יחצל אלא מן אלכללor:  ;אלחאצל מן אלגמלהMS. Hunt. 185, 151b, 152b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 33, 34
(§4). Thus, “anything obtained from the grapevine” prohibits unmentioned grape products, and “but
roasted over fire” eating the paschal sacrifice in non-roasted form.
1227
1228
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shebe-khlalot, and he held that the Amoraim debated whether or not a verse containing a
lav shebe-khlalot imposes punishments beyond the explicitly named prohibitions.1229 This
perspective led Daniel to reject Maimonides’ claim that a Sinaitic tradition had served to
divide (le-ḥaleq) certain verses and to mandate the consequent imposition of multiple
punishments. Daniel explained that the Talmud assumes that the verses prohibiting the
consumption of animal fats (Lev. 7:23) and grain of the new crop (Lev. 23:14)1230 are
examples of a lav shebe-khlalot, not because each contains a single do not, but because
the prohibited objects in each of the verses share a “name” (ism). Although each of the
prohibitions should incur a distinct punishment by dint of having been mentioned
explicitly in the Pentateuch, Daniel asserted that their grouping under an overarching
“name” means that each constitutes just one commandment. Here too, Daniel emphasized
conceptual relationships over the role of Scripture in the enumeration.1231
(3) Lastly, Daniel ha-Bavli rejected Maimonides’ descriptions of the puṭita,
nemalah, and ṣirʿah, writing that Maimonides’ view “is neither found among any of the
early ones, nor established truthfully.”1232 Daniel asserted that by ignoring the
“unrestricted denotation” (muṭlaq) meanings of these terms and defining them as specific
types of ants and hornets, Maimonides needlessly narrowed the import of the talmudic
discussion.1233

MS. Hunt. 185, 151a-152b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 31-34 (§4).
See bKer 4a-5a.
1231
MS. Hunt. 185, 153a-154a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 34-36 (§4).
1232
 ;והד'א ראי לם יוג'ד לאחד אלמתדקמין ולם ית'בת עלי אלמחאקקהMS. Hunt. 185, 146b-147a; Maʿaseh
Nissim, 27 (§4). Maimonides himself proclaimed the novelty of his interpretation; see above, n1128.
1233
MS. Hunt. 185, 146a-146b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 26 (§4). On muṭlaq in Islamic legal theory, see
Weiss, The Search for God’s Law, 382-88, 434-38; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 46-47; and
Sherman Jackson, “Taqlīd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative
1229
1230
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Daniel’s close reading of Sefer ha-Miṣvot led him to make a surprising polemical
charge. Maimonides had asserted that a prohibition can only apply to something which
already exhibits its characteristic,1234 but Daniel argued that this claim violates the
principle that an already forbidden object cannot be the locus of additional prohibitions
(ein isur ḥal ʿal isur).1235 In what may be his harshest jab, he exclaimed that Maimonides
had, in effect, adopted the view of “some Qaraites” (baʿḍ madhāhib al-qarāyīn), who
claimed that consumption of the jāmūs (water buffalo) is forbidden because it rests in
water, thus exhibiting characteristics of a fish, but lacks the signs of a kosher fish!1236
Daniel therefore accepted the view of earlier jurists, as framed by Maimonides; they had
asserted that repeated verses impose multiple punishments and that “general” (ʿāmma)
verses (e.g., Lev. 11:43; “Anything that swarms”) apply to all relevant creatures.1237
Daniel added that the fact that the Talmud associates Abaye’s comment that fish
“are created from water” (mi-maya ivru; bʿEiruv 27b) with the puṭita, proves that the

Theory: Muṭlaq and ʿĀmm in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb Al-dīn Al-Qarāfī,” Islamic Law and Society 3,
no. 2 (1996): 165-92.
1234
See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 267-68 (Neg. 179). Abraham Maimonides
accepted this as the “apparent” (ẓāhir) meaning of Maimonides’ words; MS. Hunt. 185, 185a; Maʿaseh
Nissim, 40 (§4).
1235
MS. Hunt. 185, 146a-146b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 26 (§4). On this concept, see above, n851.
1236
MS. Hunt. 185, 146b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 27 (§4). I have not identified any Qaraites who
adopted this view; I thank Daniel Frank for his assistance on this matter. The geonim debated how to
classify the jāmūs; Saʿadya considered it a beheimah (“domesticated animal”), but Hayya a ḥayah (“wild
animal”); see Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni, 516 and n7; Abramson, “Sefer haTanjīs (‘ha-Ṣimud’),” 120-21; Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya Gaon le-Bereishit, 48; and Saʿadya ben
Joseph, Ha-Egron, ed. Neḥemya Allony (Jerusalem: Ha-Aqademiyah le-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit, 1969), 311. See
also Mordechai Kislev, “Beḥinat ha-Zihuyim shel ʿAseret Minei Maʿalei-ha-Gerah ha-Ṭehorim ʿal-pi haṬaqsonomiyah,” Sinai 125 (2000): 218-19. For Abraham Maimonides’ view of the jāmūs, see also David,
“Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 18 line 19. For other seemingly incongruous references to Qaraites in the exchange
between Daniel and Abraham, see MS. Hunt. 185, 93b, 211b; Bikrat Avraham, 51 (§38); Maʿaseh Nissim,
105 (§13). I hope to return to this subject.
1237
MS. Hunt. 185, 147b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 28 (§4).
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puṭita is born in water; this was in contradiction with the Maimonidean position recorded
in Daniel’s version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1238

Abraham Maimonides’ Response to Daniel ha-Bavli
Abraham was acutely aware of the significance of Daniel’s challenges and of their
potential impact on Maimonides’ image. He twice apologized for his own lengthy
refutations. The first of these, comprising almost twenty lines in the manuscript, praises
Daniel as, “without doubt, one of the noble ones occupied with the study of the Talmud
and speculative investigation regarding it,”1239 but suggests that Daniel requires
additional “transmission from the sages” (naql min al-ʿulamāʾ)” in order to properly
analyze the “principles of [Maimonides’] speculation.”1240 Abraham wrote that “one who
is unaware [of the truth] may stumble due to the ostensible meaning (ẓawāhīr) of
[Daniel’s] statements,”1241 leading the ignorant to ascribe errors to Maimonides.
Switching to rhyming prose, he cautioned Daniel to take extreme care, as many might
misunderstand Daniel’s words.1242 At the end of this responsum, Abraham defended his
lengthy rebuttal as necessary “in order that these doubts do not cause error,” in
fulfillment of the verse “Remove the obstacle in the way of My people” (Isa. 57:14).1243
As was his wont, Abraham steadfastly defended his father, offering a point-bypoint rebuttal of Daniel’s claims. Like Maimonides, Abraham insisted that the explicit

1238
1239
1240
1241

MS. Hunt. 185, 147a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 27 (§4); see above, n1138.
 ;ואן כנת מן נבלא אלמשתגלין בקראה אלתלמוד ואלנט'ר פיה בלא שךGoldberg read נכלא.
.פי תחציל אצול נט'רה
 ;פיגת'ר בטואהר תלך אלאקאול מן לא יתנבהon the exchange of ʿayn and ghayn in Judeo-Arabic texts,

see Blau, Diqduq ha-ʿAravit-ha-Yehudit, §24.
1242
MS. Hunt. 185, 164a-164b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 48-49 (§4).
1243
 ;חתי לא תגלט הד'ה אלשכוךMS. Hunt. 185, 172b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 59 (§4).
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nature of particular prohibitions overrides other considerations for the purposes of
enumeration. Therefore, he explained, although pruning and gathering grapes could each
be “derived (tastamidd) … through qiyās (here: reasoning),” and although “their concepts
are not distinct” (maʿānīhuma ghayr munfaṣila), explicit mention of each activity serves
as a “specification” (takhṣīṣ),1244 which renders them as two discrete commandments.
Abraham further cited the rule that “a biblical verse does not leave the realm of its
peshaṭ,” along with Principle Two in the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, in order to
argue that repeated prohibitions against the consumption of blood constitute a single
commandment.1245 This, he argued, is because Scripture’s “peshaṭ” governs the
enumeration, and not rabbinic interpretations.
Abraham firmly rejected several of Daniel’s claims. He censured Daniel for
associating Maimonides’ words with Qaraism, asserting that Daniel’s accusation would
lead to “mockery [in the eyes of] one whose mind is too feeble to achieve understanding
of [Maimonides’] words.”1246 These “bad manners” (sūʾ adab), he reminded Daniel, “are
not proper for us; … we are forbidden from responding to such [accusations],” he
wrote.1247 Regarding Daniel’s view of lav shebe-khlalot, Abraham exhorted Daniel to
“know the remote depths of the statements of the masters of knowledge, accurately
render their utterances, toil in examining them, and be assiduous in clarifying their
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On takhṣīṣ, see above, n649.
MS. Hunt. 185, 163b-164a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 47-48 (§4);  באלקיאס... תסתמד. Abraham used the
tenth form of m-d-d throughout; Goldberg repeatedly transcribed the dalet as a reish, reading  תסתמרand
אסמתר, etc. Note that Maimonides did not invoke Principle Two in this regard. Compare Abraham’s
mention of Principle Nine in another context; MS. Hunt. 185, 202a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 95 (§10).
1245

1246
1247

.פלא אעלם פיה מעני סוי אלתהכם במן גבי אלד'הן ען אלוצול לפהם קולה
 ;והד'א סו אדב לא יליק בנא נחן אלמקאבלה עליה לאנה קד נהי ען אלג'ואב עלי מת'להMS. Hunt. 185, 159a;

Maʿaseh Nissim, 42 (§4).
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meaning before hurriedly responding to them.”1248 Similarly, he dismissed Daniel’s
assumption that it is biblically prohibited for a priest to marry a woman who has been
released from the obligation to perform levirate marriage,1249 as well as his claim that this
prohibition, and the prohibition against a priest marrying a divorcée, constitute a single
“category” (sheim). Abraham wrote that this “baseless” challenge was due to the
“paltriness of [Daniel’s] transmission from the sages (ʿulamāʾ).”1250
Elsewhere, Abraham defended his father but nevertheless praised Daniel. He
labeled Daniel’s claim that the term lav shebe-khlalot denotes “non-explicit” prohibitions
as “sound” (ṣaḥīḥ) but incomplete, describing it as one that reflects only part of the
“proper” definition.1251 He similarly labeled Daniel’s proof about the term “violates”
(ʿover), “a good challenge, and only a stubborn person would deny its excellence.
However,” continued Abraham, “despite its excellence, it does not compel doubt about
his Principle,” because Maimonides had cited other evidence.1252 Elsewhere, he admitted
that the “apparent” (ẓāhir) meaning of Maimonides’ words is in contradiction with a
specific rabbinic text; his father’s words, he wrote, require careful consideration.1253 He
also recognized one of Daniel’s readings of Sefer ha-Miṣvot as “a good challenge and an
excellent examination.”1254 Nevertheless, Abraham declared that Maimonides’
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ואעלם בעד גור אקאויל ד'וי אלעלם באלחקיקה ותחריר עבאר[א]תהם ואדאב עלי אלבחת פיהא ואמען פי תצפח
 ;מעאניהא קבל אלתהאפת ללרד עליהאMS. Hunt. 185, 167b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 52 (compare 166a; 50-51; §4).

See Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “Ḥaluṣah de-Rabanan Hi?” in Peraqim be-Hishtalshelut ha-Halakhah
(Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1992), 273-80; and Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. ḥaluṣah le-kohen.
15:374-75.
1250
 ;לקלה נקלך ען אלעלמאMS. Hunt. 185, 162a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 45 (§4).
1251
MS. Hunt. 185, 169a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 55 (§4). See above, n1229.
1252
 ; אעתראצ'א ג'ידא ולא ינכר ג'ודתה אלא מעאנר אלא אנה מע ג'ודתה לא ילזם אצלה ז"ל בה שךMS. Hunt. 185,
155a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 37 (§4). See above, n1215.
1253
MS. Hunt. 185, 162b-163a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 46 (§4); see also above, n1234.
1249

1254

.פיעלם אללה אן ד'לך לאעתראץ' חסן ותנקיב ג'יד
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“speculation (naẓarahu) surpasses this speculation, and his statements are accurate – he
[i.e., Maimonides] is not among those who are ignorant of such things to such an
extant.”1255 Abraham also used the Mishneh Torah, completed after Sefer ha-Miṣvot, to
reread the earlier work, and he conceded that Maimonides’ formulations in Sefer haMiṣvot could indeed “lead to suspicion” (muwahhima).1256
Abraham also invoked formal logic to defend his father. Daniel had cited the
talmudic statement that fish “are created from water” (bʿEiruv 27b) in order to show that
the puṭita is a water insect, but Abraham described this statement as “indesignate”
(muhmal), i.e., it refers to a particular but unspecified class of fish, not all fish. Echoing
his father’s Treatise on Logic, he asserted that “indesignate statements have the force of
the particular (jazāʾ),” and concluded that this talmudic declaration refers only to kosher
fish.1257
For apparently apologetic reasons, Abraham placed little emphasis on
Maimonides’ claim that punishments are linked to the project of enumeration. He wrote
that his father never claimed that one cannot receive multiple punishments for violating a
single commandment; indeed, his father counted as a single commandment the
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.יג'ב אן תעלם אן נט'רה ז"ל פוק הד'א אלנט'ר ואקאוילה מחררה וליס ממן יגפל מת'ל הד'א אלקדר

Goldberg translated this as “unclear” (einah brurah); MS. Hunt. 185, 157b-158b; Maʿaseh
Nissim, 39-41 (§4). Daniel had asserted that traits of forbidden creatures cannot appear at different times
(above, n1235), but Hilkhot Maʿakhalot Asurot, 2:23, reads: הרי שהיתה הבריה משרץ העוף ומשרץ המים ומשרץ
הארץ. In Abraham’s words, these animals possess these attributes in their “nature” (ṭabīʿa).
1257
 ;ואלמהמל קותה קוה אלגזאיMS. Hunt. 185, 160a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 43 (§4); Goldberg made the
connection to the Treatise on Logic. See Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 36 (English pagination):
“If however no sign is attached to the subject of the proposition, as when we say ‘Men are animals’ or
‘Men write’, we call this proposition indesignate. … We regard it always as a particular proposition,
whether affirmative or negative. Thus when we say ‘Men write’, it has for us the same force as if we said
‘Some men write’; and when we say ‘Men do not write’, it is as if we said ‘Not every man writes’.” I do
not know why Abraham’s view of the puṭita ignored Maimonides’ later claims; above, n1138.
1256
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prohibition banning blemished priests from service in the Temple, even though each and
every disqualifying blemish within a group of one hundred forty-four makes a priest
liable for punishment (see Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 8:14). Rather, claimed Abraham,
Maimonides simply meant that a single punishment for numerous acts serves as evidence
that these acts constitute a single commandment. Therefore, one may incur an obligation
to bring two atoning sacrifices for the performance of two forbidden labors on the
Sabbath.1258 While Abraham correctly noted that his father did not explicitly reject the
possibility of incurring multiple punishments for violating a single commandment, his
larger argument ignores many of Maimonides’ claims.1259
In addition to these substantive disagreements, Daniel and Abraham disagreed
about the accurate reading of several texts. Abraham insisted that texts of Sefer ha-Miṣvot
should be corrected to read that it was the amora Rava who held that violation of a lav
shebe-khlalot incurs one, or no, punishment.1260 Abraham conceded uncertainty about the
views adopted by Abaye and Rava, given the conflicting evidence. Still, he wrote, “we
preferred” (rajjaḥnā) the conclusion of Maimonides because it is consistent with various
principles of adjudication.1261 Abraham also disagreed with a number of Daniel’s

MS. Hunt. 185, 171b-172b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 58-59 (§4); see above, n1220. See similarly,
above, n1190.
1259
For various reasons, priestly blemishes and forbidden Sabbath labors were more likely
exceptions to Maimonides’ claim that violating one commandment incurs one punishment; for this and
other criticism of Abraham’s assertions here, see Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:35.
1260
MS. Hunt. 185, 164b-165a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 49 (§4). See above, nn1153, 1197, 1205, 1222.
1261
MS. Hunt. 185, 165a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 50 (§4). Abraham, in fact, showed tremendous
flexibility regarding principles of adjudication, writing that he could defend texts of Sefer ha-Miṣvot that
associate this view with Abaye by suggesting that the rule that Abaye is followed over Rava only in six
cases (see bQid 52b, etc.) does not apply when Abaye’s view is shared by others. He similarly remarked
that one of Daniel’s claims could be dismissed by invoking the principle “one cannot learn from general
rules” (ein lemedin min ha-kelalot; bʿEiruv 29a etc.); MS. Hunt. 185, 169a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 55 (§4). And
he described the rule that the law follows the second version of a statement (lishna batra) as not
1258
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readings of specific sugyot, even preferring a reading that varied from one adopted in
Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1262

Conclusion
From several perspectives, the relationship between the Pentateuch and the
enumeration of the commandments constitutes Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s most sustained concern.
Maimonides’ attempt to provide a systematic and consistent map of this relationship –
perhaps the most daunting and multifaceted problem in this work – forced him to ask
novel questions, to draw on diverse bodies of knowledge, and to struggle with the impact
of numerous talmudic passages. As many scholars have observed, medieval Jews who
accepted the authority of the Talmud were usually hesitant to derive new laws from
readings of Scripture that do not appear in rabbinic literature (though there are some

“systematic” (munaẓẓam; on this principle, see Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 83-85) but subject to
exceptions, just like the rule that the law follows the majority (bBer 9a etc.); MS. Hunt. 185, 167b;
Maʿaseh Nissim, 53 (§4). On principles of adjudication, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 165; idem,
Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 78-87; Tsvi Groner, The Legal Methodology of Hai Gaon (Chico, California:
Scholars Press, 1985), 44-116; Assaf, Tequfat ha-Geonim, 224-45; and Jonathan S. Milgram,
“Methodological Musings on the Study of ‘Kelalei Pesak’: ‘Hilkheta ke-Rav be-issurei ve-khi-Shemuel bedinei,” JJS 61, no. 2 (2010): 278-90.
1262
He asserted, thus, that bTem 7b does not render the view that violating a lav shebe-khlalot
incurs no punishment “fully rejected” (teyuvta de-X teyuvta) but “difficult” (qashya; unlike the reading
offered in Sefer ha-Miṣvot); MS. Hunt. 185, 168b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 53-54 (§4); see above, nn1186, 1223.
Various versions of this text are recorded even in standard printings of the Vilna Talmud. Abraham also
rejected Daniel’s reading of bPes 41b; MS. Hunt. 185, 165b-166b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 51-52 (§4; see above,
n1225); and bKer 3a; MS. Hunt. 185, 150b-151a, 169a-169b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 32, 54-55 (§4); on the latter,
see Yoav Rosenthal, “Masekhet Keritut (Bavli): Le-Ḥeiqer Masoroteha,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University,
2003), 155, 170n123, 171-73, 215, 219-22, 225-30. Abraham further asserted that Daniel’s claims about
when the two explanations (ika de-amrei) of the view that violating a lav shebe-khlalot does not incur
punishment appear in the Talmud is incorrect; MS. Hunt. 185, 165b-167b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 50-52 (§4).
Both Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides used the Arabic word dars to denote “the correct
textual reading”; on this term, see Adam Gacek, The Arabic Manuscript Tradition: A Glossary of Technical
Terms and Bibliography—Supplement (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 23, and idem, The Arabic Manuscript
Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 67. I thank Joseph Lowry for his assistance with this matter. Abraham used
this word in a similar sense in Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 247; and High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 2:319.
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notable exceptions).1263 This makes Maimonides’ willingness to do so – in the context of
enumerating the commandments – all the more striking. In his eyes, it was Scripture that
determined which acts incur punishments and that was the source of the 613 “concepts”
that structure the law.
Diachronic analysis of Maimonides’ writings, and of Sefer ha-Miṣvot in
particular, opens a window onto Maimonides’ thought process and reveals his ongoing,
and occasionally incomplete, editing of this work.1264 The fact that Maimonides
continued to rethink the implications of Principle Nine, in Sefer ha-Miṣvot itself, in his
edits to the Commentary on the Mishnah, and in the Mishneh Torah underscores this
Principle’s importance.
Daniel ha-Bavli’s careful analysis of the Talmud and emphasis on different
concepts in rabbinic literature showed that many of Maimonides’ conclusions in Principle

For treatment and examples, see Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “Midrash ha-Ketuvim be-Tequfah ha-BatarTalmudit,” in Mikhtam le-David: Divrei Torah, Meḥqarim, ve-Ḥinukh le-Zikhro shel ha-Rav Dr. David
Oks, eds. Yiṣḥaq Gilat and Eliezer Stern (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1978), 210-31, repr. in
idem, Peraqim be-Hishtalshelut ha-Halakhah, 374-93; Gerald Blidstein, “Who is Not a Jew? – The
Medieval Discussion,” Israel Law Review 11, no. 3 (1976): 379, 383, 384n56, 385, 389n74; Abraham
Grossman, Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), 87, 155-57, 188, 324, 430-31,
434n92; idem, “Ziqatah shel Yahadut Ashkenaz el Ereṣ-Yisrael,” Shalem 3 (1981): 70-73; David Berger,
“Ḥeiqer Rabbanut Ashkenaz ha-Qedumah,” Tarbiẓ 53, no. 3 (1984): 484n6; idem, “Jacob Katz on Jews and
Christians in the Middle Ages,” in The Pride of Jacob: Essays on Jacob Katz and His Work, ed. Jay M.
Harris (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 49n21; Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 65, 69; Oded
Irshai, “Mumar ke-Yoresh be-Teshuvot ha-Geonim – Yesodoteha shel Pesiqah u-Maqbiloteha be-Mishpaṭ
ha-Nokhri,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 442-43; Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:32633; Jeffrey R. Woolf, “Between Law and Society: Mahariq’s Responsum on the ‘Ways of the Gentiles’
(ḥuqqot ha-‘akkum),” AJS Review 25, no. 1 (2000): 51n30; Michael Rosensweig, “Reflections on the
Conceptual Approach to Talmud Torah,” in לומדות: The Conceptual Approach to Jewish Learning, ed.
Yosef Blau (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2006), 228n55; Ḥayim Sabbato, “Ha-Im Yesh Reshut liDrosh Derashot Hilkhatiyot min ha-Pesuqim af she-lo Neʾemru be-Talmud?” in Teshurah le-ʿAmos, 499519; and Soloveitchik, Collected Essays, 2:85-103. Two examples that I do not believe have been
mentioned are Abraham ben David of Posquières, Temim Deiʿim (Jerusalem, 2006), 68 (Heb. pagination;
§237; note the comments of Nissim of Gerona in bShev 7b [Alfasi pagination]); and Lewin, Oṣar haGeonim, Masekhet ʿEiruvin, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 27 (§70).
1264
In addition to the discussions of the definition of lav shebe-khlalot and the grape products
prohibited to the nazirite, see above, nn1093, 1099, 1125, 1134, 1137-1138.
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Nine were vulnerable to criticism. Daniel missed few opportunities to attack Maimonides
or to challenge many of Maimonides’ innovative claims. Even Abraham Maimonides,
who valiantly defended his father, accepted the strength of many of Daniel’s arguments.
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Conclusion
Rabbanite jurists in the Islamic world were deeply concerned with questions of
legal theory. This interest was manifest in their ongoing discussions of supra-legal topics
and in the complexity and nuance of the ideas that they developed in order to place the
talmudic legal system on firm theoretical footing. Maimonides may well have been the
Rabbanite author most concerned with problems of jurisprudence; more of his systematic
writings on legal theory survive than those of any other Rabbanite.1265 His statements of
Rabbanite legal theory, particularly in his Commentary on the Mishnah and Sefer haMiṣvot, reframed age-old questions and posed new ones. Earlier Rabbanites who
embraced the idea that God gave precisely 613 commandments had used this number to
consider abstract legal problems, but Maimonides, by contrast, wedded legal theory to the
enumeration of the commandments, and was thus able to bring together a variety of
epistemological, interpretive, and conceptual themes under a single rubric.
This dissertation seeks, in part, to widen the scope of scholarly understanding of
Rabbanite legal theory by subjecting Rabbanite ideas to synchronic and diachronic
analysis. In so doing, it aims to demonstrate that Rabbanite writings were engaged in a
multilayered conversation, one that involved their talmudic and post-talmudic past,
Rabbanite and non-Rabbanite coreligionists, and elements of the Islamic intellectual
tradition that were most helpful for the explanation and reconsideration of their own
tradition. Foremost among these were uṣūl al-fiqh, qurʾānic exegesis, logic, and
linguistics. By investigating, interpreting, and manipulating talmudic concepts,

Compare above, n378. Future research, particularly on David ben Saʿadya al-Ger’s Kitāb alḤāwī, will likely fill in the picture of pre-Maimonidean jurisprudence.
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Rabbanites articulated legal theory that addressed the needs of medieval Judaism and its
ideologues. Though cloaked in rabbinic garb, this project was innovative and profoundly
contemporary.
Rabbanite jurisprudential writings underscore the dynamism of medieval Jewish
thought and its ability to embrace new challenges. Theoretical reflections on the
enumeration of the 613 commandments were largely detached from those aspects of
Jewish law that Jews encountered on a regular basis; in my view, it was precisely this
distance from the practical elements of law that made this project attractive to jurists as
an entry point into meta-halakhic thinking.
Rabbanite jurists elaborated their legal theory in the shadow of Islamic thought.
Its most extreme manifestation is discussed in Chapter One, where I suggest that the
geonic presentation of revelation, particularly that of Saʿadya, was informed by broader
societal emphasis on prophetic authority. But the primary reason for Rabbanite adaptation
of modes of thinking and terminology from contemporaneous Muslim legal texts may
have been quite simple: the concepts and terms current in wider society were helpful in
the articulation of Rabbanite ideas. The commonalities between Rabbanite Judaism and
Sunni Islam in this period facilitated Rabbanite engagement with ideas in contemporary
Islamic law, allowing them to apply these ideas to their own legal system. These common
features included the affirmation of a two-fold written and oral revelation; the assumed
closure of foundational legal canons (i.e., the Talmud and ḥadīth); and the emphases on
the study and performance of religious law as a crucial vehicle of religious expression.
Post-talmudic legal theory was not limited to the topics addressed in this study
and it did not conclude in the mid-thirteenth century, the chronological endpoint of this
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dissertation, which focuses on specific aspects of Rabbanite legal theory within a discrete
timeframe. Certain themes discussed in the Fourteen Principles in Maimonides’ Sefer haMiṣvot have been excluded from this project and demand further scholarly attention.
These include the eternality of the law (Principle Three) and the interpretation of legal
language (Principles Five and Eight, and, to a certain extent, Four and Six). It would be
fruitful to examine these and other subjects in conjunction with Qaraite legal thought in
order to examine the ways that Jews of different orientations in the Islamic world
developed systematic legal theory.
Jewish jurists outside of the Islamic context also continued to explore legal
theory. The writings of later Spaniards such as Naḥmanides and his school were the first
to engage Maimonides’ jurisprudential legacy beyond the Arabic-speaking world.1266 The
medieval legacy as a whole loomed large in the theoretical writings of rabbis Nafatli Zvi
Yehuda Berlin (1816-93) and Zadok ha-Kohen of Lublin (1823-1900), among many
others.1267

The approaches of Naḥmanides’ successors, other than Nissim of Girona, remain
understudied; for now, see the discussion in Gerald Blidstein, “Lo Masran ha-Katuv ele le-Ḥakhamim: leGilgulei ha-Niv u-Mashmaʿuto,” Netuʿim 14 (2006): 9-29; and David Weiss Halivni, “On Man’s Role in
Revelation,” in From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism, 2:45-47.
1267
On Berlin, see Yaakov Elman, “History, Halakhah, and Revelation: The Historicization of the
Sinaitic Revelation in ‘Ha’ameq Davar’,” in Mishpetei Shalom: A Jubilee Volume in Honor of Rabbi Saul
(Shalom) Berman, ed. Yamin Levy (Riverdale: Yeshivat Chovevei Torah Rabbinical School), 157-78. On
Zadok ha-Kohen, see Amira Liwer, “Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Khitvei R. Zadoq ha-Kohen mi-Lublin,” (PhD
diss., Hebrew University, 2006). On modern Zionist thinkers, see Alexander Kaye, “The Legal
Philosophies of Religious Zionism 1937-1967,” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012).
1266
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Rabbanite Legal Theory in the Shadow of Islamic Thought
S.D. Goitein’s characterization of the relationship between Judaism and Islam as
marked by “creative symbiosis” is one of the most enduring scholarly notions pertaining
to Jewish life in the Islamic world. Goitein borrowed the term “symbiosis” from the field
of biology, defining it, in an early article, as “the coexistence of two organs in such a way
as to benefit from the proximity, in the sense that one party benefits while the other does
not suffer.”1268 In his magnum opus, A Mediterranean Society, Goitein applied the idea of
symbiosis primarily to economic and other modes of interpersonal relations between
Jews and Muslims.1269 But in his earlier, programmatic work, Jews and Arabs, Goitein
took a broader view, speaking of “the influence of Islam on Jewish thought” and “the
impact of Muhammadan spiritual life on the Jewish mind,” and asserting that “traditional
Judaism received its final shape under Muslim-Arab influence.”1270 While Goitein
himself paid considerably less attention to the “spiritual” aspects of symbiosis, Steven
Wasserstrom has noted that scholars have tended to view the impact of symbiosis most
acutely in the “efflorescence of freethinking, … interreligious tolerance, [and] the

1268
S.D. Goitein, “ʿAl Simbiozah Yehudit-Aravit,” Molad 2, no. 11 (1949): 259; translation in
Gideon Libson, “Hidden Worlds and Open Shutters: S.D. Goitein Between Judaism and Islam,” in The
Jewish Past Revisited: Reflections on Modern Jewish Historians, eds. David N. Myers and David B.
Ruderman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 175.
1269
S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 2:28999; see also 5:9, speaking of “physical and educational symbiosis.”
1270
Goitein, Jews and Arabs, 11, 140 (see similarly, 127), 10. He emphasized that “the first and
most basic aspect of Jewish-Arab symbiosis is the simple fact that the great majority of the Jews …
adopted the Arabic language” (131), and described Maimonides’ Guide as “a great monument of JewishArab symbiosis, not merely because it is written in Arabic by an original Jewish thinker and was studied by
Arabs, but because it developed and conveyed to large sections of the Jewish people ideas which had long
occupied the Arab mind” (146-47). For treatment of Goitein’s approach, see Wasserstrom, Between Muslim
and Jew, 3-12, 222-32; idem, “Recent Works on the ‘Creative Symbiosis’ of Judaism and Islam,” Religious
Studies Review 16, no. 1 (1990): 43-47; and Libson, “Hidden Worlds and Open Shutters,” 175-79.
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enlightened character of … interfaith relations.” Reflecting something of a scholarly
consensus, Wasserstrom explained that “it is difficult to avoid positing Jewish-Muslim
philosophy as the intellectual end product of symbiosis.”1271 In a somewhat broader
formulation, Sarah Stroumsa concluded that:
In the sciences, in philosophy, and in theology, the Jews became an integral part
of Islamic culture. Judeo-Arabic works on these subjects are often
indistinguishable from Muslim or Christian compositions on the same topics. …
The prevalent Arabic terminology, the topoi, the concerns and the mentality of
their non-Jewish neighbors, all became internalized by Jewish authors.1272
While many of the philosophers and theologians who penned exemplary texts of
symbiosis in the realm of Jewish thought were also prominent jurists (e.g., Saʿadya,
Maimonides, and Abraham Maimonides, to name figures central to this dissertation), the
field of law was obviously less inter-confessional than that of philosophy. As a result,
“symbiosis” of Jews and Muslims within the field of law necessarily had different
contours.1273 Nevertheless, as David Friedenreich noted, significant elements of non-

Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and Jew, 225; see there, 225-35; and idem, “The Islamic Social
and Cultural Context,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, eds. Daniel Frank and Oliver Leaman (New York:
Routledge, 2005), 73-75. On the encounter of Judaism and Sufism as the “epitome” of symbiosis, see RussFishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt, 32-39. Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and
Jew, 9, pointedly rejected Goitein’s rosy picture of symbiosis: “Symbiosis, as a thinly happy and
monovalently positive benefit, did not happen. Its complexity is reduced to mere benefit only by a
tendentious dilution” (emphasis in original).
1272
Stroumsa, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam, 218.
1273
See David Friedenreich, “Fusion Cooking in an Islamic Milieu: Jewish and Christian Jurists
on Food Associated with Foreigners,” in Beyond Religious Borders, 145. On this issue, scholars have
generally distinguished between the formative and post-formative periods of Islamic law. Concerning the
“origin and early develop of Islam in its Jewish environment,” Goitein described “Islam [as] an Arab recast
of Israel’s religion”; Jews and Arabs, 11. For his more measured statements, see idem, “The Interplay of
Jewish and Islamic Laws,” in Jewish Law in Legal History and the Modern World, ed. Bernard Jackson
(Leiden: Brill, 1980), 65-66; and idem, “The Birth Hour of Islamic Law,” in Studies in Islamic History and
Institutions (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 132-34. Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law, 7, affirmed this chronological
distinction: “During … the first phase, … it was generally Judaism that influenced Islam. Only in the
second phases, during the 8th and 9th centuries, did the nature of the contacts between the two religions
begin to change.” For criticism of this approach, see Lena Salaymeh, “‘Comparing’ Jewish and Islamic
Legal Traditions: Between Disciplinarity and Critical Historical Jurisprudence,” Critical Analysis of Law 2,
1271
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Muslim legal works, such as the structure of legal compendia, the selection of topics, and
certain modes of legal reasoning,1274 would have been recognizable to Muslim jurists and
unique to the Islamic world. Yet Friedenreich added that while scholars might label such
ideas “Islamic” – due to their origin (when this can be ascertained), or because they are
predominantly found in works of Islamic (in the narrow sense) law, or because they
flourished in the Islamic world – non-Muslim jurists would never have considered these
elements to be “Islamic” in nature.1275 I would suggest that Jewish jurists engaged the
“terminology, topoi, and concerns” in question because they were the predominant means
of legal expression; these constituted central issues that any jurist was expected to
address, especially in light of the overlap in the content of legal traditions that was a
legacy of late antiquity.
Reading Jewish law in concert with other legal traditions is a scholarly imperative
when seeking to understand Jewish law in the Islamic world. Ultimately, scholars must
balance the contradictory truths contained in the aphorisms “people resemble their
contemporaries more than their own ancestors” (al-nās bi-azmānihim ashbah minhum biaslāfihim) and “they are more like their ancestors than their contemporaries” (annahum
ashbah bi-abāʾihim minhum bi-azmānihim).1276

no. 1 (2015): 158. For application of “symbiosis” to later legal history, see Goitein, “The Interplay of
Jewish and Islamic Laws,” 62. For a review of scholarship in Goitein’s wake, see Phillip AckermanLieberman, The Business of Identity: Jews, Muslims, and Economic Life in Medieval Egypt (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2014), 4-41. On comparative Jewish and Islamic law, see above, n8.
1274
Friedenreich, “Fusion Cooking in an Islamic Milieu,” 148-50, 155-56.
1275
Ibid, 160.
1276
On these maxims, see S.D. Goitein, “Changes in the Middle East (950-1150) as Illustrated by
the Documents of the Cairo Geniza,” Islamic Civilization, 950-1150, ed. D.S. Richards (Oxford: Cassirer,
1973), 19; and Ackerman-Lieberman, The Business of Identity, 332n79.
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Elkin, Zeʾev. “Ha-Nusaḥ ha-Qaraʾi shel ‘Sefer ha-Ḥiluqim bein benei Ereẓ-Yisrael levnei Bavel’.” Tarbiẓ 66, no. 1 (1997): 101-111.
Elman, Yaakov. “Acculturation to Elite Persian Norms and Modes of Thought in the
Babylonian Jewish Community of Late Antiquity.” In Netiʿot Ledavid: Jubilee
Volume for David Weiss Halivni, edited by Yaakov Elman, Ephraim Bezalel
Halivni, and Zvi Arie Steinfeld, 31-56. Jerusalem: Orḥot Press, 2004.
———. “History, Halakhah, and Revelation: The Historicization of the Sinaitic
Revelation in ‘Ha’ameq Davar’.” In Mishpetei Shalom: A Jubilee Volume in
Honor of Rabbi Saul (Shalom) Berman, edited by Yamin Levy, 157-178.
Riverdale: Yeshivat Chovevei Torah Rabbinical School, 2010.
———. “Le-Toldot ha-Ribbuy be-Talmud ha-Bavli.” Proceedings of the World
Congress of Jewish Studies Division C: Thought and Literature, Volume I:
Rabbinic and Talmudic Literature (1993): 87-94.
———. “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance
in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition.” In The Cambridge Companion to the
Talmud and Rabbinic Literature, edited by Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and
Martin S. Jaffee, 165-197. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
———. “Rava as Mara de-Atra in Maḥoza.” Ḥakira 11 (2011): 59-85.
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———. Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot: ve-ʿIman Teshuvot, Pesaqim u-Feirushim
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Grossman, Abraham. Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz ha-Rishonim. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981.
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Yosef Yahalom and Joshua Blau. Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2002.
———. Taḥkemoni: o, Maḥberot Heman ha-Ezraḥi, edited by Yosef Yahalom and
Naoya Katsumata. Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2010.
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Frankel. Jerusalem: Hoṣaʾat Shabbtai Frankel, 1975-2007.

399

———. Sefer Mishneh Torah: Yoṣei la-Or Paʿam Rishonah ʿal-pi Kitvei Yad Teiman ʿim
Peirush Maqif, 23 vols., edited by Yosef Kafiḥ. Qiryat Ono: Mekhon Mishnat haRambam, 1983-1997.
———. Shemonah Peraqim: ve-hem Haqdamat ha-Rambam le-Feirusho le-Masekhet
Avot, translated by Michael Schwarz, introduction by Sara Klein-Braslavy.
Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2011.
———. Teshuvot ha-Rambam, edited by A.H. Freimann. Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim,
1934.
———. Teshuvot ha-Rambam: Yoṣaʾot le-Or be-Paʿam ha-Rishonah be-Meqoran haʿAravi, 4 vols., translated and edited by Joshua Blau. Jerusalem: Meqiṣei
Nirdamim, 1957-1961.
———. The Code of Maimonides, 13 vols. Various translators. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1949-.
———. The Guide of the Perplexed, translated by Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963.
———. Tiqun Mishnah: Hashlamot ve-Tiqunim le-Feirush ha-Mishnah Mahadurat haRav Y. Kafiḥ ʿal pi ʿeṣem ketav yad qodsho shel ha-Rambam, Masekhtot ʿAvodah
Zarah ve-Horayot, edited and translated by Isaac Shailat. Jerusalem: Maʿaliyot,
2002.
Maimonides, Obadiah ben Abraham. The Treatise of the Pool (al-Maqāla al-Ḥawḍiyya),
edited by Paul Fenton. London: Octagon Press, 1981.
Makdisi, George. “The Juridical Theology of Shâfiʿî: Origins and Significance of Uṣûl
al-Fiqh.” Studia Islamica 59 (1984): 5-47.
———. The Rise of Colleges: Institutions and Learning in Islam and the West.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981.
Malakhi ben Jacob ha-Kohen. Sefer Yad Malakhi. 3 vols. Livorno, 1767.
Malter, Henry. Saadia Gaon, his Life and Works. Philadelphia: JPS, 1921.
———. “Saadia Studies.” JQR 3, no. 4 (1913): 487-509.
Mandelbaum, Bernard, ed. Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana: ʿal pi Ketav Yad Oqsford ve-Shinuyei
Nusḥaʾot mi-Kol Kitvei ha-Yad u-Seridei ha-Genizah. 2 vols. New York: Beit haMidrash le-Rabbanim sheba-America, 1987.
Mann, Jacob. “A Fihrist of Saʿadya’s Works.” JQR 11, no. 4 (1921): 423-428.
———. “A Tract by an Early Karaite Settler in Jerusalem.” JQR 12, no. 3 (1922): 257298.
———. “Gaonic Studies I, The Last Period of the Sura Gaonate.” In Hebrew Union
College Jubilee Volume, 1875-1925, edited by David Philipson, 223-262.
Cincinnati, 1925.
———. “Genizah Studies.” The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures
46, no. 4 (1930): 266-283.
———. Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature. 2 vols. Cincinnati: Hebrew
Union College Press, 1931; Philadelphia: JPS, 1935.
400

———. “The Responsa of the Babylonian Geonim as a Source of Jewish History.” JQR
7, no. 1 (1916-1917): 457-490; 8, no. 3 (1917-1918): 339-366; 9, no. 1-2 (19181919): 139-179; 10, no. 1 (1919-1920): 121-151; 10, no. 2-3 (1919-1920): 309365; 11, no. 4 (1920-1921): 433-471.
Maori, Yeshayahu. “ʿAl Mashmaʿut ha-Munaḥ ‘Divrei Yaḥid’ be-Feirush Rabiʿ laMiqra: le-Yaḥaso shel Rabiʿ le-Midreshei Ḥazal.” Shenaton le-Ḥeiqer ha-Miqra
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———. “Mischna Avot: Frühe Weisheitsschrift, pharisäisches Erbe oder spätrabbinische
Bildung?” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 96, no. 3-4 (2005):
243-258.
———. “‘Moses received Torah…’ (M. Avot 1,1): Rabbinic Conceptions of
Revelation.” In Jerusalem, Alexandria, Rome: Studies in Ancient Cultural
Interaction in Honour of A. Hilhorst, edited by Florentino García Martínez and
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———. Minhag Ashkenaz ha-Qadmon: Ḥeiqer ve-ʿIyun. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1992.
———. “Teshuvat ha-Rambam be-ʿInyan Birkat Betulim.” Maimonidean Studies 2
(1992): 9-15.
419

———. “Teshuvat ha-Rambam be-ʿInyan ha-Haflagah be-Naharot be-Shabbat.”
Maimonidean Studies 1 (1990): 23-42.
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